Text från PDF
Ira Helfand, MD
International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War
Physicians for Social Responsibility
NUCLEAR FAMINE:
A BILLION PEOPLE
AT RISK?
Global Impacts of Limited Nuclear War
on Agriculture, Food Supplies, and Human Nutrition
TWO
SECOND EDITION
Credits and Acknowledgements
The first edition of this briefing paper was made possible
thanks to the generous financial support of the Swiss Federal
Department of Foreign Affairs.
Special thanks to Madison Marks for her research assistance
on this second edition.
Copyright © November 2013
In April of 2012 we released the report Nuclear Famine: A
Billion People at Riskwhich examined the climatic and agri-
cultural consequences of a limited, regional nuclear war.
The report looked specifically at the declines in US maize
and Chinese rice production that would result from the pre-
dicted climate disruption and concluded that even a limited
nuclear conflict would cause extensive famine, mainly in the
developing world, and put more than one billion people at
risk of starvation.
Since then new research by Lili Xia and Alan Robock has
shown that the climate change caused by a limited nuclear
war would affect Chinese maize production as severely as
rice production and it would affect wheat production much
more severely than rice output. Their new findings suggest
that the original report may have seriously underestimated
the consequences of a limited nuclear war. In addition to the
one billion people in the developing world who would face
possible starvation, 1.3 billion people in China would confront
severe food insecurity. The prospect of a decade of wide-
spread hunger and intense social and economic instability in
the world’s largest country has immense implications for the
entire global community, as does the possibility that the huge
declines in Chinese wheat production will be matched by sim-
ilar declines in other wheat producing countries.
This updated version of Nuclear Famineattempts to
address these new concerns and better define the full
extent of the worldwide catastrophe that will result from
even a limited, regional nuclear war.
Introduction to the Second Edition
1NUCLEAR FAMINE: TWO BILLION PEOPLE AT RISK?
2 NUCLEAR FAMINE: TWO BILLION PEOPLE AT RISK?
ver the last several years, a number of
studies have shown that a limited, regional
nuclear war between India and Pakistan would
cause significant climate disruption worldwide.
Two studies published in 2012 examined the
impact on agricultural output that would result
from this climate disruption.
In the US, corn production would decline by an
average of 10% for an entire decade, with the
most severe decline, about 20%, in year 5. There
would be a similar decline in soybean production,
with the most severe loss, again about 20%, in
year 5.
A second study found a significant decline in
Chinese middle season rice production. During
the first 4 years, rice production would decline by
an average of 21%; over the next 6 years the
decline would average 10%.
A third study, completed in the fall of 2013,
showed that there would be even larger declines
in Chinese winter wheat production. Production
would fall 50% in the first year, and, averaged
over the entire decade after the war, it would be
31% below baseline.
The decline in available food would be exacer-
bated by increases in food prices which would
make food inaccessible to hundreds of millions of
the world’s poorest. Even if agricultural markets
continued to function normally, 215 million people
O
would be added to the rolls of the malnourished
over the course of a decade.
However, markets would not function normally.
Significant, sustained agricultural shortfalls over
an extended period would almost certainly lead
to panic and hoarding on an international scale
as food exporting nations suspended exports in
order to assure adequate food supplies for their
own populations. This turmoil in the agricultural
markets would further reduce accessible food.
The 870 million people in the world who are chron-
ically malnourished today have a baseline con-
sumption of 1,750 calories or less per day. Even a
10% decline in their food consumption would put
this entire group at risk. In addition, the anticipat-
ed suspension of exports from grain growing
countries would threaten the food supplies of sev-
eral hundred million additional people who have
adequate nutrition today, but who live in countries
that are highly dependent on food imports.
Finally, more than a billion people in China would
also face severe food insecurity. The number of
people threatened by nuclear-war induced
famine would be well over two billion.
These studies demonstrate the need for addition-
al research and underscore the urgent need to
move with all possible speed to the negotiation of
a global agreement to outlaw and eliminate
nuclear weapons and the danger of nuclear war.
Executive
Summary
n the 1980s, a number of scientific studies
demonstrated that a large scale nuclear war
between the United States and the Soviet Union
would cause “Nuclear Winter”, a profound world-
wide climate disruption with significant decreases
in precipitation and average surface temperature.
A US National Academy of Sciences study on the
medical consequences of nuclear war concluded
that, in the aftermath of such a war, “the primary
mechanisms for human fatalities would likely not
be from blast effects, not from thermal radiation
burns, and not from ionizing radiation, but, rather,
from mass starvation.”
1
While the direct mortali-
ty attributed to a “large-scale nuclear war” was
estimated at several hundred million people, the
subsequent food and health crisis was expected
to result in “the loss of one to four billion lives.”
In 2007, a study by Robock et al demonstrated
that even a very “limited” regional nuclear war,
involving only 100 Hiroshima-sized bombs, or
less than 0.5% of the world’s nuclear arsenal,
would also produce global climate disruption,
although the impact on temperature and precipi-
tation would be less profound.
2
At that time,
there were no data on the effect that the predict-
ed climate disruption would have on agricultural
production. The historical experience following
cooling events caused by volcanic eruptions,
most notably the Tambora eruption in 1815, sug-
gested that there might be a very significant
impact on food production and human nutrition.
A 2007 report by the International Physicians for
the Prevention of Nuclear War and its US affili-
ate, Physicians for Social Responsibility, sug-
gested that up to one billion people might starve
if a limited nuclear war led to even a 10% decline
in their food consumption.
3
This report is an initial attempt to quantify the
impact of a limited nuclear war on agricultural pro-
duction and the subsequent effects on global food
prices and food supply, and on human nutrition.
I
Harwell, M., and C. Harwell. 1986. Nuclear Famine: The Indirect Effects of Nuclear War. In, Solomon, F. and R. Marston (Eds.). The Medical
Implications of Nuclear War. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press. 117-135.
1
Robock, A., L. Oman, G. Stenchikov, O. Toon, C. Bardeen and R. Turco, 2007, Climatic consequences of regional nuclear conflicts. Atm. Chem.
Phys., 7: 2003-12.
2
Helfand, I. 2007. An Assessment of the Extent of Projected Global Famine Resulting from Limited, Regional Nuclear War.Paper presented to the
Royal Society of Medicine, London, UK, October 2007.
3
Background
UN PHOTO / ALBERT GONZALEZ FARRAN
3NUCLEAR FAMINE: TWO BILLION PEOPLE AT RISK?
4 NUCLEAR FAMINE: TWO BILLION PEOPLE AT RISK?
2007 study by Toon et al
4
considered the
consequences of a possible nuclear war
between India and Pakistan and showed that
such a conflict would loft up to 6.6 Tg (6.6 tera-
grams or 6.6 million metric tons) of black car-
bon aerosol particles into the upper tropo-
sphere. Robock et al then calculated the effect
that this injection of soot would have on global
climate assuming a war in South Asia occurring
in mid May.
Their study used a state of the art general cir-
culation climate model, ModelE from the NASA
Goddard Institute for Space Studies, and
employed a conservative figure of only 5 Tg of
black carbon particles. They found that, “A
global average surface cooling of -1.25°C per-
sists for years, and after a decade the cooling
is still -0.50°C. The temperature changes are
largest over land. A cooling of several degrees
occurs over large areas of North America and
Eurasia, including most of the grain-growing
regions.” In addition the study found significant
declines in global precipitation with marked
decreases in rainfall in the most important tem-
perate grain growing regions of North America
and Eurasia, and a large reduction in the Asian
summer monsoon.
5
Two additional studies, one by Stenke et al, and
the other by Mills et al, each using a different cli-
mate model have also examined the impact on
global climate of this limited nuclear war scenario
and they have both found comparable effects.
6, 7
A
Toon, Owen B., Richard P. Turco, Alan Robock, Charles Bardeen, Luke Oman, and Georgiy L. Stenchikov, 2007: Atmospheric effects and societal
consequences of regional scale nuclear conflicts and acts of individual nuclear terrorism. Atm. Chem. Phys., 7, 1973-2002.
4
Robock, Alan, Luke Oman, Georgiy L. Stenchikov, Owen B. Toon, Charles Bardeen, and Richard P. Turco, 2007: Climatic consequences of region-
al nuclear conflicts. Atm. Chem. Phys.,7, 2003-2012.
5
Climate disruption
from a “limited”
regional nuclear war
UN PHOTO / ESKINDER DEBEBE
http://www.atmos-chem-phys-discuss.net/13/12089/2013/acpd-13-12089-2013.html
6
Mills, M., Toon, O. B., Taylor, J., Robock, A., “Multi-decadal global cooling and unprecedented ozone loss following a regional nuclear conflict,” pub-
lication pending.
7
Ozdogan, Mutlu, Alan Robock, and Christopher Kucharik, 2012: Impacts of Nuclear Conflict in South Asia on Crop Production in the Midwestern
United States.
8
wo studies conducted in 2012 examined
how these climate alterations would affect
agricultural output.
Ozdogan et al
8
examined the impact on corn and
soybean production in the US Corn Belt where
more than 70% of US grain is produced.
Localized climate data were generated for four
separate sites in the Corn Belt, one each in
Indiana, Illinois, Iowa, and Missouri (Figure 1).
T
The study used a comprehensive terrestrial
ecosystem model, the Agro-Integrated Biosphere
Simulator (Agro-IBIS), to calculate the change in
predicted yield for corn and soybeans at each of
these sites for the 10 years following a limited
nuclear war in South Asia. The calculated change
in crop yield was based on the decline in precip-
itation, solar radiation, growing season length,
and average monthly temperature predicted in
Robock’s study.
Figure 1.Localized climate data were generated for four sites in the US Corn Belt. From left to right, Iowa,
Missouri, Illinois, and Indiana. [Figure 1 from Ozdogan et al.
8
]
The impact
on agricultural
production
UN PHOTO / MARTINE PERRET
Row crops
Cropland Natural Mosaic
Deciduous Forest
Boreal Forest
Grassland
Coniferous Forest
Shrublands
Hay Pasture
Urban Built-Up Land
Grassland Forest Mosaic
5NUCLEAR FAMINE: TWO BILLION PEOPLE AT RISK?
6 NUCLEAR FAMINE: TWO BILLION PEOPLE AT RISK?
The calculations in this initial study are probably
conservative, as the study did not consider two
other environmental factors which would be
expected to produce a further significant decline
in yield. It did not factor in the increase in UV
light secondary to ozone depletion, and, perhaps
more importantly, it did not consider daily temper-
ature extremes which may lead to complete crop
failure. The observed weather following the
Tambora eruption suggests that these daily
extremes may be the largest determinant of total
crop losses. The average global deviation in tem-
perature in 1816 was only -0.7°C, but there was
significant shortening of the growing season.
In the northeastern United States and eastern
Canada, which were particularly hard hit, temper-
atures were actually above average during the
early part of the year, and even during the sum-
mer months there were a number of periods with
average or above average temperatures. But
four severe cold waves, June 6-11, July 9-11, and
August 21 and August 30, brought killing frosts
as far south as the Mid Atlantic States, and in
New England and Quebec there was even signif-
icant snow fall in June.
9
These periods of frost
Stommel H, Stommel E. 1979. The year without a summer. Scientific American. 240:176-186
9
UN PHOTO / MARTINE PERRET
TEMPERATURE EXTREMES MAY LEAD
TO COMPLETE CROP FAILURE
A farmer in Timor-Leste packs up bundles
of rice destroyed by climate extremes.
ILLINOIS
MAIZE
IOWA
MAIZE
MISSOURI
MAIZE
INDIANA
MAIZE
Figure 2.Declines in US corn (maize) production. To generate an estimate of the probable change in crop
yield, computer simulations were run to obtain 300 different baseline crop yield levels using random selec-
tion of actual annual climate data over the past 30 years. The x axis shows the percent change in crop yield
from the estimated baseline; the y axis shows the number of simulations that yielded a change of that size.
[Figure 7 from Ozdogan et al. ]
8
Number of Simulation Runs
(300 in total)
Number of Simulation Runs
(300 in total)
Number of Simulation Runs
(300 in total)
Number of Simulation Runs
(300 in total)
7
caused extensive damage to crops. A similar
pattern in Northern Europe caused crop losses in
the range of 75%
10
and the last multi-country
famine in European history.
In addition, the study did not consider several
other factors which might limit food production.
Modern agriculture is very dependent on gaso-
line to power tractors and irrigation pumps and
to transport produce to market, and on other
petroleum products used in the manufacture of
fertilizer and pesticides. A major conflict in South
Asia would be very likely to affect petroleum sup-
plies and prices which would have an additional
negative impact on agricultural output. Further,
given the intense demand for petroleum prod-
ucts, some of the grain produced might be
diverted to ethanol production to try to offset the
shortfall in petroleum.
Despite this conservative bias, the study showed
very significant declines in both corn and soy-
bean production. Averaged over 10 years, corn
production would decline by 10% at all four sites
(Figure 2). But there would be a great deal of
variation from year to year, and losses would be
Post, J. 1983. Climatic change and subsistence crises. Journal of Interdisciplinary History. 14:153-160.
10
NUCLEAR FAMINE: TWO BILLION PEOPLE AT RISK?
8 NUCLEAR FAMINE: TWO BILLION PEOPLE AT RISK?
Xia, Lili, and Alan Robock, 2012: Impacts of Nuclear Conflict in South Asia on Rice Production in Mainland China. Climatic Change.
11
Figure 3.Reduction of maize production over time, with whiskers showing one standard deviation for
each year after the nuclear war. The gray area shows ±1 standard deviation from the control runs, illus-
trating the effect of interannual weather variations. [Figure courtesy of M. Ozdogan.]
Years After Nuclear War
Relative Yield Change [%]
-
-
-
-
most severe in year 5, averaging more than 20%
(Figure 3). For soybeans there would be a simi-
lar decline averaged over 10 years (Figure 4 on
pg 9). Here, too, the losses would be most
severe in year 5, again averaging more than
20%.
In a separate study, Xia and Robock
11
examined
the decline in Chinese middle season rice pro-
duction in response to this 5 Tg event. This study
used a different model, the Decision Support
System for Agrotechnology Transfer model 4.02
(DSSAT). It is a dynamic biophysical crop model
and simulates plant growth on a per hectare
basis, maintaining balances for water, carbon
and nitrogen. The required inputs include the
plant environment (weather and soil), cultivar
genotypes and agricultural management prac-
tices. The outputs from this model are potential
yields, which are usually higher than actual
yields. Perturbed climate data in 24 provinces in
China were generated using predictions of cli-
mate change from Robock et al. and observa-
tions in China from 198 weather stations from
1978 to 2008 (China Meteorological Data
Sharing Service System). The simulated change
in middle season rice yield in China was due to
the predicted decline in average monthly precipi-
tation, solar radiation and temperature.
This study also did not consider the effect of UV
light increases or daily temperature extremes, or
the possible decline in available fertilizer, pesti-
cide and gasoline. Again, despite this conserva-
tive bias, the study showed a significant decline
in Chinese middle season rice production.
Averaged over 10 years, the decline would be
about 15% (Figure 5 on pg 10). During the first 4
years, rice production would decline by an aver-
age of 21%; over the next 6 years the decline
would average 10% (Figure 6 on pg 10).
The impact on rice production was found to vary
widely by province (Figure 7 on pg 11). In some
areas in the South and East of China, production
would actually rise. For example, in Hainan rice
Figure 4.Declines in US soy production. The graphs were generated using the same methodology as in
Figure 2 on pg 7. [Figure 8 from Ozdogan et al. ]
7
Number of Simulation Runs
(300 in total)
Number of Simulation Runs
(300 in total)
Number of Simulation Runs
(300 in total)
Number of Simulation Runs
(300 in total)
9NUCLEAR FAMINE: TWO BILLION PEOPLE AT RISK?
ILLINOIS
SOY
IOWA-
SOY
MISSOURI
SOY
INDIANA
SOY
yield would increase by 5 to 15% per year. In
other areas to the North and West the decline
would be much more severe than the national
average. In Heilongjian province, home to 36 mil-
lion people, there would be a complete failure of
the rice crop in year 1 following the war. Rice pro-
duction would remain 60 to 70% below baseline
for most of the rest of the following decade (Figure
8 on pg 11).
In their 2013 study, Xia, Robock and their col-
leagues looked at the impact of the climate
change following limited nuclear war on rice,
maize and, wheat production in China.
12
For this
study they used the 2007 climate change projec-
tions by Robock et al. that were used in the ear-
lier studies of US maize and Chinese rice pro-
duction, and also the subsequent climate projec-
tions of Stenke et al. and Mills et al. There were
some variations in the crop outputs found using
the different climate models, but they all showed
significant declines in crop size. For maize the
average decline was about 16% over a full
decade. For middle season rice the projected
decline was somewhat larger than in their earlier
estimates: 20% for the first 5 years and 17% over
the course of 10 years. The most disturbing new
projection related to the Chinese winter wheat
crop which normally is just a little bit smaller than
middle season rice production. The effect on win-
ter wheat was much more severe, averaging
about 39% for the first 5 years and 31% for a full
decade. In the first year, the projected decline in
winter wheat was more than 50%.
Xia, L., Robock, A., Mills, M., Stenke, A., Helfand, I., “Global famine after a regional nuclear war” submitted to Earth’s FutureOctober 2013.
12
10 NUCLEAR FAMINE: TWO BILLION PEOPLE AT RISK?
Figure 6.Reduction of rice production with whiskers showing one standard deviation for each year after
the nuclear war. The gray area shows ±1 standard deviation from the control runs, illustrating the effect
of interannual weather variations. [Figure 2(a) from Xia and Robock. ]
11
Figure 5.Distribution of rice production change (%): The gray area shows ±1 standard deviation from the
control runs, illustrating the effect of interannual weather variations. [Figure 2(b) from Xia and Robock.11]
Figure 8.Reduction of rice yield over time in Heilongjiang Province, with whiskers showing one standard
deviation for each year after the nuclear war. [Redrawn from Figure 6 of Xia and Robock. ]
11
Figure 7.Map of rice yield reduction (%) for the first 4 years after regional nuclear conflict. Brown indi-
cates negative change, and green indicates positive change. White regions are provinces for which we
did not conduct model simulations. [Redrawn from Figure 5 of Xia and Robock. ]
11
11NUCLEAR FAMINE: TWO BILLION PEOPLE AT RISK?
12 NUCLEAR FAMINE: TWO BILLION PEOPLE AT RISK
he world is particularly vulnerable at this
time to a major decline in food production.
In June 2013, the UN Food and Agriculture
Organization estimated that grain stocks were
509 million metric tons, 21% of the annual con-
sumption of 2,339 million metric tons.
13
Expressed as days of consumption, this reserve
would last for 77 days. The US Department of
Agriculture estimates were somewhat lower at
432 million metric tons of grain stocks, a mere
19% of their estimated annual consumption, of
2,289 million metric tons.
14
Expressed as days
of consumption, this reserve would last for only
68 days.
Furthermore, the UN Food and Agriculture
Organization estimated in 2012 that there are
870 million people in the world who already suf-
fer from malnutrition.
15
Given this precarious situation, even small fur-
ther declines in food production could have major
consequences.
The large and protracted declines in agricultural
output predicted by Ozdogan and Xia are
unprecedented in modern times, and the full
extent of their impact on human nutrition are dif-
ficult to predict.
The impact on human
nutrition and health
T
Normally a decline in agricultural production
affects food consumption by raising the cost of
food; the decline in “accessible” food, the amount
of food that people can afford to buy, is much
greater than the decline in “available” food, the
actual agricultural output. The impact of rising
food prices is, of course, felt disproportionately
by people who are already malnourished precise-
ly because they cannot, at baseline prices, afford
to buy enough food.
A 2011 study by Webb et al
16
, drawing on the
data generated by Ozdogan, attempted to esti-
mate the effect that the shortfall in agricultural
output following a limited nuclear war would have
on the price of food, and therefore on its accessi-
bility. Using a global economy-wide model, the
Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP), the study
examined the effects on food prices, and the
numbers of people who are malnourished. In
order to simulate the shock’s effect on cereal and
soybean prices, the study assumed that all crops
produced globally suffer yield declines to the
same extent that Ozdogan predicts for maize and
soybeans in the US corn belt.
The study found that the rise in food prices asso-
ciated with the average yearly decline in food
production would cause an additional 40 million
www.fao.org/worldfoodsituation/wfs-home/csdb/en/
13
www.usda.gov/oce/commodity/wasde/latest.pdf
14
ippnw.org/pdf/projected-impacts-webb.pdf
16
www.fao.org/publications/sofi/en/
15
UN PHOTO / STUART PRICE
13
people to become malnourished, and that the
largest annual decline in food production in year
5 would cause 67 million to enter the ranks of the
malnourished. The cumulative effect over 10
years would cause a total of 215 million people to
become malnourished.
The study concluded that a one year 20%
decline in crop yield would cause crop prices to
rise 19.7%. But this rise would be very uneven-
ly distributed across the globe. In East Asia the
rise would be 21.4% and in South Asia 31.6%.
The relationship between crop yield and food
prices is not linear: a further decline in yield
would lead to a much larger increase in prices.
While the current crop studies do not predict a
decline of 40%, should that occur, it would cause
global crop prices to rise an average of 98.7%.
Again the price rise would be very uneven. In
South Asia as a whole prices would rise 140.6%,
and in India 159.6%.
It is hard to calculate with certainty the effect of
these price rises on caloric intake, but the study
argues that, “There is a broad consensus in the
literature that this parameter [the percentage
change in caloric intake given a one percent
increase in the price of food] is approximately -
0.5.” So a one year decline in crop yield of 20%
worldwide would lead to a 19.7% rise in prices
and a 10% decline in caloric intake. The much
larger increases in food prices in some areas that
are predicted in the study would therefore be
expected to have a profound effect on the num-
ber of calories that people are able to consume.
A number of factors suggest that the accessible
food for those who are already malnourished
would decline even more dramatically than these
numbers suggest. The GTAP model looks only
at market behavior and assumes that markets
behave “normally.” In fact, experience suggests
that, in the aftermath of nuclear war, markets
would not behave normally. As the authors
explain, “Markets react.. with commodity specu-
lation, hoarding (withholding of products from the
market), or by seeking to capture market share
through private non-open market deals (a loss of
transaction transparency), each of which con-
tributed to higher price volatility and market
uncertainty” in recent years. For example, in
March 2008, global wheat prices leaped 25% in
a single day; in the following month the price of
rice rose 50% in just two weeks.
17
These tran-
sient jumps in price were prompted by events far
less significant than a nuclear war.
At the time of the great Bengal famine of 1943,
Somalia Suffers from Worst
Drought in Century
A woman holding her malnour-
ished baby queues for food at the
Badbado camp for Internally
Displaced Persons. Famine has
been declared in two regions of
southern Somalia. In 2011, UN
Secretary General Ban Ki-moon
indicated that 3.7 million people
across the country—that’s nearly
half of the Somali population—
were in crisis and in urgent need
of assistance.
Webb, P. 2010. Medium to Long-Run Implications of High Food Prices for Global Nutrition. Journal of Nutrition. 140 (1): 140S-47S.
17
UN PHOTO / STUART PRICE
NUCLEAR FAMINE: TWO BILLION PEOPLE AT RISK?
Brown, LR. Outgrowing the Earth.New York: WW Norton & Co. 2004.
19
Khrennikov, I. Medvedev orders review of Russian grain export ban at harvest end. 2010.
www.businessweek.com/news/2010-10-04/medvedev-orders-review-of-russia-grain-export-ban-at-harvest-end.html
20
during which three million people died, food pro-
duction was only 5% less than it had been on
average over the preceding five years, and it was
actually 13% higher than it had been in 1941
when there was not a famine. But in 1943, after
the Japanese occupation of Burma, which had
historically exported grain to Bengal, the decline
in food production was coupled with panic hoard-
ing, and the price of rice increased nearly five
fold, making food unaffordable to large numbers
of people.
18
These two factors, hoarding and the
severe increase in rice prices, caused an effec-
tive inaccessibility of food far more severe than
the actual shortfall in production.
We would have to expect panic on a far greater
scale following a nuclear war, even if it were a
“limited” regional war, especially as it became
clear that there would be significant, sustained
agricultural shortfalls over an extended period.
It is probable that there would be hoarding on an
international scale as food exporting nations sus-
pended exports in order to assure adequate food
supplies for their own populations. In the last
decade there have been a number of examples
of nations banning grain exports. In September
2002, Canada, faced with a sharp decline in
wheat production because of drought conditions,
suspended wheat exports for a year. The next
year the European Union took similar action, as
did Russia. And in August 2004, Vietnam indicat-
ed it would not export rice until the following
spring.
19
India banned rice exports in November
2007 which, followed by export rice restrictions in
Vietnam, Egypt, and China in January 2008, con-
tributed to historic increases in world rice prices.
In 2010, Russia, responding to the severe
drought conditions that year, again suspended
grain exports.
20
In the event of a regional nuclear war, the grain
exporting states would be faced with major crop
losses and the prospect of bad harvests for the
next several years. It is probable that they would
take similar action, and refuse to export whatev-
er grain surplus they might have, retaining it
instead as a domestic reserve. It is also probable
that there would be widespread speculation on
agricultural markets.
Given these potential disturbances in normal
market conditions, it is possible that the increas-
es in food prices could be much larger than pre-
dicted by the Global Trade Analysis Project
(GTAP) model used in the Webb et al study.
Even if we do not take into account the way that
rising food prices exacerbate the effects of a
fall in food production, the declines in available
Sen, A. Poverty and famines. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1981.
18
14 NUCLEAR FAMINE: TWO BILLION PEOPLE AT RISK?
This child is just one of more than
150,000 displaced Afghans living
at Maslakh (internally displaced per-
sons) camp in mud huts and tents.
UN PHOTO / ESKINDER DEBEBE
15
Refugees from Libya queue for food
at the Tunisia Transit Camp.
food predicted by Ozdogan and Xia would be
devastating.
For the 870 million people who are currently mal-
nourished, the majority of their caloric intake is
derived from grain. For example, in Bangladesh
the figure is about 78%. We cannot know with
certainty that a 10-20% decline in grain produc-
tion would translate directly into a 10-20%
decline in grain consumption for all 870 million.
Some of the malnourished are subsistence farm-
ers who live in areas where grain production
might not decline. But we do know that the
chronically malnourished cannot survive a signif-
icant, sustained further decline in their caloric
intake. With a baseline consumption of 1,750
calories per day, even a 10% decline would lead
to an additional deficit of 175 calories per day.
While many of the malnourished might survive
the first year, it is realistic to fear that they would
not survive if these conditions persisted for a
decade.
Even if minimal, life-sustaining, levels of calories
could be provided for all of the malnourished, the
decline in quality of nutrition would cause signifi-
cant health effects. As Webb et al point out in
their study:
“As food prices rise people spend relatively
more on staples and less on ‘quality’ foods
(which tend to be micronutrient rich, including
meat, eggs, vegetables, etc.)...
“The specific impacts of reduced diet quality as
well as quantity include a rise in wasting among
children under 5, maternal undernutrition (low
body mass index) which can also cause irre-
versible damage to the fetus and a rise in rates
of low birth weights, and outbreaks of micronu-
trient deficiency diseases that may be killers in
their own right.
“Based on such experiences, one can assume
that any large food price increases attendant on
a nuclear shock would result in similar shifts in
household consumption globally (not only in
South Asia) away from nutrient-rich, higher cost
foods towards core staples (with a view to
buffering at least a minimum energy intake).
There are insufficient data to allow for the more
complex modeling required to estimate resulting
nutrition outcomes in terms of increased
micronutrient deficiencies, maternal nutritional
compromise or low birth weight. However, it is
clear that the human impacts would be huge—
with impaired growth and development of chil-
dren, increased morbidity (due to failing
immune functions caused by malnutrition), and
a rise in excess mortality.”
21
UN PHOTO / OCHA/ DAVID OHANA
Webb et al, op. cit. 2011. www.ippnw.org/pdf/projected-impacts-webb.pdf
21
NUCLEAR FAMINE: TWO BILLION PEOPLE AT RISK?
In addition, expressed as days of food consump-
tion, China has significantly larger reserves of
grain than the world as a whole. In the summer
of 2013, wheat reserves totaled nearly 167 days
of consumption, and rice reserves were 119
days of consumption.
26
Despite this relatively strong position, China
would be hard pressed to deal with the very large
reduction in wheat production projected in the
new study. While rice (144 million tons per year)
is the most important grain in China in terms of
direct human consumption, wheat (125 million
tons) is a close second and accounts for more
than 1/3 of grain consumption,
27
and China’s
wheat consumption amounts to 19% of world
production.
28
As a 2012 Australian government
study noted, “Security of supply for these two
cereals is of uttermost importance in China and
therefore food security in China often refers to
“grain security”. Not surprisingly, China pays
much attention to ensuring a high-level of self-
sufficiency in these two crops.”
29
A 31% shortfall in wheat production, coupled with
the previously predicted 15% decline in rice pro-
duction, would end that state of self-sufficiency.
Even the large reserves that China maintains
would be exhausted within 2 years. At that point
China would be forced to attempt to make mas-
sive purchases on world grain markets driving
prices up even more. If, as expected, internation-
al hoarding made grain unavailable, China would
have to dramatically curtail rice and wheat con-
sumption.
The 15% decline in Chinese maize production
predicted in the new study by Xia and Robock
would further affect food security. Maize is actu-
ally China’s largest grain crop, at 177 million tons
in 2010.
30
The vast majority is used, not for direct
16
NUCLEAR FAMINE: TWO BILLION PEOPLE AT RISK?
The agricultural disruption caused by a limited
nuclear war would also pose a threat to the sev-
eral hundred million people who enjoy adequate
nutrition at this time, but who live in countries that
are dependent on food imports. The nations of
North Africa, home to more than 150 million peo-
ple, import more than 45% of their food.
22
Malaysia, South Korea, Japan and Taiwan, as
well as a number of countries in the Middle East,
import 50% or more of their grain.
23
The antici-
pated suspension of exports from grain growing
countries might cause severe effects on nutrition
in all of these countries. The wealthier among
them might initially be able to obtain grain by bid-
ding up the price on international markets, but as
the extent and duration of the crop losses
became clear, exporting countries would proba-
bly tighten their bans on exports threatening the
food supplies of all these importing countries.
The more recent study of Chinese maize and
wheat production by Xia and Robock suggests
other impacts that need to be considered. Prior
to the release of their work, it had been assumed
that China, like most of the industrial world,
would be spared the worst effects of the global
famine. But these new data raise real questions
about China’s ability to feed its own people.
At baseline, China is in a better position to with-
stand the effects of decreased food production
than the poorer nations of the world. Caloric
intake has risen significantly with the dramatic
economic expansion of the last 3 decades and
the average Chinese now consumes about 3000
calories per day.
24
The diet has also become
more diversified with some decline in the pro-
portion of calories obtained from grains and a
rise in the amount obtained from fruits, vegeta-
bles and meat products, although cereals still
account for more than 40% of caloric intake.
25
www.ers.usda.gov/publications/gfa16/GFA16CountryTablesNAfrca.xls.
22
www.iucn.org/themes/wani/eatlas/html/gm19.html.
23
Pinstrop-Anderson, P and Cheng, F, Case Studies in Food Policy for Developing Countries. Ithaca, New York. Cornell University Press. 2009.
Viewed at http://goo.gl/oAGfoS
25
http://faostat.fao.org/CountryProfiles/Country_Profile/Direct.aspx?lang=en&area=351
24
http://www.fas.usda.gov/psdonline/psdreport.aspx?hidReportRetrievalName=BVS&hidReportRetrievalID=867&hidReportRetrievalTemplateID=13
26
http://www.daff.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0006/2259123/food-consumption-trends-in-china-v2.pdf
27
http://www.fas.usda.gov/psdonline/psdreport.aspx?hidReportRetrievalName=BVS&hidReportRetrievalID=867&hidReportRetrievalTemplateID=13
28
http://www.daff.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0006/2259123/food-consumption-trends-in-china-v2.pdf
29
Ibid.
30
human consumption, but for animal feed. The
decline in maize production would primarily affect
the 20% of caloric intake currently provided by
meat and poultry.
Taken together, the declines in rice, maize, and
wheat would lead to a decline of more than 10%
in average caloric intake in China. However, this
is the average effect, and given the great eco-
nomic inequality seen in China today the impact
on the billion plus people in China who remain
poor would probably be much greater. It is diffi-
cult to estimate how many of these people might
actually starve. It is clear that this dramatic
decrease in food supply would cause profound
economic and social instability in the largest
country in the world, home to the world’s second
largest and most dynamic economy, and a large
nuclear arsenal of its own.
The data on Chinese grain production also raise
questions about possible implications for produc-
tion in other parts of the globe. Most of the
world’s wheat is grown in countries at latitudes
similar to China’s. Will there be similar impacts
on wheat production in North America, Russia,
the European Union? Will the decline in maize
production demonstrated now for both China and
the US also occur in other countries? There is an
urgent need to determine the impact that climate
disruption after limited nuclear war will have on
these critical food crops.
Combined with the 870 million people who are
currently malnourished, and the populations of
the food importing countries, the 1.3 billion
Chinese who are also at risk place the number of
people potentially threatened by famine at well
over two billion.
Two other issues need to be considered as well.
First, there is a very high likelihood that famine
on this scale would lead to major epidemics of
infectious diseases. The prolonged cooling and
resultant famine in 536-545 AD was accompa-
nied by a major outbreak of plague which devel-
oped over the next half century into a global pan-
demic.
31
The famine of 1816 triggered an epi-
demic of typhus in Ireland that spread to much of
Europe
32
and the famine conditions in India that
year led to an outbreak of cholera that has been
implicated in the first global cholera pandemic.
33
The well studied Great Bengal Famine of 1943
was associated with major local epidemics of
cholera, malaria, smallpox, and dysentery.
34
Keys, D. Catastrophe.London: Century. 1999.
31
Stommel, H. Volcano weather: The story of 1816, the year without a winter. Newport, Rhode Island: Seven Seas Press. 1983.
32
17NUCLEAR FAMINE: TWO BILLION PEOPLE AT RISK?
Stommel, H, Stommel, E. op. cit.
33
Sen. op. cit.
34
18 NUCLEAR FAMINE: TWO BILLION PEOPLE AT RISK?
UN PHOTO / JOHN ISAAC
A husband watches over his severely malnourished wife as
she lies in agony at a camp for drought victims in Makalle,
northern Ethiopia.
Despite the advances in medical technology of the
last half century, a global famine on the scale antic-
ipated would provide the ideal breeding ground for
epidemics involving any or all of these illnesses. In
particular, the vast megacities of the developing
world, crowded, and often lacking adequate sanita-
tion in the best of times, would almost certainly see
major outbreaks of infectious diseases; and ill-
nesses, like plague, which have not been preva-
lent in recent years might again become major
health threats.
Finally, we need to consider the immense potential
for war and civil conflict that would be created by
famine on this scale. Within nations where famine is
widespread, there would almost certainly be food
riots, and competition for limited food resources
might well exacerbate ethnic and regional animosi-
ties. Among nations, armed conflict would be a very
real possibility as states dependent on imports
attempted to maintain access to food supplies.
It is impossible to estimate the additional global
death toll from disease and further warfare that this
“limited regional” nuclear war might cause, but,
given the worldwide scope of the climate effects,
the dead from these causes might well number in
the hundreds of millions.
19
According to the World Food Programme, the number of under-
nourished people worldwide is just under 1 billion - equivalent to
the population of North America and Europe combined.
UN PHOTO / PETER MAGUBANE
NUCLEAR FAMINE: TWO BILLION PEOPLE AT RISK?
The newly generated data on the decline in agricultural pro-
duction that would follow a limited, regional nuclear war in
South Asia raise the concern that a global famine could result,
threatening more than two billion people. Epidemic disease
and further conflict spawned by such a famine would put addi-
tional hundreds of millions at risk. These findings support the
following recommendations:
Conclusions and recommendations
There is an urgent need for further study to con-
firm the declines in corn, rice and wheat predict-
ed by Ozdogan, Xia and their colleagues and to
examine the effect on key crops in other impor-
tant food producing countries.
1)
2)
3)
There is a need to explore in more detail the sub-
sequent effects that these shortfalls would have
on human nutrition including both the extent of
the decline in caloric intake that would result from
these crop losses and the extent of micronutrient
deficiencies that would, in turn, result from this
decline in caloric intake.
The need for further study notwithstanding, the
preliminary data in these studies raises a giant
red flag about the threat to humanity posed not
only by the nuclear arms race in South Asia but
also by the larger and more dangerous nuclear
arsenals possessed by the other nuclear
weapons states. These studies demonstrate the
need for additional research and underscore the
urgent need to move with all possible speed to
the negotiation of a global agreement to outlaw
and eliminate nuclear weapons and the danger
of nuclear war.
20 NUCLEAR FAMINE: TWO BILLION PEOPLE AT RISK?
About the author
Ira Helfand, a physician from Northampton, Massachusetts, has
been writing and speaking about the medical consequences of
nuclear war on behalf of IPPNW and its US affiliate, Physicians
for Social Responsibility, since the 1980s. For the past five years,
he has been working with climate scientists Alan Robock, O. B.
Toon, and others to help document the health and environmental
disaster that would ensue from a range of possible nuclear wars.
Questions, and comments can be directed to:
irahelfand@gmail.com
Founded in 1961, Physicians for Social
Responsibility(PSR), the US affiliate of
IPPNW, is a non-profit organization that is
the medical and public health voice for poli-
cies to prevent nuclear war and proliferation
and to slow, stop and reverse global warming
and toxic degradation of the environment.
1111 14th Street NW, Suite 700,
Washington, DC, 20005
Web: psr.org
International Physicians for the
Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW) is a
federation of national medical organizations
in 62 countries, representing doctors, med-
ical students, other health workers, and con-
cerned citizens who share the common goal
of creating a more peaceful and secure world
freed from the threat of nuclear annihilation.
IPPNW received the 1985 Nobel Peace Prize.
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Somerville, MA 02143
Web: ippnw.org
