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Securing our Survival
(SOS)
The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention
The Updated Model Convention on the Prohibition of the
Development, Testing, Production, Stockpiling, Transfer, Use and
Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons and on their Elimination
With updated Commentary and Responses
Foreword by Judge C.G. Weeramantry
Securing our Survival
(SOS)
The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention
Including the Updated Model Convention on the Prohibition of the
Development, Testing, Production, Stockpiling, Transfer, Use and
Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons and on their Elimination
With Commentary and Responses
Foreword by Judge C.G. Weeramantry
International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms
International Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation
International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War
The model Nuclear Weapons Convention (NWC) presented in this book is a draft model treaty for the
phased elimination of nuclear weapons. It is a revised edition of the model NWC submitted by Costa Rica
to the United Nations Secretary-General as a discussion draft, UN Doc. A/C.1/52/7 (1997), and contained
in Security and Survival: The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention (1999).
The book and the model NWC are non-governmental initiatives to further the goal of nuclear weapons
abolition. The commentary and revisions to the model reflect governmental and non-governmental
responses to the 1997 and 1999 versions.
Drafters and consultants to the model NWC are listed on the inside back cover. Sections 1,3, and 4 were
authored by the International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms, the International Network
of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation, and International Physicians for the Prevention of
Nuclear War, except where otherwise noted. The authors and contributors do not necessarily share all of
the views presented here.
Principal authors: Merav Datan, Felicity Hill, Jürgen Scheffran, Alyn Ware
Contributing authors: Martin Kalinowski, Victor Sidel
Editors: Tilman Ruff, John Loretz,
Design and production: Natalie Lowrey
Copyright © 2007
International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War
International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms
International Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation
ISBN: 978-0-646-47379-6
Any section of this book may be copied and distributed provided all relevant sources are cited. Please
send copies of publications containing reprinted material to IPPNW ad the address below. Responses are
welcome and may also be sent to the address below.
IPPNW
Ref. NWC
727 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02139 USA
Telephone: + 1 617-868-5050
Fax: + 1 617-868-2560
Email: ippnwbos@ippnw.org
We gratefully acknowledge the Poola Foundation (Tom Kantor Fund), the New Zealand Disarmament
Education United Nations Implementation Fund and the Samuel Rubin Foundation for supporting the
publication of this book.
Where the mind is without fear and the head is held high;
Where knowledge is free;
Where the world has not been broken up into fragments by narrow domestic walls;
Where words come out from the depth of truth;
Where tireless striving stretches its arms towards perfection;
Where the clear stream of reason has not lost its way into the dreary desert sand of dead habit;
Where the mind is led forward into ever-widening thought and action
Into that heaven of freedom, let my country awake.
- Rabindranath Tagore
CONTENTS
Foreword: Judge C.G. Weeramantry i
Preface to the second edition ii
Section 1: Reversing Proliferation: The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention 1
What Is a Nuclear Weapons Convention? 2
Who Makes a Nuclear Weapons Convention? 9
When Will a Nuclear Weapons Convention Be Possible? 11
Why Pursue a Nuclear Weapons Convention? 13
How to Achieve a Nuclear Weapons Convention? 22
Where Does the Nuclear Weapons Convention Fit? 29
Section 2: Model Nuclear Weapons Convention 41
Model Nuclear Weapons Convention Summary 44
Model Nuclear Weapons Convention Text 46
Purposes and Uses of the Model Nuclear Weapons Convention 48
Section 3. Comments and Critical Questions 107
Enforcement 109
Security 112
Breakout 114
Deterrence 116
Terrorism 118
Health and Environment 120
De-Alerting 127
Cleanup, Disposition and Safe Disarmament 130
Nuclear Energy 133
Knowledge and Reversibility 139
Conversion 142
Research 147
Economic Aspects 150
Section 4. Verification 157
Principles and Demands of Verification 158
Political Mechanisms of Verification: Building on Existing Regimes 163
Means and Procedures for NWC Verification 167
Elements of NWC Verification 170
Security Context and Challenges of NWC Verification 174
Documents 179
Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention
I
Foreword: Judge C.G. Weeramantry
The start of a new century invariably gives rise to universal attention to ways in which that century can be
made a century of peace. So it was at the dawn of the 20
th
Century when the great Peace Conference of 1899
sought ways and means of achieving a century of peace. Those hopes were shattered and that century became
the bloodiest century in human history.
Yet humanity survived to see the dawn of another century - the first century in human history that has
dawned with humanity having the power to destroy itself. That century instead of commencing on a note of
peace, has commenced on a note of war. We will not be granted another century to put our house in order. We
must do so in this century or all civilizations will perish. That is the urgency of the situation. But the urgency
is not perceived as widely as it should be. Certainly it has not seeped through into the corridors of power.
The principal agenda item in our program for human survival in this 21
st
Century must be the elimination
of nuclear weapons, especially because resort to the nuclear weapon is becoming easier year by year, month
by month and even day by day.
Why? There are at least fifteen different reasons why the dangers of the use of nuclear weapons by some
one, some where, some time is growing ever closer. Increasing knowledge of how to construct a bomb,
increasing availability of the materials with which to make a bomb, increasing numbers of people desperate
enough to use the bomb, lack of inventories of fissile materials, lack of the international resolve to ban the
bomb and banish it from the arsenals of the world – all these are factors which bring the use of the bomb ever
closer to us.
Our desired objective of eliminating the bomb can only be achieved through a Convention subscribed
to by all powers, nuclears and non-nuclears alike. The nuclears cannot expect the non-nuclears to pursue a
policy of abstention while they themselves desire to keep the bomb as a means of projecting their power and
might.
The bomb clearly stands categorically condemned by upwards of a dozen basic principles of international
law. The International Court of Justice in its Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of
Nuclear Weapons (1996) has unanimously held that “there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and
bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective
international control.”
There cannot be one law for the nuclear powers and another law for the non-nuclear powers. By the very
principles of law and justice which the powerful states seek to uphold, the nuclear weapon in any shape or
form stands condemned. No policeman can enforce a law which the policeman himself openly violates.
At the close of the 19
th
Century all the members of the world community agreed that even weapons such
as the dum dum bullet which caused unnecessary suffering through its explosion when entering the victim’s
body were too cruel to be used in warfare among civilised nations. Civilised nations today still adhere to these
principles and will considerately refrain from using dum dum bullets, but will argue that the nuclear weapon
does not fall into this category.
A school child of ten would see the absurdity of such a position but the great powers seem to have
difficulty in perceiving this absurdity. A visitor from outer space might well wonder on what logical basis we
construct the national policies on which the future of humanity depends.
Here shortly stated are the reasons why a case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention is unassailable. It is an
SOS for the whole human race. Nations large and small, rich and poor, strong and weak must all agree on the
unassailable logic of the proposition that such a Convention is perhaps the most imperative need of our time.
I have much pleasure in providing a Foreword to a book that highlights the need for such a Convention.
All creatures great and small are instilled with the instinct for self preservation and when life threatening
dangers loom large and clear within their horizon they act instinctively to avoid it. Humans alone seem to
react differently despite this threat to their very survival which every child can perceive.
With the nuclear weapons in front of us we only face destruction and annihilation. With the nuclear weapon
behind us we can all look forward to reaching that sunlit plateau of peace and justice, which has been the
dream of humanity throughout the ages.
Can there be any choice?
II
Preface to the second edition
Ten years ago, experts in law, science, disarmament and negotiation came together
to draft a Model Nuclear Weapons Convention (Model NWC), a draft treaty for
the abolition of nuclear weapons. Their purpose was to determine whether nuclear
disarmament is possible by exploring the legal, technical and political requirements
for a nuclear-weapons-free world, taking into consideration the security concerns of all
States and of humanity as a whole.
The process was difficult as drafters placed themselves in the positions of
governments, including those of nuclear weapon possessing states, with diverse
security needs, asymmetrical nuclear forces and policies, and varying reasons for
resisting nuclear disarmament negotiations. After a year of consultations, however,
the drafting process was successful in April 1997 and the resulting Model NWC was
submitted to the United Nations in the same year and circulated as UN Document
A/C.1/52/7.
This was followed in 1999 by the publication of Security and Survival: The Case for
a Nuclear Weapons Convention, which explained the rationale for a Nuclear Weapons
Convention (NWC), explored the political processes for achieving an NWC (or a
framework of agreements which would achieve the same results as an NWC), and
discussed critical questions about issues such as verification, enforcement, international
security, alternatives to nuclear deterrence, terrorism, health and environment, nuclear
energy, nuclear knowledge, reversibility, conversion, research and more.
Security and Survival also outlined some of the political and technical developments
that make the achievement of a nuclear-weapons-free world (NWFW) a realizable
goal. The Model NWC contained in Security and Survival and updated in this revised
publication offers a vision of what such a nuclear-weapons-free world might look like
and a plan for how to get there.
The Model NWC was well received by many governments, academics, scientists,
civil society leaders and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Initiatives by
some nuclear weapons possessing states, including studies on verification and new
restrictions on specific fuel chain elements, reflected ideas raised in the Model NWC.
On the other hand, key nuclear weapons possessing states continue to resist the idea of
commencing negotiations that would lead to the conclusion of an NWC.
Major political and social changes since 1997 have affected the broader context in
which nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament are addressed. These include the
rising spectre of nuclear terrorism, nuclear testing by India, Pakistan and North Korea;
concern about nuclear fuel chain capabilities of some non-nuclear weapon states; the
debate on missile defence; and the expansion of the nuclear doctrines of some of the
nuclear-weapons-possessing states to include the threat or use of nuclear weapons in
response to suspected development of weapons of mass destruction and even against
threats from conventional weapons.
Former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan has also noted the growing divide
between those countries advocating non-proliferation first and those advocating
disarmament first.
This makes revisiting the idea of an NWC timely as it combines both non-
proliferation and disarmament measures. Can the NWC approach provide a way to
bridge the divide and stimulate constructive steps towards nuclear abolition? Can an
NWC address the new security concerns relating to nuclear proliferation risks? Is
achievement of an NWC a political possibility or a utopian ideal?
The Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission chaired by Hans Blix regretted
the “serious malaise” in disarmament diplomacy in recent years, and recommended
that nuclear weapons be outlawed, identifying the key as “ dispel[ing] the perception
that outlawing nuclear weapons is a utopian goal. A nuclear disarmament treaty
Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention
III
is achievable and can be reached through careful, sensible and practical measures.
Benchmarks should be set; definitions agreed; timetables drawn up and agreed upon;
and transparency requirements agreed. Disarmament work should be set in motion.”
1
With this updated discussion on The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention,
experts have returned, and been joined by others, to reconsider the NWC in the
changed global security dynamic. These experts address the variety of concerns and
questions about the call for nuclear abolition under an NWC. They argue that in a
world experiencing diverse security challenges and terrorism, nuclear abolition is both
an attractive and logical means of reducing and eliminating the dangers of accidents,
sabotage or deliberate use of a nuclear device.
They reaffirm the perspective of Nobel Peace Laureates in their 2006 Rome
Declaration: “The failure to work for nuclear weapons abolition shreds the fabric
of cooperative security. A world with nuclear haves and have-nots is fragmented
and unstable, a fact underscored by the current threats of proliferation. In such an
environment cooperation fails. Thus, nations are unable to address effectively the
real threats of poverty, environmental degradation and nuclear catastrophe. Nuclear
weapons are more of a problem than any problem they seek to solve.”
2
This book might not answer all relevant questions sufficiently. There may be
different perspectives on the degree of verification required for nuclear abolition,
or a change in the actual timeframes for the achievement of specific disarmament
steps, or differing opinions on the security value of alternatives to nuclear deterrence,
or continuing concerns about nuclear technologies used to generate electricity, or a
requirement for improved methods of fissile materials disposal.
The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention indicates, however, that incomplete
answers to these questions should not prevent negotiations on an NWC from starting
and being brought to a conclusion in the near future. In fact, many of the answers will
evolve from the negotiations themselves.
Although the international security environment today might appear discouraging
for nuclear disarmament advocates, the Nuclear Weapons Convention — as a goal, as
an indication of change in global security policy, and as a catalyst to further change
— does not depend exclusively on arms control and short-term incremental progress.
Efforts toward next steps in arms control and non-proliferation are conceivably
blocked precisely because they have avoided the fundamental underlying dilemma
posed by nuclear weapons: whether a global security regime based on threats of mass
destruction, either evenly or unevenly distributed, is consistent with global survival and
sustainability.
Since the Model Nuclear Weapons Convention was published, the debate has grown
richer, broader in scope, and more nuanced in content. But debate is not enough. The
International Court of Justice in 1996 affirmed, “there exists an obligation to pursue
in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations on nuclear disarmament in all its
aspects under strict and effective international control.”
The drafters of the Model NWC and the authors of this publication hope that by
demonstrating the feasibility of nuclear disarmament, governments will be inspired
to take on the difficult but necessary and increasingly urgent task of commencing,
and bringing to a conclusion, nuclear disarmament negotiations. Not to do so will
condemn the world to an inevitable catastrophe – unimaginable in scale. To do so will
be enacting the will of the democratic majority, building a more cooperative and safe
world, and indeed Securing our Survival.
_____________________________________________________________
1
Weapon of Mass Destruction Commission, final report, Weapons of Terror: Freeing the World of Nuclear, Biological
and Chemical Arms (Stockholm: June 1, 2006), p. 109.
2
The Rome Declaration of Nobel Peace Laureates, 19 November 2006. http://www.pugwash.org/reports/nw/
Nobelrome_declaration.pdf
The Evolution of a Nuclear Weapons Convention:
Treaty, Custom, Norm
The abolition of nuclear weapons will be achieved through a combination of negotiated agreements,
national implementation measures, and the comprehensive rejection of nuclear weapons
by civil society, political institutions and legal authorities. Thus a Nuclear Weapons Convention
will be a combination of treaty, custom and norm.
WhatTreaty
Negotiated agreement
Custom
Accepted practice
Norm
Universal principle
Who
GovernmentsCivil SocietyHumanity
When
LegislationTransformationEvolution
Why
Legal obligations
Human Rights
State Security
Human Security
Survival
Morality
How
Incremental steps
Package of agreements
Comprehensive treaty
Arms control
Non-acquisition
No use of threat of use
Regulation/cooperation
Disarmament
Abolition
Section
Reversing Proliferation:
The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention
1
A boy contemplates a display of missiles and other
weaponry at Beijing military museum, China
Photo: AP/Greg Baker
2
What Is a Nuclear Weapons Convention?
Convention • n. 1. a way in which something is usually done. Socially acceptable
behaviour.
2. an agreement between States.
Concise Oxford Dictionary, 10
th
Edition
In the strict sense, a Nuclear Weapons Convention (NWC) is an international treaty.
An NWC will be similar to other international treaties banning entire categories
of weapons such as the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Biological Weapons
Convention and the Mine Ban Treaty.
Treaties to prohibit weapons such as these are achieved through negotiations among
states. Generally they prohibit all aspects of development and testing of the weapons,
and include measures to prevent the spread of technology and know-how in relation to
the weapons, as well as a framework for their elimination. The most effective treaties
include a system for verifying that no state party is cheating, including declarations,
inspections and technical monitoring, as well as a mechanism for the settlement of
disputes and enforcement in case of
serious violations.
No such treaty exists yet for
nuclear weapons, but demands for
one have increased in recent years,
as have more general demands for
complete nuclear disarmament.
In a wider sense, the Nuclear
Weapons Convention would be the
implementation of the universal
societal condemnation of nuclear
weapons and the codification of the
customary norm against all weapons
of mass destruction. It would thus
include additional measures at
national and international levels
further delegitimising nuclear
weapons and supporting their
prohibition. Its impact will therefore
be deeper and more far-reaching
than the treaty language itself. Such
a treaty would reflect a broader social
and political movement away from reliance on weapons of mass destruction and
military solutions to conflicts, and would incorporate the desires and responsibilities
of global civil society for a less militarized world. It would realise a profound and near
universal desire to finally free this and future generations, human civilisation and the
biosphere from the unprecedented and unparalleled threat of nuclear annihilation.
Generated by technical, legal and political experts, the model NWC in this book
provides ideas and text suggestions for the usual components of a comprehensive
treaty, based largely on the Chemical Weapons Convention, the first treaty completely
banning an entire category of weapons and providing for their verified elimination.
It is also based on the International Atomic Energy Agency and UN Security Council
procedures aimed at preventing nuclear proliferation. Like other treaty texts, it
provides rule-framed expectations of conduct. It also provides schedules for progress,
and crystallizes the elements of the problem and solution by defining them precisely.
World Court Project
advocates display boxes
before the World Court
which contains millions
of Declarations of Public
Conscience submitted to
the court as evidence of
global opposition to
nclear weapons.
Photo: Ann Marie Janson/
World Court Project
Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention
3
Section 1
Responses to the Model NWC - A Summary
Since the release of the Model NWC and the publication of Security and Survival:
The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention in 1997, there has been considerable
discussion in informal and formal settings relating to ideas from these documents. The
Nuclear Weapons Convention Monitor, in its issues published in 2000, 2001 and 2002,
documented and included some of this ongoing discussion. It has focused primarily on
the “how” of nuclear disarmament as distinct from the more familiar political debate on
“when” it should occur and “whether” it is possible. The main clusters of response to
the Model NWC are summarised below. In-depth discussion of many of these issues is
covered in the Critical Questions section.
Long-term goal and next steps: To what extent can a focus on the long-term goal
of nuclear disarmament facilitate the identification and promotion of next feasible steps
and help generate political impetus towards achieving such steps? Is it possibly too
ambitious and counter-productive to discuss the end goal? There is no single answer to
these questions. However, a preliminary conclusion appears to be that selective use of
the NWC as both a tool to assist short-term goals and as a concrete long-term political
objective can be genuinely helpful. In addition, States’ approach to the NWC can serve
as a litmus test of commitment to nuclear disarmament.
Low levels vs. zero: There are varying opinions on the relative difficulty of
verifying low levels of nuclear weapons as opposed to verifying maintenance of a
nuclear-weapons-free world, and thus on whether it is realistic to aim for zero nuclear
weapons. It might be possible for a NWS to hide a few nuclear warheads and thus
possibly remain a single nuclear-armed State in an otherwise nuclear-weapons-free
world. In order to prevent such a monopoly, the most that might be possible is to get
down to low levels of nuclear weapons. On the other hand, maintaining a nuclear-
weapon-free world once the infrastructure had been verifiably dismantled and the
nuclear option renounced would be more straightforward than verifying a precise low
number of nuclear weapons and trying to enact an absolute policy of no-use and no-
threat-of-use while some States still possessed nuclear weapons ‘just in case’. If we
consider the two options, it appears that, we would be better off with a comprehensive
abolition regime which would include robust mechanisms for verifying, enforcing
and dealing with breakout and for ensuring security without nuclear weapons, than
we would be with a partial disarmament regime with less capability to detect secret
stockpiles and programmes. There will be risks in implementing a NWC, however,
these risks pale in comparison to the risks posed by maintaining the status quo or
in only developing partial disarmament measures leaving the nuclear option still a
possibility.
Compliance: The model NWC envisions a security regime based on incentives
for compliance, good faith, institutionalising the norm of non-possession of nuclear
weapons, reducing or eliminating the technical possibility for maintaining or
developing nuclear weapons, and establishing mechanisms for addressing non-
compliance. The Model NWC includes some procedures similar to the Chemical
Weapons Convention, but places more emphasis on individual responsibility, and gives
the Agency greater powers to impose preliminary sanctions (on technical assistance) in
the case of non-compliance before having to refer the situation to the Security Council.
Some commentators feel that the Security Council is so biased with respect to nuclear
disarmament that situations of non-compliance should not be referred there at all but
should instead be referred to the UN General Assembly. Others feel that the NWS
4
would have to be committed to nuclear disarmament for a NWC to be negotiated and
so would by then also be committed to its successful enforcement. There has also been
a suggestion of a reform to the Security Council to ensure that any one NWS could not
block compliance action regarding its own nuclear weapons programmes.
Verification and the political process: There has been considerable discussion
on verification for a nuclear weapons free world since the Model NWC was released.
Some, but not all of this has been stimulated by ideas and proposals in the Model
NWC. The UK Study on verification of warhead destruction mirrors the warhead
identification proposals in the Model NWC. The IAEA additional protocol is similar
to the nuclear facilities verification in the Model NWC, although the Model NWC
goes further in prohibiting plutonium reprocessing and uranium enriching beyond
20%. There has also been considerable discussion on the emerging technologies for
verification, the role of societal verification and political considerations on the degree
of certainty required in verification.
The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) political process benefited from the
extensive research on verification and development of verification mechanisms that
preceded conclusion of negotiations. The NWC, or a future regime for complete
nuclear disarmament, would benefit from similar research and development if it helps
establish the feasibility of verifiable disarmament. The more complex and unresolved
political and technical questions, however, makes this somewhat more elusive for some
than the case of the CTBT. Which facilities should be subject to verification? Facilities
that can produce nuclear materials, facilities that can handle or fabricate nuclear
components or can transform components back into fissile materials, civil facilities
that can fabricate fissile materials into fuel, and assembly/disassembly facilities where
components are assembled or disassembled into warheads. On the other hand there
are emerging technologies and other developments that make verification much easier.
These include increased access to satellite photography, better radioisotope monitoring,
a wider range of portal control systems and sampling techniques, real-time or near-
real time data communications systems and a greater capacity for monitoring by non-
governmental entities.
Costs of disarmament: Discussion of the economic aspects of nuclear
disarmament is included in the Critical Questions section. What has not yet been done,
but has been recommended, is a full analysis and projection of the costs involved in
nuclear abolition and disarmament. It is estimated that such costs will be very high,
particularly due to the difficulties in decommissioning and cleaning up nuclear fuel
facilities. The costs involved in verification will be hard to assess as these could vary
greatly depending on the technologies chosen, degree of certainty required and extent
to which existing verification mechanisms can be used. Thus the actual costs for
disarmament will revolve as much around political considerations as around baseline
costs for specific tasks.
The issue of how to convert nuclear weapons industries to nuclear disarmament
industries is covered in the Critical Questions. One of the interesting areas of
discussion on this issue has been the degree to which the new wave of ethical investing
can be applied to nuclear weapons industries in order to help facilitate their conversion
prior to the negotiation of a nuclear weapons convention or whether such economic
aspects should be left in the hands of the States parties to an eventual NWC.
Non-participants: There has been considerable discussion over entry-into-force
requirements and whether it would be possible for a NWC to be concluded if one or
more key States remained outside. The likelihood of states that would not participate in
Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention
5
Section 1
the political negotiation process or the implementation of a future NWC raises critical
questions about its feasibility. At the same time, this question is not unique to the
NWC. The NPT was concluded without two NWS (China and France joined later) and
four nuclear weapons capable states are outside of the Non-Proliferation Treaty regime
today. Focusing on a nuclear disarmament regime might, in fact, serve to draw in these
states or, at a minimum, help identify the source of resistance. Thus there has been the
suggestion that early commencement of negotiations on a NWC, even without key
States in the beginning, would help create the political environment that would move
the remaining States to join.
Carrots and sticks: The approach in the model NWC places an emphasis on
compliance over coercive enforcement. There are disincentives for non-compliance
including targeted sanctions, but it would be useful to explore and develop incentives
in order to make compliance more attractive than non-compliance. More carrots, as
well as carrot cake, are needed. The NPT provides for assistance in nuclear energy for
States parties and some have proposed something similar for the NWC. However, the
proliferation and environmental risks of nuclear energy led the drafters of the Model
NWC to instead propose assistance in alternative energy for States parties that choose
to phase out or not to develop nuclear energy. There are no specific incentives for
other States parties to the NWC, other than assurances that they will not be attacked
by nuclear weapons and that the world will be a safer place with nuclear abolition.
Perhaps other incentives would be desirable.
Societal verification and whistleblowers: The role of societal verification and
protection for whistle blowers has been a recurrent theme. Some see this as the most
promising approach to nuclear disarmament, including education aimed at increasing
scientific and societal responsibility. The capacity for non-governmental access to
verification data such as satellite imagery has markedly increased. It was an NGO for
example, which alerted the world to the fact that China was preparing for a nuclear test
in 1995, using commercially available satellite photography. The potential for whistle
blowing by those involved in the nuclear weapons industry is event greater. It has been
often noted, however, that in totalitarian regimes whistle blowers run high risk of being
punished unless there is a way to report violations anonymously. In the US, protections
have been moderately effective – returning whistleblowers to the job and awarding
damages. However in Israel and Russia, whistleblowers such as Mordechai Vanunu
and Alexandr Nikitin have been imprisoned with long sentences. An open question
is whether the provisions in the Model NWC are sufficient to both encourage whistle
blowing if there are State violations of the treaty, and to protect such whistleblowers
from such a State.
A problem with relying too heavily on societal verification is that it increases
the openness of the nuclear complex, which could contribute to proliferation of
information with respect to nuclear weapons if it is not properly protected.
Implementing agencies: The Model NWC proposes the establishment of an
Agency to implement and verify the treaty. However, there is a question as to whether a
new body should be established for a NWC or whether we should build on the existing
implementation and verification bodies including the IAEA, CTBT and OPCW.
Resolution of this question will depend on political structures that emerge, expertise
and experience of existing agencies, bureaucratic culture, concerns about duplicating
efforts, and the ability to modify or separate the mission(s) of existing bodies.
6
Nuclear Weapons Convention - the Treaty
A Nuclear Weapons Convention
Defines terms in precise detail to establish thresholds and limits
Creates rules so that everybody understands what is prohibited and what is allowed
Establishes a schedule for sequenced steps to remove the threat of nuclear weapons by
separating them from delivery vehicles and dismantling them
Outlines patterns of behaviour and cooperation that will enhance the communication and
transparency in implementing the treaty, and those that will arouse suspicion and possible
sanctions
Establishes verification measures to make sure that no one is cheating.
While some governments believe that calls for a comprehensive NWC are premature,
the majority of states in the world want negotiations to commence. In December 2006
at the UN General Assembly, 125 governments - including nuclear-armed China,
India and Pakistan - called upon states to immediately fulfil their nuclear disarmament
obligations “by commencing multilateral negotiations leading to an early conclusion
of a nuclear weapons convention prohibiting the development, production, testing,
deployment, stockpiling, transfer, threat or use of nuclear weapons and providing for
their elimination”.
1
International desire and demand for the elimination of nuclear weapons have existed
since nuclear weapons themselves were first invented. The very first resolution of the
United Nations called unanimously for “the elimination from national armaments of
atomic weapons...”
4
– a call repeated in various forms nearly every year since then.
Not only do a majority of states want a Nuclear Weapons Convention; opinion polls
demonstrate that a majority of citizens – including those of nuclear weapon states
– also overwhelmingly want a nuclear-weapon-free future.
Convention as a Customary Norm
“The solution arrived at in this [International Court of Justice] Advisory
Opinion frankly states the legal reality, while faithfully expressing and
reflecting the hope, shared by all, peoples and States alike, that nuclear
disarmament will always remain the ultimate goal of all action in the field of
nuclear weapons, that the goal is no longer utopian and that it is the duty of all
to seek to attain it more actively than ever... Indeed, it is not unreasonable to
think that, considering the at least formal unanimity in this field, this twofold
obligation to negotiate in good faith and achieve the desired result has now, 50
years on, acquired a customary character.”
Declaration by Judge Mohammed Bedjaoui, former President of the
International Court of Justice, appended to the Advisory Opinion on the
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, delivered on 8 July 1996.
[Original: French]
Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention
7
Section 1
There are few recent polls on nuclear weapons but those conducted towards the end of the
nineties were strongly supportive of negotiation of a Nuclear Weapons Convention. It is possible
that opinion may have moved during the last decade but unlikely to have changed dramatically.
69 % of Europeans polled in France, Italy, Germany, Belgium Turkey and the UK want Europe to
be nuclear free. (StratCom for Greenpeace International in March 2006)
87% of those polled in the US agreed, “the US should negotiate an agreement to eliminate
nuclear weapons.” (Lake, Sosin and Snell, 1997)
87% of those polled in Britain agreed, “Britain should help to negotiate a global treaty to prohibit
and eliminate nuclear weapons.” (Gallup, 1997)
61% of Russians polled agreed that “All nuclear weapons states should eliminate such weapons.”
(Vox Populi commissioned by TASS, 1998)
62% of Indians polled agreed that “India should not produce nuclear bombs.” (The Hindu,1998)
78% of Japanese polled agreed that “all nuclear weapons states should eliminate such weapons.”
(Asahi Shimbun, 1998)
92% of Australians polled agreed that “Australia should help negotiate a global treaty to ban and
destroy all nuclear weapons.” (Roy Morgan Research Co., 1998)
92% of Norwegians polled agreed that “Norway should work actively for a ban on nuclear
weapons.” (4 fakta A/S, 1998)
72% of Belgians polled said they were for “an initiative on behalf of Belgium with an aim of
initiating talks concerning a treaty for the abolition of nuclear weapons.” (Market Response, 1998)
93% of Canadians polled agreed that “Canada should take a leadership role in global negotiations
to eliminate nuclear weapons” (Angus Reid Group, 1998)
International law comes from both treaties and customary norms, a combination of
generally accepted practice and a sense of legal obligation. When a custom becomes
self-evident and requires formalization, treaties are negotiated to codify the practice
into law. The Mine Ban Treaty the Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical
Weapons Convention are treaties that have prohibited landmines, biological weapons
and chemical weapons, respectively.
They evolved from already existing customary prohibitions against weapons
that are indiscriminate, that use poison, that cause unnecessary suffering, that do
not differentiate between combatants and non-combatants, or that are used in a
disproportionate manner that violates neutral territory or causes long-term and severe
damage to the environment. Weapons of mass destruction, by their very nature, violate
most or all of these principles, many of which were codified in the Geneva and Hague
Conventions and the Statute for an International Criminal Court.
8
The highest court in the world on general questions of international law is the
International Court of Justice (ICJ), the judicial branch of the UN. In 1996, the ICJ
applied international law to nuclear weapons, and determined unanimously that the
threat or use of nuclear weapons is generally illegal, and that there exists an obligation
to pursue and conclude negotiations leading to complete nuclear disarmament.
The court was unanimous on whether governments were obliged to negotiate on
disarmament. The judges found that not only were states required by law to begin
negotiations, but also they must achieve complete nuclear disarmament through good-
faith negotiation. The court insisted that talking is not enough; the talk must lead
to achievement of a successful outcome. The Court also de-linked the obligation to
achieve nuclear disarmament from the objective of comprehensive demilitarization
(general and complete disarmament) and insisted that the obligation to achieve nuclear
disarmament applies universally to all states, not just the states with nuclear weapons.
In arriving at this conclusion, the ICJ took into consideration the “dictates of
public conscience”, which are mentioned in the Hague and Geneva Conventions as
an important indication of the legal status of particular weapons systems for which
there is no specific treaty prohibition. The ICJ was presented with nearly four million
“declarations of public conscience” in 40 different languages, along with evidence of
widespread public condemnation of nuclear weapons.
Therefore, an NWC should be seen not as creating an entirely new prohibition
against nuclear weapons, but as implementing an existing prohibition against weapons
of mass destruction. Nuclear weapons are by far the most potent and destructive
weapons ever invented; qualitatively and quantitatively in a different league from any
other weapon. They alone have the potential to exterminate much of humanity and
other species, end human civilisation, severely damage most ecosystems and disrupt
the climate, and cause global radioactive contamination over vast timeframes. Their
singular potency accounts in part for the reluctance of the states that possess them to
give them up. It also makes their abolition within a proximate timeframe all the more
urgent.
An argument has been made that other weapons of mass destruction, namely
biological and chemical weapons, continue to pose current and potential future threats,
despite treaties for their prohibition. The Biological Weapons Convention and the
Chemical Weapons Convention have not yet brought about the complete elimination of
these weapons. But a primary reason offered as justification for the pursuit of biological
and chemical weapons by less developed states is that they are the “poor man’s nuclear
weapons”—that is, they are needed to counter the threat of nuclear weapons. Similarly,
the nuclear weapon states justify their retention of nuclear weapons, in part, as
deterrents to the use of biological and chemical weapons and as potentially necessary
to eliminate such threats pre-emptively. Thus, although the legal regimes addressing
nuclear, biological and chemical weapons are distinct, the elimination of nuclear
weapons will assist in the elimination of all indiscriminate weapons.
There are valid technical and political reasons for maintaining distinct disarmament
and verification mechanisms for the various weapons of mass destruction. But without
a general recognition that reliance on the capacity for mass destruction feeds on itself,
decision-makers will continue to rely on—and further develop—these capabilities.
The technical difficulties in verifying an NWC are not impediments to the
negotiation of such a treaty. The technology to produce chemical weapons is far
simpler, more diverse, more widely available, and more difficult to differentiate from
legitimate industrial, agricultural, pharmaceutical and other purposes than is the
technology required to produce nuclear weapons. The Chemical Weapons Convention
includes verification and inspection provisions that are relatively intrusive but widely
accepted. On the other hand, the Biological Weapons Convention has been severely
constrained by the lack of effective verification and enforcement provisions. The efforts
“A nuclear disarmament
treaty is achievable and
can be reached through
careful, sensible and
practical measures.
Benchmarks should
be set; definitions
agreed; timetables
drawn up and agreed
upon; and transparency
requirements agreed.
Disarmament work
should be set in
motion.”
- Weapons of Terror,
Weapons of Mass
Destruction
Commission, 2006
Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention
9
Section 1
of many countries over many years to strengthen the BWC through an additional
protocol containing verification provisions modelled on those of the CWC have been
frustrated by the unwillingness of the current US administration to accept any such
provisions. In addition to the technical challenges, major deficiencies in the regimes
for minimising chemical and especially biological weapons threats, both current and
future, relate to political will.
The Biological and Chemical Weapons Conventions are key milestones for the
global community, establishing a clear prohibition of these weapons, spelling out
specific obligations to eliminate stockpiles, and providing means to respond to non-
compliance. The mechanisms are not flawless, but they impose severe practical and
political restraints on the development and use of such weapons, and markedly advance
the base from which further efforts to eliminate chemical and biological weapon threats
can proceed. A Nuclear Weapons Convention would complete the triad; both building
on and reinforcing these other efforts.
More than a Treaty
Not all who support the goal of nuclear abolition see a Nuclear Weapons Convention
as the best approach. Some have argued that focusing on a “single” treaty is unrealistic
and counterproductive, because it could detract from important intermediate measures
that governments are more likely to undertake.
According to this logic, entire sections of our model treaty might be redundant if
nuclear weapon states unilaterally disarm, or fast-track the process by negotiating
among themselves. This may turn sections of the comprehensive treaty into separate
instruments, to become part of the “framework encompassing a mutually reinforcing
set of instruments”, a formulation that some governments prefer to use when describing
the nuclear disarmament process.
In the long run it would not matter whether elimination of nuclear weapons were
achieved through one treaty or through a framework of treaties, provided that the
framework approach did not result in inordinate delay. For a Nuclear Weapons
Convention to be meaningful and effective, more than a signed agreement among
governments will be necessary. Political will and social motivation on several fronts are
required, and are an integral part of the treaty development process—lobbying efforts,
drafting, negotiations and implementation.
The policies, institutions and scientific and technical expertise that support today’s
nuclear establishment must be reoriented towards nuclear disarmament, and this
reversal of direction is the “singular” concept embodied in the Nuclear Weapons
Convention. Such a reversal will entail deeper and further reaching developments than
a mere treaty, but the treaty process can be used to identify, guide and reinforce these
developments towards the singular purpose of complete nuclear disarmament.
Who Makes a Nuclear Weapons Convention?
In the traditional conception of treaty making, governments are the principal actors
and the only ones required to consent to the final agreement. Civil society, relevant
business actors, international organisations and parliaments, however, are recognized
as playing an increasingly important role in the negotiations, treaty acceptance
and implementation.
3
The Mine Ban Treaty is often cited as a good example of
governments working with civil society, medical professionals and military experts
to affect the pace and content of this international law. To enhance ongoing and
comprehensive implementation, governmental agreement and action should be based
on the will, consent and involvement of citizens and its own democratic institutions.
“Nuclear Weapons
must be banned and
elimintated just as
chemical and biological
weapons have been
prohibited ... through the
adoption ... as a first step
of a universal and legally
binding multilateral
agreement committing
all states to the complete
eliminations of nuclear
weapons”
- Mulhammad Siddique Khan
Kanju, Minister for Foreign
Affairs, Pakistan, July 1998
10
This means that coordinated, voluntary governmental and non-governmental
participation is needed. In the case of a Nuclear Weapons Convention, this includes
broad expertise and participation of scientific, professional, academic, religious,
environmental and social justice organizations, as well as other social groups, at the
international, national and local levels.
While not discounting these meaningful contributions to negotiations and to the
context in which they occur, the genuine commitment of governments is essential
in treaty negotiation - particularly with regard to an NWC - because the question
of enforcement is uniquely difficult. Government bodies, whether trans-national or
national, are responsible for existing and future implementation mechanisms. They also
manage the agencies with the relevant expertise or information to improve and refine
such mechanisms when necessary.
The question of who will participate in the creation and implementation of a nuclear
weapons convention must take into account more than six decades of determined
and increasingly widespread pursuit of nuclear weapons capability. Enormous
resources and effort have gone into creating the current stockpiles, and their ongoing
development. Reversing this legacy is complicated, dangerous work, in large part
because the materials involved are uniquely hazardous and will outlast anyone
living today by many millennia. The US Department of Energy has observed that the
environmental problems alone necessitate efforts at least on the scale of the Manhattan
Project.
4
Barring a massive global catastrophe, such as nuclear war, countless future
generations have no choice but to continue to safeguard toxic and radioactive nuclear
materials.
While abolishing nuclear materials is not feasible, abolishing nuclear weapons
is—plausibly within the span of a generation. But however long it takes, uncertainty
about the political and social context of future nuclear disarmament work cannot be
allowed to prevent progress on the legal and technological foundations. The abolition
of nuclear weapons is essential for human survival
and sustainability; the current situation of planned
indefinite retention of their nuclear weapons by the
NWS feeds proliferation, is unstable, dangerous
and unsustainable. Allowing this status quo to
remain, and likely deteriorate further, is simply not
a realistic option. Future generations may well need
to complete and continue many of the complex tasks
related to eliminating nuclear weapons, but there
is no more important test for current leaders than
ensuring that substantial progress has been made in a
coherent and convincing framework towards nuclear
weapons abolition, and that available, practical steps
are not held hostage to uncertainties about the future.
The precise roles of the institutions—the
government agencies and the private, commercial,
and academic bodies—and individuals who will
undertake the work of undoing the cumulative
burden of the nuclear age will turn on the particular
combination of implementation and verification mechanisms chosen. Decisions about
what is to be stored, in what forms and for how long will determine the appropriate
combination of reliance on environmental cues, surveillance, inspections and other
verification mechanisms. Fortunately, the necessary capabilities already exist.
Implementation of these capabilities, however, simply requires continued development
and greater production of the relevant technologies in the context of a comprehensive
plan.
The knowledge, experience and technology accumulated to date are enough to lay
the cornerstone of a regime for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. The
The UN general Assembly
Photo: UN/DPI
by Eskinder Debebe
Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention
11
Section 1
work must begin now, with a view to the future roles of policymakers, scientists and
engineers. The call for a Nuclear Weapons Convention is not an attempt to predict the
future; rather it is a reflection of the desire for a better future.
Implementing the NWC would not necessarily require creation of entirely new
mechanisms but, more likely, definition and coordination of functions on the part of
existing and emerging agencies as well as effective application of current technology.
The experience of many international and inter-governmental bodies will be useful,
whether their current functions remain or change. These include:
• UN General Assembly to both broker agreements and maintain norms;
• UN Security Council to report violations and agree to enforcement action such
as the arrangements established under Resolution 1540;
• International Atomic Energy Agency to verify safeguarded global
disarmament;
• Conference on Disarmament as the world’s primary multilateral disarmament
treaty negotiating forum;
• Nuclear-weapon-free zone implementation agencies to ensure regions remain
nuclear-weapon-free;
• Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization to detect any nuclear testing;
• International Court of Justice as the world’s highest legal authority, to
adjudicate on matters flowing from its 1996 Advisory Opinion, and other legal
matters including disputes;
• Regional organisations such as the EU to address particular regional issues;
• US and Russian disarmament and non-proliferation bodies, including:
o Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) and Intermediate Range
o Nuclear Force (INF) Treaty verification mechanisms
o Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR)
o Material Protection Control and Accounting (MPC&A)
o Nuclear Cities Initiative.
When Will a Nuclear Weapons Convention
Be Possible?
Because the precise nature of future political actors, structures and events is unknown,
some claim that the call for a Nuclear Weapons Convention is premature. This view
confuses prediction of the future political context for disarmament with preparation for
a better future. The call for an NWC and the drafting of a Model NWC are efforts to
address the urgency of formulating and advancing coherent and consistent approaches
to the creation of a true nuclear disarmament regime.
There are many perspectives on when an NWC could or should be concluded.
Of the states that possess nuclear weapons, the US, France, Russia and Israel
have all argued that even thinking about an NWC is premature. They are unwilling
to provide a time reference for beginning, let alone concluding, an NWC. Rather,
they are planning on retaining their nuclear weapons arsenals indefinitely into the
future and are undertaking replacement and modernisation programs to ensure such
long-term possession. The governments of India, China and Pakistan support the
commencement of negotiations on an NWC, but have taken no action to advance
such negotiations. The UK has accepted the end goal of an NWC and has undertaken
some preparatory work on verification requirements
5
, but asserts that it is too early to
commence any negotiations and is also planning nuclear weapons renewal programs
“Nuclear weapons
corrode and democratic
rule.”
- Avner Cohen,
Israel and the Bomb
12
to maintain its arsenal into the indefinite future. The Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea has strenuously emphasised that discussions and negotiations in the Conference
on Disarmament (CD) should be oriented towards achieving complete nuclear
disarmament.
As already noted, there are 125 governments that want negotiations for an NWC
to commence immediately.
6
In August 1996, the Non-Aligned Movement submitted a
proposal to the Conference on Disarmament calling for the entry into force of an NWC
by the year 2010 and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons by the year 2020.
7
The mayors of over 1500 cities in 120 countries support this vision for 2020.
8
The Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons determined
that, while there is a need to further develop verification and weapons dismantlement
systems, there are no real technological barriers to concluding an agreement or
agreements to prohibit and eliminate nuclear weapons. The determining factor is not
technology but political will.
9
When there is sufficient political will, negotiations can be concluded fairly quickly.
The Partial Test Ban Treaty, for example, was concluded in ten days of determined
negotiating in July 1963, after years of deadlock.
10
Agreements on timeframes
for negotiations can sometimes help facilitate the process. The parties to the Non-
Proliferation Treaty in 1995 agreed to a timeframe for concluding negotiations on a
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty no later than 1996. Such a timeframe helped to bring
the negotiations to a conclusion.
11
The Mine Ban Treaty was also concluded very quickly – within a year of the start
of negotiations. On the other hand the Chemical Weapons Convention took ten years
to negotiate as a high level of verification and confidence building was required in
the treaty. It is likely that, unless there are major improvements in relevant global and
regional security systems, nuclear weapon states will require a high level of confidence
that there will be universal compliance with an NWC for them to agree to eliminate
their nuclear weapons. Moreover, the nuclear systems of the different states are
asymmetrical, requiring fairly complicated disarmament formulas. Thus, negotiations
are likely to be complex and may take some time.
The approach adopted in the Model Nuclear Weapons Convention does not
suggest a time bound framework for conclusion of the negotiations or fixed
dates for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. Rather it calls for the
immediate commencement of negotiations that ought to be concluded in a quick but
comprehensive manner.
At some stage a timeframe for elimination of nuclear weapons will have to be
negotiated. The Model NWC suggests that this be done in phases, from entry into
force. This is somewhat like incorporating a step-by-step process into a comprehensive
approach. The Model NWC attempts to balance the need for a speedy elimination of
nuclear arsenals with the concerns of safety, confidence, and irreversibility.
These considerations, while delaying conclusion of an NWC, should not prevent
the commencement of negotiations. In fact, it is through the negotiations that these
issues can be adequately addressed and resolved. What is desperately needed is the
commitment to begin.
According to some analysts, lack of certainty about the future has created obstacles
to the willingness to commence nuclear disarmament negotiations. William Walker in
1997 observed that:
[T]he main reason for the resistance of policy elites to disarmament, and for
their ability to mount effective campaigns against nuclear abolition within the corridors
of power, is that satisfactory answers have not yet been given to three fundamental
questions:
1. Would nuclear disarmament increase or decrease national, regional and
global security?
2. What exactly is entailed by nuclear disarmament—what is being disarmed,
Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention
13
Section 1
and when has whatever is being disarmed finally been disarmed?
3. How do we get from here to there safely and securely, and once in the
condition of disarmament how can we collectively ensure that we all stay
there... ?
Unhappily, there are no clear, unambiguous answers to these questions ...
Uncertainty is inherent to the current situation.
12
Since 1997 considerable attention has been given to these questions by political,
academic and military analysts. With respect to the first question, the weight of
evidence is overwhelming that regional and global security is seriously threatened by
the continued possession and proliferation of nuclear weapons and that such security
would be considerably enhanced by nuclear abolition (see “Why pursue an NWC”,
below).
There has also been considerable work on the second and third questions, including
inter alia, drafting of a Model Nuclear Weapons Convention that explores the legal,
technical and political elements required for the achievement and maintenance of a
nuclear-weapons-free world: papers published in the Nuclear Weapons Convention
Monitor;
13
work undertaken by the Commission on Weapons of Mass Destruction;
14
verification studies on nuclear disarmament conducted by the United Kingdom
15
and
VERTIC;
16
informal inter-governmental Article VI Forum meetings on the elements
required to achieve a nuclear-weapons-free world;
17
and technical studies on nuclear
disarmament coordinated and published by INESAP.
18
Any remaining uncertainty about the second and third questions should not prevent
but should stimulate work on an NWC. Uncertainty about the future did not prevent
large-scale development and deployment of nuclear weapons, which shaped the
international security regime. Similarly, decisive action towards nuclear disarmament
will shape the viability of this goal. Uncertainty about the future has rarely prevented
human beings from seeking answers—in fact, it is generally an incentive. In the context
of nuclear weapons, pursuit of these answers is imperative for a positive outcome.
Significant impediments to the commencement and conclusion of negotiations on an
NWC are the belief systems that nuclear weapons provide political power and military
security. As long as these beliefs continue to be held by the governments of NWS,
commencement of negotiations towards and conclusion of an NWC will remain a pipe
dream. Once these beliefs are abandoned, the achievement of an NWC could happen
very quickly. Thus, the next section looks at the rationale for abandoning nuclear
weapons and moving to a nuclear weapons free world through a Nuclear Weapons
Convention. Further discussion on nuclear deterrence and its replacement with security
based on nuclear abolition can be found in the Critical Questions section.
Why Pursue a Nuclear Weapons Convention?
The rationale for a Nuclear Weapons Convention is outlined in the Preamble of the
Model Nuclear Weapons Convention. It begins:
“We the people of the Earth, through the States signatory to this Convention:
Convinced that the existence of nuclear weapons poses a threat to all humanity
and that their use would have catastrophic consequences for all the creatures of
this Earth,
Gravely concerned that the use of nuclear weapons might be brought about not
only intentionally by war or terrorism, but also through human or mechanical
error or failure, and that the very existence and gravity of these threats of
nuclear weapons use generates a climate of suspicion and fear which is
antagonistic to the promotion of universal respect for and observance of the
human rights and fundamental freedoms set forth in the Charter of the United
Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
“The world is on the
edge of warfare”
- Senator Daniel Moynihan,
former US Ambassador to
India, 1998
We must “put the genie
back in the bottle.
If we do not there is
substantial risk that
the twenty-first century
will witness a nuclear
tragedy.”
19
- Robert McNamara, Former
US Secretary
of Defense
14
Convinced of the serious threats posed to the environment by nuclear arsenals,
the economic and social costs and waste of intellectual talent occasioned
by these arsenals and the efforts required to prevent their use, the dangers
inherent in the existence of the materials used to make nuclear weapons and
the attendant problems of proliferation, the medically and psychologically
catastrophic effects of any use of a nuclear weapon, the potential effects of
mutations on the genetic pool and numerous other risks associated with nuclear
weapons,
and concludes,
Convinced that a convention prohibiting the development, testing, production,
stockpiling, transfer, use and threat of use of nuclear weapons and providing
for their elimination is required to abolish these weapons from the Earth,
Some points made in the preamble deserve further explanation here.
Bridging the Divide between Non-proliferation
and Disarmament
Former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, in his final major address before retiring
in 2006, listed some of the major threats confronting humankind that require collective
and comprehensive action. These include economic and social threats (poverty,
environmental degradation and infectious diseases), conflicts between and within
States, and terrorism.
Annan noted, however, that the greatest danger requiring action is that of nuclear
weapons: “Even a single bomb can destroy an entire city, as we know from the terrible
example of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and today, there are bombs many times as
powerful as those. These weapons pose a unique threat to humanity as a whole.”
Annan criticised countries for tackling this issue selectively and from two polarised
paths. One of these is promoted by the “non-proliferation first” advocates (including
the Nuclear-Weapons-possessing States), who take no action on their own stockpiles
but attempt to prevent anyone else from acquiring nuclear weapons. The other path
is pursued by the “disarmament first” advocates, who are hesitant to support stronger
non-proliferation measures while the NWS make no progress on disarmament.
Annan expressed concern that because of inaction, the world is not only
“sleepwalking towards disaster. In truth, it is worse than that – we are asleep at the
controls of a fast-moving aircraft. Unless we wake up and take control, the outcome is
all too predictable.”
The answer, according to Annan, is to work on both nonproliferation and
disarmament. ͆An aircraft, of course, can remain airborne only if both wings are in
working order. We cannot choose between non-proliferation and disarmament. We
must tackle both tasks with the urgency they demand.”
The Nuclear Weapons Convention addresses nonproliferation and disarmament
simultaneously and thus bridges the divide between the disarmament-first advocates
and the non-proliferation-first advocates. The NWC adopts an abolition approach,
which would prohibit proliferation as well as the maintenance of nuclear stockpiles and
doctrines and plans for their use.
The NWC would establish legal, technical and political mechanisms that would
prevent proliferation and nuclear terrorism and achieve disarmament. These include
the comprehensive control of fissile materials, enhanced verification measures
applicable to all nuclear-capable States and all nuclear-related facilities, and national
implementation measures to prohibit any individual from engaging in nuclear weapons
activities regardless of whether such individuals were government officials or non-State
actors and whether such activities were related to activities of proliferation concern or
to NWS practice of maintaining nuclear arsenals and the policies behind them.
Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention
15
Section 1
The 21
st
Century faces an increased risk of a nuclear catastrophe from the
proliferation of nuclear weapons to new States; the increasing potential for nuclear
weapons acquisition and use by terrorists; and
the further development of new, including “more
usable”, nuclear weapons and expanded nuclear-
use plans of the NWS. The NPT, which entered
into force in 1970, provided a non-proliferation
and disarmament bargain that has, until recently,
been moderately successful in preventing further
proliferation and in encouraging NWS to take
disarmament steps. The NPT no longer provides
this security. An NWC could do this and more
– it could make the 21
st
Century the one in which
nuclear weapons became as anachronistic as
slavery and colonies.
Slippery Slope to Armageddon:
the growing risk of a nuclear
catastrophe through nuclear
terrorism, proliferation and war
The post–Cold War “window of opportunity” for peace and disarmament has not
resulted in the predicted peace dividend. Throughout the 1990s, however, a complex
and interlocking web of multilateral, regional and bilateral agreements was in place
and was seen as a positive foundation for progress on disarmament. Progress was
frustratingly slow and at times undermined or challenged by the practices and stated
policies of the nuclear weapon states, but the overall trend was towards arms control
and solidification of non-proliferation achievements, with a general consensus on the
need for progress towards disarmament.
The limited capacity of the NPT and associated safeguards to prevent proliferation
was graphically demonstrated in 1991 by the advanced nuclear weapons program
that Iraq had developed while a party in apparently good standing to the NPT. Israel’s
development of nuclear weapons had already highlighted the weakness of a non-
proliferation regime that was not universal. Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union
in 1991, public fears of a nuclear war subsided until nuclear tests by India and Pakistan
in 1998 and their conflict in 2002 that nearly resulted in all-out war. These provided
sobering wake-up calls that not all was well in the nuclear arena. Not only did they
raise the appalling spectre of a nuclear exchange between the two countries, they
also demonstrated the erosion of the non-proliferation regime and the inevitability of
nuclear weapons acquisition by additional countries if a global disarmament regime
was not achieved in the near future.
The non-proliferation regime unravelled further in 2003 when North Korea quit the
NPT and announced its own nuclear weapons program as a response to the US and
UK invasion of Iraq. As North Korea explained, Iraq was invaded after they destroyed
their weapons of mass destruction. Thus, North Korea articulated a need for their own
WMD in order to deter the US from attacking their country.
20
The risks of nuclear terrorism have also increased with the growing sophistication of
terrorist organisations, the increasing willingness of terrorist organisations to kill larger
numbers of people in their attacks, and the increasing availability of nuclear materials
and know-how. Both nuclear terrorist and state proliferation risks were highlighted by
the discovery of the black-market nuclear trade undertaken by the A.Q. Khan network,
an extensive international network which operated for years, with transit points and
dealers in 30 countries, selling uranium enrichment centrifuge designs and components,
and Chinese nuclear weapons designs.
21
Survivors walking through
the ruins of Nagasaki
on August 10, 1945, the
day after the US used its
second atomic bomb.
Photo: Yosuke Yamahata,
Hiroshima Nagasaki
Publishing Company.
16
The legal-political foundation of disarmament has been further shaken by a new
preventive-use-of-force doctrine in which certain Nuclear Weapon States claim a
right to pre-emptively attack other countries that are suspected of developing nuclear
weapons or other WMD. In addition, there has been a growing abandonment by a few
States of hard-won arms control and non-proliferation achievements, the abrogation of
treaties and the blocking of negotiations and treaty bodies. The abrogation by the US of
the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, the first renunciation of a major nuclear arms
control agreement, was an extremely negative precedent.
While international attention has been drawn to the non-existent weapons of mass
destruction in Iraq and the nuclear tests in South Asia and North Korea, what is not
widely realized is that the nuclear weapon states maintain 27,000 warheads with
a combined explosive potential 330,000 times greater than the Hiroshima bomb.
22
Several thousand of these weapons are on hair-trigger alert and are ready to be fired at
several minutes notice. It is also not widely known that France, the UK, the US and
now also Russia maintain policies that permit first use of nuclear weapons—that is,
they maintain the option to use nuclear weapons even when nuclear weapons are not
used or threatened against them.
In January 2006, French President Jacques Chirac said that France was prepared
to launch a nuclear strike against any country that sponsors a terrorist attack against
French interests. He said his country’s nuclear arsenal had been reconfigured to include
the ability to make a tactical strike in retaliation for terrorism.
23
This opens up the
possibility that nuclear weapons could be used in a range of conflicts, not just those
between nuclear states. In fact, the US is known to have made explicit threats to use
nuclear weapons four times since the end of the Cold War: against Iraq, Libya, Iran and
North Korea.
The implications of any use of nuclear weapons need to be spelled out repeatedly
– this is the fundamental physical, biological and social reality which must underpin all
discussion of nuclear weapons. The International Court of Justice warned in 1996 that
any use of even a tactical nuclear weapon would threaten escalation into a devastating
nuclear exchange. The Court also noted the uniquely destructive aspects of nuclear
weapons in both blast and radiation and stated that “[t]he destructive power of nuclear
weapons cannot be contained in either space or time”.
24
Nor is the nuclear arms race over. Nuclear weapon states continue to research,
design, test, modernise and develop nuclear weapons. Programs to develop reliable
replacement warheads, earth-penetrating warheads and mini-nukes are at various
stages in the US. The total US budget for nuclear weapons work soared to roughly
$US 6 billion in the 2005-2006 fiscal year from a low of about $US3200 million in
1994-1995. The Department of Energy plans to spend almost $90m in fiscal year 2008,
and $300m over the next few years to develop the first of the Reliable Replacement
Warhead group of warheads. This new weapon would replace the W-76 Trident
warhead in service with the US Navy.
In early 2006, Russian President Vladimir Putin boasted of a new hypersonic
missile for delivering nuclear and other weapons that is capable of changing flight
path. Laboratory-based expansions of French nuclear weapon design, development and
production capacities have been under way for a number of years. For example, more
than $US 3 billion is being spent on a new high-energy laser facility. This year, France
is expected to start testing a new missile (the M 51) for its submarine-launched nuclear
warheads, which will have an increased range, France is also working on improving
the capabilities of its air-launched nuclear delivery vehicle along with a more “robust”
warhead, the tête nucléaire aéroportée.
On 14 March 2007, the House of Commons voted in favour of the UK government’s
plans to renew its Trident submarine-launched ballistic missiles. The UK government
has announced its intent to spend more than £1000 million over the next three years on
“Since nuclear weapons
can destroy all life on the
planet, they imperil all
that humanity has ever
stood for, and indeed
humanity itself ... The
work that this committee
(united Nations
Disarmament Committee)
has done in calling for
negotiations leading
to a Nuclear Weapons
Convention must be
increased. Those nuclear
weapons states resisiting
such negotiations
must be challenged,
for, in clinging to their
outmoded rationales for
nuclear deterence, they
are denying the most
srdent of aspirations of
humanity as well as the
opinion of the highest
legal authority in the
world ... the International
Court of Justice”
- Archbishop Renato
Martino, Permanent
Observer of the Holy See to
the United Nations, October
15, 1997
“Now is the time for
serious consideration of
an integrated approach,
encompassing both
bilateral and multilateral
negotiations, culminating
in an international
agreement on a total ban
on nuclear weapons.”
- Ray Burke, United Nations,
September 1997 (Then the
Minister of Foreign Affairs of
Ireland)
Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention
17
Section 1
refurbishing key facilities at its nuclear weapon complex. This includes new facilities
for assembling and disassembling nuclear weapons and the handling of high explosives
and weapon-grade uranium, as well as a new high-energy laser facility. Plans to recruit
more than 1000 new staff over the next three years have also been announced, as has
the extension of the nuclear weapon cooperation agreement with the US for another 10
years.
In February 2002, the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists moved the hands of its
Doomsday Clock forward from nine minutes to midnight to seven minutes to midnight.
On 17 January 2007, the Bulletin’s Board of Directors and Board of Sponsors,
including 18 Nobel Laureates again moved the hands of the clock forward to five
minutes to midnight. They stated:
“Not since the first atomic bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki
has the world faced such perilous choices. North Korea’s recent test of a
nuclear weapon, Iran’s nuclear ambitions, a renewed US emphasis on the
military utility of nuclear weapons, the failure to adequately secure nuclear
materials, and the continued presence of some 26,000 nuclear weapons in
the United States and Russia are symptomatic of a larger failure to solve the
problems posed by the most destructive technology on Earth.”
25
In 2005, Robert McNamara, former US Secretary of Defense wrote of the increased
risks of nuclear proliferation and nuclear weapons use because of the policies of the
NWS:
Among the costs of maintaining nuclear weapons is the risk—to me an
unacceptable risk—of use of the weapons either by accident or as a result of
misjudgement or miscalculation in times of crisis. The Cuban Missile Crisis
demonstrated that the United States and the Soviet Union—and indeed the
rest of the world—came within a hair’s breadth of nuclear disaster in October
1962...
Human beings are fallible. In conventional war, mistakes cost lives, sometimes
thousands of lives. However, if mistakes were to affect decisions relating to the
use of nuclear forces, there would be no learning curve. They would result in
the destruction of nations. The indefinite combination of human fallibility and
nuclear weapons carries a very high risk of nuclear catastrophe...
If the United States continues its current nuclear stance, over time, substantial
proliferation of nuclear weapons will almost surely follow. Some, or all, of
such nations as Egypt, Japan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Taiwan will very likely
initiate nuclear weapons programs, increasing both the risk of use of the
weapons and the diversion of weapons and fissile materials into the hands of
rogue states or terrorists.
McNamara, former US President Jimmy Carter,
26
former Head of US Stratcom
General Lee Butler,
27
and others, have concluded that the only strategy that can
ensure humanity does not risk a nuclear catastrophe is to move towards the complete
abolition of nuclear weapons. Prominent Cold Warriors former Secretaries of State
Henry Kissinger and George Schultz, and Defense Secretary William Perry, urged the
US to lead in creating “a world without nuclear weapons” in the Wall Street Journal in
January 2007.
28
Drawing from their expertise and direct experience in dealing with
nuclear weapons, their analysis was that the reliance on nuclear weapons is becoming
“increasingly hazardous and decreasingly effective”.
The Legal Obligation
Under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT),
“Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on
18
effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to
nuclear disarmament.”
29
On 8 July 1996, the International Court of Justice concluded unanimously that
“[t]here exists an obligation to pursue in good faith, and bring to a conclusion,
negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective
international control”.
30
The significance of the ICJ decision is that it affirmed that:
the existence of a good-faith obligation means there is an obligation to achieve the
goal, not merely to discuss the possibility or even to negotiate towards it;
the obligation is not merely to achieve steps toward nuclear disarmament, but to
achieve nuclear disarmament “in all its aspects” (that is, to achieve the complete
elimination of nuclear weapons);
the elimination of nuclear weapons should occur under international control; nd
like any legal obligation, this obligation must be performed within an appropriate
timeframe and cannot be postponed indefinitely.
The UN General Assembly, which had originally requested the opinion from the ICJ,
determined through yearly resolutions that this obligation should be fulfilled by the
immediate commencement of negotiations leading to an early conclusion of an NWC
prohibiting the development, testing, production, stockpiling, transfer, use and threat of
use of nuclear weapons and providing for their elimination. The European Parliament
repeated this call on 13 March 1997.
The conclusions of the General Assembly and European Parliament are not
surprising. An NWC provides the most logical way to satisfy the ICJ requirements
that nuclear disarmament be negotiated and completed under strict and effective
international control. An NWC is also the most logical way to achieve the elimination
of nuclear weapons in a non-discriminatory manner that will incorporate the security
concerns of states that currently possess nuclear weapons, because the negotiation
process will inevitably require consideration of such concerns. The NWC is also the
most logical way of drastically reducing, if not to eliminating, the threat from nuclear
weapons. Partial steps that leave any number of nuclear weapons in the arsenals of
some states will not provide a solution.
The Canberra Commission observed: “The proposition that nuclear weapons can
be retained in perpetuity and never be used—accidentally or by decision—defies
credibility ... The opportunity now exists, perhaps without precedent or recurrence, to
make a new and clear choice to enable the world to conduct its affairs without nuclear
weapons, and in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.”
31
This view is now supported by the majority of governments in the world and even
more so by citizens, including citizens of the nuclear weapon states and their allies.
Public opinion polls in the UK, the US, the Netherlands, Germany, Canada and
Belgium consistently show that more than 80 per cent of people support an NWC
[see table above]. The Mellman Group poll in the US showed that the public was not
generally in favour of nuclear disarmament unless it was in the context of an NWC.
32
While the ICJ opinion cited the NPT as an important indication of disarmament
responsibility, it did not assert that the obligation is confined to states parties to the
NPT. ICJ President Bedjaoui, in his separate declaration, stated that the obligation
has “assumed customary force” and that “it is the duty of all to seek to attain [nuclear
disarmament] more actively than ever”.
33
The US and the UK argued at the ICJ that their nuclear disarmament obligation
was linked to progress in conventional disarmament and in developing alternative
security systems to the system of nuclear deterrence. The Court did not accept this
argument and, apart from the requirement for international control, made no mention of
conditions that were required to move toward nuclear disarmament.
Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention
19
Section 1
Thus the question to be asked is not why there should be an NWC, but why nuclear
weapon states have not yet agreed to start negotiating one.
The Strategic Factor
͆The failure to address the nuclear threat and to strengthen existing treaty
obligations to work for nuclear weapons abolition shreds the fabric of
cooperative security. A world with nuclear haves and have-nots is fragmented
and unstable, a fact underscored by the current threats of proliferation. In
such an environment cooperation fails. Thus, nations are unable to address
effectively the real threats of poverty, environmental degradation and nuclear
catastrophe.”
- The Rome Declaration of Nobel Laureates
7
th
World Summit of Nobel Peace Laureates
19 November 2006
An NWC is the most crucial step towards a world without weapons of mass
destruction. These were developed as the logical extension of conventional military
thought, according to which the goal of the military is to threaten or use superior force
on an enemy in order to protect strategic interests. Historically, governments in conflict
have sought to develop ever-larger military force capabilities in order to meet this aim,
and these capabilities have, over time and with advances in scientific knowledge and
technologies, developed into weapons of mass destruction. Many major new forms
of technology, once developed, have been adapted for use in weapons. Prohibition
of particular types of weapons, especially weapons of mass destruction, reverses this
historical trend. The goal of peace and abolition of the social institution of war itself
are at the core of every major ethical and religious tradition, and integral to goals of
justice, sustainability, custodianship and human rights.
The possibility for achieving an NWC will be enhanced by efforts that increase
the interdependent web of political, social, environmental, legal and economic
factors and instruments that increasingly interlink human security worldwide. These
developments contribute to and the conclusion of an NWC will in turn contribute
to these developments. An emerging NWC will be supported by current social and
political change, and will lead to future change. The support globally for a NWC has
resulted in part from a paradigm shift in political, social and economic systems and in
consciousness. The world is moving away from self-contained nation-state systems to
inter-state interdependence combined with globalization. The enterprises and concerns
of humanity are becoming much more international through the development of
transnational and international corporations, a global market, international institutions,
and communications systems. The environmental and social effects of policies and
practices, and the influences of civil society organizations and movements, and even
a globalization of cultures and identities all contribute to the evolving sense of global
interconnectedness.
Indeed nuclear weapons are the paramount globalisation issue. The discovery of
the nuclear winter effect – the dramatic global climatic consequences of nuclear war
between the US and the former Soviet Union – made it clear that every inhabitant
of the planet could be drastically affected. Landmark international collaborative
studies undertaken in the 1980s under the auspices of the International Council of
Scientific Unions predicted that following a major nuclear war, more people would
die of starvation in areas such as India and Africa – even without being targeted – than
would die of the direct effects of nuclear blasts in the countries directly targeted.
34
While counterforce scenarios involving the two nuclear superpowers involved several
thousand nuclear explosions and more than 1,000 Mt explosive yield, major climatic
consequences could be expected with even 100 nuclear explosions targeted on cities.
35
“I would have thought
it unecessary to
demonstrate once
again the commitment
of the United States to
nuclear disarmament,
a commitment we
undertook when we
adhered to the NPT ...”
- United States Delegation
to United Nations, Oct 29,
1998 (Statement on Eight
Nation Resolution: Towards a
nuclear-weapon-free world:
the need for a new agenda)
“Viewing arms limitation
those responsible for
U.S. nuclear weapons
must not lose sight of
the fact that the intent
of these negotiations is
not to disarm the United
States. The United
States could do that
unilaterally if such was in
our interest. The intent of
U.S. arms negotiators is
to disarm them ...”
- Admiral W.J. Holland, Jr.,
Nuclear Weapons the Info
Age: Who Needs ‘Em?, US
Naval Institute Proceeding,
January 1999, p.47
“Nuclear weapons
diminish the security of
all states. Indeed states
which possess them
become themselves
targets of nuclear
weapons.”
- Canberra Commission,
August 1996
20
Recent studies using state of the art interactive climate models demonstrate that
detonation of 50 “low yield” Hiroshima size nuclear weapons (15 kt explosive yield) in
each of two countries, would result in tens of millions of direct fatalities; for example,
a conservatively estimated 21.7 million immediate deaths following use of 100 such
weapons in India and Pakistan. Such a scenario utilises less than 0.1% of the current
global nuclear arsenal in terms of weapon numbers, and only 0.03% of the explosive
yield of the current global nuclear arsenal. It is estimated that not only Britain, France,
and China, but also Israel, India and Pakistan, possess sufficient nuclear weapons
to make such a scenario quite plausible. Reducing the yields of nuclear weapons
from those typical of the US or Russian strategic arsenals to those more likely to be
associated with the newer nuclear weapons states or, potentially, terrorist groups, does
not reduce the potential destruction proportionately. Per kiloton of yield, low-yield
weapons can produce 100 times the fatalities and 100 times the amount of smoke from
fires as high yield nuclear weapons, if targeted at city centres.
36
State-of-the-art analyses of the climatic consequences of a nuclear war involving
100 Hiroshima-size (15 kt) bombs exploded on cities in the subtropics demonstrate
large and long-lasting climate changes, with significant cooling and drop in rainfall
lasting years, which would impact the global food supply.
37
Smoke plumes generated
by burning cities, the plumes would rise high into the stratosphere, causing climatic
changes, that would be more long-lasting, if less dramatic, than previous nuclear winter
simulations involving a massive nuclear weapons exchange between the superpowers.
These findings underscore the profound dangers posed by all nuclear weapons to all
of the world’s people, wherever they live.
“Progress towards a nuclear weapon free world should not be made contingent upon other
changes in the international security environment. Successful nuclear weapon negotiations will
benefit other security related negotiations and progress in regional and other political and security
related negotiations will enhance the prospect of building a nuclear weapon free world.”
Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons
Defending borders with ever-larger military capacities is becoming meaningless in
an increasingly borderless world—where power structures are being transformed from
state-based to more transnational systems.
Nuclear weapons do not fit into this emerging future but instead hold up its
development by reinforcing old and dangerous power paradigms. An NWC, on the
other hand, will necessarily involve many different elements of global society in its
implementation and will generate new mechanisms for global cooperation. It is both a
logical result of global change and an enabler of it. The experience, mechanisms and
lessons involved in achievement of an NWC could be expected to have substantial
positive benefits for efforts addressing a wide range of other global challenges, and will
create a suite of new possibilities to enhance global cooperation and the rule of law. It
would liberate massive fiscal, human and technical resources for investment in human
development and sustainability. The achievement of an NWC would also be welcomed
with enthusiastic celebration and enormous relief worldwide.
Global Support for a Nuclear Weapons Convention
Global rejection of nuclear deterrence and support for the comprehensive abolition of
nuclear weapons, encompassing both non-proliferation and disarmament, is growing
stronger. Examples of such support can be found on the opposite page. Governmental
Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention
21
Section 1
and civil society support for a Nuclear Weapons Convention, as the most practical and
feasible way to achieve abolition, is also growing, as indicated by the following:
• In November 1995, Abolition 2000, an international network calling for
negotiations on an NWC, was established. More than 2000 organizations have now
joined this network.
38
• Since 1996, the UN General Assembly has adopted resolutions every year
specifically calling for negotiations leading to the conclusion of an NWC.
39
A
number of other resolutions have also supported the call for such negotiations.
40
• The Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, which
included former key policy makers of the NWS,
41
concluded that “The
maintenance of a nuclear weapon free world will require an enduring legal
framework, linked to the Charter of the United Nations, possibly in the form of a
convention on nuclear weapons.”
42
• On 13 March 1997, the European Parliament called on all members to support
negotiations leading to the conclusion of a convention for the abolition of nuclear
weapons.
• The Foreign Ministers of Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, Slovenia,
South Africa and Sweden released a joint statement in 1998 (New Agenda
Statement) which noted that “The maintenance of a world free of nuclear weapons
will require the underpinnings of a universal and multilaterally negotiated legally
binding instrument or a framework encompassing a mutually reinforcing set of
instruments”
43
• Public opinion polls conducted in Australia, Belgium, Canada, Germany, Holland,
Japan, Norway, the UK, and the US have indicated overwhelming public support
for a nuclear weapons convention
.
• Separate resolutions have been introduced to the US House of Representatives by
Representatives Lynn Woolsey,
44
Dennis Kucinich
45
and Eleanor Holmes Norton
46
calling for negotiations leading to the conclusion of a nuclear weapons convention.
• More than 1500 mayors have joined the Mayors for Peace Vision 2020, which calls
for the negotiations on a nuclear weapons convention to be concluded by 2010
with complete elimination of nuclear weapons by 2020.
• In October 2005, the Middle Powers Initiative launched the Article VI Forum
in order to bring like-minded States together to “identify the legal, political and
technical requirements for the elimination of nuclear weapons,” and to undertake
“informational and preparatory work for the development and implementation
of the legal, political and technical elements, and the exploration of ways to start
negotiations on disarmament steps leading to a nuclear weapons convention or a
framework of instruments for the abolition of nuclear weapons.”
47
Approximately
40 middle power governments have participated in Article VI Forum meetings held
in New York, the Hague and Ottawa.
• In June 2006 the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission called on all States to
“accept the principle that nuclear weapons should be outlawed, as are biological
and chemical weapons (ie. by a comprehensive abolition treaty), and explore
the political, legal, technical and procedural options for achieving this within a
reasonable time.” The Commission also concluded that “a nuclear disarmament
treaty is achievable and can be reached through careful, sensible and practical
measures.”
48
22
How to Achieve a Nuclear Weapons Convention?
“A key challenge is to dispel the perception that outlawing nuclear weapons is
a utopian goal. A nuclear disarmament treaty is achievable and can be reached
through careful, sensible and practical measures. ...
all states should commence planning for security without nuclear weapons.
They should start preparing for the outlawing of nuclear weapons through joint
practical and incremental measures that include definitions, benchmarks and
transparency requirements for disarmament.”
49
There are three general views as to how nuclear disarmament can best be achieved.
The first, a step-by-step approach, entails negotiations on a limited number of initial
steps towards nuclear disarmament. The US, which supports this approach, has
indicated that next steps should be bilateral reductions in stockpiles as agreed under
the Moscow Treaty
50
, and a treaty to cut off production of fissile material.
51
The NPT
Review Conferences in 1995 and 2000 agreed that a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
was one of these disarmament steps, but the US has since reversed its support for the
CTBT.
A divergent perspective calls for comprehensive negotiations on the complete
elimination of nuclear weapons under a time-bound framework. The Non-Aligned
Movement, for example, has called on the Conference on Disarmament to “commence
negotiations ... on a phased program of nuclear disarmament and for the eventual
elimination of nuclear weapons within a time-bound framework”.
52
A third perspective calls for a middle path between the first two, combining
elements of the step-by-step approach and the comprehensive approach into an
incremental–comprehensive program. The declaration of eight foreign ministers
entitled Towards a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World: The Need for a New Agenda, calls for
a series of bilateral, plurilateral, and multilateral steps, which would lead towards the
elimination of nuclear weapons through a legally binding instrument or framework of
instruments.
53
Step-by-Step Approach
The US argues that “the step-by-step is the only realistic approach in this highly
complex field”, and that it is “yielding significant, concrete results in the area of
nuclear disarmament”.
54
The validity of the second point is hotly contested. While
the step-by-step process has delivered a number of limited disarmament and arms
control treaties, including the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (START I & II), the
INF and Moscow Treaty, the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) and negotiation of the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty,
55
these have had little effect on the policies of the
nuclear weapon states, on their ability to inflict unimaginable damage worldwide with
their remaining weapons, or on their ability to design and develop new weapons and
delivery vehicles.
Under START I and the Moscow Treaty the US and Russia are reducing their
deployed nuclear weapons to no more than 2200 by 2012. The US, at least, has no
intention of reducing these numbers further. The US claims, “This range establishes
the lowest possible number consistent with national security requirements and alliance
obligations while maintaining a level that provides a credible deterrent.” By “credible
deterrent” the US explains that, ‘“US nuclear forces dissuade potential adversaries by
being so numerous, advanced, and reliable that the US retains an unassailable edge for
the foreseeable future.”
In fact, the US retains the option to reverse these reductions: “The remaining
US strategic nuclear weapons remain in storage and serve as an augmentation
capability should US strategic nuclear force requirements rise above the levels of the
Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention
23
Section 1
Moscow Treaty.”
In the words of the WMDC:
“While continuing the positive downward trend
in deployments, this treaty does not involve any
destruction of warheads, as they will simply be put in
to storage, nor any counting rules or new verification
measures. Under SORT, deployments change but the
weapons remain.”
It is unlikely that Russia would unilaterally cut
its nuclear forces much below the numbers of US
forces. As most strategic weapons have yields of 100-
500 kilotons, this will leave an explosive equivalent
of approximately 100,000 Hiroshima-sized bombs
in US and Russian arsenals in 2012 and into the
indefinite future.
The Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT), hailed as
an important disarmament step, in fact did not halt
nuclear testing, since the nuclear weapon states
merely shifted to underground tests. In fact, more
nuclear tests have been conducted since the PTBT
came into force (1679) than before its implementation
(372).
59
The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty has
been instrumental in curtailing nuclear test explosions
by the NWS, but has not prevented testing by other
means (see below).
It is also hard to characterize the proposed Fissile
Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) as a real disarmament measure, considering that the
nuclear weapon states have huge stockpiles of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and
plutonium and thus will not be limited by a cut-off in production of these materials—in
fact, they have already stopped production unilaterally. The proposed FMCT could
possibly help to limit nuclear weapons production and stockpiling by the nuclear
weapon states, were it to include a ban on the production of tritium, a warhead
component that must be replaced regularly due to fast decay. Tritium, however, has
been exempted from the FMCT negotiations.
60
The achievement of insignificant steps can actually have a detrimental effect on—
and delay progress towards—elimination of nuclear weapons, by giving an appearance
of progress that can reduce impetus towards more significant steps and that could
even derail ongoing negotiations. In the 1961 negotiations on a nuclear test ban treaty,
for example, both the Partial Test Ban Treaty and a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
(CTBT) had been proposed. There was considerable public and political pressure for
a CTBT. The conclusion of the PTBT, despite its failure to restrain the number of
nuclear tests and the development of new nuclear weapons, was generally perceived
as a step towards nuclear disarmament. The PTBT thus took the wind out of the sails
of the CTBT campaign. This was a key factor in the long delay before a CTBT was
negotiated.
Negotiating the CTBT in the 1990s without incorporating India’s proposals that
the treaty be linked to a firm commitment to complete nuclear disarmament may have
been a factor in India’s decision to conduct nuclear tests in May 1998—definitely a
backward step in global non-proliferation efforts.
61
Another backwards step was taken
in October 2006 when the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea tested a nuclear
weapon.
The long, drawn-out, step-by-step process that characterizes current arms control
efforts ensures that by the time a step has been achieved the nuclear weapon states have
generally developed their technology to a stage where they no longer need whatever
it was they were negotiating away. For example, by the time nations had agreed to the
CTBT, most nuclear weapon states had developed the ability to conduct a range of non-
Venting off radioactivity
from the Baneberry
underground nuclear test,
Nevada Test Site, USA,
1970.
Photo: US Department of
Energy.
24
explosive nuclear weapons tests.
62
This has led some nuclear disarmament advocates
to oppose the CTBT in its current form.
63
Many would claim, in fact, that the nuclear
weapon states have never agreed to any disarmament step until they have developed
the technology to replace what they were giving up.
64
It is arguable, therefore, that the step-by-step approach to the elimination of nuclear
weapons has been tried and, on the whole, has failed, despite significant incremental
accomplishments. The nuclear weapon states are no closer to nuclear disarmament now
than when they accepted their obligation to disarm under the Non-Proliferation Treaty
more than three decades ago. As a matter of numbers alone, there has been only modest
reduction from the nuclear stockpiles that existed when the NPT entered into force in
1970. At that time there were 39,000 nuclear weapons. Now there are 27,000.
65
An
equally important point is that the nuclear weapon states have made no moves away
from policies of threat or use. The UK, the US and France have been joined by Russia
in refusing to rule out the first use of nuclear weapons and are continuing to keep
thousands of nuclear weapons on alert status. In addition, the threat of use, including
even the use in a pre-emptive first strike, has been extended to cover threats from
chemical and biological weapons,
66
terrorism, and conventional weapons. Moreover at
a time when vertical proliferation continues, horizontal proliferation is accelerating, the
nuclear terrorist risk is growing, and the threshold for use of nuclear weapons has been
lowered, the pace of incremental progress in nuclear disarmament has ground virtually
to a halt. The CTBT, concluded in 1996, languishes while key states including China,
Israel and particularly the US refuse to ratify it, and other NWS (India, North Korea
and Pakistan) have yet to sign it. The SORT Treaty is fundamentally flawed - involving
time-limited, non-binding, non-verified and reversible withdrawals of weapons from
deployment. No substantive nuclear disarmament negotiations are currently underway.
Serious consideration should be given to the validity of the view that “the step-by-
step process is the only realistic approach in this complex field”. Nuclear disarmament
is complex. There are many political, legal and technical considerations in the process
of abandoning nuclear use policies, eliminating the stockpiles, and maintaining a
nuclear-weapon-free world. The political considerations may be most important. The
governments of nuclear weapon states continue to resist any but the most minimal
nuclear disarmament steps, because they believe that nuclear weapons still serve one
or more purposes. They continue to assert their belief that nuclear weapons prevent
war. The UK, for example, has argued that nuclear weapons are a necessary insurance
policy in order to prevent “subjection to conquest which may be of the most brutal and
enslaving character”.
67
The US has argued that “the policy of nuclear deterrence has
saved many millions of lives from the scourge of war during the past 50 years. In this
special sense nuclear weapons have been used defensively every day for over half a
century ... to preserve the peace.”
68
There is also evidence of an unspoken belief among the nuclear weapon states that
nuclear status confers political power. In 1995 the Mexican Ambassador to Geneva
noted:
“What is at the heart of this debate is that it ... forces a rethinking of the whole
cold war power structure ... Look at France ... The French government thinks that
their legitimacy comes from having nuclear weapons. Take away their nukes and
their Security Council veto, and what are they? A little more than Italy and less than
Germany.”
69
Until the nuclear weapon states abandon these perspectives, which risk
unprecedented worldwide destruction and undermine the security of their own people
as much as that of others, they will not agree to a comprehensive approach to nuclear
disarmament. Thus, a limited step-by-step approach, minimal as it is, may indeed be
the only realistic way some governments see to move forward today. The danger of
maintaining the status quo and the increasing instability of the non-proliferation regime
may soon alert them to the need for reduced reliance on nuclear weapons, but public
pressure is also needed.
Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention
25
Section 1
The corporate and scientific interest in maintaining a robust nuclear weapons
industry also constrains nuclear disarmament to limited steps. Harold Muller notes that
“[t]housands of jobs and careers depend on the production, or at least the maintenance,
of these weapons.”
70
Scientists, engineers, bureaucrats and corporations have
considerable power to influence government decisions on nuclear policy.
According to Lichterman and Cabasso, the weapons laboratories in the US
convinced the Clinton administration that the only way to achieve congressional
support for a CTBT was to guarantee a well-funded “nuclear weapons research and
testing program of Cold War proportions that will keep nuclear weapons in the arsenal,
in the budget, and in the career paths of scientists well into the next century”.
71
Comprehensive Approach
Advocates of the comprehensive approach argue that it is high time the nuclear
weapon states abandoned their nuclear deterrence policies and began work on a
treaty for their complete elimination of nuclear weapons. Their arguments include the
following:
Nuclear deterrence is inherently unstable and is bound to fail at some point.
Deterrence relies on preventing an attack by convincing the enemy that a nuclear
response would result. An enemy is only convinced if they perceive a genuine
chance that nuclear weapons may be used against them. Thus, the line separating
threat from actual use in a conflict situation must remain solid for deterrence to
work. Once this line is crossed, deterrence has clearly failed, and when it fails,
there is no plan B. In the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Soviet Union approached that
line and then backed down. Had they crossed the line, the US would have faced a
dilemma: either use nuclear weapons or downgrade their deterrent value. If nuclear
deterrence remains an indefinite policy, a conflict between nuclear weapon states—
whether through intent, human error, malice or ill will, technical malfunction,
inadvertent crisis escalation, sabotage, or terrorist provocation—will inevitably
cross the line at some time and thus result in a nuclear exchange.
Nuclear war could also occur by accident or miscalculation. A number of
accidents that could have resulted in an inadvertent nuclear exchange have already
occurred.
72
Nuclear deterrence stimulates other states to develop or acquire either nuclear
weapons or other weapons of mass destruction in response. For these reasons,
nuclear deterrence should be abandoned immediately. There is no valid reason to
wait until nuclear disarmament steps have been achieved before dropping policies
of first use—or indeed any use—of nuclear weapons.
Proponents of a comprehensive approach also argue that this is the only way to
deal with the asymmetries in nuclear arsenals and capabilities, as has been clearly
demonstrated in the case of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. The CTBT was
originally proposed by India. Yet India rejected the CTBT when it was finally
concluded, because by then other nuclear weapon states had developed the means for
non-explosive testing while India had not.
73
With the US, Russia, France, the UK and some of their allies refusing at this stage
to embark upon a comprehensive approach, such a proposal seems unrealistic.
74
As
indicated by the work of the Article VI Forum and others,
75
however, it is possible for
likeminded States to make some progress on the development and implementation
of the legal, technical and political elements for a nuclear-weapons-free world even
before all NWS have agreed to such a comprehensive approach. A change in political
circumstances, governments, or leaders may suddenly enable progress, and such
“As a matter of numbers
alone, there has been
very little net reduction
from the nuclear
stockpiles that existed
when the NPT entered
into force in 1970. At that
time there were 39,000
nuclear weapons, Now
there are 36,000”
- Canberra Commission,
August 1996
26
changes may be facilitated by public and political pressure and preparatory work.
Advocates of a comprehensive approach, however, believe that it is possible to
change the perspectives of the hold-out NWS and their allies. Indeed, rejection of
nuclear deterrence and support for a rapid and comprehensive disarmament process
has already permeated the consciences of many academics, policy makers, scientists,
military leaders, and citizens throughout the world. For example:
On 6 February 1985, the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki launched an appeal
calling for the complete prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons. The
appeal has since been signed by more than 80 million people, making it the
largest petition in the world.
76
On 5 December 1996, General Lee Butler and more than 50 other retired
generals and admirals from 17 countries including Russia, the UK, France,
India and Pakistan released a statement calling for the comprehensive
elimination of nuclear weapons.
77
On 17 June 1997, the US National Academy of Sciences released a report
calling for a long-term strategy of complete elimination of nuclear weapons
and intermediate steps including restricting the role of nuclear weapons to only
deterring nuclear threats.
78
On 2 February 1998, 117 civilian leaders, including 47 past or present heads
of state, (including from France, US, UK, Russia, Germany, Japan and South
Korea), released a statement calling for the elimination of nuclear weapons.
79
On 9 June 1998, the foreign ministers of Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New
Zealand, Slovenia, South Africa and Sweden released a joint declaration calling
for a new agenda for nuclear disarmament culminating in the elimination of
nuclear weapons.
In October 1998, 75 US bishops released a statement condemning nuclear
deterrence and called for nuclear abolition.
80
Fifteen years earlier this same
group of bishops had condemned the use of nuclear weapons but had given
limited support to nuclear weapons possession and nuclear deterrence.
81
On 3 October 2000, 70 prominent Americans, including former President
Jimmy Carter, Martin Sheen (actor), General Charles Horner (Commander
of the Coalition Air Forces in Desert Storm and Former Commander in Chief
of US SPAC ECOM), Admiral William J. Crowe Jr. (Former Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff), Walter Cronkite, Ambassador Paul Nitze, Admiral
Stansfield Turner (Former Director of Central Intelligence); Elie Wiesel (Nobel
Peace Laureate), Mia Farrow, Bill Joy (Co-Founder and Chief Scientist Sun
Microsystems), Sally Ride (Astronaut and President of Space.com), Hans
Bethe (Nobel Peace Laureate and physicist in the Manhattan Project), Joe
Firmage (CEO Project Voyager and Former CEO of US Web), and Steven
Kirsch (Founder Infoseek and Chairman and Founder Propel), released a
statement in the New York Times calling upon “the United States government
to commit itself unequivocally to negotiate the worldwide reduction and
elimination of nuclear weapons, in a series of well-defined stages accompanied
by increasing verification and control.”
On 25 June 2001, the US Conference of Mayors adopted a policy supporting
the elimination of nuclear weapons and presented this policy along with a
longer Mayors Statement on nuclear disarmament to President Bush when he
addressed the conference on the same day.
83
The World Council of Churches, at its 9
th
Assembly in February 2006 in
Porto Alegre, Brazil, issued a Minute on the Elimination of Nuclear Arms,
which recognizes “the incontrovertible immorality of nuclear weapons.” The
five original nuclear weapons states “must pledge never to be the first to use
nuclear weapons, never threaten any use, and remove their weapons from
high alert status and from the territory of non-nuclear states.” The Assembly
“calls on each member church to urge its own government to pursue the
unequivocal elimination of nuclear weapons under the terms of the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty.”
84
In June 2006, the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission issued its report
declaring that a nuclear disarmament treaty is achievable and can be reached
through careful, sensible and practical measures.
85
Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention
27
Section 1
By October 2006, more than 1,500 mayors in 120 countries had joined Mayors
for Peace, which is designed to build solidarity and facilitate coordination
among the cities that support the Program to Promote the Solidarity of Cities
towards the Total Abolition of Nuclear Weapons.
Advocates of a comprehensive approach have also noted the
parallels between nuclear weapons and landmines, for which
a comprehensive approach was successful. Francis Sejersted,
at that time the Chairman of the Nobel Committee, noted that:
“Both hit victims at a vast remove from the actual warfare.
They strike mainly at civilian populations, and their effects
continue for generations after the end of the armed conflict.
They are weapons, which cast the shadow of war also across
peace. War’s threat to life and limb is everywhere and never
ending.”
86
For some years, negotiations on landmines were bogged
down in a step-by-step process involving negotiations of
limited protocols of the Inhumane Weapons Convention.
87
The
shift by the majority of states to a comprehensive approach, led
by Canada in the early 1990s, resulted in the rapid conclusion of the Mine Ban Treaty.
88
A key to the success of the landmines campaign was that the focus on a complete
ban, not just on control of landmines or a ban on certain types such as “dumb”
mines, captured public attention as a meaningful and visionary measure. During the
negotiation process, the comprehensive approach allowed the negotiators to jump over
tricky issues such as which types of mines are “smart” and which types are “dumb”,
and to sidestep the fact that control mechanisms tend to discriminate in favour of
technically advanced countries.
A similar comprehensive approach to nuclear weapons has the potential to capture
public attention and to jump over deadlocks in negotiations caused by asymmetries in
nuclear capabilities; disagreements over definitions, scope, and relative priorities; a
range of complexities regarding reporting and verification; and other issues—deadlocks
that cannot be overcome by partial measures.
Canadian Member of Parliament Bill Blaiklie had this to say after the achievement
of the Mine Ban Treaty: “What we need now is a similar but even more comprehensive
and successful dynamic—to abolish nuclear weapons which pose a threat to the entire
human prospect.”
89
An Incremental–Comprehensive Approach
An alternative path forward between the above two extremes has been described
as an incremental–comprehensive approach.
90
This approach incorporates step-by-
step measures within a comprehensive framework. It is the approach suggested by the
Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons,
91
by the New Agenda
Coalition
92
and the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission.
The UN resolutions in relation to the International Court of Justice advisory opinion
on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons also suggest this approach.
93
These resolutions call for the implementation of the disarmament obligation through
negotiations leading to the conclusion of a nuclear weapons convention.
In introducing the follow up of the ICJ resolution, Malaysia noted:
While a model draft convention prepared by leading international nuclear
disarmament experts is already in circulation as a basis of discussion, my delegation
is not ... suggesting the immediate negotiations on such a convention at this stage.
We believe the road towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons will be a long
The US nuclear bomb,
the B28R1, was
recovered from waters off
the coast of Spain after a
B-52 bomber collided with
its refueler, scattering four
nuclear bombs over the
Spanish countryside.
Photo: Natural Resources
Defense Council, Nuclear
Weapons Databook,
Volume 1.
28
and arduous one and would be best travelled through a series of well-defined stages,
accompanied by proper verification and control mechanisms. Such an approach is,
therefore, not incompatible with the step-by-step incremental approaches already
mooted by others.”
94
An incremental–comprehensive approach has many advantages over a purely
step-by-step approach. It would ensure that negotiations would continue beyond
the achievement of small steps. Negotiators, policy makers and the public would all
understand that the goal is not the small step but the complete measure. It could also
increase the momentum to complete the elimination process as governments and
citizens feel empowered by initial success and
develop greater confidence that the final goal is
achievable.
An incremental–comprehensive approach
would help to overcome the problems of
asymmetry in nuclear arsenals. Negotiating
parties would be willing to accept temporary
imbalances in forces or capabilities because
they would be confident that such temporary
imbalances would be rectified by subsequent
measures that would be part of the negotiating
program. Ultimately, the only real balance will
occur when no state possesses nuclear weapons.
If they recognize a clear program and can see
progress to reach that goal, states will more easily
agree to the steps along the way.
While the path to nuclear disarmament will
not mirror precisely the paths taken towards the
abolition of biological weapons, chemical weapons, and landmines, adopting a similar
comprehensive goal for nuclear disarmament, as was done in those treaties, will assist
the process.
The nuclear weapon states are resisting the incremental–comprehensive approach
because they are not prepared to accept the complete elimination of nuclear weapons,
and they see this as the slippery slope to elimination.
The UK, for example, opposed the 1998 UN resolution Towards a nuclear-weapon-
free world: the need for a new agenda
95
because it “advocates measures which we on
the national basis ... concluded ... would be at the present time inconsistent with the
maintenance of a credible minimum nuclear deterrence”.
96
It would probably be more accurate to describe the incremental–comprehensive
approach as a path rather than a slippery slope. Once we are on the path, reaching
the destination is easier than if we had not begun the journey, but there would still be
checks and resting points along the way if confidence and security were not sufficiently
developed to advance to the next step. For example, the Model NWC proposes a series
of phases for reducing the numbers of nuclear weapons. Before commencing a phase of
reductions, states would have the opportunity to affirm their confidence that other states
have implemented their obligations under the previous phase.
Stansfield Turner has noted that the most difficult step may be proceeding from
a few nuclear weapons to zero. He thus proposes a resting point prior to complete
elimination that would provide a “virtual zero”. This could be done by placing all
remaining nuclear weapons under a system of “strategic escrow”, which would “lock
up” the weapons but make them available if necessary in an emergency and with
permission from an international controlling agency.
97
The very fact that initial steps on the path had been taken would increase confidence
to take the next step. For example, the de-alerting of nuclear weapons, with appropriate
verification, is one of the suggested early steps in this approach. This measure would
increase confidence on all sides that they would not be subject to a surprise attack, or
General Lee Butler
and General Andrew
Goodpastor address
the National Press Club
in Washington, DC, to
announce the statement
by more than 50 other
retired generals and
admirals calling for the
elimination of nuclear
weapons.
Photo: Art Garrison
Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention
29
Section 1
to accidental or inadvertent launch of nuclear weapons. It would enable a move away
from launch-on-warning posture, as states would have advance warning of any moves
to re-alert an opposing force’s weapons before they could be launched.
At the outset, states may prefer not to remove warheads from the delivery vehicles
until they have confidence in the verification systems developed through the de-alerting
process. Once such confidence has been achieved, it would be much easier to adopt the
next disarmament measure.
In addition, an incremental–comprehensive approach would include threshold
states
98
and nuclear capable states
99
as participants in the negotiating process, thus
reducing or eliminating the continuing risk of nuclear proliferation, which has been a
key rationale used by the nuclear weapon states to hold onto their nuclear weapons.
100
Where Does the Nuclear Weapons Convention Fit?
The NWC fits into either a comprehensive approach or an incremental–
comprehensive approach. It provides a conceptual package for the complete
elimination of nuclear weapons, taking into consideration each of the following:
the security concerns that would need to be the subject of negotiations;
the technical difficulties in verifying the elimination of nuclear weapons and
the safe disposal of weapons materials; and
the legal mechanisms that would need to be established to implement the
process with fairness and enforcement capacity.
In addition, it is framed in order to encourage and encompass incremental measures
that could be adopted on the way to negotiating a complete convention.
Process for Negotiation
There are various perspectives on which negotiating forum can best achieve
nuclear disarmament. The Non-Aligned Movement has called for the Conference
on Disarmament “to establish, as the highest priority, an ad hoc committee to start
negotiations on a phased program for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons”.
101
The 2000 NPT Review Conference identified the necessity of establishing in the
Conference on Disarmament an appropriate subsidiary body with a mandate to deal
with nuclear disarmament.
102
The US, on the other hand, holds that “bilateral efforts which have already produced
concrete results in the area of nuclear disarmament remain, for the time being, the only
realistic approach to arms control”.
103
For this reason, the US opposes any negotiations,
or even discussions on negotiations, in the Conference on Disarmament.
Negotiations leading to the conclusion of an NWC would most likely require
packages of negotiations in different forums. Ultimately, the conclusion of negotiations
on an NWC will need to be folded into one specific multilateral forum. Most likely
that will be either the Conference on Disarmament or a special negotiating conference.
Work in other forums will be necessary, however, if there is to be progress towards the
final goal.
Bilateral Negotiations
The US and Russia continue to hold 95% of the world’s nuclear weapons – 26,000
of the 27,000 global total (and more than 90% of the 12,000 deployed nuclear
weapons).
104
Moreover, they maintain stockpiles of nuclear weapons at functionally
close to Cold War levels – much larger arsenals than are needed to strike all significant
“The nuclear weapon is
obsolete. I want to get
rid of it”
- General Charles Homer,
Former commander of US
Space Command.
30
military targets, as well as every moderate to large city in the world. Many targets are
targeted with multiple warheads. Other nuclear weapon states have indicated that they
will not join plurilateral negotiations on reductions until the stockpiles of the US and
Russia are brought down to levels comparable with their own. The most appropriate
way for US and Russian stockpiles to be further reduced is through bilateral
negotiations.
General Lee Butler has observed that numbers are not the key question—policy
is.
105
In this case, policy issues include forward deployment, level of authorisation
required to launch nuclear weapons, alert status of nuclear weapons, first use, potential
and thresholds for use, use against other weapons of mass destruction and non-WMD
threats, security assurances, commitment to abolition, transparency, and nuclear
weapons research and development. Plurilateral negotiations (amongst Nuclear Weapon
States
106
or nuclear-weapons-possessing states
107
) and multilateral negotiations,
particularly regarding policy aspects of nuclear disarmament, should therefore be
held concurrently with bilateral negotiations and should not be held hostage to any
difficulties in bilateral processes.
Number reductions, however, are not the only accomplishment in bilateral processes.
In negotiating and implementing bilateral treaties,
108
the US and Russia have also
established comprehensive missile and warhead destruction processes, verification
regimes, and confidence-building measures.
Some of these elements can be usefully included in plurilateral and multilateral
procedures yet to be negotiated. Transferring some of them into a multilateral context,
however, may be difficult or inappropriate. Certain information that neither state would
want to be made available to other states is shared confidentially. Certain technical
information could, for example, be useful to a threshold state wishing to advance its
nuclear program. Thus, there could be a need for additional bilateral agreements on
specific sensitive areas to be negotiated in conjunction with plurilateral and multilateral
agreements.
Plurilateral Negotiations
Different suggestions have been made for how negotiations could occur among
some or all of the nuclear weapon states recognized under the NPT (the US, Russia,
UK, France, and China) and those states that remain outside the treaty with nuclear
weapons (India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea). The Washington Council on
Non-Proliferation has suggested five-power or five-power-plus-one negotiations to
implement the NPT Article VI obligations for nuclear disarmament.
109
The proposal
envisages negotiations among the five NPT nuclear weapons states (China, France,
Russia, the UK and the US) with the possibility of including a non-nuclear state. In
1998, then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif of Pakistan proposed negotiations among
China, India, Pakistan, Russia and the US; India proposed negotiations among the then
eight nuclear weapon possessing states. In 2000, Russia offered to start negotiations
with the US to go down to 1,000 weapons on each side.
110
Plurilateral negotiations on certain aspects of nuclear disarmament may be useful.
Experience with bilateral negotiations indicates that progress can be made relatively
quickly on reductions of stockpiles, on verification and on confidence building when
negotiations and implementing mechanisms are kept to a small number of parties.
Some security issues regarding nuclear disarmament, particularly in regional contexts,
could also be handled more efficiently in negotiations among a small number of parties.
Plurilateral negotiations, however, should take place concurrently with multilateral
negotiations. Nuclear-capable states need to be incorporated in the negotiating process
in order to ensure that verification and compliance considerations that relate to them
are developed with their agreement and participation. Mechanisms and procedures
developed bilaterally and plurilaterally will need to be consistent with obligations and
approaches developed multilaterally.
Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention
31
Section 1
Non-nuclear-capable states also have an interest in being involved in the
negotiations. Nuclear weapons threaten all states and all people. Therefore, all states
and all people have an interest in and, indeed a responsibility for participating in
developing a regime for their elimination. As with the CTBT, some non-nuclear-
capable states also have expertise and technical facilities useful for the development of
implementation procedures and systems. Some non-nuclear-capable states also have
experience, skills, resources and creative ideas, communication channels and influence
that can make them valuable partners in negotiations, especially in overcoming
deadlocks.
Conference on Disarmament
The Conference on Disarmament (CD) was established as the primary multilateral
negotiating forum for disarmament. Along with its predecessor (the Eighteen-Nation
Disarmament Committee), it was the negotiating forum for the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty, the Biological Weapons Convention, the Chemical Weapons
Convention and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
The CD, however, has some drawbacks:
all its decisions are taken by consensus, meaning that any member state could
prevent the beginning of negotiations or their successful conclusion;
membership is limited to the current 65 members, although some countries
that are not members have expressed an interest in participating fully in such
negotiations.
The first drawback would also apply to some degree to other negotiating forums,
since it is unlikely that any of the nuclear weapon states will begin negotiations without
the involvement of all of the nuclear weapon states. Once all five nuclear weapon states
agree to begin negotiations, the other members most likely will also agree. The second
drawback may be overcome to some degree if provision is made for non-members
to attend sessions as observers and to make their views known unofficially; and/or if
membership can be expanded.
Non-Proliferation Treaty as a Negotiating Opportunity?
The parties to an existing treaty could negotiate a protocol, an amendment or even
a new treaty in order to further the aims and objectives of the current treaty. The
Philippines, for example, suggested in 1996 that the parties to the Non-Proliferation
Treaty convene a conference for the purpose of negotiating an NWC as a means to
implement Article VI of the NPT.
111
The Marshall Islands in 1997 proposed that the
2000 NPT Review Conference establish an inter-sessional working group to assist in
negotiations on an NWC.
112
If such a group were established, considerable preparatory
work for an NWC could commence even before the nuclear weapons states agree to
enter into negotiations.
Malaysia and Costa Rica submitted working papers to the 2000 and 2005 NPT
Review Conferences calling on States Party to the NPT to “agree to commence
multilateral negotiations leading to the conclusion of a nuclear weapons convention
and invite those States that have not acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons to join in such negotiations.”
113
Another proposal is that the parties to the NPT call a special conference to amend
the NPT.
114
The amendment, in the form of a negotiated protocol to the treaty, would prohibit
nuclear weapons and provide for their elimination. While obtaining agreement from
the nuclear weapon states on such a protocol could be difficult, the NPT requires a
conference to be held to discuss the proposal if one-third of the parties to the treaty
32
request such a conference. A similar approach was taken in 1991 when one-third
of the parties to the Partial Test Ban Treaty requested a conference at which they
proposed amending the PTBT to make it a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. While the
nuclear weapon states did not agree to the amendment, the process did help achieve a
negotiating mandate for a CTBT in the Conference on Disarmament.
International Conference
Another possible avenue to negotiations leading to an NWC would be the
establishment of an ongoing international conference especially for this purpose. The
Law of the Sea, for example, was negotiated through the establishment, by the UN
General Assembly, of the Law of the Sea Conferences. The establishment of a special
negotiating body allows for the creation of an appropriate negotiating forum. The Law
of the Sea Conferences used a combination of formal and informal structures, including
a number of working groups, which suited the large number of issues to be negotiated.
In 1998, the UN General Assembly called for “the convening of an international
conference on nuclear disarmament at an early date with the objective of arriving at
an agreement on a phased programme of nuclear disarmament and for the eventual
elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified framework of time through a nuclear
weapons convention”.
115
Establishing an international conference to negotiate an NWC would have a distinct
advantage: this would leave the CD free to continue its work on other disarmament
issues, such as prevention of an arms race in outer space and transparency in
armaments. The CD would also be able to conclude agreements on certain steps
towards nuclear disarmament on which it is already working, such as the Fissile
Material Cut-Off Treaty.
Then-UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan called for an international conference at
the 2000 NPT Review conference and again in his report to the Millennium Summit.
In their initial resolution voted on 4 December 1998, the New Agenda Coalition
also called for an international conference. In its 59
th
recommendation, the WMD
Commission also called for the United Nations General Assembly to convene a World
Summit on disarmament, non-proliferation and terrorist use of weapons of mass
destruction, to meet after thorough preparations. This World Summit should also
discuss and decide on reforms to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the UN
disarmament machinery.
United Nations Subcommittees on nuclear disarmament
In 2005, a group of States including Brazil, Canada, Kenya, Mexico, New
Zealand and Sweden floated a proposal for the UN General Assembly to establish
sub-committees to commence work on four disarmament items – negative security
assurances, a fissile materials treaty, nuclear disarmament and prevention of an arms
race in outer space.
116
This proposal was similar to the idea of a UN negotiating conference, with the
difference that it envisaged that the subcommittees would merely commence work that
would be concluded by the Conference on Disarmament. The rationale for the proposal
was that the commencement of such work should not be delayed by the consensus
procedures of the CD – procedures that have allowed one or two States to prevent any
substantial progress in the CD on nuclear disarmament items since negotiations on the
CTBT were concluded in 1996.
If such committees were established they would provide an opportunity to
commence deliberations and negotiations on an NWC even if not all NWS would be
ready to participate.
Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention
33
Section 1
Ottawa-style process
In the early 1990s, efforts were underway to negotiate an additional protocol to the
Inhumane Weapons Convention,
117
which would restrict or prohibit anti-personnel
landmines. When it became clear at the 1996 IWC Review Conference that a
prohibition on anti-personnel landmines could not be achieved due to opposition by a
few key States, an alternative approach was announced by Canada’s Foreign Minister
Lloyd Axworthy which became known as the Ottawa process. Axworthy invited all
interested States to Ottawa to negotiate and adopt a treaty prohibiting anti-personnel
landmines. The negotiations concluded with adoption of the treaty in 1997 and it
entered into force following the 40
th
ratification in 1998.
While the Mine Ban Treaty has not been ratified by all States, it has been
instrumental in strengthening the global norm against landmines and generating
sufficient political will to move some States which previously employed landmines to
relinquish them, and others to announce that they intend to do so in due course.
118
The situation with nuclear weapons is not the same as with landmines. While both
weapons are indiscriminate, inhumane and arguably illegal, their nature, effects,
military and political utility differ enormously, as does the current situation with
regard to constraint regimes. In the case of nuclear weapons, the world already has an
Ottawa-style treaty, i.e. one in which those countries prepared to abandon the weapons
have joined: it is the NPT. What is required with nuclear weapons is to go beyond an
Ottawa-style treaty and develop a process to involve all States including NWS and
non-Parties to the NPT.
Despite these differences, there is considerable merit in the concept of an
independent deliberating and negotiating conference on nuclear abolition in which all
States are invited to join, and which can begin work on nuclear abolition measures
even if not all the NWS currently participate or agree. Like the Ottawa process, such an
ongoing conference would generate considerable media coverage and political pressure
on NWS and non-NPT States to abandon nuclear deterrence and war-fighting and
embrace abolition.
The deliberations could provide a useful forum for developing plans and procedures
required for the abolition of nuclear weapons, including consideration of such key
issues as security assurances, compliance measures, verification, disposition of fissile
material, transparency versus commercial and State confidentiality, development of
individual rights (whistleblower protection) and responsibilities (including scientific
responsibilities and criminal law).
Such deliberations could also lead to the adoption and implementation of measures
that could assist abolition even prior to the beginning of abolition negotiations by
the NWS. This could include, for example, establishment of verification systems
and adoption of national abolition measures including more robust criminal law and
prohibition of transit of nuclear weapons and fissile materials through areas within
national jurisdiction, including airspace and territorial waters.
There are a number of possible candidates to initiate or lead an Ottawa-style
process including a NWS, a non-Party to the NPT, a State that has relinquished nuclear
weapons, a group of States that have abandoned nuclear weapons (such as within
NWFZs) or a State or States that have particular political significance in relation to
nuclear disarmament (such as Japan or the New Agenda Coalition).
119
i) Nuclear Weapon State
A process led by a NWS would be very influential on the other NWS. The most
obvious candidate from amongst the NWS would be the United Kingdom which has
acknowledged that a Nuclear Weapons Convention will be required at some stage in
the future, has reduced the operational readiness of its nuclear weapons, and has begun
work on verification of its nuclear weapons as would be required once negotiations
34
begin. The UK, however, has indicated its unwillingness to take any further
disarmament steps until the numbers of weapons held by the US and Russia are down
to the hundreds rather than the thousands. UK government plans to renew its Trident
nuclear arsenal, supported by the House of Commons on 14 Mar 2007, may preclude
the UK taking a lead on nuclear disarmament unless this position is overturned. China
has indicated support for negotiations on a nuclear weapons convention, but has been
unwilling to take any practical steps that would advance this.
ii) State non-Party to the NPT
The NWS and some of their allies might be dismissive of a process led by a State
non-Party to the NPT, as they might see it as an attempt by that State to gain an
international platform to criticize the NWS but take no responsibility for its own
nuclear policies. Thus, if a non-Party to the NPT led this process, it would need to
commit itself to some nuclear disarmament steps from the outset in order to build
credibility.
The most likely candidate would be India, which advanced the Rajiv Gandhi plan
for nuclear abolition under a previous Congress-led government. The current Congress-
led government has indicated an interest in reviving and updating the Rajiv Gandhi
plan and on seeking opportunities to make progress.
120
iii) State which has relinquished nuclear weapons or a nuclear weapons
development program
Candidates here would include Argentina, Belarus, Brazil, Kazakhstan, Libya,
South Africa and the Ukraine. Each State has nuclear disarmament credibility having
willing relinquished nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons programmes. Argentina
and Brazil possibly have more experience than the others in verification of nuclear
disarmament agreements as a result of the measures developed under the Agreement
for the Exclusively Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy Argentina and Brazil, 1991. If they
worked collectively these States would generate considerable interest and political
impetus.
iv) Nuclear Weapon Free Zone States Parties
The regional NWFZs have started inter-zone communication and collaboration in
order to strengthen the existing NWFZs, encourage establishment of additional zones
and contribute to the achievement of a nuclear weapons-free world. This includes a
process led by Brazil and New Zealand to consolidate a Southern Hemisphere and
Adjacent Areas NWFZ, and the first meeting of States Parties to NWFZs hosted by
Mexico in 2005.
A nuclear abolition process led by the NWFZ State Parties, now numbering 113,
would have the political weight of the numbers of States sponsoring the process, the
moral credibility of having forsworn nuclear weapons and an already established
connection with the NWS (as signatories to the NWFZ protocols).
v) Japan
Mayors for Peace has proposed a “Hiroshima process” to make progress towards
nuclear abolition. They envisage States being invited to Hiroshima to begin
deliberations and negotiations for nuclear abolition. A problem with this proposal is
that without the support of the Japanese government, other States may be reluctant
to see this as a State-State negotiating process. On the other hand the initiative is
worth considering given the surprisingly strong development of the Mayors for Peace
abolition campaign, which in three years has recruited more than 1500 mayors from
cities around the world including the capitals of NWS, and thus their potential to
generate political will.\
vi) New Agenda Coalition
The New Agenda Coalition (Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, Slovenia,
South Africa and Sweden) has been very effective in advancing a nuclear disarmament
Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention
35
Section 1
program in such a way as to engage all NPT members including NATO members and
the NWS. The success of the 2000 NPT Review Conference is due in large part to the
New Agenda Coalition and their skilful diplomatic approach. An independent abolition
process led by the NAC would thus hold diplomatic credibility. On the other hand, the
NAC as currently functioning may not be able to muster sufficient influence with the
NWS or States not Parties to the NPT to generate sufficient political will to move the
NWS and non-NPT States to join the process. If the NAC elevated itself to Heads of
State level, such as was done by the Six Nation Initiative in the 1980s, backed up with
a concerted diplomatic effort, it might be able to generate sufficient political clout to
generate real traction.
Participation of Civil Society
As noted earlier, the elimination of nuclear
weapons will require participation not just by
governments, but also by various sectors of civil
society. Scientists, engineers, technicians and
corporations working in the nuclear field are the most
obvious participants, given their technical expertise
and the responsibility they will have to ensure that no
work in other nuclear-related fields is diverted into
nuclear weapons work. Beyond that, individuals and
organizations involved in education, public policy,
law, health, human rights, environmental stewardship,
social justice, ethics, religion and other fields must be
included to ensure that a nuclear-weapon-free regime
is widely accepted and promoted. The general norm
against nuclear weapons will need to be inculcated
at all levels of society in order to make any breakout by states or non-state actors
unthinkable and unsupported. Individuals will have a responsibility under an NWC to
refuse to participate in activities that would support nuclear weapons, and to report any
such activities that come to their attention. Thus, wide awareness and understanding of
the NWC throughout global society will be important.
Negotiations for the Mine Ban Treaty and the International Criminal Court included
substantial input from non-government organizations (NGOs). Negotiations for an
NWC, likewise, should include wide involvement of the constituents of civil society,
not only through governments, but also through interested and experienced NGOs.
Political Will
Currently the leaders of the nuclear weapon states do not have the political will to
abolish nuclear weapons and are influenced by strong political forces not to develop
such will. Barring a massive nuclear catastrophe, or the emergence of new and
visionary global leaders, only the combined efforts of citizens and supportive non-
nuclear governments are likely to persuade them to move.
The concept of an NWC can be an important tool in these efforts, exploring many
concerns that are sure to arise as the nuclear weapon states consider moving away from
a security policy that they know and with which they have lived for decades, albeit
very dangerously and with many undesired consequences.
The NWC approach also provides a way to ease or reverse the opposition of nuclear
weapons scientists, engineers, and corporations to nuclear disarmament. Considerable
scientific and engineering expertise and corporate involvement will be necessary for
the destruction of nuclear weapons and for the verification of the nuclear-weapon-free
Demonstrations like this
one at the former Soviet
test site in Kazakhstan
helped to close it down.
Photos: James Lerager
36
regime, and for the safeguarding of fissile materials and the means to produce them, for
the essentially indefinite future.
Progress on nuclear abolition requires political, legal and technical developments.
These are interrelated, and improvement in one area can stimulate improvement in the
others. Rather than waiting for progress on one of these fronts before working on the
others, therefore, we can improve the chances for overall progress by enabling efforts
towards complete nuclear disarmament in any and every relevant sector. To reiterate,
the crucial ingredient currently lacking is political will. But it is also clear that, in the
words of former US Vice-President Al Gore, political will is a renewable resource.
Political will and visionary leadership have never been more urgently needed on an
issue of greater moment to our collective future on planet Earth.
_________________________________________________________________________
Endnotes to Section 1
1
General Assembly vote on 6 December 2006, 125 in favour to 27 against, with 29 abstentionsA/RES/61/83 Follow-up
to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons,
http://daccess-ods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?Open&DS=A/RES/61/83&Lang=E
2
UN General Assembly Resolution 1 (1) Establishment of a Commission to Deal with the Problems Raised by the
Discovery of Nuclear Energy, adopted 24 January 1946.
3
See Tom Farer, (1995), ‘New Players in the Old Game: The De Facto Expansion of Standing to Participate in Global
Security Negotiations’, American Behavioral Scientist, Vol. 38 No. 6, p. 842., Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink,
Activists beyond Borders (1998), Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY and London., Ann. M, Florini, (2000), The Third
Force. Japan Center for International Exchange, Japan and Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington
D.C.
4
“Closing the Circle on the Splitting of the Atom”, U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Environmental Management,
January 1995, p. 9.
5
See Nuclear verification: Working paper submitted by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 2000
Conference of States Party to the NPT, http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/npt/NPTDocuments/mc1docs/ukwp.html
6
General Assembly vote on 6 December 2006, 125 in favour to 27 against, with 29 abstentionsA/RES/61/83 Follow-up
to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons,
http://daccess-ods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?Open&DS=A/RES/61/83&Lang=E
7
Final Document of the XII Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement, Durban, September 1998.
8
The Mayors for Peace is designed to build solidarity and facilitate coordination among the cities that support the
Program to Promote the Solidarity of Cities toward the Total Abolition of Nuclear Weapons. Its primary goal is to work
internationally to raise consciousness regarding nuclear weapons abolition. It is also formally committed to pursuing
lasting world peace by working to address starvation, poverty, refugee welfare, human rights abuses, environmental
destruction, and other problems that threaten peaceful coexistence.
http://www.mayorsforpeace.org/english/index.html
9
Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, Canberra, Australia, 1996. Available at Canberra
Commission homepage: www.dfat.gov.au/cc/cchome.html.
10
Daalder, Ivo H. The Limited Test Ban Treaty. In: Carnesale Albert, and Richard N. Haass, eds., Superpower Arms
Control: Setting the Record Straight. Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger. 1987.
11
NPT Principles and Objectives. See Final Document of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, Decision
2, paragraph 4: “The achievement of the following measures is important in the full realization and effective
implementation of Article VI, including the program of action as reflected below:...(a) The completion by the
Conference on Disarmament of the negotiations on a universal and internationally and effectively verifiable
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty no later than 1996....”
12
William Walker, Evolutionary versus Planned Approaches to Nuclear Disarmament”, Disarmament Diplomacy No. 15,
May 1997. Disarmament Diplomacy is published by the Acronym Institute, website: www.gn.apc.org/acronym/.
13
See Nuclear Weapons Convention Monitor: updating the debate on the prohibition and elimination of nuclear
weapons, Issue 2, April 2001, http://www.ippnw.org/PDF%20files/NWMonitor2.pdf
Nuclear Weapons Convention Monitor: updating the debate on the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons,
Issue 3, June 2002, http://www.ippnw.org/PDF%20files/NWCM3.pdf
14
See Weapons of Terror: Freeing the World of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Arms, Final Report of the
Commission on Weapons on Mass Destruction, 1 June 2006, Sweden. See in particular Chapter 8. Compliance,
verification, enforcement and the role of the United Nations.
15
Verification of nuclear disarmament: final report on studies into the verification of nuclear warheads and their
components’, Working Paper submitted to the 2005 NPT Review Conference by the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland, April 18, 2005, NPT/CONF.2005/WP.1
16
See for example:
- Laying the Foundations for Getting to Zero: Verifying the Transition to Low Levels of Nuclear Weapons, Patricia
Lewis, VERTIC, September 1998
- Verifying the Transition from Low Levels of Nuclear Weapons to a Nuclear Weapon-Free World, Tom Milne and
Henrietta Wilson, VERTIC, June 1999
- Virtual Nuclear Capabilities and Deterrence in a World Without Nuclear Weapons, George Paloczi-Horvath, VERTIC,
October 1998
- Sustaining a Verification Regime in a Nuclear Weapon-Free World, Suzanna Van Moyland, VERTIC, June 1999.
17
See: - 28 States Participate: Inaugural “Article VI Forum” United Nations, New York, October 3, 2005
http://www.middlepowers.org/mpi/pubs/ArticleVI_Report.pdf
Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention
37
Section 1
- Gaining Confidence in Nuclear Disarmament Steps: Final Report from Second meeting of Article VI Forum,
http://www.gsinstitute.org/mpi/pubs/Hague_A6F_Final.pdf
- MPI Hosts Third Meeting of Article VI Forum in Ottawa, MPI Event Report, Ottawa, Canada, September 28-29, 2006.
http://www.middlepowers.org/mpi/archives/000319.shtml#000319
18
See for example:
- INESAP Bulletin Issue No. 25, April 2005, Transformation of the Nuclear Control Regime From the NPT to Nuclear
Abolition, http://www.inesap.org/bulletin25/index.htm
- INESAP Bulletin Issue No. 14, November, 1997, Searching For The Bomb: Nuclear Disarmament Verification
http://www.inesap.org/bulletin14/bulletin14.htm
19
In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam, Robert McNamara, Time Books, 1995, p.346.
20
According to a 15 May 2003 press release from the Korean Committee for Solidarity with World Peoples, a
mouthpiece for the North Korean government:
“The Iraqi war taught the lesson that “nuclear suspicion,” “suspected development of weapons of mass destruction”
and suspected “sponsorship of terrorism” touted by the U.S. were all aimed to find a pretext for war and one would fall
victim to a war when one meekly responds to the IAEA’s inspection for disarmament. Neither strong international public
opinion or big country’s opposition to war nor the UN charter could prevent the U.S. from launching the Iraqi war. It is
a serious lesson the world has drawn from the Iraqi war that a war can be averted and the sovereignty of the country
and the security of the nation can be protected only when a country has a physical deterrent force, a strong military
deterrent force capable of decisively repelling any attack to be made by any types of sophisticated weapons.”
21
See Dr. Khan’s Nuclear WalMart, Christopher Clary, Disarmament Diplomacy, Issue No. 76, March/April 2004,
http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd76/76cc.htm
22
5000 MT (BAS Jan/Feb 07 p34) divided by 15 Kt (0.015 MT) = 330,000
23
Jacques Chirac, 19 January 2006, “The leaders of states who would use terrorist means against us, as well as those
who would envision using . . . weapons of mass destruction, must understand that they would lay themselves open to a
firm and fitting response on our part,” Chirac said during a visit to a nuclear submarine base in Brittany. “This response
could be a conventional one. It could also be of a different kind.”
24
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ),
July 8), U.N. Doc. A51/218 (1996), reprinted in 35 I.L.M. 809 & 1343 (1996). The Advisory Opinion and separate
declarations and opinions of judges are available on the website of IALANA: www.ddh.nl/org/ialana/opiniontable.html.
25
Board of Directors. It is 5 minutes to midnight. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. 2007;63(1):66-71.
26
A Nuclear Crisis, Jimmy Carter, Washington Post, 23 FEBRUARY 2000
27
Abolition of Nuclear Weapons, GENERAL LEE BUTLER*, 4 DECEMBER 1996 NATIONAL PRESS CLUB,
WASHINGTON, DC
28
George P. Shultz, Henry A. Kissinger, William J. Perry, Sam Nunn. A world free of nuclear weapons. Wall Street
Journal. 4 Jan 2007, pA15.
29
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, entered into force 1970.
30
ICJ Advisory Opinion, op. cit., note 7.
31
Canberra Commission, op. cit., note 3.
32
Melman Group poll, “Public Attitudes on Nuclear Weapons,” commissioned by the Stimson Center, interviews Sept.
10-15, 1997.
33
ICJ Advisory Opinion, Declaration of President Bedjaoui, op. cit., note 7.
34
Scientific Committee on Problems of the Environment, International Council of Scientific Unions. Environmental
consequences of nuclear war. SCOPE 28. Vols 1 & 2 Chichester, Wiley, 1989.
35
Turco RP, Toon OB, Ackerman TP, Pollack JB, Sagan C. Climate and smoke: an appraisal of nuclear winter. Science
1990; 247:166-76.
36
Toon OB, Turco RP, Robock A, Bardeen C, Oman L, Stenchikov GL. Consequences of regional scale nuclear
conflicts and acts of individual nuclear terrorism. Atmos Chem Phys Discuss 2006;6:11745-816.
37
Robock A, Oman L, Stenchikov GL, Toon OB, Bardeen C, Turco RP. Climate consequences of regional nuclear
cnflicts. Atmos Chem Phys Discuss 2006;6:11817-843.
38
See www.abolition2000.org
39
UNGA Res. 51/45 M, December 10, 1996. UNGA Res. 52/38 O, December 9, 1997. UNGA Res. 53/77 W, December
4, 1998 (See Documents section for copies of the most recent resolution).
40
UNGA Resolution 52/38 L adopted on December 9, 1997; UNGA Resolution 52/39 C, adopted on December 9, 1997;
UNGA Resolution 53/77 X adopted on December 4, 1998; UNGA Resolution 53/78 D, adopted on December 4, 1998.
41
Members of the Commission included Michel Rocard (former Prime Minister of France), General Lee Butler (former
Head of US Strategic Command) and Robert MacNamara (former US Secretary of Defense).
42
Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, Final Report Part 2,
http://www.dfat.gov.au/cc/cc_report2.html
43
‘A Nuclear-Weapons-Free World: The Need for a New Agenda,’ Joint Declaration by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs
of Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, Slovenia, South Africa and Sweden, 9 June 1998
44
H.Res 479, 105th Congress, 2d Session, June 18, 1998, H.Res.82, 106th Congress, 1st Session, February 24,
1999.
45
Resolution to the 109
th
Congress calling for nuclear abolition,
http://www.gsinstitute.org/pnnd/docs/US_Kucinich_abolition_bill.pdf
46
H. R. 2545 Nuclear Disarmament and Economic Conversion Act of 1999
47
“28 States Participate: Inaugural Article VI Forum” United Nations, New York, October 3, 2005
http://www.middlepowers.org/mpi/pubs/ArticleVI_Report.pdf
48
Weapons of Terror, Recommendation 30,p. 109
49
Weapons of Terror, p. 109
50
Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation On Strategic Offensive Reductions, May
2002.
http://www.state.gov/t/ac/trt/18016.htm#1
51
Statement by John Holum, Acting Undersecretary of State and Director of the US Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency, UN First Committee, October 14, 1998
52
UNGA Res. 50/70 P, 12 December 1995.
53
“Towards a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World: The Need for a New Agenda”, joint declaration of the foreign ministers of
Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, Slovenia, South Africa and Sweden, June 9, 1998.
54
United States Explanation of Vote on UN General Assembly Resolution L.45, November 10, 1998.
38
55
Other treaties, including the treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Pelindaba and Bangkok, (establishing nuclear-weapon-
free zones in Latin America, South Pacific, Africa and Southeast Asia, respectively), the Non-Proliferation Treaty and
the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the
Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof, act to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons rather than
to implement disarmament of existing stockpiles.
56
Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations, US Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2006,
http://www.nukestrat.com/us/jcs/JCS_JP3-12_05draft.pdf
57
US Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations, Final Coordination, 15 March 2005, p xii.
58
Weapons of terror, p 93.
59
NRDC Nuclear Notebook, in Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, November/December 1998, p66.
60
An FMCT will nevertheless still be a useful treaty to achieve as it could well develop procedures and accumulate
information which will be useful once the nuclear weapon states agree to a path of verified disarmament. Complete
monitoring of civilian fissile material production and of stockpiles of fissile material will be necessary to develop
confidence in compliance with a nuclear abolition regime (See Section 4, Verification).
61
The Indian government was one of the first to call for a CTBT and had been a strong supporter of it up until the final
stages of the negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. India proposed language in the CTBT linking
it with a commitment for nuclear disarmament within a time bound framework. Rather than addressing this proposal
in the negotiations, a draft text of the CTBT, which had not been agreed by all delegations at the CD, was presented
to the United Nations General Assembly and forced through with a vote. India and Pakistan opposed the resolution. A
press statement released by the Indian government on 15 May 15 1998, following their nuclear tests noted that “It is
because of the continuing threat posed to India by the deployment of nuclear weapons... that we have been forced to
carry out these tests.”
62
See “Stewardship Smokescreen”, Hisham Zerriffi and Arjun Markhijani, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, September/
October 1996.
63
Victor Sidel, “Why Abolitionists Should Not Support the CTBT in Its Current Form” Victor Sidel, Medicine and Global
Survival, October 1998. Vol. 5, Issue 3. See also accompanying article, Daryl Kimball, “Why the CTBT Is Still an
Essential Step Toward Nuclear Abolition”.
64
French President Jacques Chirac highlighted this when he announced a resumption of French testing in 1995 in
order to “perfect computer simulation techniques that would end the need for further (physical) testing”. NY Times, 6
Sept. 1995.
65
The Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission in Weapons of Terror, cite SIPRI and the Federation of American
Scientists data and calculate 27,000 nuclear warheads.
66
The US Doctrine for Joint Theater Nuclear Operations of 1996, for example, holds that nuclear “operations must
be planned and executed to destroy or eliminate enemy WMD (weapons of mass destruction) delivery systems and
supporting infrastructure before they can strike friendly forces.”
67
Sir Nicholas Lyell, UK Attorney General, Statement to the International Court of Justice, November 15, 1995.
68
John McNeill, Senior Deputy General Counsel for the Department of Defense. Statement to the International Court of
Justice, November 15, 1995.
69
“Ban the Bomb?” The Nation, January 9/16, 1995.
70
“An Incremental Strategy for Nuclear Disarmament: Rationale and Practical Considerations,” Harald Muller,
Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation, April, 1998.
71
“A Faustian Bargain: Why Stockpile Stewardship is Fundamentally Incompatible with the Process of Disarmament”,
Western States Legal Foundation, April 1998. See also “Stockpile Stewardship of Nuclear Weapons: The Deal to
Subsidize Nuclear Weaponeers”, Facing Reality, CA 1998.
72
See, e.g., “Selected Accidents Involving Nuclear Weapons 1950-1993”, Greenpeace, March 1996, at
http://www.greenpeace.org/~comms/nukes/ctbt/read3.html.
73
Statement by Arundhati Ghose, Ambassador of India to the UN in Geneva, to the Conference on Disarmament,
February 15, 1996.
74
Of the states possessing nuclear weapons, only China, India Pakistan and North Korea support comprehensive
disarmament. All four have called for negotiations on a nuclear weapons convention.
75
See Snaring the Sun: Opportunities to prevent nuclear weapons proliferation and advance nuclear disarmament
through an abolition framework, Alyn Ware, Dr Kate Dewes and H.E. Michael Powles, Disarmament and Security
Centre, February 2005. http://www.disarmsecure.org/publications/papers/snaringsun.html
See also International Ju-Jitsu: Using United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 to advance nuclear
disarmament, Alyn Ware, Disarmament and Security Centre, July 2004, http://www.disarmsecure.org/publications/
papers/Ju-Jitsu.html
76
Appeal from Hiroshima and Nagasaki - for a Total Ban on and the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons. http://www10.
plala.or.jp/antiatom/html/e/egensu/documents/hnappeal.htm
77
Statement by International Generals and Admirals, December 5, 1996 http://www.gsinstitute.org/archives/000014.
shtml
78
The Future of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy, Committee on International Security and Arms Control, National
Academy of Sciences, National Academies Press, 1997. http://books.nap.edu/catalog/5796.html#toc
79
Statement by Heads of State and Civilian Leaders Worldwide, February 2, 1998, Washington, D.C. National Press
Club, http://www.nuclearfiles.org/menu/key-issues/nuclear-weapons/issues/civil-society/cranston_statement-heads-
state.htm
80
The Morality of Nuclear Deterrence, June 1998. http://www.ccnr.org/pax_christi.html
81
“Fifteen years ago we concurred with Pope John Paul II in acknowledging that, given the context of that time,
possession of these weapons as a deterrent against the use of nuclear weapons by others could be morally
acceptable, but acceptable only as an interim measure and only if deterrence were combined with clear steps toward
progressive disarmament... In 1998 the global context is significantly different from what it was a few years ago... We
raise up our voices with those around the world in calling for an end to the reliance on nuclear deterrence and instead
call upon the United States and the other nuclear weapons states to enter into a process leading to the complete
elimination of these morally offensive weapons.”
82
An Appeal to End the Nuclear Threat: Concerned Americans Speak Out. New York Times advertisement, 3 October
2000, http://www.gsinstitute.org/gsi/pubs/rsp_ad.pdf
83
U.S. Mayors Ask Bush to Commit to Eliminating Nuclear Weapons, 25 June 2001. http://www.gsinstitute.org/
archives/000061.shtml#000061
84
World Council of Churches 9
th
Assembly. Minute on the Elimination of Nuclear Arms. Porto Alegre, Brazil, 14-23 Feb 2006.
Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention
39
Section 1
85
Weapons of Terror, p. 109
86
Francis Sejersted, December 10, 1997. Speech at the presentation of the Nobel Peace Award to the International
Campaign to Ban Landmines.
87
Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to
Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects.
88
Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their
Destruction.
89
Blaiklie, B. Speech to the Canadian Parliament November 3, 1997
90
“Nuclear Weapons Convention on Track: UN Resolution, Incremental Comprehensive Approaches and the Drafting
Process.” INESAP Information Bulletin, December 11, 1996.
91
Canberra Commission, op. cit., note 3.
92
“Towards a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World: The Need for a New Agenda”, op. cit., note 22.
93
UNGA Res. 51/45 M, December 10, 1996. UNGA Res. 52/38 O, December 9, 1997. UNGA Res. 53/77 W, December
4, 1998 (See Documents section for copies of the most recent resolutions.)
94
Ambassador Hasmy Agam, Permanent Representative of Malaysia to the United Nations. United Nations First
Committee, October 12, 1999.
95
UNGA Resolution 53/77 Y, December 4, 1998.
96
R. Tauwhare, United Kingdom. Debate of the UN First Committee, October 27, 1998.
97
Stansfield Turner, Caging the Nuclear Genie, Westview Press, 1997.
98
India and Pakistan are resistant to joining the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty,
and to negotiating a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty. However both states indicated that they would have supported the
CTBT and would support FMCT if they were linked to a program for complete nuclear disarmament.
99
All nuclear weapon capable states, ie those with nuclear reactors, are members of the Conference on Disarmament,
which would most likely be the negotiating body for the major multilateral elements of a program for nuclear
disarmament.
100
The US Defense Department’s 1994 Annual Report, for example, noted that “...US nuclear weapons and nuclear
posture can play a role in deterring the acquisition of nuclear weapons by other nations.”
101
Final Document of the XII Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement, Durban, Sep 1998.
102
2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Final Document,
Vol 1, NPT/CONF.2000/28, access at disarmament.un.org/wmd/npt/finaldoc.html
103
US Explanation of Vote before the vote on United Nations General Assembly resolution A/C.1/52/L.37, Nov 10,
1997.
104
Weapons of Terror, p36.
105
General Lee Butler, public meeting, 3 March 1999, Ottawa, Canada.
106
Those States which had tested nuclear weapons as at Jan 1 1970. This includes China, France, Russia, the United
Kingdom and the United States
107
This currently includes NWS as well as India, Israel, Pakistan and North Korea.
108
Including the ABM, START, INF and Moscow treaties, the Hot Line and Nuclear Accidents Agreements, and the
Agreement on Notifications of Launches of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles and Submarine Launched Missiles.
109
“An Article VI Negotiating Forum of Five Plus One”, Nuclear Disarmament: How Much Have the Five Nuclear
Powers Promised in the Non-Proliferation Treaty?, Washington Council on Non-Proliferation, June 1994.
110
In November 2000, President Putin of Russia made a statement proposing that the next round of negotiations
between Russia and the US in the Strategic Arms Reduction or START series of treaties, entail much deeper
reductions, down to a level of 1,000 to 1,500 warheads for each side. See Patrick E. Tyler, ‘Eyeing U.S. Missile
Defense, Russia Wants Less Offense’ New York Times 15 November 2000, http://www.nytimes.com/2000/11/15/world/
15RUSS.html?ex=1169096400&en=424982ff94fff67a&ei=5070
111
Statement by Philippines President Fidel Ramos. Manila. July 9, 1996.
112
General considerations to be taken into account by Parties in the Review Process. Submitted by the Marshall
Islands. NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/11, 11 April 1997.
113
Follow-up to the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear
Weapons: Legal, technical and political elements required for the establishment and maintenance of a nuclear weapon-
free world: Working Paper submitted by Malaysia, Costa Rica, Bolivia, Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste, Nicaragua,
and Yemen. 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, New
York, 2-27 May 2005, http://www.lcnp.org/disarmament/npt/2005NPTmalaysia-wp.htm
114
“Diplomatic Judo: Using the NPT to make the nuclear weapons states negotiate the abolition of nuclear weapons”,
Zia Mian and M.V.Ramana, Center for Energy and Environmental Studies, Princeton University, October 1998.
114
UNGA 53/77 X, adopted December 4, 1998.
116
“Initiating work on priority disarmament and non-proliferation issues” Draft elements of an UNGA60 First Committee
Resolution, Brazil, Canada, Kenya, Mexico, New Zealand and Sweden, http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/
1com/1com05/docs/draftelementsinitiating.pdf
117
Convention on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of certain conventional weapons which may be deemed to be
excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects (1981).
118
See “A Ban against landmines? Never!” Jody Williams, in Peace is Possible, Fredrik Heffermehl (ed) International
Peace Bureau, Geneva, 2000.
119
For more on the potential of an Ottawa Style process for negotiating an NWC and additional support measures, see
Snaring the Sun: Opportunities to prevent nuclear weapons proliferation and advance nuclear disarmament through an
abolition framework, Alyn Ware, Dr Kate Dewes and H.E. Michael Powles, Disarmament and Security Centre, February
2005. http://www.disarmsecure.org/publications/papers/snaringsun.html
120
See Rajiv Gandhi Action Plan for a Nuclear-Weapons-Free World (Draft Convention), Mani Shankar Aiyar MP,
presentation at an international parliamentary forum: From Nuclear Dangers to Cooperative Security: Parliamentarians
and the Legal Imperative for Nuclear Disarmament. Liu Institute for Global Issues, University of British Colombia,
Vancouver, Nov 7-9, 2003, http://www.gsinstitute.org/pnnd/reports.html, and
A gaffe, or a historic chance? Praful Bidwai, Frontline, Volume 22 - Issue 01, Jan. 01 - 14, 2005, http://www.flonnet.
com/fl2201/stories/20050114007112400.htm
40
Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention
41
Section 2
Section
2
Model Nuclear Weapons Convention
Convention on the Prohibition of the
Development, Testing, Production, Stockpiling,
Transfer, Use and Threat of Use of Nuclear
Weapons and on Their Elimination.
with
Comments and Critical Questions
42
Summary of the Model
Nuclear Weapons Convention
General Obligations
The Model Nuclear Weapons Convention prohibits development, testing,
production, stockpiling, transfer, use and threat of use of nuclear weapons. States
possessing nuclear weapons will be required to destroy their arsenals according to
a series of phases. The Convention also prohibits the production of weapons-usable
fissile material and requires delivery vehicles to be destroyed or converted to make
them non-nuclear capable.
Declarations
States parties to the Convention will be required to declare all nuclear weapons,
nuclear material, nuclear facilities and nuclear weapons delivery vehicles they possess
or control, and the locations of these.
Phases for Elimination
The Convention outlines a series of five phases for the elimination of nuclear
weapons beginning with taking nuclear weapons off alert, removing weapons from
deployment, removing nuclear warheads from their delivery vehicles, disabling the
warheads, removing and disfiguring the “pits” and placing the fissile material under
international control. In the initial phases the U.S. and Russia are required to make the
deepest cuts in their nuclear arsenals.
Verification
Verification will include declarations and reports from States, routine inspections,
challenge inspections, on-site sensors, satellite photography, radionuclide sampling
and other remote sensors, information sharing with other organizations, and citizen
reporting. Persons reporting suspected violations of the convention will be provided
protection through the Convention including the right of asylum.
An International Monitoring System will be established under the Convention to
gather information, and will make most of this information available through a registry.
Information which may jeopardize commercial secrets or national security will be kept
confidential.
National Implementation Measures
States parties are required to adopt necessary legislative measures to implement their
obligations under the Convention to provide for prosecution of persons committing
crimes and protection for persons reporting violations of the Convention.
States are also required to establish a national authority to be responsible for
national tasks in implementation.
Rights and Obligations of Persons
The Convention applies rights and obligations to individuals and legal entities as
well as States. Individuals have an obligation to report violations of the Convention
and the right to protection if they do so. Procedures for the apprehension and fair trial
of individuals accused of committing crimes under the treaty are provided.
Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention
43
Section 2
Agency
An agency would be established to implement the Convention. It will be responsible
for verification, ensuring compliance, and decision making, and will comprise a
Conference of States Parties, an Executive Council and a Technical Secretariat.
Nuclear Material
The Convention prohibits the production of any fissionable or fusionable material
which can be used directly to make a nuclear weapon, including plutonium (other
than that in spent fuel) and highly enriched uranium. Low enriched uranium would be
permitted for nuclear energy purposes.
Cooperation, Compliance and Dispute Settlement
Provisions are included for consultation, cooperation and fact-finding to clarify and
resolve questions of interpretation with respect to compliance and other matters. A
legal dispute may be referred to the International Court of Justice by mutual consent of
States Parties. The Agency also is empowered to request an advisory opinion from the
ICJ on a legal dispute.
The Convention provides for a series of graduated responses for non-compliance
beginning with consultation and clarification, negotiation, and, if required, sanctions or
recourse to the U.N. General Assembly and Security Council for action.
Relation with Other International Agreements
The Model NWC would build on existing nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament
regimes and verification and compliance arrangements, including the Non-Proliferation
Treaty, International Atomic Energy Agency Safeguards, Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty Organisation International Monitoring System and bilateral agreements between
Russia and the United States. In some cases the NWC may add to the functions and
activities of such regimes and arrangements. In other cases, the NWC would establish
additional complementary arrangements.
Financing
Nuclear weapon states are obliged to cover the costs of the elimination of their
nuclear arsenals.
However, an international fund will be established to assist states that may have
financial difficulties in meeting their obligations.
Optional Protocol Concerning Energy Assistance
The Convention does not prohibit the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.
However it includes an optional protocol which would establish a program of energy
assistance to promote sustainable energy resources for States parties choosing not to
develop nuclear energy or to phase out existing nuclear energy programs.
44
CONTENTS: MODEL NUCLEAR WEAPONS CONVENTION
Preamble 46
I. General Obligations 48
A. State Obligations 48
B. Obligations of Persons 49
II. Definitions 50
A. States and Persons 50
B. Nuclear Weapons 50
C. Nuclear Energy, Explosion, and Explosive Device 50
D. Nuclear Material 51
E. Nuclear Facilities 52
F. Nuclear Activities 53
G. Verification 55
I. Delivery Vehicles 56
III. Declarations 58
A. Nuclear Weapons 58
B. Nuclear Material 58
C. Nuclear Facilities 58
D. Delivery Vehicles 59
IV. Phases for Implementation 60
A. General Requirements 60
B. Extension of Deadlines 60
C. Reciprocity in Extensions 60
D. Phases 60
E. Special Provision 62
V. Verication 63
A. Elements of Verication Regime 63
B. Activities, Facilities, and Materials Subject to Verification 63
C. Rights and Obligations of States Parties with Respect to Verification 63
D. Confidence-Building Measures 64
E. Relation to Other Verification Arrangements 64
F. Implementation 65
VI. National Implementaion Measures 66
A. Legislative Implementation 66
B. Relations Between the State Party and the Agency 67
C. Confidentiality 67
D. Relation to implementation measures assumed or required under other arrangements 67
VII. Rights and Obligations of Persons
A. Crimes Under this Convention 68
B. Responsibility to Report Crimes 68
C. Protection for Persons Providing Information 68
VIII. Agency
A. General Provisions 70
B. Conference of State Parties 70
C. Executive Council 72
D. Technical Secretariat 74
63
68
70
Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention
45
Section 2
E. Privileges and Immunities 76
F. Registry and Other Databases 77
G. International Monitoring System 77
IX. Nuclear Weapons 79
A. General Requirements 79
B. Procedures for Destroying Nuclear Weapons 79
C. Prevention of Production of Nuclear Weapons 79
X. Nuclear Material 80
A. Reconstruction and Documentation 80
B. Control of Special Nuclear Material 80
C. Licensing Requirements 80
D. Relation to other International Agreements 81
XI. Nuclear Facilities 82
A. Nuclear Weapons Facilities 82
B. Command, Control, and Communications Facilities and Deployment Sites 82
C. Nuclear reactors, enrichment and reprocessing facilities, nuclear materials storage
sites and other nuclear-fuel cycle locations outside of facilities. 83
D. Activities at nuclear facilities 83
XII. Nuclear Weapons Delivery Vehicles 84
XIII. Activities Not Prohibited Under This Convention 85
XIV. Cooperation, Compliance and Dispute Settlement 86
A. Consultation, Cooperation and Fact-finding 86
B. Measures to Redress a Situation and to Ensure Compliance, Including Sanction 90
C. Settlement of Disputes 90
XV. Entry Into Force 92
A. Conditions of Entry Into Force 92
B. State Waiver of Entry Into Force Requirements 92
XVI. Financing 93
XVII. Amendments 94
XVIII. Scope and Application of Convention 96
A. Relation to Other International Agreements 96
B. Status of the Annexes 96
C. Duration and Withdrawal 96
D. Reservations 96
XIX. Conclusion of Convention 97
A. Signature 97
B. Ratification 97
C. Accession 97
D. Depository 97
E. Authentic Texts 97
Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes 98
Optional Protocol Concerning Energy Assistance 99
Annex I: Nuclear Activities 100
A. Guidelines for Schedules of Nuclear Activities 100
B. Schedule of Nuclear Activities 101
Annex II: Nuclear Weapon Components 103
Annex III: List of countries and geographical regions for the purpose of Article VII.C.23 104
Annex IV: List of Countries with Nuclear Power Reactors 105
Annex V: List of Countries with nuclear power reactors and/or nuclear research reactors 105
46
Preamble
We the people of the Earth, through the States Parties to this Convention:
Convinced that the existence of nuclear weapons poses a threat to all humanity and that their use
would have catastrophic consequences for all the creatures of this Earth;
Noting that the destructive effects of nuclear weapons upon life on earth are uncontrollable in time
or space;
Aware that amongst weapons of mass destruction, the abolition of which is recognized as being
in the collective security interest of all people and States, nuclear weapons are unprecedented and
unequalled in destructive potential;
Affirming that the inherent dignity and equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human
family include the right to life, liberty, peace and the security of person;
Convinced that all countries have an obligation to make every effort to achieve the goal of
eliminating nuclear weapons, the terror which they hold for humankind and the threat which they pose
to life on Earth;
Recognizing that numerous regions, including Antarctica, Outer Space, Latin America and the
Caribbean, the Sea Bed, the South Pacific, Southeast Asia, Africa, and Central Asia have already been
established as nuclear weapon free zones, where possession, production, development, deployment,
use and threat of use of nuclear weapons are forever prohibited, and desiring to extend this benefit to
the entire planet for the good of all life;
Determined to eliminate the risks of environmental pollution by radioactive waste and other
radioactive matter associated with nuclear weapons and to ensure that the bounty and beauty of the
Earth shall remain the common heritage of all of us and our descendants in perpetuity to be enjoyed
by all in peace;
Recognizing the universal need for environmentally safe, sustainable energy;
Gravely concerned that the use of nuclear weapons might be brought about not only intentionally
by war or terrorism, but also through human or mechanical error or failure, and that the very existence
and gravity of these threats of nuclear weapons use generates a climate of suspicion and fear which
is antagonistic to the promotion of universal respect for and observance of the human rights and
fundamental freedoms set forth in the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights;
Convinced of the serious threats posed to the environment by nuclear arsenals, the economic and
social costs and waste of intellectual talent occasioned by these arsenals and the efforts required to
prevent their use, the dangers inherent in the existence of the materials used to make nuclear weapons
and the attendant problems of proliferation, the medically and psychologically catastrophic effects of
any use of a nuclear weapon, the potential effects of mutations on the genetic pool and numerous other
risks associated with nuclear weapons;
Welcoming the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction and the Convention on the
Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their
Destruction, as indications of a progression toward the elimination of all weapons of mass destruction;
Recognizing that all life is sacred and that there is a moral imperative to eliminate all weapons of
mass destruction;
Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention
47
Section 2
Welcoming the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of
Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, as an indication of progress towards the prohibition
and elimination of weapons which are indiscriminate and cause unnecessary suffering;
[Welcoming the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism as an
indication of progress in addressing the threat of acquisition, use or threat of use of nuclear weapons by
non-State actors;]
Welcoming also the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, in particular the recognition
of individual responsibility for crimes involved in employing weapons which cause unnecessary
suffering or which are inherently indiscriminate;
Believing that the threat and use of nuclear weapons is incompatible with civilized norms, standards
of morality and humanitarian law which prohibit the use of inhumane weapons and those with
indiscriminate effects;
Recalling Resolution 1(I), adopted unanimously on January 24, 1946 at the First Session of the
General Assembly of the United Nations, and the many subsequent resolutions of the United Nations
which call for the elimination of atomic weapons;
Recalling also the Final Document of the United Nations First Special Session of the General
Assembly on Disarmament 1978, which calls for the elimination of nuclear weapons;
Mindful of the solemn obligations of States made in Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to end the nuclear arms race at an early date and achieve nuclear
disarmament, and to further commitments on specific steps to achieve nuclear disarmament in the
“Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament” agreed in 1995, and the
“
Practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement Article VI of the Treaty on
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons” agreed in 2000;
Convinced that the elimination of nuclear weapons is an important step towards the goal of general
and complete disarmament and that the implementation of disarmament obligations would strengthen
international law and peaceful relations between countries;
Welcoming the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of July 8, 1996, which
concluded “that the threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of
international law applicable in armed conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian
law”, and concluded unanimously that “There exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to
a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective
international control”;
Recalling United Nations General Assembly resolutions 51/45 M, of 10 December 1996, 52/38
O of 9 December 1997, 53/77 W of 4 December 1998, 54/54 Q of 1 December 1999, 55/33 X of 20
November 2000, 56/24 S of 29 November 2001, 57/85 of 22 November 2002, 58/46 of 8 December
2003, 59/83 of 3 December 2004, 60/76 of 8 December 2005, and 61/83 of 6 December 2006 which
underline the nuclear disarmament obligation affirmed by the International Court of Justice and
call “upon all States to fulfill that obligation immediately by commencing multilateral negotiations
... leading to an early conclusion of a nuclear weapons convention prohibiting the development,
production, testing, deployment, stockpiling, transfer, threat or use of nuclear weapons and providing
for their elimination”;
Convinced that a convention prohibiting the development, testing, production, stockpiling, transfer,
use and threat of use of nuclear weapons and providing for their elimination is required to abolish these
weapons from the Earth;
Have agreed as follows:
48
I. General Obligations
A. State Obligations
1. Each State Party to this Convention undertakes never under any circumstances:
a. To use or threaten to use nuclear weapons;
b. To engage in any military or other preparations to use nuclear
weapons;
c. To develop, test, produce, otherwise acquire, deploy, stockpile,
maintain, retain, or transfer nuclear weapons except as specified under
paragraph 4 of this Article;
d. To develop, test, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile, retain, transfer
or use proscribed nuclear material except as specified under paragraph
4 of this Article;
e. To develop, test, produce, otherwise acquire, deploy, stockpile,
maintain, retain, or transfer nuclear weapons delivery vehicles;
f. To develop, test, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile, maintain,
retain, or transfer nuclear weapon components or equipment as
specified in this Convention;
g. To fund [or conduct] nuclear weapons research, with the exception of
nuclear disarmament research;
h. To assist, encourage, induce or permit, in any way, directly or
indirectly, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited under this
Convention.
2. Each State Party undertakes:
a. To destroy all nuclear weapons it owns or possesses, or that are
located in any place under its jurisdiction or control, in accordance
with the provisions of this Convention;
b. To destroy all nuclear weapons it abands on the territory of another
State, in accordance with the provisions of this Convention;
c. To submit all nuclear facilities to preventive controls;
d. To destroy all nuclear weapons facilities it owns or possesses, or that
are located in any place under its jurisdiction or control, or to convert
such facilities to weapons destruction facilities or other facilities not
prohibited by this Convention;
e. [To disable or destroy all facilities, systems or sub-systems designed
or used in the command or control of nuclear weapons, or convert
such facilities, systems or sub-systems to purposes not prohibited
under this Convention;]
f. To destroy or convert for purposes not prohibited under this
Convention all nuclear weapons delivery vehicles and nuclear weapon
components;
g. To place all special nuclear material under preventive controls as
specified in this Convention.
The prohibition on
funding nuclear
weapons research
(subparagraph 1.g)
replaces the prohibition
on research in the 1997
MNWC, as this would
be pragmatically and
ethically problematic.
The bracketed language
would maintain this
prohibition, which some
respondents consider
essential.
Preventive controls entail
obligations additional to
safeguards and would
imply new obligations on
the part of non-nuclear
weapon states. (See
Verification Section 4.)
There is no satisfactory
answer yet to the
question of verification
of command and control
facilities.
Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention
49
Section 2
h. To participate in good faith in activities aimed at the promotion of
transparency with respect to nuclear weapons and related technologies
and the promotion of education for the purposes of detecting and
preventing activities prohibited under this Convention;
i. To report violations of this Convention to the Agency [and to
cooperate to the fullest with the Agency’s investigative, monitoring
and verification functions;] [and to provide to the Agency
all information requested by the Agency for the purposes of
implementing this Convention, except such information as may be
with-held for legitimate international or national security or trade
secret concerns;]
j. To enact all domestic legislation necessary for the implementation of
this Convention.
3. These obligations shall apply equally to nuclear explosive devices intended for
peaceful purposes.
4. These obligations shall not be interpreted to prohibit activities consistent
with the application and implementation of the provisions of this Convention
[including but not limited to transfer of nuclear weapons, special nuclear
material, and nuclear weapons delivery vehicles for the purpose of their
destruction or disposal, and nuclear disarmament research and verification
thereof].
B. Obligations of Persons
5. The following acts are crimes for which persons shall be held responsible
regardless of their position, residence, citizenship or country of incorporation:
a. To engage or attempt to engage in any acts listed in subparagraphs 1.a
through 1.g, inclusive, of this Article;
b. To aid, abet, or otherwise assist, in any way, anyone to engage in any
activity prohibited under this Convention.
6. The fact that the present Convention provides criminal responsibility for
individuals does not affect the responsibility of States under international law.
Subparagraph 2.h
promotes transperancy
and education. This
is a response to the
argument that nuclear
weapons technology
and knowledge cannot
be disinvented. (See
also Critical Question
on Knowledge and
Reversibility.)
Paragraph 4 is necessary
in order to ensure
implementation that
is consistent with the
purposes of the NWC.
Some responses
indicated that the
bracketed language
should be deleted
because it leaves room
for loopholes. The
question of intent and
the difficulty of defining
technical criteria for all
provisions that turn on
intent surface here and
elsewhere.
50
II. Definitions
A. States and Persons
1. “Nuclear Weapons State” means a state which has manufactured and
exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to
1 January 1967
2. “Nuclear Capable State” means [a State which has developed or has
the capacity to develop nuclear weapons and which is not party to the
Non-Proliferation Treaty]
3. “Person” means a natural or legal person.
B. Nuclear Weapons
4. “Nuclear Weapon” means:
a. Any device which is capable of releasing nuclear energy in an
uncontrolled manner and which has a group of characteristics
that are appropriate for use for warlike purposes;
b. Any nuclear explosive device;
c. Any radiological weapon; or
d. Any weapon which is designed to include a nuclear explosive
device as a trigger or other component.
5. “Nuclear Weapon Component” means any constituent part of a
nuclear weapon. [excluding the special nuclear material when
separated from other components]
6. “Nuclear Weapons Delivery Vehicle” means any vehicle designed
for or capable of delivering a nuclear weapon. Any nuclear weapons
delivery vehicle that has been constructed, developed, flight-tested or
deployed for weapon delivery shall be considered a nuclear weapons
delivery vehicle.
7. “Plutonium Pit” means the core element of a nuclear weapon’s
primary or fission component.
8. “Radiological Weapon” means any weapon that disperses radioactive
material or uses radioactive material as a primary material in its
construction.
9. “Warhead” means the explosive part of a nuclear weapons system.
Warheads consist of nuclear materials, conventional high explosives,
related firing mechanisms and containment structure.
C. Nuclear Energy, Explosives, and Explosive Devices
10. “Nuclear Energy” means energy released from the nucleus of an atom
either spontaneously or through interaction with other particles and/or
electromagnetic radiation.
11. “Nuclear Explosion” means the release of significant amounts of
nuclear energy on a time-scale faster than or comparable to chemical
explosives [including micro-fission, micro-fusion or miniaturized
devices of any yield].
The definition of Nuclear
Weapons State is
consistent with the
definition in the Non-
Proliferation Treaty.
The 1997 Model NWC
definition of ‘Nuclear
Threshold State’ has
been replaced with
“Nuclear Capable State”
and includes all States
outside of the NPT that
have a current capability
to produce nuclear
weapons. States which
could develop a nuclear
capability in the future
are not defined but
rather listed in the annex
on States with nuclear
reactors.
“Natural person” means
an individual. “Legal
person” includes, for
example, corporations.
Definition 4.a. is
borrowed from the
Treaty of Tlatelolco.
Definitions 4.b,c and
d update and expand
this definition to cover
modern weapons that
use nuclear technology.
Nuclear weapons are
generally understood to
be warheads (which have
guidance systems and
are delivered by missiles)
or gravity bombs
(delivered by aircraft).
Notes:
[..] Square brackets
indicate alternative
language or optional text
Within Article II
{Definition}, each category
begins with the definition
of the categorical term.
Other definitions follow in
alphabetical order.
The text makes reference to a
“Verification Annex” which
would form an integral part of
a negotiated NWC, but is not
included in this Model NWC
Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention
51
Section 2
12. “Nuclear Explosive Device” means any device capable of undergoing
a nuclear explosion, irrespective of its purpose. The term includes
such a weapon or device in unassembled and partly assembled forms,
as well as devices or assemblies which belong to a nuclear explosive
device or are a modification of such suitable for development and
testing of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, but
does not include the means of transport or delivery of such a weapon
or device if separable from and not an indivisible part of it.
13. “Significant Amount of Nuclear Energy” means more than the energy
released by radioactive decay and spontaneous fission and may be
much smaller than the maximum energy yield of the largest chemical
explosions.
D. Nuclear Material
14. “Nuclear Material” means any source or fissionable or fusionable
material as defined in this Convention.
15. “Exemption Quantities” mean quantities of nuclear material not
prohibited under the provisions of this Convention [and preventive
controls].
16. “Fissionable Material” means any isotope which may undergo either
spontaneous fission or fission induced by neutrons of any energy, as
well as any compound or mixture including such isotopes.
17. “Fusionable Material” means any isotope capable of undergoing
fusion with the same kind of nuclide or with any other nuclide by
applying sufficient conditions (pressure, temperature and inclusion
time) with technical means.
18. “Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU)” means uranium in which the
naturally occurring U-235 isotope (0.7% in natural uranium) is
increased to 20% U-235 or above.
19. “Low Enriched Uranium (LEU)” means uranium enriched in the
isotopic content of U-235 but to less than 20% of the total mass.
20. “Mixed Oxide Fuel (MOX fuel)” means nuclear reactor fuel
composed of plutonium and uranium oxides.
21. [“Other Special Nuclear Material” means special nuclear material
other than plutonium and uranium enriched to 20% or more U-235 or
U-233.]
22. “Proscribed fissionable material” means any fissionable material
that can be used for the manufacture of nuclear weapons without
transmutation, chemical reprocessing or further enrichment, and
includes any isotopic mixture of separated and un-irradiated
plutonium, uranium enriched in the isotopes 235 to 20% or more,
uranium-233.
23. “Proscribed fusionable material” means any fusionable material
that can be used for the manufacture of nuclear weapons without
transmutation, redoxation or further enrichment.
24. “Proscribed nuclear material” means any proscribed fissionable or any
proscribed fusionable material.
25. “Significant quantity” means the approximate quantity of nuclear
material in respect of which, taking into account any conversion
See Critical Question on
Nuclear Energy.
The number of nuclides
that fall under the
definition of fushionable
material may change
with scientific-technical
progress.
The terms , ‘proscribed’
material, are offered to
cover all materials that
are to be banned under
the MNWC. Proscribed
fissionable material does
not include plutonium in
spent fuel or plutonium
that is irretrievably
stored.
52
process involved, the possibility of manufacturing a nuclear explosive
device cannot be excluded.
26. “Source Material” means uranium containing the mixture of isotopes
occurring in nature; uranium depleted in the isotope U-235, thorium,
lithium beyond naturally occurring concentration, deuterium, helium-
3, or any of the foregoing in the form of metal, alloy, chemical
compound or concentrate.
27. “Special Fissionable Material” means fissionable material that can be
used for the manufacture of nuclear weapons.
28. “Special Fusionable Material” means any fusionable material that
can be used for the manufacture of nuclear weapons and includes
deuterium, tritium, helium-3, and lithium-6.
29. “Special Nuclear Material” means any special fissionable or any
special fusionable material.
E. Nuclear Facilities
30. “Nuclear Facility” means any facility for the research, testing,
production, extraction, enrichment, processing, reprocessing, or
storage of nuclear material; any facility for the production of nuclear
energy; any facility for the research, development, testing, production,
storage, assembly, disassembly, maintenance, modification,
deployment, or delivery of nuclear weapons, or nuclear weapon
components; or any facility deemed a nuclear facility by the Technical
Secretariat. The term “Nuclear Facility” includes [but is not limited
to] the following:
31. “Command, Control or Communication Facility”, means [any facility
designed or used for the purpose of launching, targeting, directing or
detonating a nuclear weapon or its delivery vehicle, or for aiding or
assisting in any of these purposes.]
32. “Deployment Site” means the location where a nuclear weapon is or
has been deployed, or a location which is equipped for the deployment
of nuclear weapons.
33. “Nuclear Enrichment Facility” means a facility capable of increasing
the ratio of the isotope uranium-235 in natural uranium.
34. “Nuclear Material Storage Facility” means a facility for the interim or
long-term storage of nuclear material.
35. “Nuclear Reactor” means any device in which a controlled, self-
sustaining fission chain-reaction can be maintained or in which a
controlled fission chain is maintained partly by an external source of
neutrons.
36. “Nuclear Reprocessing Facility” means a facility to separate irradiated
nuclear material and fission products in whole or in part, and includes
the facility’s head-end treatment section and its associated storage and
analytical sections.
37. “Nuclear Weapons Destruction Facility” means any facility for
disassembly or destruction of nuclear weapons or for rendering them
permanently inoperable.
38. “Nuclear Weapons Facility” means any facility for the design,
research, development, testing, production, storage, assembly,
The definition of C3
facilities may not be
necessary if such
facilities were no longer
used for the command
and control of nuclear
weapons by the time
of entry into force of
the NWC. In any case,
verification of nuclear
activities at these
facilities would be
difficult, so trust among
States would have to
be strong.
It is necessary to draw
a distinction between
deployment sites and
storage facilities not
located in deployment
sites, since a deployment
site will have facilities for
storage. This distinction
could be made by
requiring a certain
distance between a
deployment site and any
storage facility.
Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention
53
Section 2
maintenance, modification, deployment, delivery, command, or
control of nuclear weapons or Schedule 1 or Schedule 2 nuclear
weapon components.
39. “Nuclear Weapons Production Facility” means any nuclear facility
which produces materials which have been or may be used for
military purposes, including such a reactor, a plant for processing
nuclear material irradiated in a reactor, a plant for separating the
isotopes of nuclear material, a plant for processing or fabricating
nuclear material, a plant for the construction or assembly of nuclear
weapon components, or a facility or plant of such other type as may
be deemed a Nuclear Weapons Production Facility by the Technical
Secretariat.
40. “Nuclear Weapons Research Facility” means any facility in which
nuclear weapons research, development, testing or computer
simulation is conducted.
41. “Nuclear Weapons Storage Facility” means a facility for the storage
of nuclear weapons but does not include such a facility located on a
deployment site.
42. “Nuclear Weapons Testing Facility” means a facility or prepared site
for conducting nuclear weapons testing.
F. Nuclear Activities
43. “Nuclear Activity” means:
a. Any construction or use of a nuclear reactor or component parts
thereof;
b. Any production, use or threat of use of a nuclear weapon;
c. Any research, development or testing of nuclear energy or nuclear
weapons;
d. Any production, separation, treatment or handling of nuclear
material;
e. Any dismantling, disabling or destruction of nuclear weapons;
f. Any decommissioning of nuclear reactors and power plants;
g. Any application of radiation and isotopes in food, agriculture,
medicine, engineering, geology or other industrial processes; or
h. Any other activity listed below or deemed a nuclear activity by the
Agency.
44. “Convert” means modify to a use not prohibited under this
Convention.
45. “De-alert” means reduce the alert status of nuclear weapons by
eliminating launch-on-warning or launch-under-attack alert readiness
postures, e.g., by removing key trigger mechanisms, decoupling
warheads from nuclear weapons delivery vehicles or other means.
46. “Deployment of a nuclear weapon” means prepare or maintain a
nuclear weapon for possible use by any of the following:
a. placing it on, in or near a delivery system;
b. moving it to or maintaining it at a location suitable for delivery to a
target.
47. “Destroy” means, with regard to a nuclear weapon, to remove the
As long as they exist,
nuclear weapons
destruction facilities
would be under
verification to ensure
that they are not used for
prohibited activities.
The definition nuclear
weapons facility does
not include nuclear
weapons destruction
facilities.Thus, all nuclear
weapons facilities
can be closed or
decommissioned even
while weapons are being
destroyed. If disassembly
and destruction of
nuclear weapons were
both to take place
at nuclear weapons
facilities, this definition
wold require refining.
A nuclear weapons
production facility
might but would not
necessarily be a complex
that includes research,
storage, destruction,
reprocessing, or testing
facilities. It would also
include facilities for the
production of nuclear
weapon components
that are non-nuclear.
Nuclear weapons
storage facilities do
not include such
facilities if located on a
deployment site because
of the requirement that
warheads and bombs be
stored seperately from
their delivery vehicles.
54
warhead from its delivery vehicle, dismantle and irreversibly disable
the warhead and its components, and dismantle and disable or convert
the delivery vehicle to non-nuclear use, in accordance with the
provisions of this Convention.
48. “Disable” means:
a. with regard to a nuclear weapon, to render the weapon unable to be
detonated by such means as disengaging or removing the arming fuse
and firing mechanisms;
b. with regard to a plutonium pit, to render it unable to be used in a
nuclear weapon, e.g., by disfiguring, quenching, squeezing, dilution,
mixing with highly radioactive waste, immobilization and disposition,
transmutation or other means;
c. with regard to command and control systems for nuclear weapons,
to render such systems incapable of initiating or directing the launch
of nuclear weapons delivery vehicles;
d. with regard to a nuclear weapons delivery vehicle, to render such
vehicle unable to launch a nuclear weapon including such means as
removing essential components and removing the delivery vehicle
from the launch facilities.
49. “Disassemble” or “Dismantle” means:
a. with regard to nuclear weapons, to take apart the warhead and
remove the subassemblies, components, and individual parts;
b. with regard to a nuclear weapons delivery vehicle, to separate the
essential component parts, such as warheads, propulsion and guidance
units.
50. “Immobilization” means the process of putting nuclear material into
non-weapons usable form without irradiation, e.g., by mixing with
highly radioactive isotopes and encasing into a matrix of another
material in order to render separation of the nuclear material from the
matrix technically difficult. Immobilization includes vitrification and
encasing nuclear material in ceramic.
51. “Nuclear Disarmament Research” means research intended to further
the purposes of this Convention.
52. “Nuclear Weapons Research” means experimental or theoretical
work undertaken principally to acquire new knowledge going beyond
publicly available information of phenomena and observable facts
directed toward understanding, development, improvement, testing,
production, deployment, or use of nuclear weapons.
53. “Nuclear Weapons Testing” means nuclear explosions, computer
simulations, hydrodynamic tests, hydronuclear tests designed to
simulate behavior of nuclear materials, nuclear warheads, nuclear
weapons or their components, under nuclear explosive conditions, and
sub-critical testing using nuclear materials.
54. “Reprocessing” means the separation of irradiated nuclear material
and fission products in whole or in part.
55. “Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons” means any act, whether physical
or verbal, including the maintenance of a previously stated policy that
creates or is intended to create a perception that a nuclear weapon
may or will be used.
Disposition refers to
irretrievable disposal
of nuclear weapons
usable material. There
is no known satisfactory
technology for
disposition yet.
The definition of nuclear
disarmament research
was deemed necessary
to distinguish between
prohibited and necessary
research with respect to
the NWC. This concept
requires more analysis
and discussion.
Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention
55
Section 2
56. “Uranium Enrichment” means the process of increasing the
percentage of U-235 isotopes so that the uranium can be used as
reactor fuel or in nuclear weapons.
57. “Use of Nuclear Weapons” means the detonation of a nuclear weapon.
G. Verification
58. “Verification” means a comprehensive system for ensuring the
compliance with and implementation of this Convention. Verification
measures include obtaining, providing, and assuring the accuracy of
information on nuclear weapons, nuclear material, nuclear facilities,
and nuclear weapons delivery vehicles, including information in
archives, data bases, and transportation systems, through declarations,
monitoring, agreements on sharing information, consultation and
clarification, on-site inspections, confidence-building measures,
reporting and protection, preventive controls, and any other measures
deemed necessary by the Agency.
59. “Abuse of the Right of Verification” means obtaining information,
or attempting to obtain information, through verification activities,
for purposes not relating to the verification or implementation of and
compliance with this Convention.
60. “Confidence-Building Measures” means voluntary measures by
States Parties to supply information, additional to that required, to
the Technical Secretariat or to other States Parties in order to develop
greater confidence in compliance with the Convention. These could
include bilateral or multilateral agreements on monitoring and
information sharing between States Parties.
61. “Dual-access” means access to nuclear weapons, nuclear material,
or nuclear facilities that requires authorization of a State Party and
another State Party or the Agency.
62. “Reconstruction” means undertaking good faith scientifically sound
efforts to produce or reproduce data that is not readily available
regarding past production of nuclear material. Reconstruction
measures include gathering and reviewing past data records, analyzing
production capacity and estimating the range of quantity of nuclear
material produced, and interviewing individuals with knowledge of
the operation of a nuclear facility under review.
63. “Preventive Controls” mean provisions adopted by the Agency to
ensure that nuclear material and nuclear facilities are not used for any
military or other purpose prohibited under this Convention.
a. The goals of preventive controls include:
i. Timely detection of diversion of nuclear material to allow
a response before the material can be fabricated into a
nuclear weapon;
ii. Deterring clandestine activities through the possibility of
detection;
iii. Prevention of diversion through physical safety
procedures and transfer of national access to dual-access.
b. Preventive controls encompass safeguards of the IAEA (including
all provisions of the 93+2 Programme), EURATOM, ABACC or other
bodies; agreements among States; and agreements between States and
the Agency.
Dual-access agreements
establish a “two-key”
model of access, which
may be worked out
bilaterally or multilaterally
among States, or
between States and the
Agency. No State Party
would have exclusive
national access to
nuclear weapons, nuclear
material or nuclear
facilities it formally owned
or possessed after Phase
I. Eventually dual-access
agreements would be
between States and the
Agency. Dual-access
is distinct from national
control with international
monitoring, which would
apply to early de-alerting
measures.
Preventive controls
may include the
establishment of
procedures for transport,
treatment, storage and
disposition of such
materials, including
the establishment of
environmental guidelines
on such activities.
56
c. Preventive controls apply to all nuclear weapons, nuclear material
and nuclear facilities. The degree of restrictiveness, accountability
and accessibility vary according to the risks posed by these weapons,
materials or facilities to the purposes of this Convention. Preventive
controls may include:
i. Accountancy and surveillance of nuclear material in any
form;
ii. Containment of special nuclear material in any form;
iii. Guidelines for the transport, treatment, handling, storage
and disposition of nuclear material;
iv. Environmental guidelines;
v. Dual-access agreements for all nuclear weapons facilities
and nuclear storage facilities for proscribed nuclear material.
64. “Technical Means” means the independent gathering or analysis of
information which may have relevance to verification of the Convention,
without physically accessing the territory being inspected.
65. “National Technical Means” (NTM) comprise nationally-owned and
operated technologies and techniques used to monitor the activities of
other states, including their compliance with treaty obligations. [NTM
include satellites, aircraft, remote monitoring, signals intelligence
(SIGINT) and open source information.]
66. “Open Skies” means a regime for the conduct of observation flights by
States Parties over the territories of other States Parties.
I. Delivery Vehicles
67. “Nuclear Weapons Delivery Vehicle” means any vehicle designed
for or capable of delivering a nuclear weapon. Any nuclear weapon
delivery vehicle which has been constructed, developed, flight-tested
or deployed for weapon delivery shall be considered a nuclear weapon
delivery vehicle.
68. “Ballistic Missile” means a missile that
a. consists of single or multiple stage(s) whose sole means of
propulsion is an internal rocket engine that is functional over all or a
portion of the flight path;
b. follows a ballistic trajectory over the remaining unpowered portion
of a flight path;
and
c. is devoid of active aerodynamic surfaces.
69. “Air-to-Surface Ballistic Missile (ASBM)” means a ballistic missile
that is installed in an aircraft or on its external mountings for the purpose of
being launched from this aircraft.
70. “Ground-Launched Ballistic Missile (GLBM)” means a ground-
launched ballistic missile that is a weapon-delivery vehicle.
See discussion of
Preventive Controls in
Section 4 of this book.
Technical means
encompass national
technical means (state
systems of surveillance)
and international
technical means of the
Agency.
Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention
57
Section 2
71. “Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM)” means a land-based
ballistic missile with a range in excess of 5,500 kilometers.
72. “Submarine [Sea] Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM)” means a
ballistic missile designed to be launched from a submarine or other
naval vessel.
73. “Cruise Missile” means an unmanned, self-propelled weapon delivery
vehicle that sustains flight through the use of aerodynamic lift over
most of its flight path. Cruise Missiles include:
a. Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM);
b. Ground Launched Cruise Missile (GLCM);
c. Sea Launched Cruise Missile (SLCM).
74. “Intermediate-Range Missile” means a ballistic or cruise missile
having a range capability “in excess” of 1,000 kilometers but not i
excess of 5,500 kilometers;
75. “Shorter-Range Missile” means a ballistic or cruise missile having
a range capability equal to or in excess of 500 kilometers but not in
excess of 1,000 kilometers;
76. “Bomber” means an airplane which was initially constructed or later
converted to be equipped for bombs or air-to-surface missiles.
77. “Heavy Bomber” means a bomber which satisfies either of the
following criteria:
a. its range is greater than 8,000 kilometers; or
b. it is equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs.
78. “Nuclear-Capable” in relation to delivery vehicles means able to
deliver and activate a nuclear weapon.
79. “Nuclear-Capable Missile” means a missile able to deliver any
payload over 300 kilometers.
80. “Nuclear-Capable Submarines” includes ballistic missile submarines,
cruise missile submarines and attack submarines capable of delivery
of nuclear weapons.
58
III. Declarations
A. Nuclear Weapons
Each State Party shall submit to the Registry, not later than [30] days after this
Convention enters into force for it, the following declarations, in which it shall, in
accordance with the standards and guidelines set forth in the Verification Annex:
1. Declare whether it owns or possesses or has owned or possessed any nuclear
weapons, or whether there are any nuclear weapons located in any place under
its jurisdiction or control;
2. Specify the precise location, aggregate quantity and detailed inventory of
nuclear weapons it owns or possesses, or that are located in any place under its
jurisdiction or control.
3. Report any nuclear weapons on its territory that are owned or possessed by
another State or under the jurisdiction or control of another State, whether or
not that State is a Party to this Convention.
4. Declare whether it has transferred or received, directly or indirectly, nuclear
weapons and specify the transfer or receipt of such weapons.
5. Provide its general plan for destruction of nuclear weapons that it owns or
possesses, or that are located in any place under its jurisdiction or control.
B. Nuclear Material
Each State Party shall submit to the Registry the following declarations, in which
it shall, in accordance with the standards and guidelines set forth in the Verification
Annex:
6. Not later than [60] days after this Convention enters into force for it, declare
an inventory of all special nuclear material it owns or possesses or that is
located within its jurisdiction or control, whether intended for civilian or
military use.
7. Not later than [90] days after this Convention enters into force for it, declare
an inventory of all other nuclear material it owns or possesses or that is located
within its jurisdiction or control, whether intended for civilian or military use.
8. Not later than [120] days after this Convention enters into force for it, submit
a report on the availability of data with respect to nuclear material produced in
the past, including estimates regarding missing data and extent of uncertainty,
and its plans for the reconstruction of such data.
C. Nuclear Facilities
Each State Party shall submit to the Registry, not later than [180] days after this
Convention enters into force for it, the following declarations, in which it shall, in
accordance with the standards and guidelines set forth in the Verification Annex:
9. With respect to nuclear weapons facilities:
a. Declare whether it has or has had any nuclear weapons facility under
its ownership or possession, or that is or has been located in any place
under its jurisdiction or control at any time.
b. Declare any nuclear weapons facility it has or has had under its
ownership or possession or that is or has been located in any place
See Critical Question
on Nuclear Energy in
Section 3 of this book.
Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention
59
Section 2
under its jurisdiction or control at any time.
c. Declare any nuclear weapons facility on its territory that another State
has or has had under its ownership or possession and that is or has
been located in any place under the jurisdiction or control of another
State at any time.
d. Declare the precise location and production and storage capacities of
any facility reported under subparagraphs a, b, or c above.
e. Declare whether it has transferred or received, directly or indirectly,
any equipment for the production of nuclear weapons, and provide a
detailed account thereof.
f. Specify actions to be taken for the closure of any facility reported
under subparagraphs a, b, or c above.
g. Provide its general plan for conversion of any facility reported under
subparagraphs a, b, or c into a nuclear weapons destruction facility.
10. With respect to other nuclear facilities, declare the precise location, nature and
scope of activities of any nuclear facility under its ownership or possession, or
located in any place under its jurisdiction or control. Such declaration shall
include, inter alia, laboratories and test and evaluation sites as well as any
other facility, site, or installation in which nuclear activities of any kind have
been or are carried out, or which are suitable for carrying out such activities.
D. Delivery Vehicles
Each State Party shall submit to the Registry, not later than [210] days after this
Convention enters into force for it, the following declarations, in which it shall, in
accordance with the standards and guidelines set forth in the Verification Annex:
11. Declare the number and location of all nuclear-capable ballistic and cruise
missiles, including all those in production, storage or under repair.
12. Declare the number and location of all nuclear-capable submarines, naval
crafts, and aircraft, including all those in production, storage or under repair.
Declarations would be
required for scientific
research laboritories
engaged in nuclear
physics research and
facilities with dual use
potential.
60
IV. Phases for Implementation
A. General Requirements
1. Each phase indicates the deadline for completion of specific implementation
activity. Any phase can begin at any time, and does not require the completion
of previous phases before initiation.
2. Implementation activities shall be conducted in accordance with the
Verification Annex.
B. Extension of Deadlines
3. If a State Party is unable to complete any of its obligations under Phase One
within the deadline, it may submit a request to the Executive Council for an
extension. Such a request must be made at least [four] months prior to the
deadline, and no extension may exceed [six] months.
4. If a State Party is unable to complete any of its obligations under Phase Two
within the deadline, it may submit a request to the Executive Council for
an extension. Such a request must be made at least [six] months prior to the
deadline, and no extension may exceed [one] year[s].
5. If a State Party is unable to complete any of its obligations under Phases
Three, Four, or Five within the deadlines, it may submit a request to the
Executive Council for an extension of the deadline. Such a request must
be made at least [one] year[s] prior to the deadline for that phase, and no
extension may exceed [one] year[s].
C. Reciprocity in Extensions
6. If any State Party makes a request for an extension of any deadline, any other
State Party may request a similar extension within [one month] of the original
State’s request.
D. Phases
7. Phase One. Not later than [one year] after entry into force of this Convention:
a. All States Parties shall have complied with the requirements of Article
III {Declarations}.
b. Targeting coordinates and navigational information for all nuclear
weapons delivery vehicles shall be removed.
c. All nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons delivery vehicles shall be
de-alerted and disabled.
d. Activities listed in Schedule 1 of the Annex on Nuclear Activities
shall have ceased.
e. Production of nuclear weapon components and equipment listed in
Schedules 1 and 2 of the Annex on Nuclear Weapons Components and
Equipment shall have ceased.
f. All nuclear weapons testing facilities, nuclear weapons research
facilities and nuclear weapons production facilities shall be designated
for decommissioning and closure or for conversion.
See Section 1, “How
to Achieve a Nuclear
Weapons Convention”
for a discussion of the
phased approach.
“De-alerting
includesturning off
power to missiles,
decoupling warheads
from missiles,
immobilizing missile silo
lids, and discontinuing
launch-on-warning
systems. Disabling
includes removing
trigger mechanisms,
replacing missile
cones with non-
aerodynamic covers,
removing SLBMs from
submarines, removing
warheads from delivery
vehicles, and disabling
launch mechanisms.”
Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention
61
Section 2
g. Production of proscribed nuclear material shall have ceased, with the
exception of exemption quantities.
h. [Funding for] nuclear weapons research of any sort not consistent with
the purposes and obligations of this Convention shall have ceased.
i. Plans for the implementation of all obligations under this Convention
shall have been submitted to the Agency.
8. Phase Two. Not later than [two] years after entry into force of this
Convention:
a. All nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons delivery vehicles shall be
removed from deployment sites.
b. All warheads shall be removed from their delivery vehicles and either
placed into nuclear weapons storage facilities or dismantled.
c. Agreements shall be negotiated to subject all nuclear weapons,
nuclear material and nuclear facilities to preventive controls.
9. Phase Three. Not later than [five] years after entry into force of this
Convention:
a. All nuclear weapons shall be dismantled.
b. All nuclear weapons shall be destroyed, except:
i. no more than [1000] warheads in each of the stockpiles of
Russia and the United States; and
ii. no more than [100] warheads in each of the stockpiles of
China, France, and the United Kingdom.
c. All nuclear weapons delivery vehicles shall be destroyed or converted
for purposes not prohibited under this Convention.
d. All nuclear weapons facilities shall be designated for
decommissioning and closure or for conversion.
10. Phase Four. Not later than [10] years after entry into force of this Convention:
a. All nuclear weapons shall be destroyed, except:
i. no more than [50] warheads in each of the stockpiles of
Russia and the United States, and
ii. no more than [10] warheads in each of the stockpiles of
China, France, and the United Kingdom.
b. All reactors using highly enriched uranium shall be closed or
converted to low enriched uranium use.
c. [All reactors using plutonium as fuel shall be closed or converted to
reactors that do not use any special nuclear material.]
d. All special nuclear material in any form shall be under strict, effective
and exclusive preventive controls.
11. Phase Five. Not later than [15] years after entry into force of this Convention:
a. All nuclear weapons shall be destroyed.
b. [The powers and functions of the Agency shall be reviewed and
adjusted to preserve its role in carrying out the objectives of this
Convention.]
See Critical Question,
Chapter 3, on Research
Phase Two would require
deep cuts in the nuclear
arsenals of the United
Staes and Russia if these
had not taken place by
the time of entry into
force of the NWC.
See Critical Question,
Chapter 3, on
Nuclear Energy
The phases are not
equivalent to a time-
bound framework. They
do not indicate actual
dates for completion
of each obligation, but
periods of time following
Entry-into-force (EIF)
of the convention. It
may be important to
add specific dates if
there are some hold-out
States preventing EIF
but there is otherwise
general support for
implementation. The
principal purpose for the
phases is to indicate the
order and coordination
of key steps towards
nuclear disarmament.
The emphasis should not
be primarily on speed
of disarmament but
on safety, security and
irreversibility.
Determining a timeline
for the final phase of
moving to zero nuclear
weapons could be the
most problematic. A high
level of confidence will
be required to move
from low numbers to
zero unless political
conditions have changed
markedly to ensure that
any threat of break out
could be met by non-
nuclear means. Some
commentators have
suggested that the
timeline for the final
phase be left open for
agreement after other
phases have been
completed. The Model
NWC however suggests
a timeline be agreed,
but that an extension
could be requested if
necessary.
62
E. Special Provision
12. The Executive Council may make special provision for temporary retention
of small and diminishing quantities of nuclear weapons or proscribed nuclear
materials by Nuclear Capable States
13. States meeting the criteria of this Special Provision shall follow the
requirements, guidelines and phases outlined in this Article. They shall not
be expected to implement the provisions of this Convention in advance of
other States Parties, nor shall they be exempted from the requirements of each
phase.
Provision designed to
deal with undeclared or
unrecognized nuclear
weapon state.
Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention
63
Section 2
V. Verification
A. Elements of the Verification Regime
In order to verify compliance with this Convention, a verification regime shall be
established consisting of the following elements:
1. Agreements on sharing data and verification activities among States, UN
organs and with existing agencies,
2. A Registry,
3. An International Monitoring System,
4. Reporting of information gathered by National Technical Means,
5. Open Skies,
6. Preventive controls,
7. Consultation and clarification,
8. On-site inspections, including challenge inspections,
9. Confidence-building measures, including additional voluntary
measures,
10. Citizen and non-governmental reporting and protection,
11. Any other measures deemed necessary by the Agency.
B. Activities, Facilities, and Materials Subject to Verification
12. All obligations of States Parties and persons as defined, inter alia, in Article I
{General Obligations}, Article III {Declarations} and Article IV, Section D
{Phases} shall be subject to verification in accordance with the relevant
provisions of this Convention and its Verification Annex.
C. Rights and Obligations With Respect to Verification
13. Verification activities shall be based on objective information, shall be limited
to the subject matter of this Convention, and shall be carried out on the basis
of full respect for the sovereignty of States Parties and in the least intrusive
manner possible consistent with the effective and timely accomplishment
of their objectives. Each State Party shall refrain from any abuse of the right of
verification.
14. Each State Party undertakes in accordance with this Convention to cooperate
through its National Authority established pursuant to Article VI {National
Implementation Measures} of this Convention, with the Agency, with other
States Parties and with other agencies as stipulated in this Convention and
in separate agreements to facilitate the verification of compliance with this
Convention by, inter alia:
a. Establishing the necessary facilities, or providing necessary
modifications to existing facilities, to participate in these verification
measures, and establishing the necessary communication;
b. Providing all relevant data obtained by technical means and by
national systems that are part of the International Monitoring System
as agreed among States;
See the discussion of
verification in Section
4 of this book. A
Verification Annex wold
have to be negotiated
among States as an
integral part of the NWC.
Article V provides the
general guidelines of the
verification regime.
64
c. Participating, as necessary, in a consultation and clarification
process;
d. Permitting the conduct of on-site inspections;
e. Participating in confidence-building measures; and
f. To the extent possible, internationalizing elements of its National
Technical Means and incorporating them into the International
Monitoring System.
15. Each State Party shall have the right to take measures not contrary to the
provisions of this Convention to prevent disclosure of confidential information
and data not related to this Convention.
16. Subject to paragraph 15, information obtained by the Agency through the
verification regime established by this Convention shall be made available
to all States Parties in accordance with the relevant provisions of this
Convention.
17. The provisions of this Convention shall not be interpreted as restricting the
international exchange of data for scientific purposes not prohibited by this
Convention.
18. Each State Party undertakes to cooperate with the Agency and with other
States Parties in the improvement of the verification regime and in the
examination of additional monitoring technologies. Such measures shall, when
agreed, be incorporated in amendments to this Convention or changes to the
Annexes or, where appropriate, be reflected in the operational manuals of the
Technical Secretariat.
D. Confidence-Building Measures
19. Each State Party undertakes to cooperate with the Agency and with other
States Parties in implementing various measures additional to those explicitly
required under this Convention in order to:
a. Develop greater confidence regarding compliance with the obligations
under this Convention, and
b. Assist in the compilation of detailed information by the International
Monitoring System.
E. Relation to Other Verification Arrangements
20. The Technical Secretariat may enter into cooperative verification arrangements
in accordance with the provisions of Article XIV {Cooperation, Compliance
and Dispute Settlement} para. 3 and the provisions of Article XVIII, Section A
{Relation to Other International Agreements} para. 2.
21. Nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as in any way limiting or
detracting from the verification arrangements assumed by either State under
the Treaties Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation
on Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and the Treaty
Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on the
Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles {INF}.
22. Nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as in any way limiting or
detracting from the verification arrangements assumed by Argentina and Brazil
under the Agreement on the Exclusively Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy
Confidence-building
measures are voluntary
measures by States
to supply information,
additional to that already
required, to the Agency
or to other States
in order to develop
greater confidences in
compliance with the
NWC.
Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention
65
Section 2
23. Nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as in any way limiting or
detracting from the verification arrangements, assumed by any State under the
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, or under safeguards agreements and
additional protocol agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency
[or under the Fissile Materials Cut-Off Treaty].
F. Implementation
24. Prior to entry into force of this Convention, nothing shall preclude any
signatory State from implementing, individually or in agreement with other
States, the verification measures of this Convention which are applicable to
them. Such measures may include public declarations as detailed in Article III
{Declarations}, negotiations with other States for the purposes of verifying
bilateral or multilateral reductions of nuclear weapons, and the verification of
plans for the destruction of nuclear weapons, disposition of special nuclear
material, and destruction or conversion of nuclear weapons facilities or nuclear
weapons delivery vehicles.
25. Verification measures adopted pursuant to paragraph 23 may include the
formation of a provisional authority for the purpose of overseeing verification
activities, including assistance in the development of national implementation
plans pursuant to Article VI {National Implementation Measures} of this
Convention.
The requirements and tasks of verification would be defined by the obligations of the
NWC. The verification tasks can be divided into the following three main stages:
1. Baseline information exchange and data gathering. Identify the current status of
the nuclear-weapons complex with reasonable accuracy without proliferating sensitive
information.
2. Disarmament: Monitor the agreed path of reducing nuclear arms and eliminating
the nuclear-weapons complex within tolerable limits of uncertainty and sufficient
confidence.
3. Preventing rearmament: During the transformation to and within a nuclear-
weapon-free world, observe any objects and detect any activities that might indicate a
nuclear-weapons capability.
Verification in all three stages would need to focus on monitoring a complex range
of treaty-limited items and activities and their combination. What actually needs to be
verified is the combination of required/prohibited objects and activities, according to
the General Obligations of the MNWC. These include, for instance, dismantlement of
nuclear weapons; disposition of nuclear material; conversion or destruction of certain
nuclear facilities; monitoring the location and status of nuclear weapons, nuclear
material, nuclear facilities, delivery systems, and command and control systems to
insure that they are not used for research, development, testing, production, transport,
deployment or use of nuclear weapons. Other activities would include storage, transfer
and handling of nuclear weapons and fissile material.
66
VI. National Implementation Measures
A. Legislative Implementation
1. Each State Party shall, in accordance with its constitutional processes, adopt
the necessary legislative measures to implement its obligations under this
Convention. In particular, it shall:
a. Extend its penal legislation to provide, in accordance with Article VII,
Section A, for the trial, extradition and punishment of persons who
commit crimes as defined in Article I, Section B.
b. Provide all necessary protection for persons who report violations of
this Convention, in accordance with Article VII, Section C.
2. Each State Party shall cooperate with other States Parties in affording legal
assistance toward fulfilling the obligations under paragraph 1.
3. Each State Party, in the implementation of its obligations under this
Convention, shall assign the highest priority to ensuring the safety of people
and to protecting the environment, and shall cooperate as appropriate with
other States Parties in this regard.
B. Relations Between the State Party and the Agency
4. In order to fulfill its obligations under this Convention, each State Party shall
designate or establish a National Authority to serve as the national focal
point for effective liaison with the Agency and other States Parties. Each
State Party shall notify the Agency of its National Authority at the time that
this Convention enters into force for it. The responsibilities of the National
Authority include:
a. The preparations and submission of declarations in the
registry;
b. The enactment of new legislation or the revision of existing legislation
to facilitate the enforcement of the Convention;
c. Preparations for receiving inspections, including, inter alia, approval
of the list of inspectors, issuing of multiple entry visas for inspectors,
providing aircraft clearances, and designating points of entry and exit.
5. Each State Party shall inform the Agency of the legislative and administrative
measures taken to implement this Convention.
6. Each State Party undertakes to cooperate with the Agency in the exercise of all
its functions and in particular to provide assistance to the Technical Secretariat.
This includes cooperation in carrying out any investigation which the Agency
may initiate, and to provide or support assistance with investigations of non-
complying State Parties and with Parties exposed to danger as a result of
violation of this Convention.
7. Each State Party shall disseminate information regarding the requirements
of this Convention and shall ensure the inclusion of such information in the
training of relevant personnel regarding obligations under this Convention.
8. Each State Party shall transmit relevant information gathered by its National
Technical Means to the International Monitoring System.
The National
implementation
Measures include
the establishment of
national authorities to
oversee implementation
of the NWC. Domestic
legal systems will have
to be adapted to the
obligations assumed by
State Parties.
Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention
67
Section 2
C. Confidentiality
9. Each State Party shall treat as confidential and afford special handling
to information and data that it receives in confidence from the Agency.
Information subject to confidentiality shall include data used for purposes not
prohibited under this Convention and state and military technology for dual
use vehicles, components and computers.
D. Relation to implementation measures assumed or required under
other arrangements
10. Nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as in any way limiting or
detracting from the National Implementation Measures assumed or required by
States under the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, International Atomic Energy
Agency Safeguards agreements, International Convention for the Suppression
of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, [Fissile Materials Cut-Off Treaty] and United
Nations Security Council Resolution 1540.
68
VII. Rights and Obligations of Persons
A. Criminal Procedure
1. Any person accused of committing a crime under this Convention within the
jurisdiction of a State Party of which such person is a citizen or resident shall
be
a. tried according to the legal process of such State if found
within such State, or
b. surrendered to the International Criminal Court if the crime alleged is
within the jurisdiction of such Court and the State concerned is unable
or unwilling to undertake adequate criminal procedures.
2. If found within another State Party, such person shall be
a. tried within such State, or
b. extradited to the State within the jurisdiction of which the crime is
alleged to have been committed, or
c. surrendered to the International Criminal Court if the crime alleged
is within the jurisdiction of such Court and the States concerned are
unable or unwilling to undertake adequate criminal procedures.
3. Any person accused of a crime under this Convention shall be assumed to
be innocent until proven guilty and have the right to a fair trial and humane
treatment, as prescribed by the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights and other conventions and agreements which have acquired the status
of customary international law.
B. Responsibility to Report Violations
4. Persons shall report any violations of this Convention to the Agency. This
responsibility takes precedence over any obligation not to disclose information
which may exist under national security laws or employment contracts.
5. [Information received by the Agency under the preceding paragraph shall
be held in confidence until formal charges are lodged, except to the extent
necessary for investigative purposes.]
C. Protection for Persons Providing Information
Intra-state protection
6. Any person reporting a suspected violation of this Convention, either by a
person or a State, shall be guaranteed full civil and political rights including
the right to liberty and security of person.
7. States Parties shall take all necessary steps to ensure that no person reporting
a suspected violation of this Convention shall have any rights diminished or
privileges withdrawn as a result.
8. Any individual who [in good faith] provides the Agency or a National
Authority with information regarding a known or suspected violation of this
Convention cannot be arrested, prosecuted or tried on account thereof.
Certain prohibited
acts unde the NWC
would be crimes for
which there should be
individual responsibility.
This section outlines
procedures for the trial
of persons accused of
crimes, including the
rights of the accuse.
In addition, protection
of individuals reporting
crimes (societal
verification) is considered
a vital component of the
model NWC (Section C).
See discussion of
Societal Verification in
Section 4 of this book
Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention
69
Section 2
9. It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate
against any employee or applicant for employment because such person has
opposed any practice as a suspected violation of this Convention, reported
such violation to the Agency or a National Authority, or testified, assisted,
or participated in any manner in an investigation or proceeding under this
Convention.
10. Any person against whom a national decision is rendered on account of
information furnished by such person to the Agency about a suspected
violation of this Convention may appeal such decision to the Agency within
[..] months of being notified of such decision. The decision of the Agency in
the matter shall be final.
Inter-State Protection
11. Any person reporting a violation of this Convention to the Agency shall be
afforded protection by the Agency and by all States Parties, including, in the
case of natural persons, the right of asylum in all other States Parties if their
safety or security is endangered in the State Party in which they permanently
or temporarily reside.
Additional Provisions
12. [The Executive Council may decide to award monetary compensation to
persons providing important information to the Agency concerning violations
of this Convention.]
13. Any person who voluntarily admits to the Agency having committed a
violation of this Convention, prior to the receipt by the Agency of information
concerning such violation from another source, may be exempt from
punishment. In deciding whether to grant such exemption, the Agency
shall consider the gravity of the violation involved as well as whether its
consequences have not yet occurred or can be reversed as a result of the
admission made.
70
VIII. Agency
A. General Provisions
1. The States Parties to this Convention hereby establish the Agency for the
Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (hereinafter “the Agency”) to achieve the
object and purpose of this Convention, to ensure the implementation of its
provisions, including those for international verification of compliance with it,
and to provide a forum for consultation and cooperation among States Parties.
2. All States Parties to this Convention shall be members of the Agency. A State
Party shall not be deprived of its membership in the Agency.
3. The seat of the Headquarters of the Agency shall be _____.
4. The organs of the Agency are the Conference of the States Parties, the
Executive Council, and the Technical Secretariat. The Technical Secretariat
shall oversee the Registry and the International Monitoring System.
5. The Agency shall conduct its verification activities provided for under
this Convention in the least intrusive manner possible consistent with the
timely and efficient accomplishment of their objectives. It shall request
only the information and data necessary to fulfill its responsibilities under
this Convention. It shall take every precaution to protect the confidentiality
of information on civil and military activities and facilities coming to its
knowledge in the implementation of this Convention.
6. In undertaking its verification activities the Agency shall consider measures to
make use of advances in science and technology.
7. The costs of the Agency’s activities shall be paid by States Parties in
accordance with Article XVI {Financing}. The budget of the Agency shall
comprise two separate chapters, one relating to administrative and other costs,
and one relating to verification costs.
8. A member of the Agency which is in arrears in the payments of its financial
contribution to the Agency shall have no vote in the Agency if the amount
of its arrears equals or exceeds the amount of the contribution due from it
for the preceding two full years. The Conference of the States Parties may,
nevertheless, permit such a member to vote if it is satisfied that the failure to
pay is due to conditions beyond the control of the member.
B. The Conference of the States Parties
Composition, procedures and decision-making
9. The Conference of the States Parties (hereinafter “the Conference”) shall
be composed of all members of this Agency. Each member shall have one
representative in the Conference, who may be accompanied by alternates and
advisors.
10. The first session of the conference shall be convened by the depositary not
later than 30 days after the entry into force of this Convention.
11. The Conference shall meet in regular sessions which shall be held annually
unless it decides otherwise.
12. Special sessions of the Conference shall be convened:
a. When decided by the Conference;
The model NWC
proposes an
implementing agency
similar in structure to
the Organization for the
Prohibition of Chemical
Weapons, although the
provisions within the
Technical Secretariat
dealing with the Registry
and the International
Monitoring System do
not have counterparts in
the Chemical Weapons
Convention.
The NWC Agency, unlike
the IAEA, would not have
the task of promoting
nuclear energy. Its
primary objectives
include containment
and surveillance of all
materials, equipment,
or facilities that
could contribute to
the development,
production, or
maintenance of nuclear
weapons.
Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention
71
Section 2
b. When requested by the Executive Council;
c. When requested by any member and supported by one third
of the members;
d. In accordance with paragraph 22 to undertake reviews of the operation
of this Convention.
Except in the case of subparagraph (d) the special session shall be convened
not later than 30 days after receipt of the request by the Director-General of
the Technical Secretariat, unless specified otherwise in the request.
13. The Conference shall also be convened in the form of an Amendment
Conference in accordance with Article XVII {Amendments}.
14. Sessions of the Conference shall take place at the seat of the Agency unless the
Conference decides otherwise.
15. The Conference shall adopt its rules of procedure. At the beginning of each
regular session, it shall elect its Chairperson and such other officers as may be
required. They shall hold office until a new Chairperson and other officers are
elected at the next regular session.
16. A majority of the members of the Agency shall constitute a quorum
for the Conference.
17. Each member of the Agency shall have one vote in the Conference.
18. The Conference shall take decisions on questions of procedure by a simple
majority of the members present and voting. Decisions on matters of
substance should be taken as far as possible by consensus. If consensus is
not attainable when an issue comes up for decision, the Chairperson shall
defer any vote for 24 hours and during this period of deferment shall make
every effort to facilitate achievement of consensus, and shall report to the
Conference before the end of this period. If consensus is not possible at
the end of 24 hours, the Conference shall take the decision by a two-thirds
majority of members present and voting unless specified otherwise in this
Convention. When the issue arises as to whether the question is one of
substance or not, the question shall be treated as a matter of substance unless
otherwise decided by the Conference by the majority required for decisions on
matters of substance.
Powers and functions
19. The Conference shall be the principal organ of the Agency. It shall consider
any questions, matters or issues within the scope of this Convention, including
those relating to the powers and functions of the Executive Council and the
Technical Secretariat. It may make recommendations and take decisions on
any questions, matters or issues related to this Convention, raised by a State
Party or brought to its attention by the Executive Council.
20. The Conference shall oversee the implementation of this Convention, and
act in order to promote its object and purpose. The Conference shall review
compliance with this Convention. It shall also oversee the activities of the
Executive Council and the Technical Secretariat and may issues guidelines
in accordance with this Convention to either of them in the exercise of their
functions.
21. The Conference shall:
a. Consider and adopt at its regular sessions the report, program and
budget of the Agency, submitted by the Executive Council, as well as
consider other reports;
The Agency’s primary
objectives include
containment and
surveillance of all
materials, equipment,
or facilities that
could contribute to
the development,
production, or
maintenance of nuclear
weapons. Sources of
information include
declarations and
reports by States,
systematic and
challlenge inspections,
information from other
agencies (including
NGOs), publicly available
resources means,
and the international
monitoring system.
72
b. Decide on the scale of financial contributions to be paid by States
Parties in accordance with paragraph 7;
c. Elect the members of the Executive Council;
d. Appoint the Director-General of the Technical Secretariat (hereinafter
referred to as “the Director-General”);
e. Approve the rules of procedure of the Executive Council
submitted by the latter;
f. Establish such subsidiary organs as it finds necessary for the exercise
of its functions in accordance with this Convention;
g. Review scientific and technological developments that could affect the
operation of this Convention and, in this context, direct the Director-
General to establish a Scientific Advisory Board to enable him or her,
in the performance of his or her functions, to render specialized advice
in areas of science and technology relevant to this Convention, to the
Conference, the Executive Council or States Parties. The Scientific
Advisory Aboard shall be composed of independent experts appointed
in accordance with terms of reference adopted by the Conference;
h. Take the necessary measures to ensure compliance with this
Convention and to redress and remedy any situation which
contravenes the provisions of this Convention, in accordance with
Article XIV {Cooperation, Compliance and Dispute Settlement}.
22. The Conference shall, not later than one year after the expiration of the fifth
and the tenth year after the entry into force of this Convention, and at such
other times within that time period as may be decided upon, convene in
special sessions to undertake reviews of the operation of this Convention.
Such reviews shall take into account any relevant scientific and technological
developments. At intervals of five years thereafter, unless otherwise decided
upon, further sessions of the Conference shall be convened with the same
objective.
C. The Executive Council
Composition, procedure and decision-making
23. The Executive Council shall consist of 44 members. Each State Party shall
have the right, in accordance with the principle of rotation, to serve on the
Executive Council. The members of the Executive Council shall be elected
by the Conference for a term of four years. Each geographical region, as
determined by Annex III, shall designate States Parties from that region for
election. In order to ensure the effective functioning of this Convention, due
regard being paid to equitable geographic distribution, to representation by
nuclear weapons states and nuclear-capable states, and to the interests of all
states to be free from the threat of nuclear devastation, the Executive Council
shall be composed as follows:
a. All Nuclear Weapons States Parties; and
b. Six States Parties from the Middle East and South Asia;
c. Seven States Parties from Latin America and the Caribbean;
d. Six States Parties from Eastern Europe;
e. Seven States Parties from Africa;
Considerations for
membership in the
Executive Council
are nuclear status,
geographic diversity,
special interest or
expertise in the aims
of the Convention
and specific concerns
regarding nuclear
weapons. This could
include, for example,
Sates in which nuclear
weapons have been
used or tested.
Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention
73
Section 2
f. Six States Parties from among North America and Western Europe;
g. Six States Parties from South East Asia, the Pacific and the Far East;
h. Up to two additional States Parties that have special interest or
expertise in implementing the aims of this Convention to be elected if
required.
24. For the first election of the Executive Council 22 members shall be elected for
a term of two years, and 22 members for a term of four years.
25. The Conference may, on its motion or upon the request of a majority of the
members of the Executive Council, review the composition of the Executive
Council taking into account developments related to the principles specified in
paragraph 23.
26. The Executive Council shall elaborate its rules of procedure and submit them
to the Conference for approval.
27. The Executive Council shall elect its Chairperson from among its
members.
28. The Executive Council shall meet for regular sessions. Between regular
sessions it shall meet as often as may be required for the fulfillment of its
powers and functions.
29. Each member of the Executive Council shall have one vote. Unless otherwise
specified in this Convention, the Executive Council shall take decisions on
matters of substance by a two-thirds majority of all its members. When
an issue arises as to whether the question is one of substance or not, that
question shall be treated as a matter of substance unless otherwise decided by
the Executive Council by the majority required for decisions on matters of
substance.
Powers and Functions
30. The Executive Council shall be the executive organ of the Agency. It shall
be responsible to the Conference. The Executive council shall carry out
the powers and functions entrusted to it under this Convention, as well as
those functions delegated to it by the Conference. In so doing, it shall act
in conformity with the recommendations, decisions and guidelines of the
Conference and assure their proper and continuous implementation.
31. The Executive Council shall promote the effective implementation of, and
compliance with, this Convention. It shall supervise the activities of the
Technical Secretariat, cooperate with the National Authority of each State
Party and facilitate consultations and cooperation among States Parties at their
request.
32. The Executive Council shall:
a. Consider and submit to the Conference the draft program and
budget of the Agency;
b. Consider and submit to the Conference the draft report of the
Agency on the implementation of this Convention, the report on the
performance of its own activities and such special reports as it deems
necessary or which the Conference may request;
c. Make arrangements for the sessions of the Conference including the
preparation of the draft agenda.
33. The Executive Council may request the convening of a special session of the
Conference.
74
34. The Executive Council shall:
a. Conclude agreements or arrangements with States and international
organizations on behalf of the Agency, subject to prior approval by the
Conference;
b. Approve agreements or arrangements relating to the implementation
of verification activities, negotiated by the Technical Secretariat with
States Parties.
35. The Executive Council shall consider any issue or matter within its
competence affecting this Convention and its implementation, including
concerns regarding compliance, and cases of non-compliance, and, as
appropriate, inform States Parties and request compliance within a specified
time.
36. If the Executive Council considers further action to be necessary, it shall take,
inter alia, one or more of the following measures in accordance with Article
XIV {Cooperation, Compliance and Dispute Settlement}:
a. Inform all States Parties of the issue or matter;
b. Bring the issue or matter to the attention of the Conference;
c. Make recommendations to the Conference regarding measures to
redress the situation and to ensure compliance.
d. The Executive Council shall, in cases of particular gravity and
urgency, bring the issue or matter, including relevant
information and conclusions, directly to the attention of the
United Nations General Assembly and the United Nations
Security Council. It shall at the same time inform all States
Parties of this step.
D. The Technical Secretariat
37. The Technical Secretariat shall assist the Conference and the Executive
Council in the performance of their functions. The Technical Secretariat shall
carry out the verification measures provided for in this Convention. It shall
carry out the other functions entrusted to it under this Convention as well as
those functions delegated to it by the Conference and the Executive Council.
38. With respect to the verification of and compliance with this Convention, the
Technical Secretariat shall:
a. Maintain the Registry and other information databases in accordance
with Section F below;
b. Maintain and coordinate the operation of the International
Monitoring System;
c. Provide technical assistance in, and support for, the installation and
operation of monitoring systems;
d. Assist the Executive Council in facilitating consultation and
clarification among States Parties;
e. Receive requests for on-site inspections and process them, facilitate
the Executive Council consideration of such requests, carry out the
preparation for, and provide technical support during, the conduct of
on-site inspections, and report to the Executive Council;
f. Negotiate agreements or arrangements relating to the implementation
The Technical Secretariat
is responsible for
verification, including
the preparation and
maintenance of technical
manuals. The contents
of these manuals are
beyond the scope of this
draft.
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75
Section 2
of verification activities with States Parties, subject to approval by the
Executive Council;
g. Provide technical assistance and technical evaluation to States Parties
in the implementation of the provisions of this Convention;
h. Assist the States Parties through their National Authorities on other
issues of verification under this Convention.
39. The Technical Secretariat shall develop and maintain, subject to approval
by the Executive Council, operational manuals to guide the operation of
various components of the verification regime, in accordance with the
Verification Annex. These manuals shall not constitute integral parts of this
Convention or the Annexes, and may be changed by the Technical Secretariat
subject to approval by the Executive Council. The Technical Secretariat shall
promptly inform the States Parties of any changes in the operational manuals.
40. With respect to administrative matters the Technical Secretariat
shall:
a. Prepare and submit to the Executive Council the draft program and
budget of the Agency;
b. Prepare and submit to the Executive Council the draft report of the
Agency on the implementation of this Convention and such other
reports as the Conference or the Executive Council may request;
c. Provide administrative and technical support to the Conference, the
Executive Council and subsidiary organs;
d. Address and receive communications on behalf of the Agency to and
from States Parties on matters pertaining to the implementation of this
Convention;
e. Upon approval by the Executive Council and the Conference, submit
the report of the Agency to the United Nations Secretary General.
41. All requests and notifications by States Parties to the Agency shall be
transmitted through their National Authorities to the Director-General.
Requests and notifications shall be in one of the official languages of the
United Nations. In response the Director-General shall use the language of the
transmitted request or notification.
42. The Technical Secretariat shall inform the Executive Council of any problem
that has arisen with regard to the discharge of its functions, including doubts,
ambiguities or uncertainties about compliance with this Convention that have
come to its notice in the performance of its verification activities or through
confidential or non-governmental sources and that it has been unable to resolve
or clarify through its consultations with the State Party concerned.
43. The Technical Secretariat shall comprise a Director-General, who shall be its
head and chief administrative officer, inspectors and such scientific, technical
and other personnel as may be required.
44. The Inspectorate shall be a unit of the Technical Secretariat and shall act under
the supervision of the Director-General.
45. The Director-General shall be appointed by the Conference upon the
recommendation of the Executive Council for a term of four years, renewable
for one further term, but not thereafter. The appointment of the Director-
General shall be considered a matter of substance governed by paragraph 18.
46. The Director-General shall be responsible to the Conference and the Executive
Council for the appointment of the staff and the organization and functioning
of the Technical Secretariat. The paramount consideration in the employment
Additinal provisions
might provide for
independent research
done by institutions other
than the current nuclear
weapons research
laboratories. A fund to
support such research
might be established.
76
of the staff and in the determination of the conditions of service shall be the
necessity of securing the highest standards of efficiency, competence and
integrity. Only citizens of States Parties shall serve as the Director-General,
as inspectors or as other members of the professional and clerical staff. Due
regard shall be paid to the importance of recruiting the staff on as wide a
geographical basis as possible. Recruitment shall be guided by the principle
that the staff shall be kept to a minimum necessary for the proper discharge of
the responsibilities of the Technical Secretariat.
47. The Director-General shall be responsible for the organization and functioning
of the Scientific Advisory Board referred to in paragraph 21.g The Director-
General shall, in consultation with States Parties and non-governmental
sources, appoint members of the Scientific Advisory Board, who shall serve
in their individual capacity. The members of the Board shall be appointed
on the basis of their expertise in the particular scientific fields relevant to
the implementation of this Convention. The Director-General may also, as
appropriate, in consultation with members of the Board, establish temporary
working groups of scientific experts to provide recommendations on specific
issues. In regard to the above, States Parties and non-governmental sources
may submit lists of experts to the Director-General. The Scientific Advisory
Board may be called upon to review nuclear or other research and determine
whether it is of a nature prohibited under this Convention or of a nature that
may contribute to verification of nuclear disarmament.
48. In the performance of their duties, the Director-General, the inspectors and
the other members of the staff shall not seek or receive instructions from any
Government or from any other source external to the Agency. They shall
refrain from any action that might reflect on their positions as international
officers responsible only to the Conference and the Executive Council.
49. Each State Party shall respect the exclusively international character of
the responsibilities of the Director-General, the inspectors and the other
members of the staff and not seek to influence them in the discharge of their
responsibilities.
E. Privileges and Immunities
50. The Agency shall enjoy on the territory and in any other place under the
jurisdiction or control of a State Party such legal capacity and such privileges
and immunities as are appropriate for the exercise of its functions.
51. Delegates of States Parties, together with their alternates and advisers,
representatives appointed to the Executive Council together with their
alternates and advisers, the Director-General and the staff of the Agency shall
enjoy such privileges and immunities as are necessary in the independent
exercise of their functions in connection with the Agency.
52. The legal capacity, privileges, and immunities referred to in this Article shall
be defined in agreements between the Agency and the States Parties as well as
in an agreement between the Agency and the State in which the headquarters
of the Agency is seated.
53. Notwithstanding paragraphs 50 and 51, the privileges and immunities enjoyed
by the Director-General and the staff of the Technical Secretariat during the
conduct of verification activities shall be those set forth in the Verification
Annex.
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77
Section 2
F. Registry and Other Databases
54. The Technical Secretariat shall maintain a Registry of the following:
a. All nuclear weapons;
b. All nuclear material;
c. All nuclear facilities;
d. All nuclear weapons delivery vehicles;
e. Any other facilities or materials as determined by the
Technical Secretariat.
55. The Technical Secretariat shall obtain information from the
following sources:
a. Declarations by States in accordance with the provisions of
Article III {Declarations};
b. Reports by States on progress in implementing their
obligations under this Convention;
c. The International Monitoring System;
d. National Technical Means;
e. Systematic inspections;
f. Challenge inspections;
g. Other organizations with which the Agency has concluded agreements
on sharing information in accordance with Article XVIII, Section A
{Relation to Other International Agreements};
h. Other inter-governmental and non-governmental organizations that
collect and submit such information;
i. Publicly available sources;
j. Any other sources which the Technical Secretariat deems
appropriate.
56. The Technical Secretariat shall make available to the Registry information
obtained from the above sources with the exception of information which may
remain confidential because of legitimate national and international security
concerns or trade secret concerns.
57. Information in the Registry shall be available to all States parties and to the
public according to criteria established by separate agreements [among States].
G. International Monitoring System
58. The International Monitoring System shall comprise facilities and systems for
monitoring by satellite, on-site sensors, remote sensors, radionuclide sampling,
respective means of communication, aircraft and other systems developed as
deemed necessary by the Agency.
59. The International Monitoring System shall be placed under the authority of the
Technical Secretariat.
60. All monitoring facilities of the International Monitoring System shall be
owned and operated by the States hosting or otherwise taking responsibility for
them except for those systems or facilities which may be owned or operated
by another agency or by the United Nations, or constructed or acquired by the
Agency in accordance with paragraph 64.
The Registry would
maintain a list of all
nuclear warheads,
delivery vehicles,
facilities and material
subject to verification.
78
61. The Technical Secretariat shall acquire equipment necessary for collating and
analyzing data provided by the International Monitoring System.
62. Any State Party may, if it so decides and upon agreement with the Technical
Secretariat, give a monitoring facility to the Agency.
63. The Technical Secretariat may, upon agreement of the Conference and in
accordance with its funding guidelines, construct or otherwise acquire a
monitoring system or facility if it determines that such a facility or system is
necessary for verification of obligations of States under this Convention, and
if no State is able or willing to provide such a system or facility or information
from such a system or facility to the International Monitoring System.
64. Each State shall have the right to participate in the international exchange of
data and to have access to all data made available to the Registry.
65. The Agency shall conclude agreements with other agencies or organizations
using international monitoring systems relating to the sharing of information
obtained through such systems relevant to the verification of this Convention
in accordance with Article XVIII, Section A {Relation to Other International
Agreements}.
66. Data obtained by the International Monitoring System not directly relevant
to verification of this Convention shall be treated as confidential, except
where such information is relevant to the verification of another international
agreement [and there is an agreement on sharing such information between
the Agency and the organization responsible for implementation of that
agreement].
67. Data obtained from the International Monitoring System shall first be
analyzed, processed and verified by the Technical Secretariat before being
compiled as part of the Registry, in accordance with the provisions of
paragraph 57.
The model NWC
proposes the
establishment of the
International Monitoring
System (IMS) similar
to but more extensive
than the International
Monitoring System
established by
the Comprehensive Test
Ban Treaty.
The main purpose of
the IMS is to enable
the Agency to gather
information necessary
for the verification of the
Convention. The system
would include monitoring
and analysis equipment
owned or controlled by
the Agency. In addition,
information generated
by equipment owned or
controlled by member
States would be shared
through agreements with
the Agency.
Special arrangements
may have to be made
for facilities located
on disputed territory
or on the territory of
indigenous nations.
Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention
79
Section 2
IX. Nuclear Weapons
A. General Requirements
1. All nuclear weapons [with corresponding delivery vehicles] shall be taken off
alert status, disabled, removed from deployment, declared, and destroyed in
accordance with the guidelines and standards of Article III {Declarations},
Article IV {Phases for Implementation}, the Verification Annex, and the
provisions set forth below:
B. Procedures for Destroying Nuclear Weapons
2. Each State Party shall take the following measures with respect to all nuclear
weapons that it owns or possesses or that are under its jurisdiction or control:
a. All warheads shall be bar-coded, registered, and tagged for
identification using secure visual tags.
b. All nuclear weapons shall be destroyed or moved to nuclear weapons
storage facilities subject to international preventive controls. No
exclusive national access to the repositories is allowed. Weapons may
be removed from the nuclear weapons storage facilities only for the
purposes of destruction.
c. All core elements from newly dismantled warheads shall be quenched
or otherwise deformed and placed in storage under international
preventive controls until final disposal of the proscribed nuclear
material, in accordance with the guidelines and standards of Article X
{Nuclear Material}.
C. Prevention of Production of Nuclear Weapons
3. All nuclear [weapons] facilities and deployment sites shall be subject to
verification, including challenge inspections at any time and non-destructive
detection of hidden warheads, to ensure compliance with obligations under
this Convention not to develop, produce, or deploy nuclear weapons.
The procedures outlined
to remove nuclear
weapons from alert
and deployment and
to register, tag, declare
and destroy such
weapons need not
necessarily follow in eact
chronological order in
exact circumstance. It
may be possible in some
cases, for example, to
disable a warhead before
removing it from its
delivery vehicle. In other
cases the procedure
may be reversed. The
manuals to be compiled
by the Technical
Secretariat will provide
the precise details for
each weapon system.
80
X. Nuclear Material
A. Reconstruction and Documentation
1. All military and civilian nuclear material shall be documented and declared
according to the guidelines and standards set forth in Article III {Declarations}
and the Verification Annex.
2. Special Nuclear Material
a. Records of production and use of special nuclear material produced
in the past shall be reconstructed to the extent possible through
analysis of past records, measures of transparency including national
legislation aimed at disclosure of information, interviews, and any
other appropriate means.
b. All special nuclear material storage sites and related nuclear facilities
usable for production of special nuclear material shall be subject to
preventive controls, including inventory verification as set forth in the
Verification Annex.
B. Control of Special Nuclear Material
3. Subject to Section C below, production and use of proscribed nuclear
material is prohibited. Existing inventories of special nuclear material shall
be subject to preventive controls and storage and disposal in accordance
with the guidelines and standards set forth below and in separate verification
agreements.
4. All treatment of nuclear material that improves its quality to the level of
proscribed nuclear material or improves the accessibility of proscribed nuclear
material is prohibited, including, inter alia, separation of plutonium from
spent fuel, enrichment of uranium in U-235 beyond unavoidable civilian
requirements or beyond 20%, or extraction of tritium from heavy water, with
the exception of exemption quantities.
5. All existing stocks of special nuclear material shall be placed under preventive
controls until a safe method of final disposal is found and approved by the
Agency. All handling of proscribed nuclear material except for such handling
as necessary for the purposes of this Convention shall be prohibited.
6. [Burning of special fissionable material is prohibited unless the net amount of
fissionable material resulting from such burning is reduced.]
7. Facilities for the production, research and testing of special nuclear material
may be converted to uses consistent with the purposes and obligations of
this Convention. Conversion of such facilities may include research and
development for methods of demilitarization and disposal of proscribed
nuclear material, including immobilization and final disposition of plutonium.
C. Licensing Requirements
8. The Agency shall establish a licensing process for civilian use of proscribed
nuclear material which is not prohibited.
Although all nuclear
material presents some
proliferation-related
risks, the emphasis
in this article is on
nuclear-weapons-usable-
material (special nuclear
material). Efforts at
reconstructing records
of past production and
transfers and accounting
for current inventories of
special nuclear material
should begin as soon as
possible. No distinction
is made in this article
between military and
civilian material, as
it is the material, not
the source, which is
of concern regarding
possible diversion to
nuclear weapons.
In practice, however,
there will be some
differences in
reconstructing and
documenting the material
from different sources.
In general, civilian
facilities have kept better
records than military
facilities since the former
were subject to a greater
degree of national and
international monitoring
and control, and safety
in civilian facilities was
often a higher priority
than in military facilities.
Paragraph 6 would
prohibit the use of
MOX fuel and HEU
in reactors as well as
certain concepts of
transmutation
Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention
81
Section 2
D. Relation to other International Agreements
9. Nothing in this Section shall be interpreted as in any way limiting or detracting from
the verification arrangements assumed by any State under safeguards agreements and
additional protocol agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency [or under
the Fissile Materials Cut-Off Treaty]
82
XI. Nuclear Facilities
A. Nuclear Weapons Facilities
1. All nuclear weapons production facilities shall cease operations prohibited
under this Convention and shall be closed or converted to purposes not
prohibited under this Convention.
2. All nuclear weapons testing facilities shall cease operations and shall be
permanently closed [or converted to purposes not prohibited under this
Convention].
3. All nuclear weapons research facilities shall be closed or converted to research
in accordance with paragraph 4.
4. Funding of research for the purposes of designing, modernizing, constructing,
modifying or maintaining reliability of nuclear weapons is prohibited.
Funding of research for the purpose of developing knowledge in the physics
of nuclear explosions is prohibited. Funding of research in safety mechanisms
for existing nuclear weapons is permitted only until all nuclear weapons are
dismantled. Funding of research for the purposes of safe dismantling and
destroying of nuclear weapons and for safe disposal of special nuclear material
is permitted.
5. [All nuclear reprocessing facilities shall cease operations and shall be
permanently closed.]
6. All nuclear facilities shall be subject to preventive controls.
7. All plans for the destruction or conversion of nuclear weapons [production,
research and testing facilities and principal nuclear] facilities, submitted
in accordance with Article IV {Phases for Implementation}, shall include
provisions or recommendations for the placement of former employees of
such facilities in positions of employment consistent with their experience and
expertise and with the object and purpose of this Convention. Such positions
and recommendations may include employment within a converted facility,
employment for the destruction of a nuclear facility, employment for the
destruction of nuclear weapons or disposition of special nuclear material, or
employment within the Agency for the purposes of verification.
B. Command, Control, and Communications Facilities and Deployment Sites
8. Each State Party shall make the following changes to nuclear targeting
commands and command systems in accordance with Article IV {Phases for
Implementation}:
a. Rescind alert status on all nuclear weapons;
b. Remove targeting coordinates from all command and control systems;
and
c. Remove navigational information for all nuclear armed missiles from
the navigational systems.
9. Each State Party shall, in accordance with Article IV {Phases for
Implementation} and the Verification Annex, destroy any facility, system or
sub-system designed or used solely for the purpose of launching, targeting,
directing or detonating a nuclear weapon or its delivery vehicle, or for aiding
or assisting in any of these purposes.
Nuclear weapons
production and research
facilities may contains
or consist of plants and
equipment useful for
the implementation of
the Convention. For this
reason, it may be more
suitable to convert rather
than close down some
of these facilities. Under
conversion, however,
verification that nuclear
weapons research and
production have stopped
could be difficult.
See Critical Questions,
Chapter 3, on Research
and Conversion.
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83
Section 2
10. Each State Party shall, in accordance with Article IV {Phases for
Implementation} and the Verification Annex, and in order to prevent use for
purposes prohibited under this Convention, destroy or convert any facility,
system or sub-system which is used for the purpose of launching, targeting,
directing or detonating a nuclear weapon or its delivery vehicle, or for aiding
or assisting in any of these purposes, and which is also used for purposes not
prohibited under this Convention.
11. Any facility, system or sub-system designed and used for detection of
activities prohibited under this Convention is permitted.
12. All plans for the destruction or conversion of command, control, and
communications facilities and deployment sites submitted in accordance with
Article IV {Phases for Implementation} and the Verification Annex, shall
include provisions or recommendations for the placement of former employees
of such facilities in positions of employment consistent with their experience
and expertise and with the object and purpose of this Convention. Such
positions and recommendations may include employment within a converted
facility, employment for the destruction of a nuclear facility, employment for
the purpose of gathering information, including National Technical Means,
and employment within the Agency for the purposes of inspection or other
methods of verification.
C. Nuclear reactors, enrichment and reprocessing facilities, nuclear materials
storage sites and other nuclear-fuel cycle locations outside of facilities.
13. All States shall declare the precise location, nature and scope of nuclear
reactors, enrichment and reprocessing facilities, nuclear laboratories, nuclear
materials storage sites and other nuclear-fuel cycle locations outside of
facilities.
14. All plutonium reprocessing facilities shall cease operations and be
permanently closed.
15. All States shall conclude safeguards agreements with the Agency [or
International Atomic Energy Agency] to verify that nuclear facilities
are operated consistent with obligations under this convention including
obligations under Section X (Nuclear Material).
D. Activities at nuclear facilities
16. Activities undertaken at nuclear facilities that are listed in Schedule 1 of the
Annex on Nuclear Activities shall be prohibited.
17. Activities undertaken at nuclear facilities that are listed in Schedule 2 of the
Annex on Nuclear Activities are permitted unless otherwise determined by the
Conference of States Parties in accordance with Articles XIV (Cooperation,
Compliance and Dispute Settlement).
18. Activities undertaken at nuclear facilities that are listed in Schedule 3 of the
Annex on Nuclear Activities are permitted.
Section C reflects a
similar provision in the
IAEA additional protocols
and is designed to
include all nuclear
fuel-cycle locations that
might be outside nuclear
facilities. Some of this
may be already covered
by other sections of the
Model NWC and thus not
necessary.
84
XII. Nuclear Weapons Delivery Vehicles
1. All deployment, development, testing, production, or acquisition of delivery
vehicles and launchers designed solely for the purpose of delivering nuclear
weapons {Schedule 1} is prohibited.
2. All delivery vehicles and launchers designed solely for the purpose of
delivering nuclear weapons shall be destroyed according to Article IV {Phases
for Implementation} [and the Verification Annex].
3. All delivery vehicles capable of use for the delivery of nuclear weapons or
non-nuclear weapons {Schedule 2} shall be destroyed according to Article IV
{Phases for Implementation} or converted for purposes not prohibited under
this Convention.
Schedule 1 - Nuclear Weapons Delivery Vehicles to Be Destroyed
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles
Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles
Heavy Bombers
Ballistic Missile Submarines
Ground Launched Cruise Missile
Schedule 2 - Delivery Vehicles to be Destroyed or Converted
Air-to-Surface Ballistic Missiles
Ground Launched Ballistic Missiles
Air Launched Cruise Missile
Sea Launched Cruise Missile
Nuclear-capable fighter bombers
Cruise Missile Submarines
Attack Submarines
Warships
[Schedule 3 - Transport Vehicles Not Designed for Nuclear Weapons to be Subject to
Preventive Controls – to be completed]
The model NWC
proposes the destruction
of delivery vehicles
designed solely for the
purpose of delivering
nuclear weapons. It
does not prohibit dual-
use delivery vehicles.
However requiring dual-
use delivery vehicles
to be converted to
non-nuclear capability
would only provide
limited confidence, as
reconversion back to
nuclear capability would
not be difficult. For this
reason, it is proposed
there be an additional
optional protocol on
prohibiting certain dual-
use delivery vehicles
which are destabilizing
irrespective of whether
Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention
85
Section 2
XIII. Activities Not Prohibited
Under This Convention
1. Each State Party has the right, subject to the provisions of this Convention [and other
agreements and regulations relating to nuclear material] to the research, development
and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.
2. Each State Party shall adopt the necessary measures to ensure that research,
development and use of nuclear energy within its territory or under its control is
undertaken only for purposes not prohibited under this Convention. To this end, and in
order to verify that activities are in accordance with obligations under this Convention,
each State Party shall subject nuclear facilities and nuclear material listed in the Annex
on Nuclear Activities, Components and Equipment of this Convention, or any other
activities so declared by the Agency, to control and verification measures as provided
in Sections V (Verification), VI (National Implementation Measures), VIII (Agency), X
(Nuclear Material), XI (Nuclear Facilities) [and the Verification Annex.]
3. Each State Party has the right to the research, development, production, acquisition
and deployment of weapons-delivery systems for security purposes. This right is
subject to the provisions of this Convention, other agreements and regulations relating
to weapons and weapons systems, the United Nations Charter and other international
law relating to the threat or use of force.
4. In the exercise of military activities not prohibited under this Convention,] each
State Party shall adopt the necessary measures to ensure that [weapons and] weapons
delivery systems are only developed, produced, otherwise acquired, retained,
transferred, tested or deployed in a manner consistent with this Convention. To this
end, and in order to verify that activities are in accordance with obligations under
this Convention, each State Party shall subject weapons delivery systems including
command, control, communication and production facilities to control and verification
measures as provided in Section XII (Nuclear Weapons Delivery Vehicles) [and the
Verification Annex].
See Optional Protocol
Concerning Energy
Assistance.
86
XIV. Cooperation, Compliance
and Dispute Settlement
A. Consultation, Cooperation, and Fact-finding
1. States Parties shall consult and cooperate, directly among themselves, or
through the Agency or other appropriate international procedures, including
procedures within the framework of the United Nations and in accordance
with its Charter, on any matter which may be raised relating to the object and
purpose, or the implementation of the provisions, of this Convention.
2. Each State Party undertakes to cooperate with the Agency and with other
States Parties in the improvement of the verification, destruction and
conversion regimes, with a view to developing specific measures to enhance
the efficient, safe and cost-effective verification, destruction and conversion
procedures and methods of this Convention.
3. Without prejudice to the right of any State Party to request a challenge
inspection, States Parties should, whenever possible, first make every effort
to clarify and resolve, through exchange of information and consultations
among themselves, any matter which may cause doubt about compliance with
this Convention, or which gives rise to concerns about a related matter which
may be considered ambiguous. A State Party which receives a request from
another State Party for clarification of any matter which the requesting State
Party believes causes such a doubt or concern shall provide the requesting
State Party as soon as possible, but in any case not later than [48] hours after
the receipt of a request to clarify a possible threat of use of nuclear weapons
or [10] days after the receipt of a request to clarify any other matter, with
information sufficient to answer the doubt or concern raised along with an
explanation of how the information provided resolves the matter. Nothing
in this Convention shall affect the right of any two or more States Parties to
arrange by mutual consent for inspections or any other procedures among
themselves to clarify and resolve any matter which may cause doubt about
compliance or gives rise to a concern about a related matter which may be
considered ambiguous. Such arrangements shall not affect the rights and
obligations of any State Party under other provisions of this Convention.
Procedure for requesting clarification
4. A State Party shall have the right to request the Executive Council to assist
in clarifying any situation which may be considered ambiguous or which
gives rise to a concern about the possible non-compliance of another State
Party with this Convention. The Executive Council shall provide appropriate
information in its possession relevant to such a concern.
5. A State Party shall have the right to request the Executive Council to
obtain clarification from another State Party on any situation which may be
considered ambiguous or which gives rise to a concern about its possible non-
compliance with this Convention. In such a case, the following shall apply:
a. The Executive Council shall forward the request for clarification to
the State Party concerned through the Director-General not later than
[24] hours after its receipt;
b. The requested State Party shall provide the clarification to the
Executive Council as soon as possible, but in any case not later than
[48] hours after the receipt of a request to clarify possible threat or use
Cooperation,
compliance and dispute
settlement: The NWC
includes provisions
for consultation and
fact-finding to clarify
and resolve questions
of interpretation with
respect to compliance
and other matters.
These procedures
would be time-crucial
to essential evidence
is not lost. Compliance
and enforcement
provisions are linked
to transparency and
confidence building
measures among State
Parties.
Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention
87
Section 2
of nuclear weapons or [10] days after the receipt of a request to clarify
any other matter;
c. The Executive Council shall take note of the clarification and forward
it to the requesting State Party not later than [24] hours after its
receipt;
d. If the requesting State Party deems the clarification to be inadequate,
it shall have the right to request the Executive Council to obtain from
the requested State Party further clarification
e. For the purpose of obtaining further clarification requested under
subparagraph d, the Executive Council may call on the Director-
General to establish a group of experts from the Technical Secretariat,
or if appropriate staff are not available in the Technical Secretariat,
from elsewhere, to examine all available information and data
relevant to the situation causing the concern. The group of experts
shall submit a factual report to the Executive Council on its findings;
f. If the requesting State Party considers the clarification obtained under
subparagraphs d and e to be unsatisfactory, it shall have the right to
request a special session of the Executive Council in which States
Parties involved that are not members of the Executive Council shall
be entitled to take part. In such a special session, the Executive
Council shall consider the matter and may recommend any measure it
deems appropriate to resolve the situation.
6. A State Party shall also have the right to request the Executive Council to
clarify any situation which has been considered ambiguous or has given rise
to a concern about its possible non-compliance with this Convention. The
Executive Council shall respond by providing such assistance as appropriate.
7. The Executive Council shall inform the States Parties about any request for
clarification provided in this Article.
8. If the doubt or concern of a State Party about a possible non-compliance has
not been resolved within [60] days after the submission of the request for
clarification to the Executive Council, or it believes its doubts warrant urgent
consideration, notwithstanding its right to request a challenge inspection, it
may request a special session of the Conference in accordance with Article
VIII {Agency}. At such a special session, the Conference shall consider the
matter and may recommend any measure it deems appropriate to resolve the
situation.
Procedures for challenge inspections
9. Each State Party has the right to request an on-site challenge inspection of any
facility or location in the territory or in any other place under the jurisdiction
or control of any other State Party for the sole purpose of clarifying and
resolving any questions concerning possible non-compliance with the
provisions of this Convention, and to have this inspection conducted anywhere
without delay by an inspection team designated by the Director-General and in
accordance with the Verification Annex.
10. Each State Party is under the obligation to keep the inspection request within
the scope of this Convention and to provide in the inspection request all
appropriate information on the basis of which a concern has arisen regarding
possible non-compliance with this Convention as specified in the Verification
Annex. Each State Party shall refrain from unfounded inspection requests,
care being taken to avoid abuse. The challenge inspection shall be carried
out for the sole purpose of determining facts relating to the possible non-
compliance.
On-site inspections
and techniques would
include both systematic,
baseline inspections and
challenge inspections
(anytime-anyplace) of
declared and undeclared
facilities, utlizing a range
of techniques, including
visual inspection,
record checks and
non-destructive
measurements (e.g.,
with portable x-ray and
gamma-ray detectors)
and could be assisted by
identification techniques,
such as tagging,
tamper-indicating seals
in nuclear power plants
and “fingerprinting”
of delivery systems.
Perimeter portal
monitoring systems
would track the flow
of items and materials
relevant for nuclear
weapons.
88
11. For the purpose of verifying compliance with the provisions of this
Convention, each State Party shall permit the Technical Secretariat to conduct
the on-site challenge inspection pursuant to paragraph 9.
12. Pursuant to a request for a challenge inspection of a facility or location, and
in accordance with the procedures provided for in the Verification Annex, the
inspected State Party shall have:
a. The right and the obligation to make every reasonable effort to
demonstrate its compliance with this Convention and, to this end, to
enable the inspection team to fulfill its mandate;
b. The obligation to provide access within the requested site for the
sole purpose of establishing facts relevant to the concern regarding
possible non-compliance; and
c. The right to take measures to protect sensitive installations, and to
prevent disclosure of confidential information and data, not related to
this Convention.
13. With regard to an observer, the following shall apply:
a. The requesting State Party may, subject to the agreement of the
inspected State Party, send a representative who may be a national
either of the requesting State Party or of a third State Party, to observe
the conduct of the challenge inspection.
b. The inspected State Party shall then grant access to the observer in
accordance with the Verification Annex.
c. The inspected State Party shall, as a rule, accept the proposed
observer, but if the inspected State Party exercises a refusal, that fact
shall be recorded in the final report.
14. The requesting State Party shall present an inspection request for an on-site
challenge inspection to the Executive Council and at the same time to the
Director-General for immediate processing.
15. The Director-General shall immediately ascertain that the inspection request
meets the requirements specified the Verification Annex, and, if necessary,
assist the requesting State Party in filing the inspection request accordingly.
When the inspection request fulfills the requirements, preparations for the
challenge inspection shall begin.
16. The Director-General shall transmit the inspection request to the inspected
State Party not less than 12 hours before the planned arrival of the inspection
team at the point of entry.
17. After having received the inspection request, the Executive Council shall take
cognizance of the Director-General’s actions on the request and shall keep the
case under its consideration throughout the inspection procedure. However, its
deliberations shall not delay the inspection process.
18. The Executive Council may, not later than 12 hours after having received
the inspection request, decide by a three-quarter majority of all its members
against carrying out the challenge inspection, if it considers the inspection
request to be frivolous, abusive or clearly beyond the scope of this Convention
as described in paragraph 9. Neither the requesting nor the inspected
State Party shall participate in such a decision. If the Executive Council
decides against the challenge inspection, preparations shall be stopped, no
further action on the inspection request shall be taken, and the States Parties
concerned shall be informed accordingly.
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Section 2
19. The Director-General shall issue an inspection mandate for the conduct of
the challenge inspection. The inspection mandate shall be the inspection
request referred to in paragraphs 9 and 10 put into operational terms, and shall
conform with the inspection request.
20. The challenge inspection shall be conducted in accordance with the provisions
of the Verification Annex. The inspection team shall be guided by the
principle of conducting the challenge inspection in the least intrusive manner
possible, consistent with the effective and timely accomplishment of its
mission.
21. The inspected State Party shall assist the inspection team throughout the
challenge inspection and facilitate its task. If the inspected State Party
proposes, pursuant to the Verification Annex, arrangements to demonstrate
compliance with this Convention, alternative to full and comprehensive access,
it shall make every reasonable effort, through consultations with the inspection
team, to reach agreement on the modalities for establishing the facts with the
aim of demonstrating its compliance.
22. The final report shall contain the factual findings as well as an assessment by
the inspection team of the degree and nature of access and cooperation granted
for the satisfactory implementation of the challenge inspection. The Director-
General shall promptly transmit the final report of the inspection team to the
requesting State Party, to the inspected State Party, to the Executive Council
and to all other States Parties. The Director-General shall further transmit
promptly to the Executive Council the assessments of the requesting and of the
inspected States Parties, as well as the views of other States Parties which may
be conveyed to the Director-General for that purpose, and then provide them to
all States Parties.
23. The Executive Council shall, in accordance with its powers and functions,
review the final report of the inspection team as soon as it is presented, and
address any concerns as to:
a. Whether any non-compliance has occurred;
b. Whether the request had been within the scope of this Convention;
and
c. Whether the right to request a challenge inspection had been abused.
24. If the Executive Council reaches the conclusion, in keeping with its powers
and functions, that further action may be necessary with regard to paragraph
23, it shall take the appropriate measures to redress the situation and to
ensure compliance with this Convention, including specific recommendations
to the Conference. In the case of abuse, the Executive Council shall
examine whether the requesting State Party should bear any of the financial
implications of the challenge inspection.
25. The requesting State Party and the inspected State Party shall have the right
to participate in the review process. The Executive Council shall inform the
States Parties and the next session of the Conference of the outcome of the
process.
26. If the Executive Council has made specific recommendations to the
Conference, the Conference shall consider action in accordance with Section
B.
90
B. Measures to Redress a Situation and to Ensure Compliance, Including
Sanctions
27. The Conference, taking into account the recommendations of the Executive
Council, shall take necessary measures, as set forth in paragraphs 28, 29 and
30 to ensure compliance with this Convention and to redress and remedy any
situation which contravenes the provisions of this Convention.
28. In cases where a State Party has been requested by the Conference or the
Executive Council to redress a situation raising problems with regard to
its compliance and fails to fulfill the request within the specified time, the
Conference may, inter alia, decide to restrict or suspend the State Party
from the exercise of its rights and privileges under this Convention until the
Conference decides otherwise.
29. In cases where damage to the object and purpose of this Convention may
result from non-compliance with the basic obligations of this Convention, the
Conference may recommend to States Parties collective measures which are
in conformity with international law. Such measures may include restrictions
or suspensions of all assistance in nuclear activities outlined in Schedule 2
of the Annex on Nuclear Activities, Components and Equipment. If the State
concerned continues in its failure to comply with the request, further sanctions
may be imposed.
30. The Conference, or alternatively, if the case is urgent, the Executive Council,
may bring the issue, including relevant information, conclusions and
recommendations, to the attention of the United Nations General Assembly
and the United Nations Security Council.
31. The threat or use of nuclear weapons shall be deemed to be a threat to the
peace subject to the provisions of the United Nations Charter.
C. Settlement of Disputes
32. Disputes that may arise concerning the application, implementation or
interpretation of this Convention shall be settled in accordance with the
relevant provisions of this Convention, including Section B and in conformity
with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.
33. When a disputes arises between two or more States Parties, or between one or
more States Parties and the Agency, relating to the application, implementation
or interpretation of this Convention, the parties concerned shall consult
together with a view to the expeditious settlement of the dispute by
negotiation, mediation, arbitration or by other peaceful means of the parties’
choice, including recourse to appropriate organs of this Convention and, by
mutual consent, referral to the International Court of Justice in conformity
with the Statute of the Court.
34. If other peaceful means of settlement are not found, a State Party in dispute
with one or more States Parties may refer the dispute to the International
Court of Justice, in conformity with the Statute of the Court [and the Optional
Protocol Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes]. The States
Parties involved shall keep the Executive Council informed of actions being
taken.
35. The Executive Council may contribute to the settlement of a dispute by
whatever means it deems appropriate, including offering its good offices,
calling upon the States Parties to a dispute to start the settlement process of
their choice and recommending a time-limit for any agreed procedure.
See Critical Questions
in Chapter 3 on
Enforcement and
Security.
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91
Section 2
36. The Conference shall consider questions related to disputes raised by States
Parties or brought to its attention by the Executive Council. The Conference
shall, as it finds necessary, establish or entrust organs with tasks related to the
settlement of these disputes in conformity with Article VIII {Agency}.
37. The Conference and the Executive Council may recommend to the General
Assembly of the United Nations, to request the International Court of Justice
to give an advisory opinion on any legal question arising within the scope
of the activities of the Agency. An agreement between the Agency and the
United Nations shall be concluded for this purpose in accordance with Article
VIII {Agency}.
38. This Section is without prejudice to Sections A and B.
92
XV. Entry Into Force
A. Conditions of Entry Into Force
1. This Convention shall enter into force [180] days after the date on which the
following conditions are met:
a. [All] Nuclear Weapons States have deposited their instruments of
ratification; and
b. All Nuclear Capable States have deposited their instruments of
ratification; and
c. At least [65] States in total have deposited instruments of ratification
[including all States listed in Annex IV: List of Countries with
Nuclear Power Reactors] [or] [including at least [40] States from
Annex V: List of Countries with Nuclear Power Reactors or Nuclear
Research Reactors].
2. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited
subsequent to the entry into force of this Convention, it shall enter into force
on the 30th day following the date of deposit of their instrument of ratification
or accession.
B. State Waiver of Entry into Force Requirements
For States who waive the entry into force requirements, this Convention shall enter into
force on the 30th day following the date of deposit of their instrument of ratification or
accession.
Two-tier entry into force
allows early entry into
force for individual
Entry into force is one of the most politically difficult provisions, as was evidenced in
the CTBT negotiations. It is unlikely that any of the Nuclear Weapon States will assent
to the Convention unless all Nuclear Weapon States and nuclear capable States assent.
On the other hand, if by the time of signing, most Nuclear Weapon States have decided
that possession of nuclear weapons has no more strategic value, as they did in the
case of chemical weapons, they may agree to a less restrictive entry-into-force require-
ment in order to advance the timetable for the elimination of nuclear weapons.
Drafters have opted for a somewhat restrictive entry-into-force requirement, including
all Nuclear Weapon States, all nuclear capable States and a minimum number of other
States, focusing primarily on those with nuclear reactors. This recognizes that all other
States that could possibly develop a nuclear capability are already obligated not to
develop or acquire nuclear weapons under the NPT, and are already bound by IAEA
safeguards, making their early accession to this Convention less urgent.
Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention
93
Section 2
XVI. Financing
1. The costs of the Agency’s activities shall be paid by States Parties in
accordance with the United Nations scale of assessment adjusted to take
into account differences in membership between the United Nations and this
Agency. The budget of the Agency shall comprise two separate chapters, one
relating to administrative and other costs, and one relating to verification and
compliance costs.
2. Each Nuclear Weapons State shall meet the costs of destruction of weapons,
proscribed nuclear material and nuclear facilities under its authority. Each
Nuclear Weapons State shall meet the costs of verification of nuclear facilities
under its authority, except for instances of challenge inspections which are
funded according to the provisions of the Verification Annex.
3. The Agency shall establish a voluntary fund to assist States Parties to comply
with paragraph 2 where such compliance imposes undue financial burdens on
them.
94
XVII. Amendments
1. Any State Party may propose amendments to this Convention. Any State Party
may also propose changes, as specified in paragraph 4, to the Annexes of this
Convention. Proposals for amendments shall be subject to the procedures in
paragraphs 2 and 3. Proposals for changes, as specified in paragraph 4, shall
be subject to the procedures in paragraph 5.
2. The text of a proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Director-General
for circulation to all States Parties and to the Depositary. The proposed
amendment shall be considered only by an Amendment Conference. Such
an Amendment Conference shall be convened if one third or more of the
States Parties notify the Director-General [not later than [60 days] after its
circulation] that they support further consideration of the proposal. The
Amendment Conference shall be held immediately following a regular session
of the Conference unless the requesting States Parties ask for an earlier
meeting. In no case shall an Amendment Conference be held less than 60 days
after the circulation of the proposed amendment.
3. Amendments shall enter into force for all States Parties 20 days after deposit
of the instruments of ratification or acceptance by all the States Parties referred
to under subparagraph b below:
a. When adopted by the Amendment Conference by a positive vote of a
majority of all States Parties [with no State Party casting a negative
vote]; and
b. Ratified or accepted by all those States Parties casting a positive vote
at the Amendment Conference.
4. In order to ensure the viability and the effectiveness of this Convention,
provisions in the Annexes shall be subject to changes in accordance
with paragraph 5, if proposed changes are related only to matters of an
administrative or technical nature.
5. Proposed changes referred to in paragraph 4 shall be made in accordance with
the following procedures:
a. The text of the proposed changes shall be transmitted together with
the necessary information to the Director-General. Additional
information for the evaluation of the proposal may be provided by
any State Party and the Director-General. The Director-General shall
promptly communicate any such proposals and information to all
States Parties, the Executive Council and the Depositary;
b. Not later than 60 days after its receipt, the Director-General shall
evaluate the proposal to determine all its possible consequences for
the provisions of this Convention and its implementation and shall
communicate any such information to all States Parties and the
Executive Council;
c. The Executive Council shall examine the proposal in the light of all
information available to it, including whether the proposal fulfills
the requirements of paragraph 4. Not later than 90 days after its
receipt, the Executive Council shall notify its recommendation, with
appropriate explanations, to all States Parties for consideration. States
Parties shall acknowledge receipt within 10 days.
d. If the Executive Council recommends to all States Parties that the
proposal be adopted, it shall be considered approved if no State Party
Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention
95
Section 2
objects to it within 90 days after receipt of the recommendation. If
the Executive Council recommends that the proposal be rejected, it
shall be considered rejected if no State Party objects to the rejection
within 90 days after receipt of the recommendation;
e. If a recommendation of the Executive Council does not meet with the
acceptance required under subparagraph d, a decision on the proposal,
including whether it fulfills the requirements of paragraph 4, shall be
taken as a matter of substance by the Conference at its next session;
f. The Director-General shall notify all States Parties and the Depositary
of any decision under this paragraph;
g. Changes approved under this procedure shall enter into force for all
States Parties 180 days after the date of notification by the Director-
General of their approval unless another time period is recommended
by the Executive Council or decided by the Conference.
96
XVIII. Scope and Application of Convention
A. Relation to other International Agreements
1. Nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as in any way limiting or
detracting from the obligations assumed by any State under the United Nations
Charter; the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; the Treaty
Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under
Water; the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America
and the Caribbean; the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of
Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed
and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof; the Agreement Governing
the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies; the South
Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty; the African Nuclear Free Zone Treaty; the
Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty; the Central Asia Nuclear
Weapon Free Zone Treaty; any other treaties establishing nuclear weapon free
zones; the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty; the Treaty Between the
U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and
Short-Range Missiles; the Treaty Between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. on the
Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms; the Treaty Between the
U.S.A. and Russia on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive
Arms; the Treaty between Russia and the United States on Strategic Offensive
Reductions, the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of
Nuclear Terrorism, or under agreements with the International Atomic Energy
Agency.
2. Pursuant to Article VIII {Agency}, the Agency may enter into agreements
with the implementing organizations of other international agreements for the
purpose of sharing information necessary or applicable to the verification tasks
of each organization involved, or for any other purposes that would further the
objectives of the international agreements concerned.
B. Status of the Annexes
3. The Annexes form an integral part of this Convention. Any reference to this
Convention includes the Annexes.
C. Duration and Withdrawal
4. This Convention shall be of unlimited duration.
5 Withdrawal from this Convention shall not be permitted [upon ratification by
all Nuclear Weapons States].
D. Reservations
6. The Articles of this Convention shall not be subject to reservations. The Annexes
of this Convention shall not be subject to reservations incompatible with its object
and purpose.
The model NWC
provides for no
withdrawal, reflecting the
view that the prohibition
of nuclear weapons,
and the obligation to
eliminate them, have
entered the realm of
customary international
law from which there
should be no exception.
Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention
97
Section 2
XIX. Conclusion of Convention
A. Signature
1. This Convention shall be open for signature for all States before its entry into
force.
B. Ratification
2. This Convention shall be subject to ratification by States Signatories according
to their respective constitutional processes.
C. Accession
3. Any State which does not sign this Convention before its entry into force may
accede to it at any time thereafter.
D. Depository
4. The Secretary-General of the United Nations is hereby designated as the Depository
of this Convention and shall, inter alia:
a. Promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each
signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or
accession and the date of the entry into force of this Convention, and
of the receipt of other notices;
b. Transmit duly certified copies of this Convention to the Governments
of all signatory and acceding States; and
c. Register this Convention pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the
United Nations.
E. Authentic Texts
5. This Convention, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and
Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-
General of the United Nations.
98
Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory
Settlement of Disputes
The States Parties to this Protocol, expressing their wish to resort to the compulsory
jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, unless some other form of settlement
is provided for in the Convention or has been agreed upon by the Parties within a
reasonable period, have agreed as follows:
Disputes arising out of the interpretation or application of this Convention shall lie
within the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, and may
accordingly be brought before the Court by an application by any party to the dispute
being a Party to this Protocol.
Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention
99
Section 2
Optional Protocol Concerning Energy Assistance
The States Parties to this Protocol:
Desiring to prevent any threat to the aims and objectives of this Convention from
arising due to the proliferation of nuclear technology which could aid or assist in the
development of nuclear weapons,
Desiring further to prevent any threat to health and the environment arising from the
excessive creation of radionuclides in nuclear reactors,
Affirming the right to the development of sustainable and environmentally safe energy
sources,
Have agreed as follows:
1. Not to manufacture, assemble, transfer or otherwise acquire nuclear power
reactors.
2. Not to use any existing power reactor, nor the products from the use of any
nuclear power reactor.
3. To close any existing nuclear power reactors within [five] years of signing this
protocol.
4. To assist other Parties to this protocol in the development and use of non-
nuclear, sustainable energy sources.
5. To create a voluntary fund for the purposes of implementing paragraph 4.
See Critical Questions
in Chapter 3 on
Nuclear Energy.
100
Annex I: Nuclear Activities
A. Guidelines for Schedules of Nuclear Activities
Guidelines for Schedule 1
1. The following criteria shall be taken into account in considering whether a
nuclear activity shall be included in Schedule 1:
a) It is an activity specifically prohibited under Article I of this
Convention
b) It is an activity the purpose of which is to aid or assist in any activity
specifically prohibited under Article I of this Convention.
c) It is an activity which poses a grave risk to the object and purpose of
this Convention by virtue of its high potential for aiding and assisting
activities specifically prohibited by this Convention.
d) It has little or no use for purposes not prohibited under this
Convention, or alternatively its use for purposes not prohibited under
this Convention can be safely substituted by another activity.
2. Schedule 1 activities are prohibited.
Guidelines for Schedule 2
3. The following criteria shall be taken into account in considering whether a
nuclear activity shall be included in Schedule 2:
a) It is an activity not specifically prohibited under Article I of this
Convention
b) It is an activity the purpose of which is not to aid or assist in any
activity specifically prohibited under Article I of this Convention.
c) It is an activity which poses some risk to the object and purpose of
this Convention by virtue of its potential to aid and assist activities
specifically prohibited by this Convention.
4. Schedule 2 activities are permitted unless otherwise determined by the
Conference in accordance with Articles [Agency, Technical Secretariat] and
[compliance].
Guidelines for Schedule 3
5. The following criteria shall be taken into account in considering whether a
nuclear activity shall be included in Schedule 3:
a) It is an activity not specifically prohibited under Article I of this
Convention
b) It is an activity the purpose of which is not to aid or assist in any
activity specifically prohibited under Article I of this Convention.
c) It is an activity which poses no risk to the object and purpose of this
Convention
6. Schedule 3 activities are permitted.
Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention
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Section 2
B. Schedule of Nuclear Activities
Schedule 1
(1) Production of nuclear weapons
(2) Use of nuclear weapons
(3) Threat of use of nuclear weapons
(4) Production and any use of special nuclear material
(5) Production of metals or alloys containing plutonium or uranium
(6) Weaponization: This covers the research, development, manufacturing and
testing required to make nuclear explosive devices from special fissionable or
fusionable material
(7) Nuclear fuel fabrication using plutonium, uranium-233, uranium enriched to
20% or more in uranium-235
(8) Import, construction or use of research and power reactors of any kind
utilizing uranium enriched to 20% or more in uranium-235, uranium-233,
plutonium or MOX as a fuel or any reactor designed specifically for plutonium
production. This includes critical and sub-critical assemblies
(9) Reprocessing of irradiated fuel or irradiation targets containing nuclear-
weapons capable material. This includes the use of hot cells and associated
equipment
(10) Enrichment of uranium in isotope U-235 beyond 20% and any preparatory
steps in this process, including the preparation and storage of UCI4 and UF6
enriched to more than 3% in U-235. {The preparation of UC14 and UF6 from
natural uranium will not be forbidden by the NWC. After enrichment it should
not be stored in this form which would be appropriate feeding material for
further enrichment beyond 20%.}
(11) Production, separation, and enrichment of the isotope of plutonium-239 ,
hydrogen, tritium and lithium-6.
(12) Production of antiprotons, antimatter, nuclear isomers and super-heavy
elements in significant quantities
Schedule 2
(1) Import, construction, use of research and power reactors of any type using
natural uranium or uranium enriched to less than 20% in uranium-235 as a
fuel. This includes critical and sub-critical assemblies, but excludes reactors
specifically designed for plutonium production.
(2) Prospecting, mining or processing of ores containing uranium and/or thorium
(3) Preparation of chemical compounds containing uranium enriched to less than
20% in uranium-235 and thorium; excluding the preparation of UCI4 and UF6
enriched to more than 3% in U-235.
(4) Nuclear fuel fabrication using natural uranium or uranium enriched to less than
20% in uranium-235.
(5) Production of particle and laser beams of all kind.
(6) Nuclear fusion experimental devices based on inertial confinement, including
diagnostics
102
Schedule 3
(1) Application of radiation and isotopes in food and agriculture:
- Soil fertility, irrigation and crop production
- [Plant breeding and genetics]
- Animal production and health
- Insect and pest control
- [Food preservation]
- Other uses upon approval
(2) Applications of radiation and isotopes in medicine
- Diagnostic and therapeutic medicine including dosimetry
- Radiotherapy by teletherapy and brachytherapy
- Nutrition and health-related environmental studies
- Other uses upon approval
(3) Application of radiation and isotopes in industrial processes
- Radiography and other non-destructive testing methods
- Industrial process control and quality control
- Radiotracer applications in oil, chemical and metallurgical processes
- Development of water and mineral resources
- Industrial radiation processing
- Other uses upon approval
(4) Applications in research with and production and disposal of radioactive isotopes
and elementary particles
- Conditioning and disposal of radioactive wastes
- Nuclear fusion experimental devices based on magnetic confinement,
including diagnostics
- Production of isotopes both radioactive and stable. The production of the
isotope Pu-239, titanium and lithium-6 is prohibited.
- Import, construction and use of neutron sources, electron accelerators,
particle accelerators, heavy icon accelerators
- Research on radiation physics and chemistry and on the physical and
chemical properties of isotopes except in areas relevant to activities not
prohibited by or subject to authorization under this Convention
Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention
103
Section 2
Annex II: Nuclear Weapon Components
Guidelines for Schedule 1
1. A component shall be included in Schedule 1 if it is produced solely for the
purpose of incorporation into a nuclear explosive device.
2. Manufacture, transfer or stockpiling of Schedule 1 components is prohibited.
Guidelines for Schedule 2
3. The following criteria shall be taken into account in considering whether a
component shall be included in Schedule 2:
a) The component is produced for incorporation into a nuclear explosive
device
b) The component is also used for purposes not prohibited under this
convention, but is not produced in large commercial quantities for
such purposes
c) There exist alternative components for the purposes cited in paragraph
(b).
4. Manufacture, transfer or stockpiling of Schedule 2 components is prohibited.
Guidelines for Schedule 3
5. The following criteria shall be taken into account in considering whether a
component shall be included in Schedule 3:
a) The component is produced for incorporation into a nuclear explosive
device
b) The component is also used for purposes not prohibited under
this convention, but is not produced in large commercial quantities for
such purposes
c) There do not exist alternative components for the purposes
cited in paragraph (b).
6. Manufacture, transfer or stockpiling of Schedule 3 components is permitted
only in accordance with the provisions established by the Agency.
Guidelines for Schedule 4
7. The following criteria shall be taken into account in considering whether a
component shall be included in Schedule 4:
a) The component is produced for incorporation into a nuclear explosive
device
b) The component is also used for purposes not prohibited under this
convention, and is produced in large commercial quantities for such
purposes
[ c) There do not exist alternative components for the purposes cited in
paragraph (b).]
8. Manufacture of Schedule 4 components is permitted only in accordance with
the provisions established by the Agency.
104
Annex III: List of countries and geographical regions for the
purpose of Article VII.C.23
Africa
Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape
Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, Djibouti,
Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea,
Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar,
Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger,
Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome & Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone,
Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, United Republic
of Tanzania, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe.
Eastern Europe
Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria,
Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova,
Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, the Former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia, Ukraine, Yugoslavia.
Latin America and the Caribbean
Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil,
Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador,
El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico,
Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint
Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, Venezuela.
Middle East and South Asia
Afghanistan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq,
Israel, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Maldives, Nepal, Oman,
Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan, Yemen.
North America and Western Europe
Andorra, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Holy See, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta,
Monaco, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, San Marino, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of
America.
South East Asia, the Pacific and the Far East
Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, China, Cook Islands, Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea, Fiji, Indonesia, Japan, Kiribati, Lao People’s Democratic
Republic, Malaysia, Marshall Islands, Micronesia (Federated States of), Mongolia,
Myanmar, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Philippines,
Republic of Korea, Samoa, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Thailand, Timor Leste, Tonga,
Tuvalu,Vanuatu, Viet Nam.
Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention
105
Section 2
Annex IV: List of Countries with Nuclear Power Reactors
Annex V: List of Countries with nuclear power reactors and/
or nuclear research reactors
ARGENTINA
ARMENIA
BELGIUM
BRAZIL
BULGARIA
CANADA
CHINA
FINLAND
FRANCE
GERMANY
HUNGARY
INDIA
IRAN
JAPAN
REPUBLIC OF
KOREA
LITHUANIA
MEXICO
NETHERLANDS
PAKISTAN
ROMANIA
RUSSIA
S.AFRICA
SLOVAKIA
SLOVENIA
SPAIN
SWEDEN
SWITZERLAND
UNITED KINGDOM
UKRAINE
USA
ARGENTINA
ARMENIA
AUSTRALIA
AUSTRIA
BANGLADESH
BELARUS
BELGIUM
BRAZIL
BULGARIA
CANADA
CHILE
CHINA
COLOMBIA
CZECH REPUBLIC
DPRK
DEMOCRATIC
REPUBLIC OF
CONGO
DENMARK
EGYPT
EUROPEAN UNION*
FINLAND
FRANCE
GEORGIA
GERMANY
GHANA
GREECE
HUNGARY
INDIA
INDONESIA
IRAN
IRAQ
ISRAEL
ITALY
JAMAICA
JAPAN
KAZAKHSTAN
LATVIA
LIBYA
LITHUANIA
MALAYSIA
MEXICO
MOROCCO
NETHERLANDS
NIGERIA
NORWAY
PAKISTAN
PERU
PHILIPPINES
POLAND
PORTUGAL
REPUBLIC OF
KOREA
ROMANIA
RUSSIA
SERBIA AND
MONTENEGRO
SLOVAKIA
SLOVENIA
SOUTH AFRICA
SPAIN
SWEDEN
SWITZERLAND
SYRIA
TAIWAN
THAILAND
TUNISIA
TURKEY
UNITED KINGDOM
UKRAINE
USA
106
Section
Comments and Critical Questions
3
A D-5 Trident II missile spins out of control after
being launched from the nuclear-powered strategic
missile submarine USS Tennessee.
Photo: US Navy
108
CONTENTS: Section 3. Comment and Critical Questions
Enforcement 109
Security 112
Breakout 114
Deterrence 116
Terrorism 118
Health and Environment 120
De-Alerting 127
Cleanup, Disposition and Safe Disarmament 130
Nuclear Energy 133
Knowledge and Reversibility 139
Conversion 142
Research 147
Economic Aspects 150
Update to comments on Breakout, Knowledge, Conversion and Research by
Jacqueline Cabasso and Andrew Lichterman, Western States Legal Foundation,
for the 2007 edition 152
Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention
109
Section 3
Enforcement
Critical Question:
Can a Nuclear Weapons Convention be enforced?
How to enforce nuclear abolition is one of the most frequently asked questions
regarding the Nuclear Weapons Convention. The model NWC emphasizes compliance
over enforcement. It is more effective to persuade states to comply with the Convention
than it is to have to respond after a violation with enforcement measures.
However, should compliance fail, enforcement may be necessary depending on
the degree of non-compliance and the threat posed. The model NWC includes some
provisions for enforcement including the restriction of States’ rights, suspension of
assistance in nuclear activities, and other sanctions. But, ultimate authority remains -
as with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention, and
the Biological Weapons Convention - with the United Nations Security Council. The
model NWC includes a provision making the threat or use of nuclear weapons a threat
to the peace, requiring action by the Security Council. Security Council action on non-
proliferation, such as Resolution 1540, demonstrate that the Security Council could go
further and mandate national implementation and enforcement measures making them
compulsory for all States regardless of whether or not they have ratified the NWC. This
would enhance enforcement powers of the Security Council.
Another provision makes threat or use of nuclear weapons a crime for which
individuals shall be held accountable before national courts and/or the International
Criminal Court.
Both the composition and the mandate of the Security Council are regularly raised
in consideration of this question. This leads to concern about the current and possible
future international security regimes and the concept of security itself. (See Critical
Question on Security.)
It has been suggested that in addition to Security Council authority to respond to a
breach, including by use of force, there should be recognition of a right of individual
states to respond with force to a breach if the Security Council does not act - for
example, due to a veto. However, to the extent that such a right goes beyond the
present right of inherent self-defense against an armed attack under the UN Charter,
it could prove destabilizing to international security arrangements generally and also
serve as a disincentive for present nuclear weapon states agreeing to an NWC.
Some also suggest that the Security Council should be granted a small number of
nuclear weapons to be able to threaten or use in response to nuclear breakout. Most
of the MNWC drafters oppose this idea on the grounds that 1) there are adequate
non-nuclear means for responding to breakout, 2) the retention by any entity of
nuclear weapons would justify the deterrent posture, and could lead to retention
by certain states of their own nuclear weapons as a counter-balance to those of the
Security Council, and 3) it is difficult to see how any threat or use of nuclear weapons,
whether by a state or the Security Council, could conform with international rules of
humanitarian law.
Experience with the NPT indicates that for most states in the world, enforcement
will not be an issue. Almost all non-nuclear weapon states parties to the NPT — the
vast majority of states in the world — have complied with their obligation under that
treaty not to acquire nuclear weapons. Cases of actual or possible violation illustrate
that while an effective international response can be difficult and problematic, it
nonetheless is possible. In the case of Iraq’s WMD programs, the measures imposed by
the UN Security Council in 1991 were successful in achieving their dismantling and
destruction including of their fledgling nuclear weapons programs.
Responses to the
question of enforcement
overwhelmingly favor
reliance on incentives for
compliance rather than
threat force, or sanctions.
110
The North Korean situation is somewhat different in that they exercised their
right to withdraw from the NPT prior to openly embarking on a nuclear weapons
program. Subsequent developments indicate that a negotiated approach involving
security assurances and economic incentives can facilitate compliance with nuclear
disarmament objectives.
Moreover, in a nuclear-weapon free world, the international response to a breach of
the NWC by small or mid-sized powers would almost certainly be more effective than
under the NPT. Among other reasons, current nuclear weapon states would no longer
have their own nuclear threat, and would have very strong incentives to ensure that no
other state acquires that capability.
Violation of the NWC by a major military power, including those states that are
now both nuclear-armed and permanent members of the Security Council with a veto,
obviously would pose serious problems for a nuclear weapon free regime. Certain
reforms, such as restricting the power of the veto or providing that the General
Assembly could act in the absence of Security Council action, may be useful in
addressing that possibility. But, in the near-term, the stability of a nuclear weapon
free regime may depend on the assessment by major powers that it is in their security
interests, and on the normative force of the prohibition of acquiring nuclear weapons
that would grow as the regime was institutionalized and endured. These are significant
factors. Moreover, the development of a nuclear weapon free regime will itself change
the security situation.In the longer term, owing in part to the NWC, global collective
security arrangements may develop that are capable of effectively responding to any
state breaching the NWC.
Illustration: Laurence Clark.
Courtesy of the Alexander Turnbull Library,
Wellington, New Zealand.
Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention
111
Section 3
Comment: Treaties are not enough
Present-day political culture derives from a long history of “might is right.” This
means that militarily and economically strong countries can make or break agreements
at their will, and enforce them on the weak with equal arbitrariness. For instance,
nuclear weapons states have signed the NPT, which requires an early end to the nuclear
arms race. Yet after three decades, all five continue to modernize their arsenals. Other
than China, none have even accepted the World Court’s unanimous advisory opinion
that Article VI requires the achievement of nuclear disarmament in all its aspects.
Nuclear apartheid can continue even after it has been declared to be illegal.
The CTBT provides a similar lesson. Though Article I bans all nuclear explosions,
including peaceful nuclear explosions, nuclear weapons states (and some others)
interpret it as allowing nuclear fusion explosions in laboratories. This interpretation of
the CTBT will allow the modernization of present arsenals, as well as the development
of entirely new types of nuclear weapons, notably pure fusion weapons.
Some of the most difficult nuclear disarmament issues relate to the minimization of
the risk of (i) a break out of the treaty and (ii) retaliation with nuclear weapons in case
breakout results in the use of nuclear weapons. To address these concerns, any nuclear
weapons convention must contain features that go well beyond the complete verified
dismantlement of nuclear weapons and related infrastructure, since both of these can
be re-constituted. Unlike many existing treaties, such as the NPT and CTBT that
permit withdrawal (usually at short notice and no specified penalty), the NWC must
completely prohibit withdrawal under any circumstances. Activities violating the treaty
should be punishable under the Nuremberg code. This would allow the individuals
making the decisions to be held accountable under international law. Further, the role
of the World Court clearly needs to be strengthened so that it can effectively deal with
violations by any state, including present-day nuclear weapon states.
Such features, which are essential to enduring nuclear disarmament, cannot be
success-fully incorporated into a NWC unless there are profound changes in the present
political, military, moral, and economic framework of which nuclear weapons are just
one part. For instance, current military and political deterrence doctrine legitimizes the
killing by states of children in an adversary country in retaliation for a nuclear attack
even though such an idea is generally regarded as immoral and illegal at individual or
non-state party levels. Unless such retaliation by a state is rejected by the majority of
the people of nuclear weapons states as immoral, there is little chance that a nuclear
weapons convention with the necessary features can be negotiated. The resistance of
the United States to the International Criminal Court is a case in point.
Finally, huge nuclear weapons budgets have created powerful vested interests that
a treaty alone cannot overcome. Even the decision to bomb Hiroshima was made
with an eye to justifying World War II nuclear weapon budgets and hence to post-
war allocations of funds. As another example, the CTBT gave birth to “stockpile
stewardship” programs that have increased the flow of money into nuclear weapons
maintenance modification, design, and laboratory testing. A full conversion of
nuclear establishments from their Cold War functions to management of weapons-
usable materials and nuclear wastes as well as to clean-up of vast areas that have been
contaminated is an essential part of the disarmament process. Such a restructuring of
functions will reduce the economic incentives for continued maintenance of nuclear
weapons capacities and help reduce the risk of a breakout from a nuclear weapons
convention.
-Arjun Makhijani, Institute for Energy and Environmental Research
112
Security
Critical Question:
Will a Nuclear Weapons Convention mean a different
international security system?
Some governments consider the threat of nuclear weapons to be a vital component
of their security. This posture will have to change before they agree to eliminate these
weapons, and this change will help create a different security system, with greater
reliance on non-violent conflict resolution, demilitarization and international law.
Existing international security mechanisms may be strengthened and new ones
created in the process, but these are not necessary prerequisites to developing a plan
for the elimination of nuclear weapons. Such security systems already exist, albeit
in undeveloped or underused form. The NWC cannot prescribe the elements of an
alternative security system. Rather, as it evolves, the NWC should incorporate and
reinforce developments towards demilitarization and less reliance on force as a method
of responding to conflicts and achieving security.
Security is related to the question of enforcement because the latter will be the
Achilles’ heel of any regime that relies primarily on threat or use of force for security
and defense. Collective security doctrines further complicate the power balance and
have the potential to aggravate perceptions of threat.
For most of the world, security increasingly refers not to the military capacity to
defend territory, but to the capacity to provide for human needs in a sustainable way.
Such ‘human’ security is threatened by the detrimental environmental and economic
impact of nuclear weapons and by the political threats which are perpetuated by nuclear
policies and which prevent the global cooperation required to meet human security
needs.
Despite this reality, the security policies of some States continue to rely on military
might in the form of policies of mass destruction, first use of nuclear weapons,
and overwhelming offensive capacity. If this approach continues, it will lead to
development of new weapons and increasingly sophisticated methods of warfare.
These could include pure fusion weapons, weapons that defy the conventional-
nuclear distinction, unforeseen means of mass destruction, militarization of space,
and information technology warfare. Possible ways to reduce reliance on policies
of security through military might include avoiding military “solutions” to human
problems, and democratizing the security debate.
Whatever international security regime emerges, the NWC should emphasize
compliance over enforcement. Compliance must be more attractive than non-
compliance. The question then becomes how to design incentives. The NPT offered
assistance in nuclear energy to non-nuclear weapons states. The NWC should offer
assistance in alternative energy possibilities, in recognition of the proliferation risks
and verification difficulties associated with nuclear energy. Other forms of development
or humanitarian assistance related to nuclear disarmament and its risks could also
provide incentive.
A recurrent question is how to reduce the existing incentives to develop nuclear
weapons and increase the repercussions enough to dissuade pursuit of the nuclear
option. If a nuclear free regime were accepted, non-compliance would be universally
condemned and likely result in ostracism and other negative consequences to the
violating State in such areas as trade, aid, cooperative endeavors and political
influence. This is the reverse of the current situation where the possession or possible
development of nuclear weapons generates international power and attention.
“We have guided
missiles and
misguided men.”
-Martin Luther King Jr.
Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention
113
Section 3
It is important to recognize, however, that for a great majority of states, nuclear
weapons are already perceived as not necessary for their peace and security, even in
the current international order. The national security of one state, and the collective
security of a group of states cannot, by definition, be separated from larger regional
and international security issues. One group’s self defense policies are often seen as
aggression by others, and in today’s political environment, this means arms races and
escalating militarism.
“Security” as the rationale for developing arsenals of nuclear weapons is not
compatible with security in the sense of common survival. Pursuit of security through
militarism — “hard” or State security — undermines “soft” or “human” security
concerns such as health, development and sustainability. “Hard” security pursuit
diverts resources away from social needs. “Hard” security has also been claimed as
the domain of governments and military experts, and decisions are often made secretly
or otherwise undemocratically, even though these decisions affect everyone. A wiser
and fairer approach, therefore, is to link security with survival at every level — global,
regional, national and local.
Comment: Security
A Nuclear Weapons Convention will be negotiated among parties that understand
they are better off without nuclear weapons than with them. In reality, an international
security regime which relies on the threat or use of greater force by a few states is
self-defeating, promotes lawless proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons
and tactics of mass destruction, and causes grave harms and threats to the health and
existence of all human beings, including all states and our common ecosystems. An
agreement reached in the ratification of a NWC establishes systematic and transparent
processes that fulfill real determination to eliminate nuclear weapons. Such an
unequivocal determination to eliminate nuclear weapons faces the fact that nuclear
deterrence has proved a dead-end and delusional basis for security for any state and
for the community of states. The vast majority of states who recognize the current
universal legal obligation to negotiate in good-faith a treaty for nuclear disarmament in
all its aspects can and should now begin formal negotiations of the NWC.
-Anabel Dwyer Lawyers’ Committee on Nuclear Policy
114
Breakout
Critical Question:
How can the NWC prevent breakout?
There is no magic formula to prevent a State breaking out from a Nuclear Weapons
Convention and pursuing a nuclear weapons capability. The key to breakout is
irreversibility of the disarmament process. A concerted effort to eliminate not only
nuclear weapons but the infrastructure behind them will require sequenced measures-
-perhaps incrementally reversible but cumulatively irreversible--aimed at building
confidence and leading to a world in which developing nuclear weapons will mean
starting from scratch. Such a program will become increasingly difficult to conceal as
elements of the nuclear weapons industry are destroyed, converted or allowed to erode.
The potential for a state to break out of the NWC and pursue a nuclear weapons
program will exist as long as there is the nuclear material, including that produced
by use of nuclear energy. The likelihood will decrease, however, as progress is made
on nuclear disarmament and reliance on nuclear weapons is stigmatized. Concern
over breakout, though valid, should not prevent progress on nuclear disarmament.
The real risk of breakout inherent in a nuclear disarmament regime must be measured
not against a perfect nuclear weapons free world--where breakout is impossible--but
against the world we live in today, where pursuit of nuclear weapons programs is a
potential temptation to some states and even non-state actors. The question becomes
whether we are safer from intentional, accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear
weapons in today’s “non-proliferation” regime or in a future regime directed toward
complete nuclear disarmament.
The Model NWC includes a number of technical, legal, political and institutional
measures that would make any possible development of nuclear weapons following
breakout that much more difficult and detrimental to State interests (see Critical
question on Enforcement). These include preventive controls on nuclear materials and
facilities, application of individual responsibility, and sanctions. Thus, while breakout
is a concern, it would not pose the same risk of nuclear weapons production and threat
as currently exists if a State breaks out from the NPT.
Comment: Breakout
If the key to breakout is the irreversibility of the disarmament process, it is essential
that the NWC be unequivocal in this regard. This will require a major departure from
the approach taken in the NPT and the CTBT, which relies upon statements of intent
not backed by measurable objectives. This has allowed the nuclear weapon states, thus
far, to circumvent meaningful compliance with the historical intent of these treaties.
While the Preamble to the CTBT claims that “the cessation of all nuclear weapon
test explosions and all other nuclear explosions, by constraining the development
and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and ending the development of
advanced new types of nuclear weapons, constitutes an effective measure of nuclear
disarmament...,” the Treaty fails to define a nuclear test. In fact, the nuclear weapon
states, separately and in cooperation with each other, are using the CTBT as a
justification for undertaking major new programs to replace underground nuclear
test explosions through advanced technological means. The October 1998 White
House ”National Security Strategy For a New Century” asserts that the U.S. must
continue to maintain, for “deterrence” purposes, a “robust triad of strategic forces,”
The potential for a state
to break out of the NWC
and pursue a nuclear
weapons program will
exist as long as there
is the nuclear material
including that produced
by use of nuclear
energy. The likelihood
will decrease, however,
as progress is made on
nuclear disarmament
and reliance on nuclear
weapons is stigmatized.
Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention
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Section 3
and states further: “We must also ensure the
continued viability of the infrastructure that supports
U.S. nuclear forces and weapons. The Stockpile
Stewardship Program will guarantee the safety
and reliability of our nuclear weapons under the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.”
[1]
Such programs also represent the antithesis of the
NPT Article VI obligation to “pursue negotiations
in good faith on effective measures relating to
cessation of the nuclear arms race and an early date
and to nuclear disarmament,” which was reaffirmed
by the nuclear weapon states in the Principles
and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and
Disarmament adopted with the NPT extension
decision in May 1995. This obligation was
reinforced by the International Court of Justice in
July 1996, which unanimously held that “there exists an obligation to pursue in good
faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its
aspects under strict and effective international control.” In fact, expanded laboratory-
based experimental programs in the nuclear weapon states fundamentally are intended
to ensure that nuclear disarmament does not occur as a consequence of the CTBT.
Moreover, new nuclear weapons designs, modifications and improvements directly
contravene the “cessation of the nuclear arms race” Article VI requirement and the
April 1995 Declaration by France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States
in connection with the NPT that “the nuclear arms race has ceased.”
[2] In addition, the
close interconnections between research, design and testing of thermonuclear weapons
and other forms of advanced weapons research have the potential to ignite entirely
new arms races. The potential development of pure fusion weapons, using inertial
confinement fusion and other Stockpile Stewardship technologies, exemplifies this
inherent danger.
If the NWC is to minimize the potential for breakout, the closure and monitoring
of the nuclear weapons infrastructure in all nuclear weapons states must begin early
in the process of disarmament. Nuclear weapons research, testing, and component
production should be halted while reductions are in progress, not after, with nuclear
weapons production and research facilities subject to intrusive verification regimes at
the earliest possible time. Fissile materials accounting, already a challenging task,
is rendered more so by the continued fabrication and testing of weapons components
in classified facilities. Early cessation of both research and production activities also
makes evasion of emerging verification regimes and covert production of components
or manufacturing equipment particularly suited to a hidden long-term nuclear weapons
capability more difficult. The continued pursuit of increased nuclear weapons
knowledge by one state – including everything from systematization of fissile materials
understanding to more rapid, flexible, and easily scaled production techniques — will
be matched to a greater or lesser degree by others. The longer such activity continues
prior to achievement of an abolition regime, the greater and more widespread the
technical capability for breakout is likely to be.
-Jacqueline Cabasso and Andrew Lichterman, Western States Legal Foundation
References
1. “A National Security Strategy For A New Century,” The White House, October 1998,
p. 12. Available on the World Wide Web at http://www.whitehouse.gov/WH/EOP/NSC/
html/documents/nssr.pdf
2. CD/1308, 7 April 1995
U1A complex, an
underground laboratory
of tunnels built 960 feet
beneath the ground,
designed to conduct
subcritical high explosive
experiments to test
nuclear weapons material.
Photo: US Department of
Energy.
116
“[Deterrence] evolved
from an increasingly
convoluted morass
of unwarranted
assumptions, unprovable
assertions and logical
contradictions. By the
end of the first decade
of the Cold War, it had
effectively served to
suspend rational thinking
about the ultimate aim
of national security: to
ensure the survival of the
nation.”
- General Lee Butler
February 2, 1998
Deterrence
Critical Question:
What is the future of nuclear deterrence?
Nuclear deterrence has served as a central component of the security posture of
nuclear weapon states and their allies since WWII. Essentially a psychological process,
deterrence relates to influencing the rational calculation of threat probability by an
aggressor, who would be assured unacceptable damage and is therefore deterred from
initiating attack. Nuclear deterrence is a contested concept. The principles of nuclear
deterrence are not objective truths, but rather theoretical concepts. However, many
believe that it has protected these states from attack and has prevented a third world
war from occurring. Such beliefs are difficult to prove or disprove. All of the Nuclear
States have been involved in wars, and indeed have lost wars despite their nuclear
arsenals. It may also have been other factors that prevented attack on the nuclear
weapon states. Countless other nations that do not have nuclear weapons or alliances
with nuclear weapon states have not been attacked either.
Doubts about the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence doctrines were multiplying
before 11 September 2001 because the geopolitical circumstances that had shaped the
Cold War balance between secrecy and democracy no longer existed. The events of 11
September 2001 spawned a new use of force doctrine outlined in the 2002 US Nuclear
Posture Review and National Security Strategy, calling for military action to prevent
rogue states from acquiring nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, a
doctrine that reflects a loss of confidence in the utility of nuclear deterrence.
With respect to non-State actors, especially terrorist organizations, deterrence is
clearly inadequate. Nuclear weapons could only be used against states sponsoring
terrorism with the danger that they might provoke the very danger they were designed
to avoid. France has recently announced that it would deploy nuclear weapons against
states supporting terrorism.
General Lee Butler, retired Commander-in-Chief of United States Strategic
Command has said that, “Deterrence is a dialogue of the blind with the deaf.
Deterrence invokes death on a scale rivaling the power of the creator... It [nuclear
deterrence] was our shield and by extension our sword. The nuclear priesthood extolled
its virtues and bowed to its demands. Allies yielded grudgingly to its dictates even
while decrying its risks and costs. We brandished it at our enemies and presumed they
embraced its suicidal corollary of mutually assured destruction. We ignored, discounted
or dismissed its flaws and cling still to the belief that deterrence is valid in a world
whose security architecture has been wholly transformed.”
[1]
Nuclear deterrence advocates claim that nuclear weapons should be retained as an
“insurance policy,” in case diplomacy or other forms of war prevention fail. However,
this approach has fatal flaws because nuclear deterrence itself can and has failed:
- By design: Deterrence relies on a “credible” threat of use in order to deter an
attacker. In a conflict situation, antagonists may decide that the point has been reached
that they have to launch a nuclear attack or lose the deterrent value of their weapons.
A crisis may also be created by the very weapons themselves, as in the Cuban Missile
Crisis. “Counter-proliferation” policies identifying a role of nuclear weapons in
countering a chemical or biological attack have widened the range of settings in which
“credibility” could drive nuclear use. {See below}
- By accident: Nuclear forces remain on alert in a launch-on-warning posture in
order to maintain “survivability” of weapons should an attack occur (i.e., “use ‘em or
lose ‘em”). In times of tension, a mistake in early warning information could lead to an
Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention
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Section 3
inadvertent nuclear “response”.
It also needs to be asked: Is nuclear deterrence really deterrence? The possession of
nuclear weapons can make the possessing country a nuclear target rather than immune
to nuclear attack. The nuclear deterrent may in fact be a nuclear magnet.
Current nuclear deterrence doctrine has additional problems:
The adherence to it by some States leads to nuclear proliferation, as other States
imitate this policy. The argument that a nuclear deterrent is required to defend against
unknown future threats suggests that all states would be wise to possess nuclear
weapons.
- It creates constant pressure to improve nuclear arsenals.
- It places the whole world at risk, not only the nuclear weapons states, and is
thus a violation of the sovereign rights and humanitarian rights of the world’s
nations and peoples.
- It creates and perpetuates an unstable, hostile attitude between nuclear
possessor States, and inhibits cooperation in promoting true security.
Finally one must ask what deterrence does to us as a society. Gandhi noted after the
bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, “We have yet to see what it does to the soul of
the destroying nation.” Does threatening to incinerate millions of people and destroy
the environment desensitize us and make us more ready to inflict harm in other areas?
Does it create a form of hopelessness about the human condition and an acceptance of
the belief that ultimately we must threaten to destroy in order to achieve our desires?
Has this posture been a contributor to the horrific increase in social violence and
despair in this century? If so, rejection of deterrence will indeed assist humanity in its
quest for the development of a more humane international society.
The United States has given conflicting signals about both preemptive and
retaliatory use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons, including chemical or
biological weapons. According to the Air Force “Nuclear Operations,”
“If US objectives are more limited, a counterforce strategy of employment
might be more appropriate. This refers to the use of weapons against the
enemy’s immediate war-fighting capability. While there will certainly be long-
term effects from the use of a nuclear device against any target, counterforce
strategy focuses on the more immediate operational effect. Nuclear weapons
might be used to destroy enemy WMD before they can be used, or they may
be used against enemy conventional forces if other means to stop them have
proven ineffective. This can reduce the threat to the United States and its
forces and could, through the destruction of enemy forces, bring an end to the
conflict.”
[2]
References
1. General Lee Butler, “The Risks of Nuclear Deterrence: From Superpowers to Rogue
Leaders”, speech to the National Press Club, Washington DC, 2 February 1998
2. Air Force Doctrine Document 2-1.5 (15 July 1998, P.8-9)
For more discussion, see R. Jeffrey Smith, “Clinton Directive Changes Strategy On Nuclear
Arms,” Washington Post, December 7, 1997, and Stephen I. Schwartz, “Miscalculated
Ambiguity: US Policy on the Use and Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons,” Disarmament
Diplomacy No. 23, available at www.acronym.org. See also Robert Bell, “Strategic
Agreements and the CTB Treaty: Striking the Right Balance”, 28 Arms Control Today No.
1 (January/February 1998)
The warhead
on the Trident II
missile is slated for
re-design.
Photo: US Navy
118
Terrorism
Critical Question:
How could a nuclear weapons convention deal with the growing
threat of terrorists acquiring and possibly using nuclear weapons?
Nuclear weapons are weapons of terror, and any use or threat of nuclear weapons
constitutes terrorism, whether by governments or non-state groups, regardless of how it is
rationalized. However, this section will deal with the issue of nuclear weapons acquisition
and threat of use by non-State terrorists.
Terrorism involving nuclear weapons or radioactive materials could take a wide variety
of forms. Terrorists could steal, buy or otherwise acquire a ready-made nuclear weapon
or take over a nuclear-armed submarine, plane or base. They could also acquire fissile
material and fabricate a crude nuclear bomb. This is a real danger: the global stockpile of
highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium currently amounts to 2300 tons, enough
for more than 200,000 nuclear weapons.
[1] These materials exist in hundreds of buildings
in more than 40 countries, under security arrangements ranging ‘from excellent to
appalling.” The IAEA Illicit Trafficking Database has documented more than 650 instances
of intercepted smuggling of radioactive materials over the past decade; 18 cases of stolen
plutonium or HEU have been confirmed.
IAEA Director General ElBaradei estimated in
March 2006 that regarding protection of nuclear material, “...perhaps 50 per cent of the
work has been completed.”
[2]
A Nuclear Weapons Convention would build on existing measures to deal with nuclear
terrorism at national and international levels.
States Parties to the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear
Terrorism (“Nuclear Terrorism Convention”), for example, are obliged to develop
appropriate legal frameworks criminalizing nuclear terrorism-related offenses, investigate
alleged offenses, and, as appropriate, arrest, prosecute, or extradite offenders. It also
calls for international cooperation with nuclear terrorism investigations and prosecutions,
through information-sharing, extradition and the transfer of detainees to assist with foreign
investigations and prosecutions.
The Nuclear Terrorism Convention however is limited to States Parties. In order to
ensure action is taken globally, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1540 [3]
requiring all States to take measures to prevent nuclear terrorism, focusing particularly
on prohibiting non-State actors from acquiring or using nuclear weapons and on further
measures to control nuclear materials and prevent proliferation. The resolution requires
States to adopt and implement measures to a) prevent non-State actors from acquiring
or using nuclear, chemical or biological weapons, and b) control nuclear, chemical and
biological weapons and related materials in order to prevent proliferation. The resolution
arose in response to security concerns from a number of States, including the United States,
arising from the possibility of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of
mass destruction to States and non-State actors. Participation in the universal reporting
process has been rather positive, despite its novelty and complexity. If the negotiation and
adoption of UNSC 1540 had many possible points of origin, the underlying motivation also
varied by state, triggered by events in 2003-4, such as information on efforts by Al Qaeda to
acquire WMD, described as a “religious duty” in comments attributed to bin Laden. [4]
UNSC 1540, however, circumvents the question of state responsibility for proliferation
of WMD by focusing on access by non-state actors to NBC weapons and defining non-
state actor for the purpose of the resolution as: “individual or entity, not acting under the
lawful authority of any State in conducting activities which come within the scope of this
resolution.” It is thus unclear whether the provision could have been used in relation to the
nuclear black market of AQ Khan, which appears to have been integrally bound up with the
Pakistani state, where lines of state authority were deliberately blurred to provide plausible
deniability.
In its report to the 1540 Committee, New Zealand emphasized that “all weapons of mass
destruction should be eliminated” and that measures should be taken to prevent “any entity
Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention
119
Section 3
- whether State or non-State actor - from attempting to develop, acquire, manufacture,
possess, transport, transfer or use WMD and their means of delivery.” New Zealand
noted that, “This is reflected in the prohibitions under New Zealand law which make it an
offence to aid or abet any person in developing WMD. This prohibition also applies extra-
territorially to agents or servants of the Crown outside the New Zealand nuclear free zone.”
Implementation requirements of a NWC would include criminal measures for both non-
State and State actors engaged in nuclear weapons related activities, similar to those already
adopted by New Zealand. However, NWC requirements would go further by extending
extra-territorial application to all citizens and incorporating universal jurisdiction, i.e. it
would be illegal for anyone anywhere in the world to engage in nuclear weapons activities
and any State could prosecute them.
Some terrorist groups now have access to professional scientific and technical skills,
large sums of money, international networks, modern communications, and a burgeoning
supply of recruits. Aum Shinrikyo and al Qaeda are the two most capable and well-
financed terrorists groups that have thus far known to have pursued nuclear weapons. An
IPPNW report “Crude Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and the Terrorist Threat,” concluded
that, “unless radical steps are taken urgently, it will not be a question of whether terrorists
can acquire or build a nuclear device, but when.”
Non-State organizations would not be parties to a Nuclear Weapons Convention and
would thus not be party to the verification regime agreed to by states parties. In addition,
non-State organizations may have less restraint on threatening to use or on using nuclear
weapons should they acquire them. This leads some commentators to question whether a
nuclear weapons convention could prevent nuclear terrorism. If not, should a small number
of nuclear weapons be retained to respond to nuclear terrorism?
To respond to the second question — A terrorist organization is unlikely to be deterred
by a State with nuclear weapons, because: a) It would be difficult for the State to find a
target to retaliate against or threaten such retaliation against. Unlike a State, a terrorist
organization does not usually have a territory or large military facilities against which to
target a weapon of mass destruction. b) Terrorists are most often prompted by a psychology
of “heroic” response to perceived aggression including the acceptance of personal death in
the battle. A threat of nuclear weapons against them would likely increase their perception
of the “evil” of the state they are fighting against, and give them justification for responding
in kind. Rather than deterring them from using nuclear weapons it would likely stimulate
them to.
A nuclear weapons convention, on the other hand, would make it much more difficult
for a terrorist organization to acquire or build a nuclear weapon. Once all nuclear weapons
are eliminated, terrorists would not be able to steal a bomb. And once all nuclear materials
and facilities are placed under safeguards it would be difficult for terrorists to acquire bomb
making materials and technical assistance. The verification systems established under a
nuclear weapons convention would make it easier to discover a potential terrorist threat
from diversion of fissile material or technical expertise in time to prevent the building of a
bomb.
In addition, a nuclear weapons convention would reduce or remove the political power
of nuclear weapons for a terrorist organization. Terrorists commit terrorist acts either
to retaliate against perceived aggression, or to generate support for their cause through
maximizing publicity. Once nuclear weapons have been prohibited, there could be no
perceived aggression requiring a nuclear response, and any threat or use of such a weapon
would be condemned universally and eliminate support for a terrorist’s cause.
References
1. Bunn M, Wier A. Terrorist nuclear weapon construction: how difficult? Annals of the
American Academy of Political and Social Science. 2006;607 (Sep): 133-49
2. ElBaradei M. Putting teeth in the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime.
2006 Karlsruhe Lecture, Larlsruhe, Germany, 25 March 2006. Available at www.iaea.org
3. S/RES/1540 (2004), http://disarmament2.un.org/Committee1540/Res1540(E).pdf
4. Kimberly McCloud and Matthew Osborne, “WMD Terrorism and Usama Bin Laden”
CNS Reports (20 November 2001) online at http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/reports/binladen.htm
120
Health and Environment
Health and Environmental Consequences of the Production,
Testing and Use of Nuclear Weapons
The world has yet to come to terms with the medical
consequences of the nuclear weapons era more than 60 years
after the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki at
the end of World War II. Nuclear weapons, when exploded
over population centers, cause not only immediate death and
suffering on a massive scale, but every part of the production
process—from mining uranium ore to developing and
testing the weapons, and storing the inevitable radioactive
waste materials—has brought with it health consequences,
especially high rates of cancer, that have never been fully
acknowledged by governments and industry. This is even
before the weapons are used. Survivors of the Hiroshima
and Nagasaki bombings suffer increased rates of illness to
this day, and the full effects on future generations, including
possible genetic effects, are not yet known. The health and
environmental consequences of long-lived high-level nuclear
waste adds further to the price paid by current and future
generations for the policies of a handful of nations.
There are significant difficulties involved in assessing
the health effects of nuclear weapons production, testing,
and use. The widespread dispersal of ionising radiation in
the environment during many of the steps involved even in
manufacturing and testing a nuclear weapon make it difficult
to quantify with certainty the doses received by affected populations. In addition,
cancers induced by radiation exposure often take decades to develop, and cannot be
distinguished in any way from cancers due to other causes.
We do know, however, that there is no safe dose of radiation exposure. Even a
very small dose carries a risk of harm. This was confirmed by the 2005 report of the
Committee on Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiation (BEIR) of the US National
Academy of Sciences, which stated, “The smallest dose has the potential to cause a
small increase in risk to humans.” There is no threshold below which radiation is
safe.
[1]
In 1984 the United Nations Human Rights Committee noted that “It is evident that
the designing, testing, manufacture, possession and deployment of nuclear weapons
are among the greatest threats to the right to life which confront mankind today,” and
concluded that “The production, testing, possession, deployment and use of nuclear
weapons should be prohibited and recognized as crimes against humanity.”
[2]
Use of nuclear weapons
On August 6, 1945, a nuclear weapon with an explosive force equivalent to that of
about 15 kilotons (thousand tons) of TNT was detonated above the city of Hiroshima.
Three days later, another nuclear weapon was detonated over the city of Nagasaki.
Each of these bombs caused the deaths over the next few days of almost 100,000
people and the deaths over succeeding months of tens of thousands of others.
[3]
John Hersey describes the consequences of the Hiroshima bomb and the role played
by a physician of Hiroshima:
Some of the injured
and dying the day
after the bomb was
dropped on Nagasaki.
Photo: Yosuke Yamabata
Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention
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Section 3
This child from Nagasaki
suffered third degree burns
that exposed the bone.
Photo: Yasuo Tomishige
The lot of the majority of physicians of Hiroshima — with their offices and
hospital destroyed, their equipment scattered, their own bodies incapacitated in varying
degrees — explained why so many citizens who were hurt went untended and why
so many who might have lived, died. Of the one hundred and fifty doctors in the
city, sixty-five were already dead and most of the rest were wounded. In the biggest
hospital, that of the Red Cross, only six doctors were able to function, and only ten
nurses. The sole uninjured doctor on the Red Cross Hospital staff was Dr. Sasaki....
Dr. Sasaki worked without method, taking those who were nearest him first,
and he noticed soon that the corridor seemed to be getting more and more crowded.
Mixed with the abrasions and lacerations which most people in the hospital had
suffered, he began to find dreadful burns. He realized then that casualties were pouring
in from outdoors. There were so many that he began to pass up the lightly wounded;
he decided that all he could hope to do was to stop people from bleeding to death.
Before long, patients lay and crouched on the floors of the wards and the laboratories
and all the other rooms, and in the corridors, and on the stairs, and in the front hall, and
under the portecochere, and on the stone front steps, and in the driveway and courtyard,
and for blocks each way in the streets outside. Wounded people supported maimed
people; disfigured families leaned together, many people were vomiting...
The people in the suffocating crowd inside the hospital wept and cried for Dr.
Sasaki, and the less seriously wounded came and pulled at his sleeve and begged him
to go to the aid of the worse wounded. Tugged here and there in his stockinged feet,
bewildered by the numbers, staggered by so much raw flesh, Dr. Sasaki lost all sense of
profession and stopped working as a skilful surgeon and a sympathetic man; he became
an automaton, mechanically wiping, daubing, winding, wiping, daubing, winding....
[4]
In addition to the effects of blast injuries and burns, many of Dr. Sasaki’s patients
soon developed the features of acute radiation sickness: severe gastrointestinal
problems, uncontrolled bleeding, hair loss, and extreme susceptibility to infection.
[5]
Dr Sasaki was among the very first medical witnesses to the utter devastation
inflicted by mankind’s newest and most terrible
weapon. Within several years, however, even
the atomic bomb was surpassed in its capacity
to destroy. During the 1950s, new types of
nuclear weapons were developed and tested first
by the United States and then the Soviet Union.
Based on nuclear fusion in addition to the initial
fission reaction, these new “thermonuclear” or
“hydrogen” bombs had a destructive force equal
to 1,000 times the force of the bombs detonated
over Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
In 1961, a group of Boston physicians
analyzed the potential medical consequences
of the use of these new weapons. An entire
issue of the prestigious New England Journal
of Medicine was dedicated to articles on “The
Medical Consequences of Thermonuclear War.”
Analyzing an attack on the US postulated in
1959 by the Joint Congressional Committee on
Atomic Energy, a new group called Physicians
for Social Responsibility (PSR) documented in
detail the health effects of nuclear explosions. If
such an explosion were to occur over Boston,
the authors wrote, severe traumatic injuries
and massive burns, combined with life-threatening radiation exposure, would kill
1,300,000 people on the first day alone, with another 1,250,000 injured. There would
be widespread destruction of health care facilities, and approximately 1,000,000 of
122
More significant is the
fact that most deployed
nclear weapons are not
the low yield tactical
weapons, but high yield
strategic weapons, most
of which are 10-100
times more powerful
than the bombs used on
Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
those injured would die. The authors concluded that effective responses by health
professionals after a thermonuclear weapon explosion would be impossible or futile,
and that civil defense efforts offered little benefit. They, and the then-editor of the New
England Journal of Medicine, argued that the prevention of use of nuclear weapons was
an urgent task for health professionals
[6,7,8]
The World Health Organization in 1986 summarized the nature and effects of
nuclear weapons in the following terms: “Quantitatively nuclear weapons are vastly
more powerful than conventional weapons. The explosive power of all the nuclear
arsenals is now about 5,000 times greater than that of all the explosives used in the
Second World War.”
[9]
Nuclear weapons are qualitatively different from conventional weapons. In addition
to the deaths and injuries caused by the effects of blast and heat, nuclear weapons
produce radioactive isotopes (fallout) that may be transported by winds great distances
from the site of the explosion. Moreover, fallout may be an obstacle to rescue
operations and effective care of injured survivors.
[10]
In 1993, the World Health Assembly reaffirmed that “no health service in the world
can alleviate in any significant way a situation resulting from the use of even one single
nuclear weapon.”
[11]
In its 1996 advisory opinion on the legal status of nuclear weapons, the International
Court of Justice (ICJ) noted, “The destructive power of nuclear weapons cannot be
contained in either space or time. They have the potential to destroy all civilization and
the entire ecosystem of the planet.”
[12]
The US and the UK argued before the ICJ that the use of precisely targeted, lower-
yield nuclear weapons would not have the same effects as those described
in the WHO studies. The Court did not accept this argument. Even the
lowest yield of nuclear weapons in the current arsenals, about 1 kiloton,
would still produce large quantities of radiation. More significant is the fact
that most deployed nuclear weapons are not low-yield tactical weapons,
but high-yield strategic weapons, most of which are 10 to 100 times more
powerful than the bombs used on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
An understanding of the massive levels of death and irremediable
suffering that would result from an explosion of even a single nuclear
warhead near a populated area compels a simple conclusion: no such
explosion must ever happen again.
Consequences of Nuclear Weapons Tests
Of all the activities in the nuclear weapons cycle, nuclear testing has
been the most destructive of human health and the environment. The US,
the former Soviet Union, China, France, India, Pakistan, and the UK have
collectively conducted more than 2,000 nuclear explosions for testing
purposes, approximately 500 above ground or under water and the rest
underground.
Lijon Eknilang, of the Marshall Islands, recounted her experiences of nuclear
testing as follows. “I was eight years old at the time of the Bravo test on Bikini in
1954. I woke up with a bright light in my eyes. There was a huge brilliant light that
consumed the sky. Soon after we heard a big loud noise and the earth started to sway
and sink...A little later...it began to ‘snow’ in Rongelap. We had heard about snow from
the missionaries, but this was the first time we saw white particles fall from the sky.
We kids were playing in the powder, but later everyone was sick and we couldn’t do
anything.... My own health has suffered as a result of radiation poisoning. I cannot have
children. I have had seven miscarriages. One was severely deformed — it had only
one eye. Many of my friends keep quiet about the strange births they had. They gave
Despite a de facto
moratorium on testing.
France began preparations
to resume testing at
Moruroa in 1995. This child
in Rarotonga joined more
than 1,500 people (one-
quarter of the population) in
protest. France was forced
to stop testing by the global
outcry, which included a
boycott of French products
Photo: Greenpeace/
Morgan
Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention
123
Section 3
birth, not to children as we like to think of them, but to
things we could only describe as “octopuses”, “apples”,
“turtles” and other things in our experience. The most
common have been “jellyfish” babies. These babies are
born with no bones in their bodies and with transparent
skin. We can see their brains and hearts beating. There
are no legs, no arms, no head, no nothing.”
[13]
The story of Lijon Eknilang is just one of the many in
the test sites and adjacent areas in the Marshall Islands,
Te Ao Maohi (French occupied Polynesia), Maralinga,
Nevada, Kazakhstan, Lop Nor, Novaya Zemlya, Kiribati,
Pokhran and elsewhere. “Radioactive Heaven and
Earth”, a study that was published by International
Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War and the
Institute for Energy and Environmental Research in
1991, estimated that global fallout from nuclear testing will lead to more than two
million cancer fatalities alone, in addition to other health and environmental effects.
[14]
Government reporting on health effects of nuclear weapons testing has often been
inaccurate, incomplete, or non-existent. The US government, for example, neglected to
conduct systematic studies of the effects of radioactive iodine-131 from atmospheric
tests between 1945 and 1962, until it was mandated to do so by the US Congress in
1982. The studies were not released for another 15 years, and even then the problem
was downplayed.
The US National Cancer Institute (NCI), which reported the findings, estimated that
fallout of radioactive iodine (I-131) from nuclear weapons tests had caused 10,000
to 75,000 cases of thyroid cancer.
[15] These high figures are cause for considerable
concern. But critics noted that the real figures are probably much higher. NCI provided
no basis for its thyroid cancer risk estimates and appeared to have ignored evidence
from Chernobyl, where thyroid cancer rates have been approximately 10 times higher
than expected from conventional calculations based on extrapolation from exposures
at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. North Dakota health department analysts estimated that
I-131 in fallout may have increased the rate of thyroid cancer in that state alone by 5 to
10 percent.
[16,17]
The American Public Health Association noted that
if disclosures of the releases had been made public
at the times they occurred, implementation of federal
protective action guidelines — including removal of
soil, destruction of milk and dairy cows, destruction
of contaminated human and animal food, and public
education about protective measures — would have been
required. No public warnings were issued (although the
Eastman Kodak corporation was warned in advance of
some of the tests, to protect its film stocks).
[18]
While the effects of radioactive iodine exposure
can generally be treated with considerable success, the
NCI study did not focus on other radioactive elements
produced by nuclear testing, including strontium,
caesium, plutonium, and carbon, the health effects of
which are much more difficult to treat.
Governments of the other nuclear weapon states
have been similarly reluctant to reveal the full extent of the health and environmental
problems from nuclear testing. Thus, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have
attempted to fill the gap.
Radiation Day at
Chelyabinsk Ecology
School, 1992. May 19
is Radiation Day at the
Chelyabinsk Ecology
School in Russia, sited on
a dead river at the edge
of the city’s metallurgical
district. Each year
on this day students
practice safety routines
designed to protect them
from a sudden release
of radiation from the
Chelyabinsk-65 complex
160 kilometers to the
north.
Photo: Robert Del Tredici
Troops at Operation
Buster, Nevada Test site,
US, November 1951.
Photo: Defense Nuclear
Agency
124
During the late 1950s and early 1960s NGOs in the
United States collected the deciduous teeth of children,
and demonstrated the replacement of calcium in the
teeth with radioactive strontium-90. The publicity
given to these findings by PSR and other groups was an
important factor in the negotiation in 1963 of the Partial
Test Ban Treaty, which banned nuclear tests in the
atmosphere, in space, and under the oceans.
[19]
The Soviet Academy of Medical Sciences determined
in 1989 that residents of Semipalatinsk, near the
main USSR nuclear test site in Kazakhstan, had
experienced excess cancers, genetic diseases, and child
deaths because of radiation exposure from pre-1963
atmospheric tests. This helped stimulate the formation
of the “Nevada-Semipalatinsk” movement, which led to
the closure of the test site in 1991.
[20]
The conclusion of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 1996 signalled a potential
end to the era of nuclear testing. However this Treaty has not yet come into effect and a
resumption of testing remains a possibility. In any event, the legacy of nuclear testing
will remain for centuries as the radiation from the tests, whether dispersed throughout
the atmosphere or concentrated in the underground test sites, will continue to threaten
human health.
Consequences of Nuclear Weapons Production
Radioactive pollution contaminates every site where nuclear
weapons have been developed. The two nations that produced the vast
majority of the world’s nuclear weapons, the US and the former Soviet
Union, are the most heavily affected.
There are more than 4,500 contaminated Department of Energy
sites in the United States. Production facilities for nuclear weapons,
such as those at Feed Materials Production Center (OH), Hanford
Reservation (WA), Los Alamos (NM), Rocky Flats (CO), Oak Ridge
(TN), and Savannah River (SC) are heavily polluted. Epidemiologic
surveys have demonstrated elevated levels of cancer in surrounding
communities. The Department of Energy knowingly polluted its
nuclear weapons production facilities and the areas surrounding them
without warning either its workers or those living in the endangered
areas around the plants. Furthermore, the impact of this pollution has
been disproportionately concentrated in areas in which poor people
and people of colour live.
Dispersion of these pollutants is an ongoing process. For example, waste storage
tanks at Hanford containing millions of gallons of highly toxic processing chemicals
and radionuclides are reaching groundwater and flowing towards the Columbia River
seven miles away. Spent nuclear fuel at this same facility is at risk of spontaneous
combustion due to uranium hydrides. Such a fire would spread deadly radionuclides
across the agricultural belt of the northwestern United States.
[21]
Production sites in the former Soviet Union are even more heavily contaminated.
These include Chelyabinsk 65 (“Ozyorsk”) in the Urals, with radioactive wastes
dumped into the Techa River and Lake Karachay; Dimistrovgrad; Tomsk; and
Krasnoyarsk. Russian authorities have now admitted injecting approximately a
billion curies of radioactive substances underground at both Tomsk and Krasnoyarsk.
While the US has dispersed an estimated three million curies of radioactivity into the
Among the most highly
exposed groups of
downwinders are
those who live near
Semipalatinsk nuclear
weapons test site in
Kazakhstan.
Photo: Yuri Kuidin.
Worker at the
Rocky Flats Plant
examining a plutonium
button inside a glove
box designed to protect
workers from radiation.
Photo: Department of
Energy
Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention
125
Section 3
environment from nuclear weapons production, the comparable figure in the former
Soviet Union is 1.7 billion curies.
[22]
Conclusion
Nuclear weapons have been developed, produced, tested, and deployed by a handful
of nations, largely in secret, with disregard for human health and environmental
well being. The effects, even without further explosions of nuclear weapons, include
deaths estimated to number in the millions, and permanent radioactive pollution of
our land, sea, and air. As nuclear arms production and the mining, fuel processing,
and manufacturing infrastructure to support it gathers momentum in India, Pakistan,
and possibly other countries that take their cue from the US and the other nuclear
weapon states, the damage to health and the environment will be compounded rather
than mitigated. If these weapons are eventually used again, as they will be if they
are not abolished, we will not only have failed to learn the lessons of Hiroshima and
Nagasaki, we will have consigned the rest of the world to their fate. A nuclear weapons
convention, as described in this book, is therefore not only a political prescription but
also a medical prescription for averting that catastrophe.
References
1. National Academies of Science, BEIR VII: Health Risks from Exposure to Low Levels
of Ionizing Radiation, 2005.
2. Human Rights Committee General Comment 14(23) on Article 6 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, November 2, 1984.
3. Kenjiro Yokoro and Manao Kamada. “The Public Health Effects of the Use of Nuclear
Weapons.” In: War and Public Health, Barry S. Levy and Victor W. Sidel, editors.
Washington, DC: American Public Health Association, 2000. pp 65-83.
4. John Hersey. Hiroshima. New York: Vintage Books, 1989
5. Robert J. Lifton. Death in Life: Survivors of Hiroshima. New York: Random House,
1968.
6. David G. Nathan, H. Jack Geiger, Victor W. Sidel, and Bernard Lown. The Medical
Consequences of Thermonuclear War: Introduction, New England Journal of Medicine,
266: 1126-1127, 1962
7. Victor W. Sidel, H. Jack Geiger, and Bernard Lown. The Medical Consequences of
Thermonuclear War: The Physician’s Role in the Postattack Period. New England Journal
of Medicine, 266:1137-1145, 1962.
8. Joseph Garland. Editorial: “Earthquake, Wind, and Fire.” New England Journal of
Medicine, 266:1174, 1962
9. World Health Organization Effects of Nuclear War on Health and Health Services.
Second Edition.
Geneva: World Health Organization, 1987.
10. Alexander Leaf. New perspectives on the medical consequences of nuclear war. New
England Journal of Medicine 315:905-912, 1986.
11. World Health Assembly Resolution 46.60, adopted 14 May 1993
12. International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of
Nuclear Weapons, July 8, 1996.
13. Lijon Eknilang, “Learning from Rongelap’s Pain”, Pacific Women Speak Out, edited
by Zohl de Ishtar, The Raven Press, Christchurch, 1998
14. IPPNW and IEER: International Commission to Investigate the Health and
Environmental Effects of Nuclear Weapons Production, reported in “Radioactive Heaven
and Earth: The health and environmental effects of nuclear weapons testing in, on and
above the earth.” The Apex Press, New York, 1991.
15. “Estimated Exposure and Thyroid Doses Received by the American People from
Iodine-131 in Fallout Following Nevada Atmospheric Nuclear Bomb Tests.” National
Cancer Institute Publication Number 97-4264, October 1997
126
16. H. Jack Geiger. NCI Study Raises New Concerns About Fallout-Related Thyroid
Cancer. Medicine and Global Survival 5(1):8-10, 1998.
17. David Rush. An Attempt to Cover Claims? Or Continuing Obfuscation? Medicine and
Global Survival 5(1):3-6, 1998.
18. P. Ortmeyer, A. Makhijani. “Worse Than We Knew.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,
November/December 1997.
19. H. L. Rosenthal, J.E. Glister, J.T. Bird. Strontium -90 Content of Deciduous Human
Incisors. Science 140:176-177, 1963
20. A. Yemelyanenkov, V. Popov. The Atom Declassified: Points of View. Berlin: H & P
Druck (Offsetdruckere: Körtestrasse 10, Berlin 61), 1992.)
21. Complex Cleanup: the Environmental Legacy of Nuclear Weapons Production
(Doc.#OTA-0-484). U.S. Congress Office of Technology Assessment, Washington: US
Government Printing Office, 1991.
22. Anthony Robbins, Arjun Makhijani, KatherineYih. Radioactive Heaven and Earth: the
Health and Environmental Effects of Nuclear Weapons Testing In, on and above the earth.
New York: Apex Press, 1991.
Additional references by topic:
Hiroshima –
John Hersey. Hiroshima. New York: Vintage Books, 1989
Use of Thermonuclear Weapons – David G. Nathan, H. Jack Geiger, Victor W. Sidel,
Bernard Lown. The Medical Consequences of Thermonuclear War: Introduction, New
England Journal of Medicine, 266: 1126-1127, 1962
Victor W. Sidel, H. Jack Geiger, Bernard Lown. The Medical Consequences of
Thermonuclear War: The Physician’s Role in the Post— attack Period. New England
Journal of Medicine, 266:1137-1145, 1962.
Nuclear Tests –
H. L. Rosenthal, J.E. Glister, J.T. Bird. Strontium -90 Content of Deciduous Human
Incisors. Science 140:176-177, 1963
Anthony Robbins, Arjun Makhijani, KatherineYih. Radioactive Heaven and Earth: the
Health and Environmental Effects of Nuclear Weapons Testing In, on and above the earth.
New York: Apex Press, 1991.
A. Yemelyanenkov, V. Popov. The Atom Declassified: Points of View. Berlin: H & P Druck
(Offsetdruckere: Körtestrasse 10, Berlin 61), 1992.
Nuclear Weapons Production –
Complex Cleanup: the Environmental Legacy of Nuclear Weapons Production (Doc.#OTA-
0-484). U.S. Congress Office of Technology Assessment, Washington: US Government
Printing Office, 1991.
Arjun Makhijani, Howard Hu, Katherine Yih, eds. Nuclear Wastelands, Cambridge, Mass:
MIT Press, 1995.
Howard Hu, Arjun Makhijani, Katherine Yih. Plutonium: Deadly Gold of the Nuclear Age.
Cambridge, Mass: International Physicians Press, 1992.
Accidental Launch –
Lachlan Forrow, Bruce G. Blair, Ira Helfand, George Lewis, Theodore Postol, Victor W.
Sidel, Barry S. Levy, Herbert Abrams, Christine Cassel. Accidental Nuclear War: A Post-
Cold War Assessment. New England Journal of Medicine 338:1326-31, 1998.
Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention
127
Section 3
De-Alerting
The Legal and Moral Case
for De-Alerting Nuclear Weapons and
Removing Launch-on-Warning
The Model NWC calls for a phased programme
of disarmament commencing with measures such as
de-alerting of all existing nuclear weapons. It would
however be helpful in reducing nuclear dangers and
in building confidence between negotiating parties
if some initial measures such as de-alerting were
undertaken by parties prior to conclusion of the
NWC. In fact, there is a legal and moral case for
the immediate de-alerting of nuclear weapons and
removing the launch-on-warning policy.
The US and Russia continue to deploy approximately 3000 nuclear weapons on
a high level of readiness for use
[1] and on launch-on-warning (LOW) operational
procedures.
[2] Such policy and practice constitute a real and immediate threat to
use nuclear weapons. The Commission on Weapons of Mass Destruction (Blix
Commission) notes that “since the flight time of US and Russian land-based missiles
is between 25 and 30 minutes – significantly less for sea-based missiles – such nuclear
postures risk causing nuclear exchanges by accident, technical malfunction or strategic
miscalculation.
[3]
Despite calls for reducing the operational readiness of nuclear weapons, the US and
Russia maintain that high alert status
[4] and LOW are necessary.
The US argues that a high level of readiness to use nuclear force acts as a deterrent
to potential aggressor States. However, they also argue that during times when an
adversary is preparing for war, visibly increasing the readiness to use nuclear force
acts as a warning to the adversary and assists deterrence.
[5] If this is true, then during
peacetime a lower level of readiness to use should be maintained in order that there
are additional steps of readiness to progress to without having to move to actual
use. Maintaining a high level of use leaves no such room for manoeuvre. Robert
McNamara, former US Secretary of Defense, has noted that the high alert status has
left the NWS vulnerable to nuclear war by accident or miscalculation. “During the
Cuban Missile Crisis we had thirteen days to muddle our way and avert nuclear war.
Today we would only have thirteen minutes.”
[6]
The policy makes the potential use of nuclear weapons by miscalculation that much
more likely. While no-one may want nuclear war, military decision makers may launch
an attack first if they know the other side has weapons on alert and is considering an
attack themselves. This is particularly true if they believe that their nuclear forces could
disable the nuclear forces of the adversary before the adversary had the opportunity to
launch
The ICJ affirmed that the threat or use of nuclear weapons must comply with the
requirements of international law applicable in armed conflict and with Articles 2 (4)
and 51 of the UN Charter. These laws prohibit the threat or use of weapons unless
an armed attack has occurred against a State and until the Security Council has taken
measures to deal with this attack.
The deployment of nuclear weapons on delivery vehicles ready to be used within
minutes or hours, at a time when there has been no attack or imminent threat of attack,
thus constitutes an illegal threat of use of such weapons. C.G. Weeramantry, former
US Strategic Air
Command Headquarters
at Offut Air Force Base,
Nebraska, USA.
Photo: US Air Force.
128
Vice-President of the ICJ, has noted (with regard to naval nuclear weapons) that:
Assuming that nuclear weapons are deployed on naval vessels on alert status,
they constitute a threat of use. The ICJ’s opinion was that the threat or use of nuclear
weapons would be generally contrary to international law, and in particular the
humanitarian laws of warfare. The only situation in which the ICJ was inconclusive on
absolute illegality was the extreme circumstance of self-defence when the very survival
of a State is at stake. Considering the conclusion of general illegality, the burden of
proof that a specific situation of threat or use is not proscribed by this rests on the
threatening or using state. There is no proof offered by the deploying states that there is
currently a threat to the very survival of a state which would require a threat or use of
nuclear weapons.
[7]
The US and Russia claim that LOW is necessary in order to protect against the
possibility of a first strike by the other side which might destroy the bulk of their
nuclear forces thus leaving them defenceless and unable to retaliate. During wartime
launch-on-warning could possibly be justified in response to a threat of imminent
nuclear attack as long as the response is designed not as retaliation but in order
to prevent further attack, and is consistent with other principles of international
humanitarian law previously discussed.
During peacetime however, launch-on-warning makes nuclear weapons use by
accident or intent much more likely. The policy leaves little time to check accuracy of
information regarding possible nuclear attacks before a retaliatory launch is authorised.
A nuclear war could be started accidentally by faulty information of an incoming
attack triggering a launch-on-warning response. In January 1995, for example, Russian
early warning systems detected a missile heading towards Moscow. Russian leaders
were alerted that it may be a nuclear tipped submarine launched nuclear missile.
The “nuclear suitcase” which is used to give commands for a retaliatory strike, was
“opened” in preparation for activation. It took eight minutes to conclude that the
missile was not a nuclear missile – less than four minutes before the deadline for
ordering a nuclear response.
[8]
LOW also establishes a response procedure that might not be appropriate. If there
is an actual nuclear attack, it could be one of a range of scenarios including a mistaken
launch, a stolen nuclear weapon fired by a non-State group, a limited demonstration
attack, or a massive attack. Launch-on-warning provides very little time to determine
the exact nature of the attack, whether a nuclear response is the most appropriate, or
what scale of response would be appropriate. Military strategy often assumes a worst-
case scenario in order to provide maximum protection for ones-self. The assumption of
a worst-case scenario in a nuclear strike could lead to a full-scale response which could
be out of all proportion to the actual attack.
Finally, launch-on-warning and maintaining nuclear forces on high alert status
constitute a highly confrontational posture which jeopardises efforts to reduce political
tensions between countries, to solve longstanding conflicts and to move towards
disarmament and cooperative threat reduction.
Philips and Starr have proposed that the US and Russia could rescind LOW and
adopt instead a policy of RELOAD (Retaliatory Launch Only After Detonation). They
argue that “ Such a policy ‘is compatible with the current posture of nuclear deterrence,
and that the military on both sides would be glad to accept it in order to reduce the risk
inherent in LoW.”
[9]
The Blix Commission says that the most urgent task is to eliminate the launch-
on-warning posture, and suggests some bilateral verification measures including the
participation of inspectors from both countries in military exercises of their strategic
forces or even a permanent presence of liaison officers at their strategic command
posts.
Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention
129
Section 3
The Blix Commission also recommends that Russia and the United States should
agree on reciprocal steps to take their nuclear weapons off hair-trigger alert and
should create a joint commission to facilitate this goal. They should implement a
controlled parallel decrease in operational readiness of a large part of their strategic
forces, through: reducing the number of strategic submarines at sea and lowering their
technical readiness to launch while in port; storing nuclear bombs and air-launched
cruise missiles separately from relevant air fields; storing separately nose cones and/or
warheads of most intercontinental ballistic missiles or taking other technical measures
to reduce their readiness.
[10]
De-alerting as part of a transition to abolition would begin to move the Nuclear
Weapon States out of the state of immorality inherent in the possession of nuclear
weapons and provide a more positive political environment for negotiating a NWC. It
would contribute to ending what Lee Butler, former commander of US strategic nuclear
forces, called the “spectacle of democratic societies clinging to the proposition that
threats to the lives of tens of millions of people can be reconciled with the underlying
tenets of our political philosophy”.
References
1. Such weapons are primed and ready for launching within moments of a launch
command.
2. Launch-on-warning procedures enable the launch of a retaliatory nuclear strike if a
nuclear-armed missile is headed toward a State but before the missile strikes.
3. Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission final report, Weapons of Terror: Freeing the
World of Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Arms, Stockholm, Sweden, 1 June 2006, page
92. For electronic copies of the report, please visit www.wmdcommission.org
4. “De-alerting undermines a basic principle of deterrence; namely the ability to retaliate
promptly so as to prevent any aggressor from assuming it can achieve a fait accompli.”
US Nuclear Policy in the 21
st
Century, National Defense Council and Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory Experts Group, 1998
5. The US Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations notes that:
Increased readiness levels help deter aggression. Consequently, an increased risk of attack,
prompted by adversary war readiness measures, may require US forces to maintain visibly
increased states of alert. Delivery system postures can send a clear warning. Nuclear-
capable bombers and submarines deploying to dispersal locations can send a forceful
message that demonstrates the national will to use nuclear weapons, and increase their
survivability.
Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations, pages I-12 – I-13
6. Presentation to the US Congress following a screening of “Thirteen Days.” 1 March
2001. See GSI Hosts Thirteen Days in Washington, D.C.
http://www.gsinstitute.org/archives/000074.shtml#000074
7. Illegality of deployment of nuclear weapons within Nuclear Weapon Free Zones:
Principles placed before the New Zealand Select Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence
and Trade by Judge C.G. Weeramantry, August 2003.
8. Taking Nuclear Weapons off Hair-Trigger Alert, Scientific American, 1998.
9. Alan Philips and Steve Starr, Change Launch on Warning Policy, 5 April 2006, Arms
Control Russia,
http://www.armscontrol.ru/pubs/en/change-low.pdf
10. WMD Commission, Recommendation 17, page 94
130
CleanUp, Disposition and Safe Disarmament
The implementation of a nuclear weapons convention
would require dismantling thousands of nuclear missiles
and disposing massive quantities of nuclear materials. In
addition, many facilities involved in the production of
nuclear weapons are severely contaminated. Experience
to date indicates that more attention, research, and
funding are necessary for safe nuclear disarmament,
disposition, and cleanup.
Not only does the production, testing, storage and
use of nuclear weapons lead to environmental and
health damage, (See Critical Question on Health
and Environment), but the process of dismantling the
weapons also carries major risks. These risks include:
accidents to or hijacking of the nuclear weapons
during their transport to the site of dismantling; the
hazards to the workers during the process of dismantling the weapons; and health
and environmental damage associated with the removed components, including their
transport, storage, and destruction.
In 1989, a committee of the U.S. Senate expressed concern that the Department of
Defense had devoted too little money and effort to finding ways to comply with nuclear
arms reductions in “an environmentally benign manner.” For example, pursuant to
the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, hundreds of Pershing missiles
were burned in the open air or exploded on a test stand at the Pueblo Army Depot in
Colorado. These procedures can release clouds of toxic hydrochloric acid when the
missiles’ solid fuel combines with moisture. (See Defending the Environment, 1989).
Virtually all the experience with the disassembly and destruction of nuclear weapons
in the United States has been gained over the past decade at the Pantex nuclear
weapons facility, located about 17 miles northeast of Amarillo, Texas. It is operated
for the U.S. Department of Energy by a contractor, the Mason & Hanger-Silas Mason
Co., and is the U.S. primary assembly and disassembly plant for nuclear weapons.
Prior to 1989 the Department of Energy had considered Pantex to be a relatively
clean and safe facility. Since 1989 Pantex has been repeatedly criticized for its safety
and health problems. These problems have included: radiation accidents in 1989 and
1990 resulting in workers being exposed to tritium and depleted uranium; inadequate
staffing, training and procedures designed to protect workers and the environment from
radiation; and violations in the general worker safety program.
Comment: Disposition
Unlike enriched uranium, plutonium poses special problems when one decides to
“get rid of it.” Enriched uranium can simply be diluted to low enriched uranium and
fabricated into fuel for nuclear power plants. Plutonium cannot be “diluted” – both
“reactor grade” plutonium, the material produced in an average nuclear power plants
and “weapons grade,” material produced in special reactors for the use in sophisticated
nuclear weapons can be used in nuclear weapons. With isotopes that have half-lives of
86 – 380,000 years, it will take 860 to 3.8 million years for the material to completely
decay.
The problem is further exacerbated by the fact that there are no acceptable methods
to eliminate plutonium. Shooting it into the sun or at the least into outer space
Barrels of transuranic
waste in temprary storage
at the E. Area Burial
Grounds, Savannah
River Site, South
Carolina, US. This waste
is contaminated with
plutonium. More than
300,000 such barrels
from nuclear weapons
production are buried or
stored around the country.
Photo: Department of
Energy
Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention
131
Section 3
would be expensive and risky – a Challenger-type disaster with a plutonium payload
could potentially harm many people. Diluting plutonium in the oceans is politically
unfeasible and may be scientifically unfeasible, too. Destroying it in underground
nuclear explosions would be hazardous and environmentally unsound, not to mention a
violation of the CTBT. The only other option is to transmute or transform it into other
isotopes in a nuclear reactor or accelerator. The only problem is that the technology for
such a process is only theoretical at the moment, and would take at least 25-50 years
to fully develop. Furthermore, transmutation would require the construction of new
nuclear reactors, which may be problematic in some countries (like the United States).
Fortunately, there are ways to minimize access to plutonium by burying underground in
a geologic repository, by putting it into a deep borehole, 2-6 km in depth, or by burying
it in deep sea muds. One can further reduce access by immobilizing plutonium in a
glass form or in a ceramic matrix prior to burial. Or, one can “burn” the plutonium as
mixed oxide fuel (MOX fuel) in nuclear reactors and transport the spent MOX fuel to a
geologic repository. Finally, instead of minimizing access, plutonium could be stored
above-ground indefinitely with tight security, but this option presupposes continued
political stability and a continued commitment to the NWC.
Only the United States and Russia have considered the question of plutonium
disposition so far. Both countries have agreed to declare 50 metric tons of plutonium
each as excess to military needs. The United States has adopted a “dual-track” method
for dispositioning plutonium: immobilizing it in a ceramic matrix and burning it as
MOX fuel in commercial reactors. Both the immobilized plutonium and the spent
MOX fuel would then be put into a mined geologic repository. Russia is very attached
to plutonium as a fuel form and would like to burn all of it as either MOX fuel or
directly in breeder reactors. At the moment, it has only one breeder reactor (one is
under construction). Russia has made no formal declarations of its intentions, in
contrast to the United States.
Because there are no straightforward solutions to plutonium disposition, it would
be difficult for the NWC to require the use of specific technologies for plutonium
disposition, especially as the technology to disposition plutonium may improve in the
future. Consequently, the NWC may be best off only requiring general conditions,
such as physical protection standards. At the moment, no global standards exist for the
physical protection of fissile materials like plutonium. For example, some countries
(like the United States) require guards protecting plutonium to be armed, whereas
other countries (like Japan) do not arm the guards protecting plutonium stockpiles.
Consequently, it could be useful for the NWC to have a clause on physical protection
for all fissile materials.
-Allison Macfarlane, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs Kennedy
School of Government, Harvard University
Related to the question of disarmament and cleanup is the problem of disposition of
weapons usable material, particularly plutonium. No satisfactory solution has been
found to date. Among the proposed options are the following:
1 Monitored and secured storage of plutonium for an indefinite period while a solution
is sought,
2 Fabrication of plutonium into mixed oxide (MOX) fuel to be used in commerical
power reactors (see discussion below),
3 Fissioning of plutonium in an accelerator or a nuclear reactor,
4 Deep geologic disposal or sub-seabed disposal of plutonium
5 Launch of plutonium into the sun
6 Destruction of nuclear warheads in an underground nuclear explosion.
Contaminated rubble
and soil from the
demolition of a uranium
processing facility and
debris from a munitions
factory and chemical
plant have been
dumped in Weldon
Spring Raffinate Pit 4
in Missouri. Photo: US
department of Energy.
132
Comment: Disposition
Disposition is a misnomer. We cannot “dispose” of plutonium, which remains lethally toxic
for 250,000 years. The latest plan to handle nuclear materials generated by nuclear power is
the Bush Administration’s Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) to replace the MOX
project.
[1] GNEP is a disastrous scheme to promote nuclear power around the world while
“controlling” the outbreak of additional nuclear weapons states by maintaining custody of the
bomb materials produced by nuclear reactors and recycling it in fast breeder reactors. The
US has been approaching established nuclear weapons states and their friends with advanced
civilian nuclear technology such as France, Japan, Russia, UK, China and India with a plan
to provide toxic nuclear “fuel services” to developing countries which includes transporting
fresh nuclear fuel to the four corners of the earth and then importing foreign “spent” fuel
back to the US and shipping it by rail and truck, to selected US sites across the continent,
to be reprocessed to make nuclear reactor fuel and shipped out again. GNEP would break
a 30 year taboo, established by President Carter, on reprocessing civilian nuclear waste,
which separates the used irradiated fuel produced by nuclear power plants into bomb-ready
plutonium and uranium.
We would be putting our security at enormous risk, raising the chances exponentially for
theft and nuclear weapons proliferation by increasing substantially the amount of bomb ready
nuclear materials and putting it in transit all over the world. There is no guarantee that we
could provide nuclear materials to a developing country for “peaceful” purposes, and that the
receiving country wouldn’t decide some day, like North Korea did, to break its agreements
and weaponize its plutonium.
GNEP creates additional toxic waste which would lie around for eons with no guarantee that
it will not seep into our groundwater, aquifers and rivers, causing increases in cancers, birth
defects, and mutations, as has been demonstrated at every other nuclear site on the planet.
Reprocessing is the most polluting part of the nuclear fuel cycle. Like the MOX scheme,
the nuclear industry is arguing that GNEP would make the material safe from terrorists. The
best, cheapest, and quickest way to secure the material from theft is to put it behind gates
with guns and guards while a new generation of scientists, untainted by the inadequate
thinking of the current weapons designers, is provided adequate resources to re-visit the
disposition problem anew.
The late Ted Taylor, a former nuclear weapons designer at Los Alamos, who quit his job
after a crisis of conscience to work for nuclear abolition, maintained that we could disable
all the nuclear weapons in our massive arsenal in a matter of weeks without resorting to the
costly, complex, and environmentally harmful processes with hi-tech facilities recommended
by the weapons scientists to dismantle the bombs over an agonizingly long period of time.
When questioned as to how that could be done he said, “Put them in molasses! That would
gunk up the works and prevent them from going off.” Frank von Hippel, President Clinton’s
former science advisor, and Co-Chair of the International Panel on Fissile Materials affirmed
that, indeed, we could just gum up the works of a nuclear bomb with some kind of sticky
substance and render it inoperable in no time.
With adequate resources and new thinking, we may discover new properties of nuclear
materials, which will enable us to render them inert over a shorter period of time than the
current 250,000-year toxic lifespan of plutonium. In the meantime, nuclear waste should
be stored as near to the site where it is generated as can be safely managed, in above
ground monitored storage, until a new generation of scientists, untainted by weapons-work
and ecological unconsciousness, has addressed the disposition conundrum, with adequate
resources, fresh thinking, and a commitment to solutions that will not further pollute the
earth. Just as the Hebrew children wandered in the desert for forty years so that no one born
into slavery would enter the Promised Land, no one who ever worked at the weapons labs
should be part of the solution for nuclear materials disposition.
-Alice Slater Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, New York
References
1. House Report 109-474-Energy and Water Development Appropriations Bill, 2007,
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgibin/cpquery/?&sid=cp109QlRbV&refer=&r_n=hr474.109&db_
id=109&item=&sel=TOC_272254&
Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention
133
Section 3
Nuclear Energy
Critical Question:
How should the NWC handle the nuclear fuel cycle?
Nuclear Energy
Unlike the NPT, the Model NWC discourages the use of nuclear energy, recognizing
that the continued reliance on nuclear power and its potential expansion pose a
challenge to verification of a nuclear-weapons-free world. Recent high-profile cases,
including the crises over the nuclear programs in Iran and the North Korea, have
brought the risks associated with the proliferation of nuclear fuel-cycle technology to
the forefront of the international agenda.
Article IV of the NPT refers to an “inalienable right” of non-nuclear-weapon states
to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. A possible problem for the confident
achievement and sustainability of a world free of nuclear weapons, this current norm
allows for states to build up the capacity and infrastructure––through ostensibly
civilian energy and research programs––to produce nuclear weapons within a brief
time period. However, any right must be exercised in conformity with international
law, as is illustrated by the NPT itself, which makes the exercise of the Article IV right
contingent on the obligation not to manufacture nuclear weapons. More broadly, the
Article IV right is subject to limits based upon the environmental and security rights
of other States and the global community. Further, while states surely are entitled
to develop energy sources as part of the sovereign right of development, that right
is subject to restrictions – including on particular energy sources – in the common
interest. Accordingly, the qualification of the NPT right to peaceful nuclear energy
as “inalienable” should be understood in the context of the NPT bargain, and not
as a claim that it is a fundamental aspect of sovereignty. It therefore may be limited
or extinguished over time by subsequent developments and agreements, as has the
NPT Article V promise of access to the “benefits” of peaceful nuclear explosions – a
provision which catered for the possibility of digging canals and mining operations
with nuclear explosive devices, but which has subsequently become understood as too
environmentally damaging and has been prohibited in the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty.
The question of the relationship of nuclear power to the achievement of a nuclear-
weapons free world remains crucial. Appreciation of the extreme environmental risks
of nuclear energy, as demonstrated by the Chernobyl disaster, have been partially offset
by a push to reduce reliance on fossil fuels creating a new demand for nuclear energy,
with a Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) study predicting a three-fold
expansion in nuclear energy by 2050. Should these predictions be accurate, the need
for nuclear fuel-cycle services will expand as well. With some adjustment, the very
same facilities and equipment used to produce low-enriched uranium fuel for power
reactors can produce high-enriched uranium suitable for use in a nuclear weapon. The
separation and reprocessing of plutonium from spent reactor fuel as mixed-oxide fuel
is a potentially greater proliferation challenge, as all separated plutonium is directly
usable in nuclear weapons. All existing commercial nuclear power reactors produce
plutonium as a by-product. The spread of these technologies increases the risk that such
facilities might be misused and nuclear material diverted to use in weapons or into the
hands of terrorists, or that the knowledge gained from operating such facilities might
be employed in a clandestine nuclear bomb program. The spread of nuclear technology
also increases the risk of terrorist attack on reactors and their spent fuel stores.
Verification of nuclear non-proliferation objectives historically has been limited in
order to maintain the balance between rights and obligations of NPT states parties.
NPT Safeguards, administered by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA),
134
are restricted to verifying that no nuclear material in each non-weapon state has been
diverted to weapons. The IAEA only has the authority to comprehensively verify
the presence or absence of undeclared nuclear activities or materials in a state if
it has accepted the voluntary Additional Protocol. Enforcement is hindered by the
treaty’s institutional deficits: the lack of a standing secretariat for the NPT and the
infrequent meetings of states parties. The UN Security Council has increasingly
filled the enforcement gap left by the lack of compliance mechanisms, but under a
traditional view its authority is limited to cases that it has found to constitute a threat
to international peace, rather than functioning as a reliable enforcer of global treaty
regimes.
These concerns over the limits of the NPT safeguards regime led a 2003 MIT team,
examining issues related to the expansion of nuclear power, to question the wisdom
of any scenario envisioning the growth of nuclear energy. Undoubtedly, the only
truly proliferation-proof solution would be the global phase-out of nuclear power.
The Model NWC does not mandate such a global phase-out, but does provide some
encouragement for it through an additional protocol on nuclear energy phase-out. This
could be assisted by the establishment of an International Sustainable Energy Agency,
which would provide assistance to States in developing environmentally sound energy
technologies and phasing out nuclear energy.
A variety of proposals exist to mitigate the risks posed by the proliferation of
sensitive nuclear technology and they should be explored and possibly implemented
in parallel with negotiation of a NWC or prior to its conclusion. The Model NWC
itself provides additional restrictions and controls on nuclear technology including a
prohibition on plutonium reprocessing and on enrichment of uranium beyond 20%
U-235 - an enrichment level sufficient for most nuclear reactors but insufficient for
nuclear weapons. This would require the phase-out of breeder reactors and reactors
using highly enriched uranium.
Beyond this, the continued existence of nationally based nuclear fuel-cycle facilities
might pose an insuperable obstacle to the verifiability of a nuclear-weapons-free world.
Thus, the IAEA has been studying the possibility of international control of fuel-
cycle in order to prevent any State from possessing the national capability to produce
material for nuclear weapons.
While there is a definite link between nuclear energy and nuclear weapons,
progress towards nuclear disarmament should not be prevented due to continuing
reliance by some States on nuclear energy. Thus the Model NWC attempts a balanced
approach, permitting nuclear energy while at the same time strengthening controls
over nuclear technology, and encouraging the phase-out of nuclear energy. Opinions
vary on whether the Model NWC is too permissive or too restrictive in this respect,
but such variance should not prevent progress on either negotiations for the NWC or
strengthening nuclear energy controls.
Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention
135
Section 3
Comment: Nuclear Energy
I agree that there should be much more thorough and open debate on nuclear energy.
I would add that it should be international, with inputs from people who are citizens
of a wide variety of countries with regard to their past and current nuclear activities.
These should include announced or unannounced possession of nuclear weapons
(including Israel); the nearly 50 countries that have nuclear power plants and/or
research/test reactors with thermal power outputs greater than about 1 megawatt; and
any other countries that are openly seriously considering use of nuclear energy for
peaceful or military purposes. I would also include the dozen or so countries within
which work is proceeding on R&D on inertial or magnetic confinement fusion power
systems.
It has been my conviction for decades that solar energy is, by far, the best
alternative, anywhere in the world, for meeting all human energy needs. I
therefore keep pressing for completely open, urgent international development and
demonstration of solar powered total energy systems to displace the present and
widely projected dependence on fossil and nuclear fuels worldwide. I expect the
environmental and economic benefits of such a global effort to become evident to
everyone within less than a decade.
– Theodore B. Taylor, former nuclear weapons designer, Los Alamos National
Laboratory.
“It has been my
conviction for decades
that solar energy
is, by far, the best
alternative, anywhere
in the world, for
meeting all human
energy needs.”
- Theodore B. Taylor
Photo: Petr Nad
136
Comment: Nuclear Energy
The fundamental problem with banning nuclear weapons but allowing nuclear power
is that they have the same energy source: the fission of uranium and plutonium isotopes.
To use uranium in a nuclear weapon, it must first be enriched in the isotope U-235. At the
same time, most of the nuclear power plants in the world also require enriched uranium,
though not enriched to the degree used in nuclear weapons. To create plutonium for use
in nuclear weapons, uranium-based fuel must be “burned” in a nuclear power reactor. In
1974, India showed the world that diversion of nuclear material for a “peaceful” nuclear
explosion was indeed possible.
On the other hand, nuclear power may be needed in the 21st century to replace energy
from fossil fuel power plants that emit greenhouse gases. Nuclear power is seen by
a number of Asian countries, themselves either fossil-fuel-poor or loathe to expand
dirty coal-burning plants, as a reliable energy source to fulfill the increasing electricity
demands of their rapidly growing populations. Finally, who are western countries, having
enjoyed the “luxury” of energy benefits from nuclear power, to inform developing Asian
countries that they cannot have nuclear power?
Currently, the IAEA verifies that non-nuclear weapon states signatories to the NPT
do not divert nuclear materials from energy to weapons purposes. With the exception of
Iraq, the IAEA has done its job successfully. There will be no way to ensure completely
that an individual country, especially a former nuclear weapons nation, will not break out
of the NWC. Unless the NWC nullifies the NPT, there will be no reason to have a parallel
organization to the IAEA. Nations, however, may wish to “update” or “recreate” the
IAEA, and perhaps doing so under the auspices of an NWC is the path to follow.
There are two processes in nuclear materials handling for nuclear energy and nuclear
weapons that are, in my mind, the most vulnerable to diversion activities: reprocessing
of spent fuel and enrichment of uranium. The latter, as noted, is necessary for fuel
fabrication in most light water type reactors, the most common reactor design. Only
CANDU (Canadian deuterium-uranium) reactors use natural uranium, but they have
their own proliferation problems. Fuel requires only 3-4% enrichment, whereas
nuclear weapons require at least 20% enrichment. Therefore, careful monitoring of
the enrichment process is necessary. As it stands now, only a few facilities worldwide
can enrich uranium, though, each country that uses nuclear power would rather not be
dependent on another for the main component of its fuel. Nonetheless, there may be
some way to control the uranium enrichment market, but I’m not certain the NWC should
do so.
Reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel is perhaps more worrying than enrichment in
terms of proliferation. It easily can create a plutonium economy, and plutonium, no
matter whether it is “weapons grade” or “reactor grade” can be used in nuclear weapons.
Currently, only Russia, France, Britain, Japan, and Germany reprocess their spent fuel.
India has plans to, and has reprocessed some material already for use in nuclear weapons.
Germany recently announced that it plans to phase out reprocessing. Such a move may
be the death knell for reprocessing plants in Britain and France, which rely heavily on
Germany’s business. Japan is finally coming to the realization that reprocessing is a very
expensive method for producing electricity. At today’s prices, uranium is so cheap that
it does not make economic sense to use anything but uranium-based fuel. The dream
of breeder reactors, which France, Japan and Russia clung to, is fading in France and
Japan, but Russia continues to cling to the idea. The only country currently enthusiastic
about plutonium as a good nuclear fuel is Russia, which has no money to reprocess spent
fuel, build new reactors, or even run the ones they have very efficiently. So, commercial
reprocessing may die a slow death. The NWC may want to restrict reprocessing
activities, but again, doing so may cause it to lose signatories (Russia, in particular). It
may be better for concerned countries to encourage those that reprocess to stop, and for
the NWC to avoid this question and the question of nuclear energy.
- Allison Macfarlane (See Comment on Disposition for affiliation)
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137
Section 3
Comment: Nuclear Energy
The problem of nuclear energy is complicated by the fact that almost all plutonium
can be used to make nuclear weapon. For a time, many in the nuclear industry believed
that the plutonium generated in power reactors could not be used for weapons.
However, it is now understood that virtually any combination of plutonium isotopes
can be used to make a nuclear weapon, using a design as simple as that of the Nagasaki
bomb.
At present, there are roughly 500 tonnes of separated plutonium in the world,
enough for over 100,000 nuclear weapons. About 250 tonnes of this plutonium has
been separated from civilian spent nuclear power-reactor fuel, mostly in France, Russia
and the UK. The stock of civilian separated plutonium is growing and will soon be
significantly larger than the amount of weapon plutonium. It is all weapon-usable.
As of December 2005, there is over 800 tonnes of plutonium contained in spent fuel
-- 700 tonnes in non-weapons states, and over 100 tonnes in the nuclear weapons states.
This will grow each year as fresh spent fuel is generated from the production of nuclear
electricity. There is an urgent need to address the problem of this growing stock of
separated and unseparated civil plutonium.
-Zia Mian (Program on Science and Global Security, Princeton University)
Plutonium generated in power reactors can be used to make nuclear weapons. This
photograph is of a nuclear missile in its silo. Photo: John Wollwerth
138
Comment: Nuclear Energy
Despite massive public relations expenditures by the nuclear industry to convince
the world that nuclear power is needed to mitigate the effects of global warming,
that contention is unsupportable. Nuclear power is the slowest and costliest way to
reduce CO2 emissions. Financing nuclear power would divert scarce resources from
investments in renewable energy and energy efficiency. The enormous costs for
nuclear power per unit of carbon emissions reduced compared to oil and coal, would
worsen climate change by buying less carbon-free energy per dollar, compared to sun
and wind. Nor is nuclear power carbon free. It is not only dependent upon fossil fuels
for the production of uranium fuel, decommissioning and the disposition of wastes
generated; it is also dependent upon a grid that is powered by other sources of energy,
typically coal. And nuclear power is not reliable in extreme weather conditions. Every
reactor needs back up power to prevent a meltdown. Recent incidents of intense heat,
drought, blizzards, and hurricanes contributed to electric grid failures. In the summer
of 2004, France had to shut down a number of reactors during the extreme heat wave.
It’s time to replace Article IV of the Non-Proliferation Treaty with an International
Sustainable Energy Agency. The nuclear crisis has resulted from the spread of
“peaceful” nuclear technology together with the nuclear weapons states failure to
disarm their arsenals. IAEA Director, Mohammed Elaborate stated, “We just cannot
continue business as usual so that every country can build its own factories for
separating plutonium or enriching uranium. Then we are really talking about 30, 40
countries sitting on the fence with a nuclear weapons capability that could be converted
into a nuclear weapon in a matter of months.”
However, the proposals to try to control civilian nuclear fuel production, suggested
by El Baradei and the Blix Commission are doomed to fail. It is unjust for certain
favored nations to make their own nuclear fuel, without world condemnation, such
as Brazil and Japan, while others, such as Iran and North Korea, are threatened for
doing so. We must supercede the “inalienable right” to peaceful nuclear technology
by establishing an International Sustainable Energy Agency (ISEA), funded by the
more than $250 billion in annual subsidies to nuclear and fossil fuel. Civil Society
has produced a model statute for the Agency. www.abolition2000.org. Just as the
CTB rendered the NPT’s Article V guaranteed right to “peaceful nuclear explosions”
inoperative, the establishment of ISEA would make the inalienable right to peaceful
nuclear technology inoperative as well. Setting up ISEA, with a moratorium on new
reactors and fuel production, phasing out nuclear power with safe, sustainable energy,
should be an integral part of the negotiations for a Nuclear Weapons Convention.
- Alice Slater Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, New York Convenor, Abolition 2000
Working Group for Sustainable Energy
Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention
139
Section 3
Knowledge and Reversibility
Critical Question:
Can the Nuclear Weapons Convention put the
nuclear “genie” back in the bottle?
A recurring argument in the debate over elimination of nuclear weapons is that the
“nuclear genie is out of the bottle”, inferring that nuclear physics cannot be unlearned.
Because of this, it has been argued, there is no point in pursuing the elimination of
nuclear weapons. True, nuclear weapons knowledge cannot be unlearned. In fact,
it would be foolish to base any non-proliferation regime on the assumption that
knowledge is lacking. But current proliferation risks are not merely a result of the
discovery of the splitting of the atom. They are also the end product of long-standing
policies to exploit this discovery for military purposes. Making nuclear disarmament
irreversible will therefore involve a gradual dismantling of the entire nuclear weapons
infrastructure, beginning with greater, not lesser, awareness of the potential risks posed
by scientific discoveries.
The MNWC actually stresses the importance of keeping up the public availability
of nuclear weapons and disarmament related knowledge in order to facilitate societal
verification and conversion. However, it is virtually impossible to reconstruct a
complicated technical device from its blueprints without referring to the implicit
knowledge of the very experts who designed and constructed it. Therefore, nuclear
weapons can be “disinvented” to some degree simply by retirement of the experienced
weapon designers and by destruction of data storage media that contain most of
the technical information relevant for nuclear weapons. A suggested approach is to
eliminate all nuclear weapons related classified information, i.e., to destroy all design
information and to declassify whatever is not destroyed.
On a more negative note, laboratory testing and computer simulation would further
knowledge of nuclear weapons. The improved simulation technology is highly
incompatible with the goal of a nuclear weapons free world. At the end of an era of
comparatively primitive trial and error, a scientific revolution is now being initiated.
With it, the theoretical understanding of nuclear weapons is supposed to be deepened.
In addition new scientists and testers are being primed for systematic conservation of
the knowledge relevant for nuclear weapons. If these developments continue, it will
become more difficult in the future to “disinvent” sophisticated designs of nuclear
weapons.
Comment: Knowledge
This is an extremely complex subject. Present and past knowledge of a wide variety
of technical concepts has evolved from basic principles of design and analysis that
are no longer secret. This knowledge has spread dramatically during the past decade
or so. Much that is considered secret by governments of announced or unannounced
Nuclear Weapon States is not in others. I therefore tend not to be hopeful that control
of information is likely to be very effective in curbing the proliferation of nuclear
weapon concepts in countries with either rudimentary or advanced understanding of
the relevant design principles. The proliferation of actual nuclear weapon arsenals now
and in the short-term future are, I believe, therefore best controlled by verified physical
control of the key materials needed for making nuclear weapons. These key materials
are now plutonium, highly enriched uranium, and tritium.
“Absent action, the
knowledge and skills
base unique to nuclear
weapons will be
atrophy.”
- The Stockpile Stewardship
and Management Program,
US DOE, Office of Defense
Program, May 1995.
140
This type of international control of nuclear weapons may no longer be applicable if
present efforts to develop pure fusion explosive weapons succeed. This possibility, the
likelihood of which is strongly debated by experts, cannot be openly assessed because
some of the key considerations remain secret.
- Ted Taylor (See Comment on Nuclear Energy for affiliation)
Comment: Knowledge
Many who advocate retention of substantial nuclear weapons facilities and arsenals
for the foreseeable future rest their case in large part on two claims. Abolition of
nuclear weapons is seen as impossible because the knowledge needed to make nuclear
weapons cannot be “disinvented”. At the same time, many of the same people argue
that we must keep and constantly modernize a huge complex of nuclear weapons
research and testing facilities, because the knowledge needed to maintain an adequate
deterrent is so fragile that it requires enormous effort to retain it.
The argument that retention of a nuclear arsenal is essential once the knowledge
needed to make nuclear weapons is widespread has many flaws. Perhaps most
important is that it implicitly compares a world without declared nuclear arsenals to a
perfect, risk free world, in which there is no possibility of either breakout by a nuclear
weapons state or proliferant or covert retention of small arsenals. The proper ground
for comparison is the world we now inhabit, one bristling with nuclear weapons, some
in decaying military structures, with a nonproliferation regime in tatters and new
nuclear and ballistic missile races underway in South Asia. It is only in this context
that the discussion of “reversibility” can be more than another abstract technical
debate. The argument that large, active nuclear weapons establishments are necessary
to sustain an acceptable deterrent rests on assumptions about the role of nuclear
weapons which still receive far too little attention in arms control debates. Deterrence
for several nuclear weapons states means far more than deterring an adversary’s
nuclear weapons use. Rather, nuclear weapons are seen by the dominant factions in
those states as an integral part of military policies which deem necessary and rightful
the capacity to apply overwhelming force in response to a wide range of perceived
threats, including threats to military forces deployed far beyond national boundaries.
Only in this context does the constant refinement of large and diverse nuclear arsenals
become understandable.
The assertion that constant increases in nuclear weapons knowledge are essential
because nuclear weapons knowledge cannot be eliminated increasingly becomes a
self-fulfilling prophecy. As the nuclear weapons states develop more sophisticated
means to simulate nuclear weapons phenomena, and as techniques of nuclear weapons
production also are developed to improve their flexibility and capacity to move quickly
from design to production, the proliferation of nuclear weapons knowledge is bound
to increase, and the technical barriers to reconstitution of a nuclear arsenal will tend
to diminish. The technical capabilities which are touted as necessary to counter
proliferation and use of weapons of mass destruction have the potential to make nuclear
weapons proliferation more likely, and abolition of nuclear weapons more difficult to
achieve.
Jonathan Katz, a member of a 1994 JASON panel which evaluated the U.S. nuclear
weapons “stewardship” program, advocated an alternative “curatorship” approach
in which new experimental facilities like the NIF “are not built, experiments are not
conducted, and design and development skills are allowed to atrophy. Only those
Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention
141
Section 3
skills required to remanufacture weapons according to their original
specifications are preserved.” Stewardship would add little to
confidence in the nuclear weapons stockpile, Katz argued, while posing
proliferation risks due to the knowledge which could diffuse from
nuclear weapons “stewardship” programs, particularly those involving
inertial confinement fusion:
“....NIF would bring together weapons scientists with scientists
who are doing unclassified work on inertial fusion. They would rub
elbows, share facilities, collaborate on unclassified experiments, and
communicate their interests and concerns to each other. Information
and understanding would diffuse from the classified to the unclassified
world, even without any technical violations of security....
Weapons work is so advanced in the United States that the
NIF would not advance it; but NIF could be of tremendous use to
nations where nuclear weapons work is less advanced. The lowering of the barriers to
proliferation of both fission and fusion weapons that NIF would bring is surely not in
the national interest....
As nuclear weapons grow older, it is inevitable that confidence in their
performance will erode. But stewardship cannot remedy that. The source of
confidence in the nuclear stockpile is the original testing program, combined with the
faithful remanufacture of weapons components to original specifications. Curatorship
is sufficient to make this degree of confidence possible, and stewardship can do no
better....
Curatorship makes more sense than stewardship. It is cheaper, more
proliferation resistant, and it is plainly more suitable for a world in which a nuclear
arms race no longer exists.”
We are entering a time in which full-scale nuclear arms races are beginning
once more. Today, they are principally races among new nuclear weapons states,
manifesting the deterioration of the nonproliferation regime, attributable in large
measure to the failure of the nuclear weapons states to make significant progress
towards nuclear disarmament in a decade of unprecedented opportunity. The
complexity of the multilateral nuclear confrontation is growing as sophisticated nuclear
weapons capabilities continue to spread, each new turn making the technical and
political tasks of achieving abolition of nuclear weapons more difficult.
In the end, the road to abolition requires political, not technical, inventiveness.
Every round of technological innovation in the nuclear weapons sphere has
proliferated, only making the world more dangerous and the path to abolition
more complicated. The problem of “reversibility” in an abolition regime is an
abstract theological debate in a world where the powerful are turning their backs on
disarmament and returning to the rule of force in international affairs. Elimination of
nuclear weapons will require profound political change within the nuclear weapons
states, leaps of faith and building of confidence on all sides, and an international
security regime that is truly multilateral. The “reversibility” of nuclear abolition, and
the degree of risk it represents, cannot be discussed meaningfully until we are at least
stumbling towards abolition rather than marching towards war.
- Jacqueline Cabasso and Andrew Lichterman Western States Legal Foundation. See
comments on Research and Breakout.
National Ignition Facility
(NIF) under construction
at Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory in
California would pursue
research on fusion
reactions for a whole new
generation of weapons.
Photo: Brian Quintard,
Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory
The proper ground
for comparison is the
world we now inhabit,
one bristling with
nuclear weapons, some
in decaying military
structures, with a non-
proliferation regime in
tatters and new nuclear
and ballistic missile races
underway in South Asia.
142
Conversion
Critical Question:
How should the Nuclear Weapons Convention handle
conversion?
Current nuclear weapons programs have generated a constituency of corporations and
workers that benefit economically from the nuclear weapons budget and is thus resistant
to nuclear disarmament. Conversion refers to the least disruptive transformation of nuclear
weapons facilities and supporting industries to non-weapons purposes. Conversion models
envisage the potential for productive roles for nuclear weapons corporations and workers.
The education, skills, and training necessary for large-scale nuclear disarmament, from
research and development to implementation, are one answer to the “jobs” argument, often
used to defend the nuclear weapons industry.
There is, however, disagreement as to the most appropriate type of work for weapons
designers, whether as part of the disarmament process or in a completely separate field
(e.g., medicine). On the one hand, the knowledge, skills and technology necessary
for verifiable nuclear disarmament are today in the hands of the nuclear weapons
establishment. Thus conversion of this infrastructure seems the most efficient way to
preserve jobs and redirect expertise. On the other hand, opponents argue, the mentality of
the nuclear weapons infrastructure would prevent it from being truly able to participate in a
nuclear disarmament regime.
The viability of conversion would seem to turn on the ability of a disarmament culture
to permeate the nuclear weapons infrastructure and the scientific educational and training
institutions that feed into it. Research and development priorities, with the emphasis on
military ambition, have limited the options available to scientists, and participation in
weapons research, in turn, has shaped the political outlook of the scientific establishment.
It is not possible to predict with certainty whether scientific research and education
institutions can be transformed from a weaponization mentality to a disarmament mentality.
The feasibility of such a transformation will depend greatly on the larger cultural context
in which scientists are educated, trained and politicized. If nuclear weapons are stigmatized
rather than glorified in political discourse and popular movies, they will also be less
appealing as objects of scientific pursuit than they are today.
The success of conversion will likely rely on a mix of coercion and incentives at both
national and internatio nal levels, many of which could be implemented prior to the NWC
entering into force, and which could in fact assist in removing institutional blocks in NWS
to their ratification of the NWC. One such example would be divestment in corporations
involved in nuclear weapons contracts – a measure already undertaken by the Norwegian
Pension Fund. Incentives could include retraining for workers and government contracts for
corporations converting to nuclear disarmament, clean-up or verification tasks.
Even without transformation to a nuclear disarmament regime, research is desperately
needed for cleanup of the radioactive and other hazardous waste produced by 50 years of a
nuclear arms race. For nuclear disarmament to progress, research is also needed in the area
of plutonium disposition and verification technology. Assuming that a good faith reordering
of research and development priorities is possible, conversion of the nuclear weapons
complex would seem to be the most efficient way to develop a nuclear disarmament regime.
Conversion, if it is possible, would likely take more than one generation and it would
depend on changes in policy and popular culture. It also depends on whether nuclear
disarmament research can be made as economically enticing and intellectually exciting as
nuclear weapons research has been for many. (See Critical Question on Research.)
“I have to cast my lot
with those who age
after age, with no
extraordinary power,
reconstitute the world.
- Adrienne Rich, Poet
Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention
143
Section 3
Comment: Conversion
What would happen to nuclear weapons laboratories in a world where nuclear
weapons had been abolished by international treaty? Presumably the weapons
laboratories, together with universities and NGOs, would play an important role
in studying how to disarm in a stable and verifiable way, how to dismantle nuclear
weapons cleanly and efficiently, and how to dispose of the material in the weapons
safely. But, if we believe that a world without nuclear weapons is possible to achieve,
what should the weapons laboratories do once such a world has been achieved?
It is fashionable on the left to say that, if they are no longer needed, weapons
laboratories should be “converted” to other purposes. I have to confess that this
puzzles me. We did not “convert” the typewriter industry when computers were
invented; we let it shrivel and
(nearly) die. In our society, which tends to trust the invisible hand of the infinitely
wise free market to allocate economic resources, it’s generally assumed that, once an
industry’s product is no longer needed, it’s best to lay off the people making products
we no longer use and let them find new jobs in industries whose products we want.
Why should a nuclear weapons laboratory be any different? And why should the
alternative, central planning by the government, work any better in the U.S. than it did
in the Soviet Union?
The problem with “converting” the weapons laboratories is that it’s like asking
an elephant to be a giraffe. If you wanted a new clean car engine or environmental
remediation technologies, you wouldn’t ask Microsoft to do it because they have no
experience in the field; so why would you ask a nuclear weapons laboratory?
Having said this, I would not close the weapons laboratories outright. They are large,
complex organizations with many subcultures, of which the weapons subculture is
only one — albeit the largest and most important one. Still, the Livermore Laboratory,
for example, has a biomedical division, it has an atmospheric sciences division, it has
people working on new computer chip technologies, new automobile engines and so
on. Such programs could become the nucleus for a smaller, different kind of laboratory
if the laboratory was no longer dominated by managers who worked their way up
through the weapons programs.
But what of the weapons scientists? Many of these have given the best years of their
lives to their country and, if their curriculum vitae are classified and their skills narrow
and esoteric, it will not be easy for them to find new jobs, especially if they are middle
aged. Besides, if they are fired en masse, the politicians representing their districts will
fight to save their jobs. Thus I would suggest a kind of GI Bill for weapons scientists.
I would lay them off with very generous severance payments that they could use to
start their own businesses, go back to college, play the stock market etc. This would
compensate the weapons scientists for their sacrifice, keep federal money flowing into
the local economy for a while, and it would, in the long run, be cheaper than keeping
the weapons labs at their present size
-Hugh Gusterson, Professor of Cultural Studies and Sociology at George Mason
University.
144
Comment: Conversion
The U.S. nuclear weapons laboratories constitute a politically powerful, self-
perpetuating, multi-billion dollar industry. Almost mystically rooted in their origins as
developers of the first atomic and hydrogen bombs, their power is amplified by the lack
of recognized independent nuclear weapons expertise and their monopoly on access to
decision makers. The link between control over nuclear weapons-relevant information
and influence over nuclear weapons policy has been formally institutionalized by the
“certification” process, an element of the “Stockpile Stewardship” program, in which
the weapons laboratories annually “certify” the “safety” and “reliability” of the nuclear
arsenal. As one of the Clinton Administration’s prerequisites for acquiescence to the
CTBT, the certification process provides an opportunity for the weapons laboratories
to call for resumption of underground testing if they are not given what they consider
adequate alternative resources to “certify” the stockpile — a temptation which may
grow in appeal if nuclear weapons begin to lose their central place in U.S. national
security dogma. The concentration of arms control and nonproliferation policy and
technology work at the weapons laboratories has further consolidated their influence
over nuclear weapons policy.
Monitoring and verification technologies also employ a facilities and skills base,
which is centered largely at the weapons laboratories. The difficulties of sorting out
what is truly needed for monitoring and verification of the nuclear disarmament process
alone from attempts to continue weapons development are substantial. Combined with
an extensive counter-proliferation program in which nuclear weapons play a central
role and an ambitious nuclear weapons “stewardship” program, which will entail new
generations of multi-use high energy density, hydrodynamic testing, and computing
capabilities, they may be insurmountable.
Conversion will require radical and profound changes at the highest levels in
national security and foreign policies, coupled with the lifting of secrecy and a greatly
increased level of public participation in decision-making at the local/community
level. These developments will necessarily be accompanied by a major realignment of
powerful economic interests.
- Jacqueline Cabasso and Andrew Lichterman, Western States Legal Foundation
(See Comments on Breakout and Knowledge.)
Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention
145
Section 3
Comment: Conversion
We have observed the response of the US nuclear weapons labs to the end of the
Cold War and the moratorium on nuclear testing. First they came up with AGEX,
(Above Ground Experiments) and then they sold the Congress on the “stockpile
stewardship” program which enabled weapons workers to design new nuclear weapons
in computer simulated cyberspace with the addition of so called “sub-critical” nuclear
tests. These tests, while shattering plutonium in underground tunnels 1,000 feet
below the desert floor at the Nevada test site, do not cause a chain reaction, and so the
weapons labs argue that they do not “count” as nuclear tests and are permitted under a
“Comprehensive” Test Ban Treaty, which they have opposed in the halls of Congress,
arguing that someday they may want to do full scale tests again. Stockpile Stewardship
has now spawned the Reliable Replacement Warhead, at a cost of nearly $9 billion a
year, where our best and brightest at the weapons labs are now arguing that we should
replace the entire nuclear arsenal with a new set of hydrogen bombs, that will last
forever, even though experts have concluded that “most plutonium pits have a credible
lifetime of at least 100 years.” [1] The oldest pits, or plutonium bomb cores, currently
in the US arsenal are still less than 50 years old.
The culture of the weapons labs makes them a very poor bet for conversion. It
would be foolish and naive, given our experience to date, to assume any "good faith
reordering of research and development priorities" by the labs. Thus, conversion would
not be the most efficient way to achieve a nuclear disarmament regime and should not
be addressed in a Nuclear Weapons Convention. It would be far more efficient to send
all the weapons designers and their teams to medical school, or muster them out with
full pay until retirement, using the $9 billion per year now budgeted for new weapons
work at the labs. We would still have enough funds left over to cover the desert with
solar panels and wouldn't be plagued by new loopholes and twisted interpretations of
our commitment to disarmament by the current weapons establishment
References
1. JASON group, (20 November 2006),
http://www.nukewatch.org/facts/nwd/JASON_ReportPuAging.pdf
-Alice Slater (See Comment on Disposition) Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, New York
146
Comment: Conversion
Conversion does not minimize disruption of the entities being converted, it refers
instead to transforming military industries into civilian industries in a manner in
which the benefits outweigh the costs. And disarmament tasks are not conversion; they
simply substitute a disarmament program for a weapons program. This is exactly what
the stockpile stewardship claims to be, and over 50% of the budget of that program
is currently being spent on research and development of new weapons. Conversion
should concentrate on people, not facilities. Unfortunately, attempts to challenge
scientists and engineers at the labs are mainly associated with new weapons design and
testing.
The only measures of viability for conversion are market-based. One cannot assume
a good faith reordering of research and development priorities if the weapon labs
control the research funds. Only the market, not another government project, can
guarantee a reordering of research funds.
Research isn’t desperately needed for cleanup of nuclear waste. DOE has research
units scattered around the complex. What is needed is a commitment to pursue cleanup.
“Innovative” research from the labs has centered on breeder reactors, MOX burning
and other methods of disposition that create more, not less, waste. Similarly, research in
plutonium disposition and verification technologies is ongoing around the US. Again,
viable methods have been by-passed so we can engage in MOX burning.
-William Weida, Economics Department, Colorado College
Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention
147
Section 3
Research
Critical Question:
How should the NWC handle research related to nuclear
weapons?
The question of research has triggered some of the most
reactive responses to the model NWC. Any suggestion
of state or international control over scientific work is
inherently disturbing, not only to scientists. There is intense
disagreement about whether certain types of nuclear
physics research should be limited or prohibited, and what
prohibitions would even be possible.
An approach to research that relies primarily on
prohibition of certain activities or knowledge will meet
resistance and its effectiveness will depend greatly
on enforcement rather than compliance. Today’s vast
accumulated knowledge about the weapons applications
of nuclear physics is not a direct and inevitable
consequence of the splitting of the atom. It is the result of deliberate research and
development priorities based on considered policy, which has led to an availability
of weapons related work and lack of meaningful alternatives. The social and political
manifestations of dependence on military power and nuclear capability for security also
play a role. Scientists do not make choices in a cultural vacuum.
Defining what constitutes nuclear weapons research is a difficult threshold question.
Whether an area of research is in conflict with the purposes of the NWC depends
largely on intent and will remain unclear and controversial as long as any nuclear
weapons are being maintained. In today’s world, such controversy is inevitable because
a policy of maintaining a nuclear arsenal allows for a “grey” area regarding the intent
of research related to nuclear weapons. An example of this is the debate in the United
States over what constitutes design of new weapons, as opposed to modification of
existing weapons types or additional safety features. These types of debates will
dissipate under a regime committed to the elimination of nuclear weapons. Grey areas
will decrease even further once weapons are actually eliminated and no research is
necessary for their interim maintenance and storage.
Research essential to nuclear weapons, if it is to be restricted, may need to be
handled differently from research that may support or enhance a nuclear capability
but primarily has other purposes. Again, intent plays a critical role here, as almost
any area of scientific research can lend itself to military applications. The answer to
this dilemma is to cultivate a culture of scientific responsibility rather than approach
science and scientists with suspicion. Scientists should learn about proliferation
risks and develop the tools to recognize potential diversion of scientific discovery
to aggressive purposes. (See Critical Question on Nuclear Weapons Knowledge and
Reversibility.)
Prohibiting nuclear weapons research does not necessarily create pragmatic or
ethical problems. Where there is no policy of nuclear weapons dependence, as in
Africa, a prohibition on research or the seeking, receiving, assisting or encouraging of
research is generally acceptable. This is evidenced in the Treaty on an African Nuclear
Weapon Free Zone (Treaty of Pelindaba), which prohibits States from conducting
research, seeking or receiving assistance in research, or assisting or encouraging
research on “any nuclear explosive device by any means anywhere” (Art. 3). However,
where there is a long history of nuclear weapons research, a direct prohibition may
Los Alamos National
Laboratory, one of
the three major labs
responsible for creating
and manufacturing the
US nuclear stockpile.
Photo: Department of
Energy.
148
be controversial or impossible until nuclear weapons are completely destroyed. For
this reason the model NWC suggests a prohibition on funding as an alternative to a
direct prohibition on research. It is also simpler to determine and define the purpose of
funding than it is to determine the potential uses of specific research.
The United States Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program has as one of
its goals attracting young scientists to keep the knowledge necessary for a nuclear
capability alive. (See Critical Question on Conversion.) Scholarships, fellowship,
education and training programs, and intellectually stimulating research opportunities
feed today’s nuclear capability in the United States and elsewhere. In fact, the current
disrepair in the former Soviet Union’s nuclear complex is directly related to the
collapse of the economic and educational systems that supported the vast nuclear
weapons structure. (See Critical Question on Economic Aspects.)
Research is desperately needed for safe, secure, irreversible and verifiable nuclear
disarmament. Most of the knowledge, skills and mechanisms essential to safely
reversing nuclear armament are today in the hands of the scientific and technical staff
of the nuclear weapons complex and supporting agencies, such as the International
Atomic Energy Agency. Thus the most efficient and least disruptive way to further
nuclear disarmament research would be to transform the weapons related institutions
and redirect the skills of their staff. Many supporters of nuclear abolition, however,
question whether the institutions that have produced today’s nuclear arsenals are
capable of change. There is concern that any NWC provisions that allow or encourage
nuclear disarmament research would function as loopholes allowing maintenance of a
nuclear weapons capability. (See Critical Question on Conversion.)
Comment: Research
I don’t believe that you can ban research in the purest sense of the term. How can
you tell scientists to stop thinking about an issue — especially when the issue (nuclear
weapons physics) is so closely tied in to other areas of academic physics? And how
would you verify such a ban? The only thing you can verifiably ban are certain
large experiments — such as nuclear tests or laser fusion shots. These take immense
amounts of money, complex social organization and political will to orchestrate and
can be banned by treaty if there is a will to do so. Computer simulations of nuclear
tests are in a different category, and I don’t see any realistic way to ban them.
If there were a NWC, I would expect the decline of nuclear weapons research to
be a very gradual affair — with some continuation of basic research initially as the
political price for such a convention. Presumably if there were such a convention, it
would at first be accompanied by the survival of a fairly substantial group of stewards
maintained as a hedge against a new arms race. The stewards would rightly say that
they wouldn’t be very good at being stewards unless they were allowed to do some
sort of basic research into their field — short of making new weapons. But over time
the existence of such a group would be seen as an extravagance and bright people
would not be very interested in joining such a dead-end profession provided there was
no resumption of the nuclear arms race internationally. It would help if there were no
further production of fissile material, of course. Furthermore, as the group of scientists
who had participated in nuclear tests died off, it would become harder to transmit
nuanced nuclear weapons knowledge to a new generation of scientists. The knowledge
and research that survived would seem, like alchemy, of increasingly questionable
value.
- Hugh Gusterson, Professor of Cultural Studies and Sociology at George Mason
University.
Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention
149
Section 3
Comment: Research
“Stockpile Stewardship” is a nuclear weapons research and testing program of
Cold War proportions that will keep nuclear weapons in the arsenal, in the budget,
and in the career paths of scientists well into the next century. Under the pretense of
maintaining the “safety” and “reliability” of the nuclear weapons stockpile, Stockpile
Stewardship is intended to preserve the capacity to maintain, test, modify, design
and produce nuclear weapons, with or without underground testing. Some of the key
Stockpile Stewardship technologies have been developed as “dual-use” scientific
facilities that can be used for both high-energy physics research and bomb science.
Prime examples are the multi-billion dollar, stadium-sized National Ignition Facility,
a laser fusion installation presently under construction at the Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory in California, and the virtually identical “Projet Megajoule,” under
construction in France, which have the potential, in combination with other ongoing
experimental research, to lead to the development of pure fusion weapons. Most
Stockpile Stewardship facilities have little to do with maintaining either the safety or
reliability (itself a highly debatable proposition) of existing weapons as they await
disablement and dismantlement on the path to elimination. Rather, they are intended to
serve as training grounds for the next generation of nuclear weapons designers as well
as the tools of the trade.
It is often stated that we can’t or shouldn’t prohibit certain types of research.
However, we don’t have to pay people to design weapons of mass destruction. What’s
needed is an engineering-based “stewardship” approach to ensure the safe and secure
containment of nuclear weapons, their components and materials, under international
supervision, as nuclear weapons are phased out and eliminated. We support a
prohibition on funding for nuclear weapons research, as suggested in the model NWC.
- Jacqueline Cabasso and Andrew Lichterman, Western States Legal
Comment: Research
The weapons labs should be shut down after a treaty is signed. There should be
an international prohibition on government funding of research for nuclear weapons
design, development, testing and production. Such a provision would be a totally
appropriate international control on government-funded research for the future of the
planet. Research should be permitted on verification and materials disposition, and
the language of the treaty should be specifically limited solely to those two areas of
research. While the verification research may require the use of older experienced
weapons lab personnel, their contribution to solutions on the disposition of materials
such as plutonium has been worse than nothing at all. Their latest new ideas for GNEP
and the Reliable Replacement Warhead, are a recipe for proliferation, giving other
countries an incentive to get nuclear weapons of their own and to develop homegrown
“peaceful” nuclear technology while creating extraordinary planetary hazards as
hundreds of thousands of tons of lethal material are shipped around the world — by
plane, ship, train, and truck — to be burnt up in civilian reactors which will cause even
more deadly environmental contamination.
-Alice Slater, Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, New York
(See Comments on Disposition and Conversion)
150
Economic Aspects
Critical question.
Will nuclear weapon states, particularly Russia, be able to
afford to eliminate their nuclear weapons?
The full cost for the total dismantlement and destruction of nuclear weapons
and disposal of fissile material is impossible to determine at this point in time, and
depends on a number of policy decisions regarding, among other things, the speed of
destruction, the types and complexity of verification systems adopted and the method
of fissile material disposal.
Experience from the START I and INF Treaties indicates that costs will be extremely
high. Projected U.S. costs for dismantlement and verification under these treaties is
approximately $31 billion. [1] However, this does not include cleanup costs, which
could reach a staggering $365 billion. Russian costs are likely to be comparable, if they
are to enact cleanup operations commensurate with the requirements.
Russia is already experiencing difficulties in meeting the costs of current programs
of dismantlement and disposition, threatening the continuation of such programs. In
response the US has provided $1.5 billion to help in dismantlement, and has agreed
to spend $8 billion - $12 billion to purchase Highly Enriched Uranium from the
dismantled bombs. However this may bring some economic return to the U.S. as it will
be used in nuclear power facilities.
While the nuclear weapons States are responsible for the costs of eliminating the
weapons they have created, the Model Nuclear Weapons Convention provides for the
establishment of a voluntary fund to assist States who might otherwise be unable to
fulfill their disarmament obligations.
As large as the disarmament costs may be, the alternative of maintaining nuclear
weapons would be even more costly, as it merely delays the disarmament costs into the
future, and adds extra costs to maintain the weapons. The US is currently spending $30
billion annually on nuclear weapons programs, and has spent over $5.5 trillion since
1940. [2] These programs continue to add to the future costs of weapon destruction
and clean-up. In purely dollar terms, it will thus be more economic to move from
the current nuclear weapons maintenance and modernization program to a nuclear
disarmament program.
Proponents of nuclear weapons research and development (R&D) often cite
economic benefits of such research, arguing that such R&D generate technological
“spin-offs” which have led to economic advancement. [3] For example, NAVSTAR
satellites, originally developed to provide pinpoint accuracy for ballistic missiles, are
now finding widespread commercial use in automobile electronic atlases and hand-
held directional finders. However, the extent of civilian benefits from nuclear weapons
spending is necessarily restricted due to the secrecy of much research and the specific
orientation to military purpose. [4] If a comparable amount of public money were spent
in civilian research and development, the returns would most likely be much greater.
References
1. “Atomic Audit: The Costs and Consequences of US Nuclear Weapons since 1940”,
Stephen Schwartz (ed), Brookings Institution, 1998.
2. Costs for the programs of the other nuclear weapon states are not available.
3. See, for example, “The Star Wars Spin-Off”, New York Times Maazine, August 24, 1986.
4. See, for example, “Labs Struggle to Promote Spin-Offs”, Science, vol 240, May 13,
1988, pp 874-76
Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention
151
Section 3
Comment: Economic Aspects
Russian cleanup costs will certainly be larger than ours because of the lax
environmental standards followed in Russia. Our cleanup costs may be as much as $1
trillion - comes from a DOE estimate that omitted many costs. The cheapest short-run
alternative for the Russians is not to clean up at all — and the cheapest course of action
is may be to retain most of their nuclear weapons. The Russians probably spent an
amount similar to the US to develop and deploy nuclear weapons. A French researcher
recently claimed that the French spent $1.5 trillion on their entire effort to develop and
deploy nuclear arms.
Spinoffs are always more expensive to develop than if the product/item had been
developed directly. As a result, they always represent an economic loss compared to
more efficient methods of development.
The real economic issue that is not addressed here is the ‘future cost’ of all the
weapon work we are now doing. The essay on economics tends to view nukes and
their waste as past events that need to be corrected. While this is true, the production
of both weapons and waste continues unabated. And the costs continue to mount.
- William Weida (See Comment on Conversion)
152
Update to comments on Breakout, Knowledge, Conversion
and Research by Jacqueline Cabasso and Andrew Lichterman,
Western States Legal Foundation, for the 2007 edition
When we wrote our comments on Breakout, Knowledge, Conversion and Research
in 1998, the window of opportunity for meaningful progress towards nuclear
disarmament that had appeared with the end of the Cold War was still open. In these
comments, which are reprinted here without changes, we warned that programs then
underway by the nuclear weapon states to maintain and upgrade their nuclear weapons
research and production infrastructures would create insurmountable obstacles to
nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament and invariably lead to new arms races.
Today, in the world’s leading nuclear weapon state, we are seeing that the deal obtained
by the U.S. nuclear weapons establishment-- modernization of its nuclear weapons
complex in exchange for the cessation of full scale underground tests-- is bearing
fruit in the form of plans for a new generation of hydrogen bombs. Moreover, these
new weapons of mass destruction play a central role in that nation’s official national
security policy.
In August 1995, citing the promise made in connection with indefinite extension
of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty earlier that year, U.S. President Bill Clinton
announced his support for a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty by 1996, in order to
“reduce the danger posed by nuclear weapons proliferation.” He also announced
the U.S. intent, “as part of our national security strategy,” to “retain strategic nuclear
forces. . . In this regard,” he stated, “I consider the maintenance of a safe and reliable
nuclear stockpile to be a supreme national interest of the United States.” Clinton
strongly endorsed the nuclear weapons labs’ “Science Based Stockpile Stewardship”
program as a means of maintaining the U.S. “nuclear deterrent” without nuclear testing,
and he appealed to Congress for bipartisan support for the program “over the next
decade and beyond.”
[1] Congress provided that support and just over ten years later, in
April 2006, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) of the Department
of Energy (DOE) rolled out its plans for Complex 2030, the new name for its evolving
nuclear weapons research and production infrastructure.
The DOE proudly traces its lineage to the Manhattan Project and the race to develop
an atomic bomb during World War II.
[2] The DOE’s Livermore Lab in California was
founded in 1952 to compete with its Los Alamos Lab in New Mexico - the original
home of the Manhattan Project - to develop a hydrogen bomb, orders of magnitude
more powerful than the U.S. atomic bombs that destroyed Hiroshima and Nagasaki
in 1945. Today, the Livermore and Los Alamos National Laboratories – the direct
descendants of the Manhattan Project – are engaged in a new arms race with each
other to design the next generation of hydrogen bombs, euphemistically called
“Reliable Replacement Warheads” (RRWs).
After a lengthy design competition, the Livermore Lab has recently been given the
green light to proceed with development of a replacement for the 100-kiloton W76
warhead
[3] (some 1,600 of which are currently deployed on Trident II D-5 submarine-
launched ballistic missiles). The Nuclear Weapons Council, a joint Department
of Defense (DoD)-DOE agency, has directed the NNSA to begin another design
competition for a second RRW. The first RRW is due for production in 2012; the
production goal for the second warhead is 2014.
[4]
A DoD document outlining the
future of the nuclear stockpile, forecasts that the U.S. will “develop warheads for next-
generation delivery systems” between 2010 and 2020. The “long term vision” stated
in the “Stockpile Transformation” chart includes “possible new DoD platforms and
delivery systems” along with “2-4 types of RRWs”.
[5]
In April 2006 testimony to Congress, the Deputy Director for Defense Programs at
the NNSA bragged: “Progress on RRW has been remarkable. Last year, the DoD and
Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention
153
Section 3
DOE jointly initiated an RRW competition in which two independent design teams
from our nuclear weapons laboratories—LLNL and LANL both in partnership with
Sandia and the production complex—are exploring RRW options. A competition of
this sort has not taken place in over 20 years, and the process is providing a unique
opportunity to train the next generation of nuclear weapons designers and engineers.
Both teams are confident that their designs will meet established requirements and be
certifiable and producible without nuclear testing.”
[6]
This testimony was proffered in support of the NNSA’s “Complex 2030” plan for
the future of the nuclear weapons complex. Under this proposal, “NNSA’s future
path is to establish a smaller, more efficient Nuclear Weapons Complex that is able to
respond to changing national and global security challenges.”
[7] The RRW Program is
identified as a principal element of Complex 2030, “to ensure the long-term reliability
and safety of the nuclear weapons stockpile and enable a more responsive supporting
infrastructure while reducing the possibility that the United States would ever need
to return to underground testing.”
[8] While the NNSA claims that “RRW is not a new
weapon providing new or different military capabilities and/or missions,”
[9] then-
NNSA chief Linton Brooks was very clear that this possibility remains on the table.
“In 2030, our Responsive Infrastructure can also produce weapons with
different or modified military requirements as required. The weapons design
community that was revitalized by the RRW program can adapt an existing
weapon within 18 months and design, develop and begin production of the
new design within 3-4 years of a decision to enter engineering development...
goals that were established in 2004. Thus, if Congress and the President
direct, we can respond quickly to changing military requirements.”
[10]
Brooks spelled out the purpose of the “responsive infrastructure:” “The current
nuclear weapons complex was built in the 1950s and 60s for the Cold War. Unless
this infrastructure is improved, we will not be suited for 21st century challenges.
As outlined in the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review, we are moving towards a nuclear
deterrent that is smaller, more capable and better able to respond to changing needs.
Our Complex 2030 plan... puts NNSA on a path to achieve this necessary national
security goal.... In short, I see a future world where a smaller, safer, more secure and
more reliable stockpile is backed up by a robust industrial and design capability to
better respond to changing technical, geopolitical or military needs.”
[11]
This work is already in progress under the existing Stockpile Stewardship program.
“Life Extension Programs,” to render the U.S. nuclear arsenal reliable for decades to
come have been completed for the W80 Cruise Missile and are underway for the B61
bomb and the W76 SLBM (Sea Launched Ballistic Missile).
[12] While considering
options for a new large-scale factory for warhead components, the U.S. is establishing
significant “interim” capacity to make bomb parts at its existing facilities.
[13]
According to the NNSA, “Once it is demonstrated that replacement warheads can
be produced on a timescale in which geopolitical threats could emerge, or the nuclear
weapons complex can respond in a timely way to technical problems in the stockpile,
further reductions can be made in reducing on-deployed warheads.”
[14]
This approach
renders the disarmament objective implicit in further reductions meaningless.
An official government study on plutonium aging, released in November 2006,
created a flurry of national media attention. The study, conducted by nuclear scientists
at the Livermore and Los Alamos Labs and reviewed by an outside panel of nuclear
weapons experts known as the JASONs, concluded that plutonium pits degrade at
a much slower rate than was previously believed. The study found that plutonium
in the U.S. nuclear arsenal remains viable for as long as 100 years, more than twice
as long as had been thought. Some critics of Complex 2030 seized on the report,
claiming it “proved” that new pits and warheads are “completely unnecessary” because
the existing warheads will last for a century.
[15] But the Democratic Congressional
154
Representative whose district includes the Livermore Lab welcomed the study,
claiming that plutonium aging is a “side matter” that will not influence the RRW
decision, which she characterized as “an opportunity to rejuvenate the complex” and
attract the “smartest scientists in the world” to the weapons labs.
[16] Indeed, the
NNSA issued a press release two days later, reaffirming its commitment to the RRW
program as the best strategy for “sustaining the nation’s nuclear weapons stockpile for
the long-term without underground nuclear testing.
[17]
In a famous line from the movie, “Field of Dreams,” the protagonist declares, “If
you build it, they will come.” He was talking about a baseball field and the sports
fans it would attract. In the same way, as we’re clearly seeing, if you build a new
nuclear weapons infrastructure, it will produce new nuclear weapons. As events have
continued to unfold in the post Cold War era, we believe it has been conclusively
demonstrated that, as we said nearly ten years ago, the closure and monitoring of
the nuclear weapons infrastructure in all nuclear weapons states must begin early
in the process of disarmament. Nuclear weapons research, testing, and component
production should be halted while reductions are in progress, not after, with nuclear
weapons production and research facilities subject to intrusive verification regimes at
the earliest possible time.
Some argue that Complex 2030 is merely a “make work” program for scientists and
engineers, or that the nuclear weapons we already have are not “useable.” But consider
the following passage from an August 2006 DoD planning document:
“Within Global Strike, US nuclear forces contribute uniquely and
fundamentally to deterrence—through their ability to threaten to impose costs
and deny benefits to an adversary in an exceedingly rapid and devastating
manner. Nuclear weapons provide the President with the ultimate means to
terminate conflict promptly on terms favorable to the US.... Nuclear weapons
threaten destruction of an adversary’s most highly valued assets, including
adversary WMD capabilities, critical industries, key resources, and means of
political organization and control (including the adversary leadership itself).
This includes destruction of targets otherwise invulnerable to conventional
attack, e.g., hard and deeply buried facilities, “location uncertainty” targets,
etc. Nuclear weapons reduce adversary decision-makers’ confidence in their
ability to control wartime escalation.”
[18]
We believe that maintenance of a nuclear arsenal for another hundred years, whether
in the form of existing or “new” weapons, by the only country that has so far used
nuclear weapons, is “unreasonable,” unacceptable, and unlawful. It is long past time
for us to break out of the confines of clever technical arguments against the “need”
for replacement warheads, and instead to demand the only reasonable alternative,
nuclear abolition. The United States, in compliance with its obligation under the NPT,
should commit to the elimination of nuclear weapons no later than 2030, by initiating
negotiations leading to conclusion of a verifiable treaty, under strict and effective
international control.
References
1. Statement by the President, Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, The White House, Office of
the Press Secretary, August 11, 1995.
2
U.S. Department of Energy, Strategic Plan, October 2, 2006, p. 6;
http://www.doe.gov/media/2006_DOE_Strategic_Plan.pdf
3. Design Selected for Reliable Replacement Warhead, National Nuclear Security
Administration, Official Press Release, March 2, 2007, http://www.nnsa.doe.gov/docs/
newsreleases/2007/PR_2007-03-02_NA-07-06.htm
4. NNSA Pursuing Second RRW Design ‘Concept,’ by George Lobsenz, Defense Daily,
February 12, 2007
Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention
155
Section 3
5. Pentagon Envisions New Warheads for New Delivery Systems, Andrew Lichterman, July
27, 2006,
http://disarmamentactivist.org/2006/07/27/pentagon-envisions-new-warheads-for-new-
delivery-systems/
6. Statement of Thomas P. D’Agostino, Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs,
National Nuclear Security Administration Before the House Armed Services Committee
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, April 5, 2006, p. 9, http://www.nnsa.doe.gov/docs/
congressional/2006/2006-04-05_HASC_Transformation_Hearing_Statement_(DAgostino).
pdf
7. National Nuclear Security Administration, Future of the Nuclear Weapons Complex,
http://www.nnsa.doe.gov/future_of_the_nuclear_weapons_complex.htm
8. Id
9. NNSA Factsheet, NNSA’s Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) Program; Modernizing
the Nuclear Weapons Complex Today To Make It More Responsive to the Challenges of
Tomorrow, http://www.nnsa.doe.gov/docs/factsheets/2006/NA-06_FS03.pdf
10. Ambassador Linton F. Brooks, Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration
Speech to the East Tennessee Economic Council March 3, 2006, p. 4, http://www.nnsa.doe.
gov/docs/speeches/2006/speech_Brooks_East-Tenn-Economic-Council-
11. NNSA press release, NNSA Establishes New Office to Lead Future of Nuclear Weapons
Complex, June 28,2006,
http://www.nnsa.doe.gov/docs/newsreleases/2006/PR_2006-06-28_NA-06-20.htm
12. The Stockpile Life Extension Program extends the lifetime of existing nuclear weapons
by identifying and correcting potential technical issues and refurbishing and replacing
certain components within each weapon. The Life Extension program can also give
existing weapons new or enhanced military capabilities. For example, under this program
the W76 warhead missile is being given a capacity to destroy “hard targets” with a “ground
burst” by modifying a sub-system in its reentry vehicle. The W76 is also the first warhead
being redesigned under the Reliable Replacement Warhead Program, with the intention of
manufacturing entirely new warheads.
13. See U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration, Notice
of Intent To Prepare a Supplement to the Stockpile Stewardship and Management
Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement—Complex 2030, Federal Register Vol. 71,
No. 202 October 19, 2006, 61731
14. Ian Hoffman, Report: Nukes not so rusty, New information on plutonium’s lifespan
undermines Bush’s plan, Oakland Tribune, November 29, 2006, http://www.insidebayarea.
com/search/ci_4738283
15. See, for example, H. Josef Hebert, Associated Press Writer, Study: Warhead plutonium
long-lasting, November 29, 2006, http://p107.news.scd.yahoo.com/s/ap/20061130/ap_on_
sc/plutonium_weapons
16. Ian Hoffman, Report: Nukes not so rusty, New information on plutonium’s lifespan
undermines Bush’s plan, Oakland Tribune, November 29, 2006, http://www.insidebayarea.
com/search/ci_4738283
17. NNSA News, Nuclear Weapons Officials Agree to Pursue RRW Strategy, December 1,
2006, http://www.nnsa.doe.gov/docs/newsreleases/2006/PR_2006-12-01_NA-06-47.pdf
18. Final Draft, Deterrent Operations Joint Operating Concept, Department of Defense,
United States of America, Version 2.0, August 2006, pp. 39-40,
http://www.dtic.mil/futurejointwarfare/concepts/do_joc_v20.doc
156
Section
Verification
4
Part of a Pershing II missile being destroyed.
Under the 1987 INF Treaty, more than 200 of these
missiles were retired and destroyed.
Photo: US Army.
158
Nuclear burst detection
satellite sensor system.
Photo: Cooperative
Monitoring Centre
1. Principles and Demands of Verification
A Nuclear Weapons Convention will only be effective if it
can be adequately verified, both in political and technical terms.
1
Verification is the process of establishing whether States parties
are complying with their obligations under an arms control or
disarmament agreement. Verification has several functions:
“First, it allows the parties to assess an agreement’s state
of implementation. By establishing how each party is fulfilling
its obligations, verification gives a good indication about the
functioning of the agreement. Second, it discourages non-
compliance with agreement provisions. Because parties know
that breeches of obligations carry the risk of detection, they
should be less inclined to attempt to renege secretly on their
commitments. Third, verification can give timely warning of
violation(s) of agreement conditions. In case of non-compliance,
verification can reveal transgressions before these have a
chance to turn alarming. Finally, by checking that obligations
are indeed being honoured, verification helps generate confidence that the agreement
and its verification mechanism are functioning as intended, thereby fostering trust and
confidence between the parties.”
2
These four verification tasks - assessing implementation, discouraging non-
compliance, timely warning, building confidence - are of particular relevance with
regard to a potential Nuclear Weapons Convention. States parties need to implement
the agreed process towards elimination and non-acquisition of nuclear weapons and
allow other States to assess the effectiveness of this process. Since a few nuclear
weapons can make a significant difference, violations of the obligations must be
detected as early as possible and with high likelihood to discourage any State party
from non-compliance due to unacceptable risks from responses of the international
community. While punishment may only be applied in exceptional cases, verification
of an NWC requires and contributes to an unprecedented degree of confidence and
cooperation, which in itself is a value that discourages benefits from acquisition of
nuclear weapons.
The Model NWC strives to prevent the construction of nuclear weapons and puts
the technical barrier for diverting nuclear-weapon-usable material as high as possible,
aiming at the detection and prevention of the illegal acquisition of nuclear weapons
through production or removal of nuclear material from existing stocks. Verification of
an NWC would monitor a wide range of nuclear-weapons objects (nuclear warheads
and components, nuclear materials, equipment, facilities, delivery systems, com-
mand and control) and nuclear-weapons activities (research, development, testing,
production, acquisition, deployment, stockpiling, maintenance, transfer, use, threat of
use, destruction, disposal, and conversion) and their combination. These include, in
particular, dismantlement of nuclear weapons; disposal of nuclear material; conversion
or destruction of certain nuclear facilities; monitoring the location and status of nuclear
weapons, nuclear material, nuclear facilities, delivery systems, and command and
control systems to ensure that they are not used for research, development, testing,
production, transport, deployment or use of nuclear weapons. Other prohibited
activities would include storage, transfer and handling of nuclear weapons and fissile
material. Some of these activities are easy to monitor (such as nuclear explosions),
others require considerable detection efforts (such as finding hidden warheads).
Verification policies of the NWC should be designed to assure early detection
and interpretation of information necessary for preventing prohibited activities or
permitting timely responses to nuclear weapons development, involving a range of
issues
3
Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention
159
Section 4
Perspectives on Nuclear Disarmament Verification
The 1996 Canberra Commission noted, “(b)efore states agree to eliminate nuclear
weapons they will require a high level of confidence that verification arrangements
would detect promptly any attempt to cheat the disarmament process.” (Executive
Summary) According to the 1998 CISAC report of the U.S. National Academy of
Sciences complete nuclear disarmament will, “require continued evolution of the
international system toward collective action, transparency, and the rule of law; a
comprehensive system of verification, which itself will require an unprecedented degree
of cooperation and transparency; and safeguards to protect against the possibility of
cheating or rapid breakout.” On the other hand, “even the most effective verification
system that can be envisioned would not produce complete confidence that a small
number of nuclear weapons had not been hidden or fabricated in secret. More
fundamentally, the knowledge of how to build nuclear weapons cannot be erased from
the human mind. Even if every nuclear warhead were destroyed, the current nuclear
weapons states, and a growing number of other technologically advanced states,
would be able to build nuclear weapons within a few months or few years of a national
decision to do so.”
4
The stakes are high: “The verification and compliance regime for a nuclear-weapon-
free world will need to be more effective than any disarmament arrangement hitherto
envisaged. One hundred per cent verification of compliance with any international
arms agreement is highly improbable. In the case of nuclear disarmament, however, the
security stakes will be so high that states will not agree to disarm and disavow future
acquisition of nuclear weapons unless verification reduces to a minimum the risk of
non-compliance.”
5
However, these fundamental restrictions do not generally exclude verifiability of
comprehensive disarmament, as Steve Fetter points out: “Although no verification
regime could provide absolute assurance that former nuclear-weapon states had not
hidden a small number of nuclear weapons or enough nuclear material to build a
small stockpile, verification could be good enough to reduce remaining uncertainties
to a level that might be tolerable in a more transparent and trusting international
environment. And although the possibility of rapid break-out will be ever present in
modern industrial society, verification could provide the steady reassurance that would
be necessary to dissipate residual fears of cheating.”
6
This indicates the link between the verifiability of the NWC and its security
environment. Accordingly, the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission notes in
its 2006 report:
7
“One state’s non-compliance with its obligations under a treaty on
arms control or disarmament may fundamentally and negatively affect the security of
others. A bilateral treaty may simply be abrogated. In a global context, this may lead
to collective reactions. Conversely, continued compliance with such treaty obligations
impacts positively on security. In both cases, credible verification to establish
compliance or non-compliance is of major importance.”
A viable regime should assure states at the very outset that participation provides a
better guarantee of security than maintaining the nuclear option. A guiding principle
should be the search for a regime sufficiently restrictive to ensure the highest level
of confidence in compliance, but also sufficiently permissive to allow states to join
without jeopardizing their legitimate security interests and commercial activities
Requirements and Guiding Principles
To discuss the possible options and means for the verification of an NWC, it is
useful to refer to some established general principles of adequate verification:
1. International law and its verification should enhance international security and
160
stability and avoid the risks of an unrestrained situation that could lead to arms
races or war;
2. Verification is a comprehensive iterative process, with political, legal,
diplomatic, economic, technical and military dimensions, for judging
compliance with international law, containing the risk of cheating and
increasing time for adequate response;
3. The verification process balances between those provisions that are to be
verified (which degree of verification is tolerable) and those activities that can
be verified (which degree of verification is feasible);
4. The demands, requirements and costs of verification are to be adapted to the
relevance of specific treaty provisions and the associated risk of cheating,
comparing the benefits and costs of additional verification measures;
5. Because existing verification means are not perfect, the residual risk needs
to be reduced to tolerable levels by adequate responses, offsetting eventual
military threats by and advantages for non-compliance.
Thus, the verifiability of a treaty is not an absolute issue, but a matter of degree
depending on political assumptions and requirements as well as the available resources
and capabilities for verification, which are not only technical. Most crucial is the
question of “tolerable” degrees of verifiability and their associated residual risks.
For the early Reagan Administration, for instance, nothing short of 100 percent
certainty that the Soviets were not cheating was tolerable. Since this was an impossible
standard to achieve with limited verification efforts, the requirement prevented progress
on disarmament. With Gorbachev, however, confidence and trust increased between
the superpowers, and finally even Reagan accepted much lower verification standards
in order to conclude the INF and START treaties. More verification was seen as too
costly, and the residual risks were accepted because the potential security implications
were perceived as manageable. It is remarkable to compare this with the [...] turn under
the Bush Administration, which refused any verification provisions under the Moscow
Treaty with Russia, failing to assert its demand for verification. Therefore, the nuclear
disarmament process of the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty SORT remains
undefined and does not build an infrastructure to implement and measure its success.
Between friendly nations, usually lower standards of verification are tolerable
because the incentive for and probability of cheating are perceived as negligible.
As long as there is a gap between verification demands and capabilities, either the
capabilities must be improved, depending on the available means and resources, or
the political requirements must be reduced to achieve the desired security gains by
the treaty within the given resource limits. Thus, the verification process assesses the
difference between the desired situation and the actual situation, and tracks the agreed
path connecting both.
If the actual path diverts from the agreed path more than is tolerable, then the
verification system should provide a timely alarm. Thus the following questions are to
be considered for the verification process:
• Which agreed states, items and activities should be achieved, limited
or prohibited during given periods with confidence and certainty (what are the
requirements/tasks of verification)?
• Which verification means could be applied to monitor actual states and
activities (what are the means of verification)?
• Can an intolerable deviation from agreed states, items and activities be
detected in time with reasonable verification efforts (what are the benefits,
costs and risks of verification)?
The requirements and tasks of verification are defined by the provisions of the NWC,
specified by the definitions, and the agreed timeframe of their realization. The tasks of
verifying these obligations can be divided into the following three main stages:
Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention
161
Section 4
1. Baseline information exchange and data gathering: Identify the
current status of the nuclear-weapons complex with reasonable accuracy
without proliferating sensitive information.
2. Disarmament: Monitor the agreed path of reducing nuclear arms and
eliminating the nuclear-weapons complex within tolerable limits of uncertainty
and sufficient confidence.
3. Prevent rearmament: During the transformation to a nuclear-weapon-free
world, and after it has been achieved, observe any objects and detect any
activities that might indicate a nuclear-weapons capability.
The NWC needs to foresee a number of provisions that help to create the necessary
confidence that the elimination of nuclear weapons is complete and will not be
reversed. Verification of the following obligations is crucial:
8
1. No nuclear weapons or relevant nuclear materials may be held back and
hidden in the current nuclear weapons states.
The existing arsenals of nuclear
weapons need to be disarmed completely. No single nuclear warhead and no significant
quantity of nuclear-weapons-usable material may be retained. The process also needs
to avoid a hidden inertia of the whole nuclear weapons production system.
Verifying the dismantlement and destruction of remaining declared weapons,
production and maintenance facilities is the easiest task of the verification system.
9
The locations are known and the state of the facilities can be checked by on-site
inspections. From the outset, member states would give a detailed inventory of their
remaining weapons and weapons-grade fissionable materials. Affixed with a unique
tamper-proof tag and seal, these would be stored in sealed containers and stored at
secure locations, well away from potential delivery systems.
Warhead pits would be
removed to internationally monitored storage facilities to await final disposition.
10
2. Nuclear weapons need to be “disinvented” to the degree achievable.
The whole infrastructure of the now existing nuclear weapons complex has to be
dismantled. No research for or testing of nuclear weapons should be conducted. The
knowledge of nuclear weapons experts should not be intentionally maintained, in
particular the important specialized personal knowledge directly related to the design of
weapons. Through these means, the threshold against reinvention of nuclear weapons
can be significantly increased. Dual-use science and technology which is perceived as
too important for civilian purposes to be banned needs to be controlled.
3. A break-out of the ban to develop or manufacture nuclear weapons needs to
be prevented and detected.
In any country that conducts nuclear power or nuclear
research programs, the diversion of nuclear materials for nuclear weapon purposes
needs to be prohibited and any related activity needs to be detected in time. Nuclear-
weapon-useable materials should neither be produced for weapon purposes nor
removed from existing stocks. Step-by-step, existing stocks have to be reduced down
to zero. While old facilities are subject to monitoring and inspection, new production
may occur at remote locations and at new, specially designed underground facilities
that may be rather small and easy to hide. The risks of these activities can be reduced
and the costs increased by a combination of remote monitoring from air and space,
environmental sampling, and on-site inspections without a complete guarantee to detect
such violations.
4. No intention to acquire nuclear weapons should remain or have a reason
to reemerge.
The international security system needs to provide clear evidence
that nuclear weapons are inherently negative, and create incentives that make the
possession of nuclear weapons undesirable.
It is essential that compliance with these obligations can be sufficiently verified
and universally and indefinitely enforced. Verification can significantly reduce the
likelihood of breakout through a combination of deterrence and enhanced warning, but
cannot completely assure that a small clandestine nuclear arsenal or hidden cache of
plutonium will be discovered.
162
Pedestrian portal monitors
at the Siberian Group
of Chemical Enterprises
Enrichment Plant.
Photo: Department of
Energy
Iterative Verification Process
Verification is not a static one-time activity of monitoring that
applies the above-mentioned means, but a dynamic, iterative process
with four distinct phases of declaration, monitoring, inspection and
enforcement being repeated successively and in parallel:
1. Declaration and registration provide the necessary
information of the initial situation as a starting point for verification
to allow comparison with future changes, either agreed or
prohibited. All treaty-limited items are tagged, identified and
registered
, using advanced identification techniques (fingerprinting)
without revealing sensitive design information.
2. Monitoring
aims at detecting prohibited objects or activities.
Continuous monitoring requires information gathering over periods
of time. Remote sensors on satellites and aircraft provide monitoring
of large areas to detect larger objects, in particular transport vehicles
and buildings. The problem is to identify treaty-limited items
among the vast number of existing civilian and military objects.
However, regular cartographic mapping provides a basis [...]
to detect irregularities/inconsistencies between official mapping
information and actual remote sensing data.
3. Inspection: As soon as a suspicion of a treaty violation is
raised, the inspection mechanism is applied to check whether it is justified or not.
During visits to facilities, the inspectors could request all the necessary detailed
information from the inspected party, including the opening of rooms, access to
computer codes and interviews with personnel and neighbors. In addition, a wide
range of non-destructive on-site monitoring devices at entrance/exit ports or along the
perimeter of critical facilities (portal/perimeter controls) could be applied to understand
the structure and function of equipment. Cooperation and consultation within the
international agency could help in gaining and proving the information.
4. Negotiation, prevention and enforcement: If sufficient information has been
gathered to indicate a treaty violation, negotiation and enforcement mechanisms could
apply. The first step would be to demand that the suspected violator ends the prohibited
activities or enters the destruction and conversion of prohibited objects. If the object or
activity of concern is to be excluded from nuclear weapons use, additional preventive
control measures are applied. If the suspected violator refuses any of these measures,
a negotiation process is started, during which the motivations of the violator and the
possible coordinated actions of the international community are explained. It would
be important to leave the violator the option of a face-saving exit as early as possible.
Ideally, enforcement measures should be preventive and minimally intrusive.
In the past, the iteration process has been incomplete. Neither remote monitoring and
challenge inspections nor prevention and enforcement were adequate or possible under
the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); the global
spread of nuclear energy has made diversion for military purposes too easy. This
explains the limited effectiveness of safeguards (see more in the following sections).
Monitoring without inspection or enforcement can raise suspicions but not prove or
prevent them. Therefore, more emphasis should be given to integrated mechanisms
realizing all four tasks.
Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention
163
Section 4
2. Political Mechanisms of Verification:
Building on Existing Regimes
Political verification of an NWC will have organizational and societal requirements.
Organizational means of verification include state, regional and international
bodies as well as national legislation and bi- or multi-lateral arrangements. Societal
verification means large-scale governmental and non-governmental participation in the
implementation of an NWC. Such participation would be sought through affirmative
obligations to report non-compliance and provide guarantees of protection for suppliers
of information.
Each of the following examples has relevance to the functions and the forms of
authority necessary for nuclear disarmament:
11
1. CWC: The Chemical Weapons Convention establishes a comprehensive
framework for elimination of an entire class of weapons to be implemented through the
Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). It proposes, among
other measures, a system for on-site inspections unprecedented in its intrusiveness.
How successful this system is considered to be in promoting compliance and
confidence will be instructive in considering the degree and type of intrusiveness to
build into an NWC.
2. CTBT: The verification provisions of the CTBT suggest a system for
gathering and processing information. The International Monitoring System under
the supervision of the Technical Secretariat includes facilities for seismological,
radionuclide, hydro-acoustic and infrasound monitoring. The Technical Secretariat
is to store and process information through its International Data Centre on behalf
of States Parties. Application of this model to an NWC would require, for example,
review of the provisions for data receipt and initiation of requests for data to adjust
for the security and transparency considerations particular to the nuclear weapons
infrastructure.
3. INF/START: The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (START) and Intermediate-
range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaties provide positive examples of bilateral verification
procedures for nuclear disarmament. They shed light on the role of confidence-
building and the ability to adjust for confidentiality concerns. The verification
provisions of these treaties apply to delivery vehicles rather than warheads. New
guidelines for verification of warhead dismantlement, removal of warheads from
deployment and de-alerting would be necessary as next steps. A salient question in
this context is the expansion of bilateral to multilateral procedures. This process must
balance considerations of security, transparency, and confidentiality.
12
Several studies
have explored the verification of deep reductions in nuclear arsenals and the special
requirements of elimination of nuclear weapons. One proposal for a “verification
scheme for deep cuts” would begin bilaterally, incorporating the other nuclear weapon
states (NWS) through transparency and confidence-building measures, leading
to proportional or gradual reductions down to very low levels, in order to lay the
foundation for eliminating nuclear weapons.
13
4. IAEA: In order to detect illegal activities, the NPT foresees nuclear safeguards
on special nuclear materials to verify compliance. The IAEA safeguards regime is the
primary model for accountancy, containment and surveillance of nuclear material.
The officially declared intention of these safeguards is not to prevent diversion of
such materials. The IAEA insists on not having a police function but only the role
of inspection. The purpose of nuclear safeguards is the timely detection of diversion
after it has happened. The detection should be made early enough to allow for political
reactions aimed at stopping the proliferating country before a bomb is manufactured
from the diverted material. However, the dual function of the IAEA—timely detection
164
of diversion and promotion of “peaceful” uses—makes its direct application to a
disarmament regime problematic. Because of unavoidable measurement uncertainties,
loss of material within facilities and lax practice, the IAEA safeguards material-
accounting system cannot with confidence detect the diversion of weapons size
quantities of nuclear material sufficient for the manufacture of dozens of weapons
(the limits became obvious in the case of Iraq). The task of differentiating between
military and civilian applications of nuclear material--widely though not unanimously
recognized as a primary source of IAEA shortcomings--will become more difficult if
reliance on nuclear energy increases. Some of the changes proposed in the IAEA 93+2
Programme and Additional Protocol reflect strategies and policies aimed at improving
the conditions for safeguarding.
14
Effectiveness of Nuclear Safeguards
Safeguards in Nuclear Weapons States (NWS) are virtually non-existent, and the
IAEA does not have the mandate it needs to effectively prevent proliferation. Current
timely detection goals are faulty, and do not take into consideration the enhanced
nature of the technical means to turn fissile materials speedily into weapons. The fact
that the nuclear weapon states are only subject to selective voluntary scrutiny has
made it easier for them to share nuclear materials and designs; several have been guilty
of this practice. IAEA safeguards are currently not extended to apply fully to mined
uranium ores, refined uranium oxides, uranium hexafluoride and uranium conversion
facilities, prior to the stages of enrichment or fuel fabrication.
14a
One severe criticism of the current nuclear safeguards system is that it cannot even
achieve the limited goal of detection. At any large bulk handling facility, large amounts
of material unaccounted for (MUF) will inevitably occur. This problem is exemplified
drastically with the publication of the US plutonium inventory for the first 50 years of
its nuclear program.
15
While there is a current stockpile of about 100 tons of plutonium,
the amount of not less than 2.8 tons of plutonium is unaccounted for. This is enough
material for hundreds or even a thousand nuclear weapons. This raises a big concern;
Will we ever have the chance to gain enough confidence that no nuclear-weapons-
usable material is diverted by any country that possesses large amounts of such
materials?
Another severe criticism of nuclear safeguards is that clandestine nuclear weapons
programs are very difficult to detect. The experiences with clandestine nuclear weapons
programs in Iraq and other countries call for very strong and efficient verification
as long as nuclear installations with significant amounts of nuclear-weapons-
usable materials exist. The 93+2 Programme of the IAEA resulted in a number of
improvements that strengthen the effectiveness and improve the efficiency of the
nuclear safeguards system. However, the MUF-problem is not even tackled by these
measures and there will still remain deficiencies with other detection problems.
The question of capabilities and limits of technical verification depends on the
degree of political demands. The main purposes of nuclear safeguards on special
nuclear materials are timely detection of and deterrence against diversions of
significant quantities of these materials, i.e. they are not designed to prevent diversion
of such materials, but to deter from diversion by the risk of detection. Diversion
remains a technical possibility. With respect to a nuclear-weapon-free world such a
political goal may change. The demand may be posed that compliance with treaty
obligations is not only verified with a high probability of detection but also rendered
impossible especially through a strict reduction of the availability and accessibility of
nuclear-weapon-usable materials.
The experience of the IAEA in verifying South Africa’s nuclear inventory and
the termination of its weapons program is significant for developing and evaluating
the framework for verification of complete nuclear disarmament within the NWC.
Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention
165
Section 4
By comparing calculations with physical inventory measurements, apparent
discrepancies indicated that an amount of enriched uranium-235 was unaccounted
for. Though extensive examinations were able to significantly reduce the magnitude
of these apparent discrepancies, the IAEA had to conclude that the assessment of the
completeness of South Africa’s inventory of nuclear materials was not free from uncer-
tainty. Nevertheless, the international community was satisfied with the result of the
investigations, which led to the conclusion that there were no indications that the initial
inventory was incomplete or that the nuclear weapon program was not completely
terminated. This positive conclusion is only possible because of the openness for trans-
parency and the cooperation of the South African authorities with respect to access to
information and past and future locations that allowed for further IAEA investigation.
The experiences with clandestine nuclear weapons programs in Iraq and other
countries call for very strong and efficient verification as long as nuclear installations
using, producing or storing significant amounts of nuclear-weapons-usable materials
exist. Activities to strengthen the current regime include the following:
16
1. Despite the improvements of the 93+2 programme, which strengthen the
effectiveness and improve the efficiency of the nuclear safeguards system, there are
still deficiencies. In 1997, the IAEA introduced the Model Additional Safeguards
Protocol
17
with expanded safeguards authorities and activities. Not much has been
achieved so far in providing the IAEA with technical means to detect clandestine
activities from a distance. Satellite imagery is used mainly for investigations on
known facilities
18
and is not capable of providing a proof for clandestine plutonium
production; environmental sampling is restricted to the locations that are routinely
visited by inspectors anyway. Adopting and fully implementing the Additional
Protocol increases the verification powers of the IAEA and expands transparency and
verifiability for the whole civilian nuclear fuel cycle. It allows the IAEA to redirect
saved verification resources towards states of greater concern.
2. UN Security Council resolution 1540 of April 2004 has made it mandatory for all
states, including the three non-NPT parties, India, Israel and Pakistan, to adopt national
implementation measures for all types of weapons of mass destruction to prevent non-
state actors from acquiring or proliferating such weapons, either on its territory or
elsewhere.
3. The Trilateral Agreement, negotiated 1996 to 2002 between Russia, the US and
the IAEA, seeks to involve the Agency in verifying disposal of excess fissionable
material and could give it a role in a multilateral global nuclear disarmament process.
The agreement’s implementation has been hampered by the fact that no material has
been offered by the US and Russia for the purpose; there is disagreement over the
period and costs of IAEA monitoring.
4. The IAEA Board of Governors has established a Special Committee on
Safeguards and Verification to examine further improvements, but it has moved slowly.
For instance, the examination of environmental and other samples from Iran has not
been as speedy as it might have been. More funding is required to conduct research in
advanced nuclear verification techniques.
A breakthrough was expected since the mid-1990s on a fissile cut-off agreement,
which has been prevented by the stalemate in the Conference on Disarmament in
Geneva.
19
Further progress is urgently needed as nuclear weapons development does
not stand still. Laboratory testing, laser enrichment and computer simulation reduce the
possibilities of driving back the knowledge about nuclear weapons development. With
improved simulation technology, highly undesirable developments are possible that
obstruct the goal of a nuclear weapons free world. At the end of an era of comparably
primitive trial and error, a scientific revolution is now being initiated, which is
supposed to deepen the theoretical understanding of nuclear weapons. Rather than
deliberate and systematic conservation of knowledge about nuclear weapons, transition
166
to a nuclear-weapon-free-world would require retiring nuclear weapons scientists and
testers to not transfer their expertise to future generations. Otherwise, it will be more
difficult to “disinvent” sophisticated designs of nuclear weapons.
In a nuclear-weapon-free world not all use of nuclear materials may be banned. To
prevent the diversion of nuclear materials for weapons development through the whole
nuclear fuel cycle, from uranium mining and milling to disposition, nuclear safeguards
would be needed. These would cover all nuclear materials in reactors, stockpiles or
extracted from dismantled weapons, including those of the nuclear weapon states, to
ensure that all sources of new fissionable material are accounted for. Consequently,
the safeguards system would cover a considerably higher amount of material and a
larger number of facilities than today. Completely banning weapons-usable materials
would significantly facilitate the verification task. Allowing the use of HEU in naval
propulsion would require special safeguards arrangements. Other ways in which
safeguards would have to be further strengthened include increasing the intrusiveness
of inspections, lowering the quantities and increasing the types of nuclear materials
requiring declaration and inspection, and boosting the intelligence and data-handling
capacities of the international verification organisation.
20
A critical issue is the “significant quantity” of weapons-usable material required for
nuclear weapons production. To provide greater assurance, the current standard (8 kg of
plutonium, 25kg of HEU) would have to be lowered and other nuclear materials identi-
fied as weapons-usable to be included. 3-4 kilograms of weapons grade plutonium is
commonly used for a nuclear warhead and, depending on the sophistication of weapons
design, even significantly smaller quantities may suffice. Another issue is to lower
the current standard for ‘timely detection’ from months to weeks which would better
address the risk of rapid diversion from former nuclear weapon states.
21
Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention
167
Section 4
3. Means and Procedures for NWC Verification
Initially states rely predominantly on their national technical means (NTM) of
verification and monitoring capabilities, including satellite monitoring, information
gathering and espionage. In the process of moving towards a nuclear-weapon-free
world a strong multilateral system of data collection and analysis capabilities needs
to be established that complements or replaces national capabilities. All measures
combined will
reduce the risks and increase the costs of illicit activities to an actual or
potential violator even though they may not completely guarantee the detection of such
violations.
While the Model NWC bases many of its verification procedures on those employed
in other treaties, new approaches are required. Remote and wide-area monitoring is
a vital element of the verification regime as soon as the relevant production facilities
are shut down and dismantled, especially if only a few sites remain to be inspected
and efforts are more concentrated on detecting clandestine facilities and activities.
Technical verification means and processes have been continuously improving. Remote
sensing from aircraft and satellites provides high-resolution images over large areas
in short time. On-site inspections have to search for hidden warheads and related
materials and to verify the shut-down of declared facilities. Challenge inspections are
necessary to search for clandestine activities. To survey sensitive installations and
activities, inspection authorities can make use of new cost-effective techniques without
frequent intrusive visits. The inspections in Iraq stimulated the introduction of new
methods such as environmental monitoring
to detect releases around nuclear-related
facilities
and ground-penetrating radar.
22
For example, atmospheric concentrations
of krypton-85 can be used to get indications for clandestine plutonium separation
from some distance.
23
Authentication and fingerprinting techniques are based on the
measurement of radiation emissions and other characteristic signatures.
24
To assure that the main obligations are adequately monitored and violations detected
within tolerable limits of deviation, a variety of verification means and procedures can
be applied, as listed in the following box. Some technical possibilities are principally
available; others require additional research and development.
To address the technical challenges in verifying nuclear dismantlement, research,
development and cooperation needs to be intensified on innovative techniques to
monitor declared and detect undeclared weapons, facilities and materials. Most of the
research in this area has been done in the US and the UK who have shared information
on the results.
25
In particular, the Atomic Weapons Establishment at Aldermaston has
concluded a five-year program to study the dismantling of their Chevaline warheads to
identify potential methodologies for a future nuclear disarmament verification regime.
In 2005 the US National Academy of Sciences’ Committee on International Security
and Arms Control (CISAC) published a comprehensive assessment of methods for
monitoring nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive materials in a disarming world.
The Committee concluded:
26
“Current and foreseeable technological capabilities
exist to support verification at declared sites, based on transparency and monitoring,
for declared stocks of all categories of nuclear weapons—strategic and nonstrategic,
deployed and nondeployed—as well as for the nuclear-explosive components and
materials that are their essential ingredients.”
An effective NWC requires specific verification mechanisms that can discover
clandestine nuclear-weapons-related activities with sufficient certainty, thereby
increasing transparency and confidence in the whole nuclear disarmament process. In
order to verify compliance with the NWC, a verification regime would be established
with all the verification means and procedures explicitly needed to assure the
verification of the NWC. The Model NWC seeks to lay out a verification regime to
assure states that participating in this regime provides a better guarantee of security
than maintaining the nuclear option.
168
The box opposite gives four categories of different readiness of verification tech-
nologies and provides a few examples for each of these categories. From this, it be-
comes apparent that most verification technologies required or proposed by the Model
NWC are already implemented in existing treaties within the nuclear disarmament and
non-proliferation regime. Some others are established in other international regimes
and can be adopted for an NWC. In addition, there are further technological means
which are already developed or demonstrated, but which are not yet implemented
in any international control regime. Only very few verification technologies which
may be helpful or necessary to verify an NWC are not yet developed or proven to
work sufficiently. However, it has to be noted that most technologies have inherent
deficiencies and need to be evaluated on a critical basis. That a variety of technical
means for the verification of an NWC already exist does not imply that these means are
covering satisfactorily all verification demands.
Verification Means and Procedures
1. Monitoring technologies
- Remote sensors in the visible, infra-red or radar spectra, based on satellites, aircraft or
on ground-based systems
- Signal and electronic reconnaissance
- Seimological, radionuclide, hydroacoustic and infrasound monitoring
- On-site sensors for non-destructive measurement, e.g. for portal perimeter monitoring:
measurement of weight, length, acoustics, light (UV, infrared, visible), electrical and
magnetic fields; passive radiation measurement, active radiation (x-ray, gamma ray, beta
particles, protons, neutrons)
2. Cooperative procedures for information exchange, inspections and safety controls
- Nuclear archaeology and forensics
- Initial declarations and data exchange
- Identification and item counting of objects (tagging, fingerprinting, registration)
- Confidence-building measures
- Joint overflights (Open Skies)
- Accountancy, control and surveillance
- Safety Controls at nuclear facilities
- Baseline and routine inspections
- Challenge inspections of suspected facilities (anytime-anywhere)
- Personal observation of destruction and suspected activities
3. Institutional verification
- International Agency for Verification
- Cooperative fact finding on compliance
- Consultation
- Dispute settlement
4. Societal verification
- Open sources, scientific knowledge
- Espionage
- Citizen reporting and protection, whistle-blowing
Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention
169
Section 4
1. Technologies which are already implemented in existing treaties within the
nuclear disarmament and verification regime
• Nuclear material accountancy, limited by Materials Unaccounted For (NPT)
• Containment and surveillance of nuclear materials (NPT)
• Identification and item counting of objects by tagging, fingerprinting, registration
(NPT and others)
• Personal observation of suspected activities and destruction (NPT, INF, START)
• Remote sensors in the visible spectrum based on satellites (INF, START)
• On-site sensors for non-destructive characterisation of containers and transport
vessels, e.g. for portal perimeter monitoring; measurement of weight, length (INF,
START)
• Seismological, radionuclide, hydro-acoustic and infrasound monitoring (CTBT)
• Challenge inspections of suspected facilities without any restrictions, i.e. anytime
and anywhere, limited by political acceptability and costs (UNSCOM)
2. Technical approaches which are established in other international regimes
and can be adopted for the NWC
• Preventive controls at nuclear facilities (Convention on Physical Protection )
• Joint overflights with remote sensors in the visible spectrum (Open Skies)
• Managed access (CWC)
3. Technical means which are already developed or demonstrated, but not yet
implemented in any international control regime
• Accounting, surveillance and containment of nuclear warheads, limited by access
• Verification of dismantling of nuclear warheads, limited by the interest to protect
sensitive design information
• Remote sensors in the infra-red or radar spectra based on satellites, aircraft or on
the ground
• Passive radiation measurement, active irradiation using x-ray, gamma ray, beta
particles, protons or neutrons, limited by free mean path depending on shielding of
nuclear radiation (e.g. Black Sea experiment for the detection of hidden warheads)
4. Technological options which need further research, development or
demonstration of their capabilities and limits, before they can be adopted for
the NWC
• Wide area radionuclide monitoring to detect uranium enrichment or plutonium
separation (e.g. krypton-85)
• Nuclear archaeology to reconstruct the working history of production reactors
Availability of Verification Technologies
27
170
4. Elements of NWC Verification
Some of the potential verification elements of the NWC are discussed in the
following.
Registry and International Monitoring System
The Registry would maintain a list of all nuclear warheads, delivery vehicles,
facilities, and materials subject to verification. The International Monitoring System
enables the Agency to gather information necessary for the verification of the NWC
and would comprise facilities and systems for monitoring by satellite, fixed on-site
sensors, remote sensors, radionuclide sampling, means of communication and other
systems. Information generated by equipment owned or controlled by member States
would be shared through agreements with the Agency. Required are agreements
on sharing data and verification activities with existing agencies, including those
responsible for implementation of other treaties regarding nuclear disarmament.
Methods of nuclear archaeology are important to reconstruct the past production
history by investigating traces which are characteristic for the relevant past activities at
production facilities and by doing model calculations.
28
On-site inspections and techniques
A challenge inspection system will be important to conduct on-site inspections,
which may require an even more intrusive system than that of the Organization for the
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) under the 1993 Chemical Weapons Conven-
tion (CWC).
This would include both systematic, baseline inspections and challenge
inspections (anytime-anyplace) of declared and undeclared facilities, utilizing a
range of techniques, including visual inspection, record checks and non-destructive
measurement (e.g., with portable x-ray and gamma-ray detectors). This could be
assisted by identification techniques, such as tagging, tamper-indicating seals in nuclear
power plants and “fingerprinting” of delivery systems. Perimeter portal monitoring
systems would track the flow of items and materials relevant for nuclear weapons.
Preventive controls and nuclear energy
28
Due to unavoidable measurement uncertainties, loss of material within facilities
and lax practice. As mentioned before, [ ... ] IAEA safeguards material-accounting
system cannot with confidence detect the diversion of weapons size quantities of
nuclear material sufficient for the manufacture of dozens of weapons, either by illegally
producing nuclear materials, or by illegally removing nuclear material from existing
stocks. The Model NWC strives to prevent the construction of nuclear weapons
and puts the technical barrier for diverting nuclear-weapon-usable material as high
as possible. Effective prevention would not be possible as long as weapons-usable
nuclear material is available and can be diverted for use in nuclear weapons at any
time. The above-mentioned problem of MUF leads to the conclusion that not only
prevention but also the verification of the NWC would be very much facilitated by
a significant reduction of the accessibility of nuclear-weapons-usable materials and
production technology.
Therefore, the Model NWC demands the reduction of inventories as well as the
reproducibility of nuclear-weapon-usable materials to the lowest possible level
30
and proposes preventive controls on nuclear-weapons-usable material to guard
against breakout of the ban to manufacture nuclear weapons. Preventive controls are
Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention
171
Section 4
broader than IAEA safeguards, which are primarily intended to deter diversion of
nuclear materials through detection of such diversion once it has taken place. The
measures proposed in the Model NWC would concentrate on prevention of diversion
through physical protection and restricted physical access to special nuclear material
(containment and surveillance), increasing the risk and the cost for cheating and
minimizing the risk for the international community. Preventive controls may include
the establishment of procedures for transport, treatment, storage and disposition of such
materials. By banning the technologies for production of direct use nuclear materials
such as the reprocessing of spent fuel for separation of plutonium and by imposing
other appropriate provisions the available quantities of nuclear-weapons-usable
materials are minimised. The inventories of these materials should be eliminated under
international control as far as possible or converted into a physical form that minimizes
access.
Recognizing the importance of declaring and monitoring all such material, the
verification provisions allow for accountancy to begin even before entry into force
of the Convention. In addition to the requirement that all special nuclear material be
placed under strict, effective and exclusive international control, the NWC proposes
to deal with long-term disposition of the fissile material through an optional protocol
that would recognize disposition as an urgent problem and devote significant resources
to the search for a permanent solution. Preventive controls will be international,
eliminating national access to be eliminated to the extent possible. Nuclear weapons-
usable materials in the civilian sector need to be included into preventive controls. An
important step towards more effectiveness is the 93+2 safeguards agreement signed by
IAEA members in May 1997. It includes expanded declarations, extended possibilities
of inspection and techniques for environmental monitoring.
31
In theory the highest barrier against breakout would be realised in a world without
nuclear energy, which would exclude the infrastructure to produce nuclear weapons
materials and would effectively foreclose any path towards the bomb. The NWC
does not prohibit peaceful uses of nuclear energy, but it offers an optional protocol on
energy assistance for States that choose not to develop or use nuclear energy. However,
it should be pointed out that the abolition of nuclear weapons could be accomplished,
though less easily, even without abolishing nuclear energy. The second best approach
is to restrict the use of those nuclear technologies that have the highest relevance for
nuclear proliferation and in addition to make the remaining special nuclear materials
as inaccessible as possible for any country. Nonetheless, while the NWC verification
measures will improve the existing safeguards system, they will face the same
challenges in a world where reactors make bomb fuel.
Organizational verification and the implementing Agency
To implement the NWC and oversee the nuclear disarmament process, the Model
NWC proposes an International Agency similar but not identical in structure to the
OPCW. Its primary objectives include containment and surveillance of all materials,
equipment, or facilities that could contribute to the development, production, or
maintenance of nuclear weapons. The Agency would encompass and expand on some
of the tasks currently within the mandate of the IAEA, which would be altered to focus
entirely on verifying global disarmament, ceasing to facilitate the nuclear industry. The
Agency in the Model NWC would have the following structure:
• The principal organ of the Agency would be a Conference of all
States Parties, which would meet annually, and for special sessions as
necessary;
• An Executive Council
would be a standing body, to be elected by
the Conference for a certain period. The EC would oversee implementation
and operation of the Convention and
would be responsible for day-to-day
172
decision-making on the operation of the treaty. It would also have the power to
demand clarification from any state party and recommend action in the case of
non-compliance.
Membership would rotate, with attention to equitable regional
distribution and representation by nuclear weapon and nuclear-capable states;
• A Technical Secretariat, headed by a Director-General, would carry
out the tasks of implementation and verification through various mechanisms,
including a Registry and an International Monitoring System. Sources for
such information include declarations and reports by States, systematic and
challenge inspections, information from other agencies (including NGOs),
publicly available sources, national technical means, and the international
monitoring system.
An important component of the institutional process would be the reform of the UN
Security Council, which needs to represent nuclear and non-nuclear great powers to
delegitimise nuclear weapons and devise an effective and fair compliance system.
Transparency, education and confidence- building
The Model NWC makes transparency and education obligatory, in response to the
argument that nuclear weapons technology and knowledge cannot be uninvented.
The idea is to promote scientific responsibility and greater awareness of the link
between nuclear science and weapons development. Scientists can and should be
trained to identify and warn others of potentially prohibited activities. Confidence
building measures (CBMs) and supplying additional information on a voluntary
basis increases confidence in compliance with the Convention. CBMs could include
bilateral agreements on reciprocal monitoring and information sharing between States.
Consultation, cooperation and fact-finding should help to clarify and resolve questions
of interpretation with respect to compliance and other matters. These procedures
would be time-critical to ensure that essential evidence is not lost. Compliance and
enforcement provisions are linked to transparency and confidence-building measures
among States Parties. Dispute settlement provisions include negotiation, mediation
and referral to regional agencies or to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). The
Executive Council or Conference would also have the authority to refer unresolved
disputes to the ICJ for an advisory opinion and to the General Assembly or Security
Council.
All NWS need to contribute to improving the mutual nuclear transparency process.
32
This is a difficult task, partly because of concerns about confidentiality, partly because
of inherent uncertainties and poor bookkeeping from the beginning of the nuclear
era.
Openness about past production of fissionable materials will be particularly
challenging, since it will be virtually impossible for any nuclear weapon state to give
a complete and accurate account.
33
The documentation of past production (nuclear
archaeology) must begin now, while discrepancies are not strategically significant
and potentially destabilising. The sooner transparency can be achieved in relation to
numbers, types and deployments of nuclear weapons, delivery systems and holdings
of special nuclear materials, the earlier and deeper can confidence be established.
Activities could
include exchange visits and cooperative monitoring ventures between
the nuclear weapon possessors.
Societal verification
Beside technical instruments, human information sources are increasingly relevant
for arms control verification. In addition to the governmental tasks in verification, new
possibilities of societal verification are created under the Model NWC which provide
citizens of all states with the right and the obligation to indicate suspected nuclear
weapons activities.
34
Cheap and ready access to information and communication
Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention
173
Section 4
A device that indicates
tampering with a nclear
material container.
Photo: Department of
Energy
technologies increases the possibilities
for NGOs to participate in verification
activities.
Civil society, including non-
governmental organisations (NGOs),
professional bodies and individuals (such
as academics, scientists and engineers),
are involved in monitoring the activities
of governments and if necessary can
‘blow the whistle’.
35
Instructive cases
are Mordechai Vanunu on the Israeli
nuclear arsenal, Kamal Hussein on Iraq’s
biological weapons program and various
Russian defectors and whistle-blowers.
Societal verification would substantially
extend the basis of information and
add to the complexity of violating the treaty. It would also be a contribution to the
protection and creation of democratic rights in all parts of the world.
Organised societal
verification is more feasible in open societies, but even in closed societies it would be
difficult to prevent defectors from leaking critical information.
Questions about the
role and function of societal verification are particularly relevant to the future direction
of nuclear research and development. The model NWC incorporates the concept
of societal verification through individual rights and obligations, including citizen
reporting and protection for whistle-blowers. According to Joseph Rotblat,
“The main form of societal verification is by inducing the citizens of the countries
signing the treaty to report to an appropriate international authority any information
about attempted violation going on in their countries. For this system of verification to
be effective it is vital that all such reporting becomes the right and the civic duty of the
citizen.”
36
Societal verification requires transparency and education. Scientists and nuclear
industry workers should be alerted to the potential links between nuclear science
and nuclear proliferation. This responsibility could be developed through training to
identify activities that are, or border on, prohibited activities. Supplying additional
information on a voluntary basis increases confidence in compliance. By definition, this
approach is not the “Big Brother” model of suspicion and surveillance where citizens
watch each other and the state watches all citizens, as some have suggested. Rather,
societal verification aims for openness and trust in scientific and industrial endeavors.
Indeed, secrecy and mistrust undermine the openness and free flow of ideas necessary
for good science and its productive application.
In addition to the governmental tasks of verification, societal verification would
substantially extend the basis of information and would be a contribution to the
protection and creation of democratic rights in all parts of the world. NGOs could
play an important role in this process. No state that secretly strives for nuclear
weapons can be sure that persons involved in clandestine activities would not transmit
their knowledge for a reward to the international community which then could take
appropriate reactions.
174
5. Security Context and Challenges of
NWC Verification
A precursor of a verification system for nuclear disarmament will be the US and
Russian experience of verifying deep cuts, building on their [ ... ] extensive bilateral
experience in verifying the INF and the START [ ... ]
treaties. Valuable lessons have
already been learned from existing regimes. On-site inspections can be managed in a
way that does not reveal security or commercial proprietary information and some of
the concerns disappear with progressing implementation and experience.
37
Verification
and transparency measures can learn from the cooperative threat reduction programs
between Russia and the US to safely dismantle the former Soviet nuclear complex and
control the fissionable material from dismantled nuclear weapons.
38
Former nuclear
scientists and facilities are employed in the disarmament process to prevent them from
spreading their knowledge. This would also minimize the risk that personnel involved
in verifying nuclear disarmament would acquire additional knowledge of nuclear
weapons and thus contribute, inadvertently or deliberately, to proliferation.
The 2005 National Academies of Science (NAS) report has identified several issues
that are critical for the monitoring of nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive materials
(NEM):
39
• There are some tensions between sharing information about nuclear weapon and
NEM stockpiles and maintaining the security of these stockpiles, but cooperative use of
technologies can substantially alleviate these tensions;
• The characteristics of NEM and nuclear weapons place some fundamental limits
on the capabilities of any system of monitoring and transparency to provide assurance
of compliance. Accordingly, a degree of uncertainty is inescapable;
• The biggest challenge to cooperation-based verification would arise if countries
give the appearance of cooperation while covertly retaining undeclared stockpiles of
nuclear weapons or NEM and/or undertaking clandestine production programs;
• Important transparency measures do not necessarily require formal treaties but
could be undertaken on the basis of informal understandings or unilateral initiatives,
e.g. as part of broader confidence-building efforts;
• There are both liabilities and benefits of incorporating, in the long run, nuclear
transparency and monitoring into formal agreements to address complexity and sustain
measures over time;
• The synergistic effect of the discussed approaches in a cooperative environment,
coupled with robust NTM capabilities, would substantially reduce current uncertainties
over time.
The report also makes clear that in view of the sheer size and age of the Russian
stockpile (where current uncertainties are equivalent of several thousand weapons),
“Russia probably could conceal undeclared stocks of several hundred weapons”. For
other countries with much smaller programs, absolute uncertainties would be much
less, leading to the possibility that “these countries could conceal undeclared stocks
equivalent to one or two dozen weapons in the case of China, and at most one or
two weapons in the cases of Israel, India, and Pakistan.” However, “confidence that
declarations were accurate and complete, and that covert stockpiles or production
facilities did not exist, would be increased by the successful operation of a monitoring
program over a period of years in an environment of increased transparency and
cooperation.”
The security impact of breakout scenarios would depend on the particular
circumstances, including the state of readiness and deliverability of weapons; the
existence of defenses; the relative military strength of the violator; and the international
Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention
175
Section 4
community’s willingness to respond (Findlay 2003). Illicit nuclear weapons produced,
“would be untested, could not be deployed until the last minute, could probably not
be delivered by conventional means, and overt training for use would have been
impossible.” Of course, such a scenario is not only possible in a nuclear-weapon-free
world, but also more likely in today’s nuclear-armed world, and it may be or may not
be deterred by the existence of other nuclear weapons. An actor (whether governmental
or non-governmental) threatening to use such a weapon would provoke others to
rebuild a nuclear device or arsenal, thus loosing the temporary advantage.
This highlights the fact that verifiability of a NWC depends on political assumptions
and requirements as well as on the available resources and capabilities for verification,
which are not only technical. A bargaining process is necessary between political
demands and technical capabilities. If political demands increase, the technical solution
may become more expensive. If technical or economic limits for introducing advanced
or improved verification means are reached, political demands are either cut back or
need to be satisfied by non-technical measures. For example more intrusive measures
of physical protection and control can be introduced which go beyond verification of
compliance with treaty obligations.
Although there may never be a foolproof multilateral verification system for
total nuclear disarmament, the limits of technical verification must not lead to the
pessimistic view, that a nuclear-weapon-free world and an irreversible path towards
that goal is not adequately verifiable. Instead, the political consequence of this merely
technically induced evaluation is to find strategies to increase the barrier against a first
or renewed access to nuclear weapons. Given their limits, verification of an NWC
would not only rely on technical measures. A number of means and procedures can be
applied to detect clandestine objects and activities and clarify critical questions. How
well these elements can be integrated into a coherent and effective verification system
for a Nuclear Weapons Convention requires further examination.
As Trevor Findlay (2006) points out, “complete nuclear disarmament implies not
just a significant evolution in verification, but an evolution of the international system.
States will have to change their attitudes towards the limits of sovereignty, the rule of
international law and governance of the international system, particularly in regard to
enforcement, if nuclear disarmament is ever to be negotiated. Indeed, the attainment of
a nuclear weapon free world is so dependent on such changes that we will only be able
to judge fully and accurately its verifiability as we become seriously engaged in moving
towards that goal.”
_________________________________________________________________________
Endnotes to Section 4
1
This section builds on the following original sources which were expanded and updated: Merav Datan, Jürgen
Scheffran, Principles and Means for Verification of a Nuclear Weapons Convention, INESAP Information Bulletin
No. 14, November 1997; Martin B. Kalinowski, Beyond Technical Verification: Integrated Prevention and Detection
of Diversion of Special Nuclear material in the Nuclear Weapons Convention, INESAP Information Bulletin No. 14,
November 1997; Merav Datan, Verification Requirements for a Nuclear Weapons Convention, Paper presented at the
9th International Summer Symposium on Science and World Affairs, Cornell University, July 1997; Jürgen Scheffran,
Content and Verification of a Nuclear Weapons Convention, in: Joseph Rotblat (Ed.), Remember Your Humanity,
Singapore: World Scientific, 1999, 318-334; Martin B. Kalinowski, Wolfgang Liebert, Jürgen Scheffran, Beyond
technical verification. Transparency, verification, and preventive control for the Nuclear Weapons Convention, in: Martin
B. Kalinowski (ed.), Global Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2000, 61-68.
2
Steve Tulliu, Thimas Schmalberger, Lexicon for Arms Control, Disarmament and Confidence-Building, Geneva:
UNIDIR, 2004, www.unidir.ch/pdf/ouvrages/pdf-1-92-9045-157-2-en.pdf.
3
A number of publications discuss the requirements and possibilities of nuclear weapons elimination: Chris B. Paine,
Tom B. Cochran, Robert S. Norris, Techniques and Procedures for Verifying Nuclear Weapons Elimination, in:
Canberra Commission Background Papers, August 1996, pp. 167-178; Steve Fetter, Verifying Nuclear Disarmament,
Washington, DC: Henry L. Stimson Center, Occasional Paper No. 29, October 1996 (excerpts are reprinted in
INESAP Bulletin No.13, July 1997, pp.41-43); George H. Quester, International Safeguards for Eliminating Weapons
of Mass Destruction, Washington, DC: Henry L. Stimson Center, Occasional Paper No.31, December 1996; Richard
Guthrie, The Transition to a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World: A New Model for the Verification Framework, Verification
176
Matters, Briefing Paper 97/1, April 1997; Patricia M. Lewis, Laying the Foundations - Verifying the transition to low
levels of nuclear weapons, VERTIC Preliminary Report, April 1997; David Fischer, Safeguards for a World Free
of Nuclear Weapons, INESAP Information Bulletin, No.14; Annette Schaper, Verifying nuclear arms control and
disarmament, in: Trevor Findlay, (ed.), Verification Yearbook 2000, VERTIC, London, 2000; Edward M. Ifft, Verifying
Nuclear Arms control and disarmament, in: Trevor Findlay, Oliver Meier (eds.), Verification Yearbook 2001, VERTIC,
London, 2001.
4
Committee on International Security and Arms Control (CISAC), National Academy of Sciences (NAS), The Future of
U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy, July 1997.
5
Trevor Findlay, Verification of a nuclear weapon-free world, VERTIC Briefs, May 2003.
6
Fetter 1996.
7
Weapons of Terror: Freeing the World of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Arms, Weapon of Mass Destruction
Commission, Stockholm, 2006.
8
Kalinowski, Liebert, Scheffran 2000.
9
Findlay 2003.
10
Tom Milne, Henrietta Wilson, Verifying the transition from low levels of nuclear weapons to a nuclear weapon-free
world, VERTIC Research Report, no. 2, June 1999, p. 17 ff .
11
Merav Datan, Verification Requirements for Nuclear Weapons Convention, Paper presented at 8th International
Summer Symposium on Science and World Affairs, Cornell University, July 1997.
12
For a full discussion of proposed immediate nuclear disarmament measures and accompanying verification
measures, see generally: Nuclear De-alerting: Taking a Step Back, UNIDIR Newsletter No. 38; Bruce Blair, Global
Zero Alert for Nuclear Forces, Brookings Institution, 1995; Chris Paine, Tom Cochran and Robert Norris, Practical
Interim Steps Toward Nuclear Weapons Elimination and a Fissile Material Control Regime for Nuclear Weapon States,
Canberra Commission Background Papers; Matthew Bunn, ’Pit-Stuffing’: How to Disable Thousands of Warheads
and Easily Verify Their Dismatlement, Federation of American Scientists Public Interest Report, Vol. 51, No. 2, March/
April 1998; Owen Greene, Multilateralising the Nuclear Disarmament Process, INESAP Information Bulletin No. 14,
November 1997.
13
Patricia M. Lewis, Laying the Foundations for Getting to Zero: Verifying the Transition to Low Levels of Nuclear
Weapons, Vertic Research Report No. 1, September 1998.
14
Suzanna van Moyland, Programme ‘93+2’: Evolution in IAEA Safeguards, in: Richard Guthrie (ed.), Verification 1997:
The Vertic Yearbook.
14a
Illusion of Protection, Medical Association for Prevention of War, Australia, Report 5 November 2006,
www.mapw.org.au/Illusion of Protection index.html.
15
Department of Energy, Plutonium - The first 50 years, Washington, February 1996.
16
Trevor Findley, Verification and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, INESAP Information Bulletin, No. 27, December
2006, pp. 67-70; IAEA, Strengthened Safeguards System: Status of Additional Protocols, 2004; Thomas E. Shea,
Potential Roles for the IAEA in a Warhead Dismantlement and Fissile Materials Transparency Regime, in N. Zarimpas,
ed., Transparency in Nuclear Warheads and Materials, New York: Oxford University Press and Stockholm International
Peace Research Institute, 2003, pp. 229-249; George Perkovich, Jessica Tuchman Mathews, Joseph Cirincione, Rose
Gottemoeller, Jon Wolfsthal, Universal Compliance: A Strategy for Nuclear Security, 2005.
17
IAEA INFCIRC/540.
18
See Gotthard Stein, Detection of Clandestine Nuclear Weapons Usable Materials Production with Satellite Imagery,
INESAP Information Bulletin, No.27, December 2006, pp. 23-26.
19
Victor Bragin, John Carlson, and John Hill, Verifying a Fissile-Material Production Cut-Off Treaty, The
Nonproliferation Review, Fall 1998, pp. 97-107.
20
Fetter 1996.
21
Findlay 2003.
22
J. Whichello, D. Parise, N. Khlebnikov, IAEA Project on Novel Techniques, INESAP Information Bulletin, No. 27,
December 2006, pp. 27-30.
23
See Martin B. Kalinowski, Heiner Daerr, Markus Kohler, Measurements of Krypton-85 to Detect Clandestine Plutoni-
um Production; Martin B. Kalinowski, Johann Feichter, Ole Ross, Atmospheric Krypton-85 transport modeling for
verification purposes; Daek Youn, Donald J.Wuebbles, Martin B. Kalinowski, Global Modeling of Atmospheric Krypton-
85 Concentrations; all published in: INESAP Information Bulletin, No. 27, December 2006.
24
Oleg Bukharin, Kenneth Luongo, US-Russian warhead dismantlement transparency: the status, problems, and
proposals, Princeton University/Center for Energy and Environmental Studies (PU/CEES) report no. 314, April 1999;
Theodore B. Taylor, Lev P. Feoktistov, Verified elimination of nuclear warheads and disposition of contained nuclear
materials, in Francesco Calogero, Marvin L. Goldberger, Sergei P. Kapitsa (eds), Verification: Monitoring Disarmament,
Westview Press, Boulder, CO, 1991.
25
Tom Milne, Global spending on nuclear disarmament verification work, Verification Matters, no. 3,VERTIC, London,
April 2002.
26
Committee on International Security and Arms Control of the National Academy of Sciences, Monitoring Nuclear
Weapons and Nuclear-Explosive Materials: An Assessment of Methods and Capabilities, Washington DC, 2005, p.12.
27
Source: Kalinowski, Liebert, Scheffran 2000.
28
Fetter 1996.
29
After a discussion in the Drafting Committee in November 1997 the term “preventive controls” has replaced the term
“Safety Controls” used in the original Model NWC.
30
Similar proposals have been put forward earlier. See especially Lisbeth Gronlund and David Wright, Beyond
Safeguards: A program for more comprehensive control of weapon-usable fissile material, report by the Union of
Concerned Scientists, Cambridge, May 1994. This report defines type 1 controls which limit the production and use of
fissile material for weapons or outside of safeguards, and type 2 controls which limit the production and use of weapon-
usable fissile material for all purposes, including civil purposes that are safeguarded, and the operation of facilities that
can produce weapon-usable fissile material.
31
Susanna von Moyland, The IAEA’s Programme `93+2’, VERTIC Report No.10, January 1997.
32
Eric R. Gerdes, Roger G. Johnston, and James E. Doyle, A Proposed Approach for Monitoring Nuclear Warhead
Dismantlement, Science and Global Security 9 (2001); James Goodby, Transparency and Irreversibility in Nuclear
Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention
177
Section 4
Warhead Dismantlement, in Harold A. Feiveson (ed.), The Nuclear Turning Point: A Blueprint for Deep Cuts and De-
Alerting of Nuclear Weapons (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1999); Annette Schaper, Transparency and
Secrecy in Nuclear Weapons, Study of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission Nr. 34, Stockholm 2005.
33
Findlay 2003, p. 10.
34
Joseph Rotblat, Societal Verification, in: Joseph Rotblat, Jack Steinberger, Bhalchandra Udgaonkar, eds., A Nuclear-
Weapon-Free World: Desirable? Feasible?Westview Press, 1998.
35
Dieter Deiseroth, Societal verification: wave of the future?, Verification Yearbook 2000, VERTIC, London, 2000.
36
Joseph Rotblat, Societal Verification, in: Rotblat/Steinberger/Udgaonkar 1993.
37
Model Protocol Additional, IAEA, INFCIRC/540, Vienna, September 1997
38
See Rose Gottemoeller, Beyond arms control: how to deal with nuclear weapons, Policy Brief, no. 23, Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, Washington, DC, February 2003; Nancy Gallagher, Verification and advanced
co-operative security, Verification Yearbook 2002, VERTIC, London, 2002; Matthew Bunn, Anthony Wier, and John
P. Holdren, Controlling Nuclear Warheads and Materials: A Report Card and Action Plan, Washington, DC: Nuclear
Threat Initiative and the Project on Managing the Atom, Harvard University, March 2003; http://
www.nti.org/cnwm
39
NAS/CISAC Committee 2005.